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Preface 
 The image of the ‘Penitent Magdalene’ by Anthony van Dyck adorns the cover of 
this book.1 In this version, Mary Magdalene is depicted as a repentant sinner holding a 
skull in her hands.2 The skull as an attribute in the representation of saints was used as a 
"symbol of the transitory nature of life on earth" because it suggested "the useless vanity 
of earthly things".3 The image of the ‘Penitent Magdalene’ in contemplation over a skull 
in this very version by Anthony van Dyck is representative of this book’s subject – the 
return of cultural objects - for three reasons:  
In the first place, the skull held by Mary Magdalene is a reference to the case of 
human remains in public collections. Different from the skull held by the ‘Penitent 
Magdalene’, symbolizing transitoriness, human remains in public collections seem to 
                                                     
1 ‘Penitent Magdalene with a skull’, paper laid down on panel, 63,5 x 48,5 cm, Anthony van Dyck. 
Provenance: Großherzogliches Museum Oldenburg; sale Frederik Muller, Amsterdam, 25 June 1924 (I22); J. 
Goudstikker, Amsterdam (inventory number from the 1940 Goudstikker inventory: 1355); A. Miedl; 
Frederick Mont, New York, 1979; Mr and Mrs Bernard Solomon, Beverly Hills; sale Sotheby’s, New York,6 
June 1985 (82); private collection Germany (Rheinland); sale, Van Ham, Cologne, 11-13 April 2002 (1124); 
restituted to the heirs of Goudstikker N.V. 2002; with Alex Wengraf, London. Exhibited: Sammlung 
Goudstikker, Rotterdam-Amsterdam 1928-1929, Nr. 18; The Art Museum, Princeton University, New 
Jersey: Van Dyck as Religious Artist, April-Mai 1979, Nr. 8 (Katalog J.R. Martin und G. Feigenbaum). 
Literature: Smith, J., Catalogue Raisonné, Bd III, 1831, p. 109, no. 388; Bode, W. von, Die Grossherzogliche 
Gemäldegalerie zu Oldenburg, 1888, p. 75; Schaeffer, E., Van Dyck, des Meisters Gemälde, 1909, p. 44; 
Rosenbaum, H., Der junge van Dyck, 1928, p. 62; Glück, G., Van Dyck, 1931, p. 10; Larsen, E., Freren 
1988, Vol. II, p. 99, Cat.-No. 228. Korrespondenz: Frans Baudouin, Rubenianum Antwerpen, Dec. 2000; 
Julius Held, Old Bennington, Oct. 1991; Barnes, S.J., Van Dyck – A complete Catalogue of the Paintings, 
2004, pp. 58-59, I.41. The image has been taken from the RKD Database:  
http://www.rkd.nl/rkddb/dispatcher.aspx?action=search&database=ChoiceImages&search=priref=48318. 
2 "Maria Magdalena poenitens", "Magna Peccatrix", "Die Büsserin, die büssende Magdalena, die reuige 
Sünderin". See further: Réau, L., 1958, pp. 846-859. 
3 Ferguson, G., 1954, p. 69. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   25 12-10-2009   12:08:55
26  |  C O N T E S T E D  CU L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
symbolize the opposite or at least defy the normal course of nature. The expression 
'ashes to ashes'4 does not apply to curated human remains that have been collected for 
future exhibition and study. Secondly, on the grounds of the paintings provenance, the 
painting serves as a bridge to the case of Nazi looted art. As a painting that had 
belonged to the trading stock of the Dutch art gallery Goudstikker N.V. it fell in the 
hands of the German banker Alois Miedl and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.5 In 
2002, when the painting was offered for sale at a German auction house, it was 
identified by the Art Loss Register and restituted to the heirs of the Goudstikker N.V. 
Finally, the pose of Mary Magdalene of contemplation and reflection is representative of 
the overall aim of this book, i.e. to reflect upon current developments with regard to 
claims challenging public collections and the return of cultural property.  
My interest for the field of cultural property law was raised towards the end of my 
studies when I attended the course ‘Law and Art: The Free Movement of Cultural 
Property’ by Prof. Dr. Hildegard Schneider. The course was a perfect link between my 
two studies, the study of law and the study of cultural sciences with an emphasis on 
‘Arts and Heritage: Policy, Management and Education’. Inspired by the ‘Law and Art’ 
course, I chose to write my master thesis on the restitution of art works looted during 
the Second World War.6 Since then, my fascination for the subject has never left me. 
While it is difficult to put my interest into words I have come to find that the research 
into the looting of artworks during the era of WWII allows for unique insights in the 
history of World War II. According to critical theory, the Holocaust cannot be 
represented.7 The atrocities of the Holocaust, the mass-slaughter of the Jews are to 
some extent incomprehensible. While I do not wish to make a claim about whether the 
studying of the Nazi appropriation of cultural property may constitute a form of 
representing the Holocaust it certainly constitutes a "prism" that allows us to better 
grasp the horrors of the Nazi Regime. Studying the cultural policy and ideology of the 
Nazis, which included the looting of art works and cultural objects on a scale 
unmatched in history, allows for a more indirect approach of the Holocaust and thereby 
contributes to the level of understanding. It seems that the aesthetic value of art works 
looted by the Nazis provides us with a visible spectrum that allows us to absorb the 
horrors of the Holocaust.  
My interest into the subject of human remains in public collections stems from my 
personal reaction when I first learnt about claims seeking the return of human remains 
in the beginning of the millennium. Mummies and other dead bodies in museums have 
always intrigued me, and I believe it is fair to state that this fascination is shared by 
                                                     
4 The phrase is an adaption from Genesis 3:19. 
5 Cf.: Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., 1999, pp. 149-153. 
6 Lubina, K.R.M., 2002. The thesis was awarded with the award for the best master thesis of the year 
(Scriptieprijs) 2002 of the Maastricht University. 
7 See, e.g.: Lyotard, J.-F., 1988; Levy, D., et al., 2005, p. 135. See further on the problem of representing the 
Holocaust, e.g.: Friedlander, S., 1992; LaCapra, D., 1994. See also the film: Lanzmann, C., 1985 as an 
example of a work discussing and reflecting the Holocaust without representing it.  
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many, as may be deducted from the success of exhibitions like the travelling exhibition 
‘Mummy: the inside story”8, ‘Botje bij Botje – Menselijke resten in Musea’9, or Gunther 
von Hagens’ ‘Body Worlds’.10 It was only when the presence of human remains was 
actively challenged by claims seeking their return that I became fully aware of the fact 
that they were the remains of once sentient human beings and that their presence in 
public collections should not be taken for granted. While it might appear a trivial moral 
question how to treat dead bodies, it is an illuminating reflection of our self-conception 
and self-understanding.11  
Starting from these two fascinations, I decided to dedicate my PhD research to the 
description, analysis and evaluation of the developments I witnessed with regard to the 
challenging of Nazi looted art and human remains in public collections and to put them 
in the greater context of the return of cultural objects from public collections. The main 
research of this book was closed in June 2009. Sporadic adaptations have been made 
after that time.  
                                                     
8 See, e.g: http://www.hmns.org/exhibits/special_exhibits/mummy_the_inside_story.asp? (last visited: 1 
July 2009). See also: Ägyptische Mumien – Unsterblichkeit im Land der Pharaonen, October 2007 – 4 
March 2008, Landesmuseum Württemberg, Stuttgart; Mumien - Traum vom ewigen Leben, October 2007 – 
May 2008, Reiss-Engelhorn Museen, Mannheim. 
9 Kunsthal Rotterdam, (translated: “Bone by Bone – human remains in museums”), November 1998 – 
January 1999. 
10 http://www.bodyworlds.com/en.html (last visited: 1 July 2009). Cf.: Lohman, J., 2006b, p. 22. 
11 Cf.: Kass, L.R., 1985, p. 24. 
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Introduction 
§1. THE PRES ENCE  OF  THE  PAST  IN  PUBLIC  COLLECT IONS  AN D  RECENT  IM PULS ES  
CHALLENGIN G  PUBLIC  COLLECT IONS    
 At some point in time, probably about 35,000 years ago, human beings started to 
create pictures.12 Ever since, art works and cultural property more in general have 
fascinated humankind: the creative accomplishments of ancient cultures, such as the 
ancient Egyptians, Greek, and Maya continue to mesmerize present-day spectators and 
students; monarchs have used art works to confirm and strengthen their claim to power; 
and even the periods of iconoclasm did not impair the adoration and relevance of the 
visual arts in the long run. Hand in hand with this fascination for cultural objects goes 
an interest in their preservation. 
An interesting period for the preservation of cultural objects are the 18th and 19th 
Century in Western Europe: on the one hand, the period is marked by the establishment 
of the first public museums (e.g. the British Museum in London was opened to the 
public in 1759; the Teylers Museum in Haarlem was the first Dutch museum to open in 
1784, and the Musée Français, better known as the “Louvre” opened its doors in 
1793).13 On the other hand, the period is marked by Napoleon’s art looting campaigns 
(1792-1814), whose scale was unprecedented in history. Sadly, the art looting by 
Napoleon was dwarfed during the 20th century by Hitler’s looting campaigns and his 
                                                     
12 Some of the oldest traces of human creativity are the cave paintings dating back to prehistoric times. 
Among the earliest cave art are the paintings found at the “Apollo 11 caves” 
(http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/apol/hd_apol.htm) in Namibia. The images are estimated to date 
from  approximately 23,000-24,000 B.C. See for an introduction to the relevance of cultural objects for 
humankind’s understanding of the world and the far-reaching influence of art on society: British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2006. 
13 See for other examples: Pomian, K., 1998, pp. 66-67. 
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megalomaniac vision to establish a Führer-Museum in Linz as the world’s grandest art 
gallery. The establishment of the Führer-Museum was of such priority that it determined 
the organisational structure of Hitler’s executive forces. Estimates and figures of the 
looting may vary; they all confirm that the Nazi art deprivation by far exceeded the 
looting campaigns of Napoleon. An often quoted figure for the number of works of art 
spoliated from the occupied countries speaks of more than three million works of art, 
which corresponds to about “one-fifth of the world’s entire art”.14 Another aspect 
making the looting by the Nazis exceptional is the fact that the looting formed an 
explicit part of the policy of Hitler.15 Art was exploited to serve the bigger, political and 
ideological end of Hitler.16 Not only did the amassing of works of art seek to glorify the 
German people17, it was simultaneously used as an instrument to dehumanize non-
Aryan races, in particular the Jews.18  
In both cases, the looting of art works by Hitler and earlier by Napoleon was 
followed by immediate efforts to restore the objects to their countries of origin and to 
return them to their former owners. After the end of WWII, the Allies went to great 
lengths to provide for the return and restitution of looted art works and cultural objects. 
By 1952, more than 90% of the cultural objects that had been removed from the 
occupied territories had been returned to the state of origin19 and by the 1960s the 
subject of Nazi looted art and its restitution seemed completed. As for the returns of 
artworks after Napoleon’s defeat, they may differ from the post WWII restitutions in 
that a proper legal ban on looting emerged only at the turn of the 19th to the 20th 
Century. However, the peace treaties concluded at the beginning of the 19th century 
and the negotiations by the Congress of Vienna (September 1814 - June 1815) provided 
                                                     
14 (Chesnoff, R.Z., 2000, p. 38). Another source states that the Nazi loot “totalled more than 21,000 items 
of art, paintings, furniture, textiles and similar valuable antiquities”, suggesting a number less great 
(Marchisotto, 1974, p. 701). Another author speaks of an estimate of 220,000 stolen works of art from 
museums and private collections throughout Europe (Kempster, N., 1998). As for France, one source 
speaks of some 21,000 art objects that were gathered during the four years of the plundering under the 
Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) (Chamberlin, R., 1983, p. 161). Another source speaks about 
100.000 works of art that have been clearly identified as being stolen during the years 1941-1944 (Mattéoli 
Report I, p. 80 cited by Anglade, L., 1999, p. 301). The value of the stolen works has been set at $2.5 billion 
in 1945 which corresponds to $20.5 billion in 2000 (M.B., November 7 1998 & Bazyler, M., 2001, p. 161). 
The difference in estimates and figures can to some extent be explained both by different understandings of 
what constitutes a cultural object and whether a figure aims solely at straightforward thefts and 
confiscations or whether it covers also forced sales and other involuntary form of loss. See for further 
details and specification: Petropoulos, J., 2000, para. 369.  
15 Nicholas, L., H., 1997, p. 39.  
16 See in general: Petropoulos, J., 1996. 
17 Ibid., p. 308.  
18 Petropoulos, J., 1997, p. 111. Cf.: Nicholas, L., H., 1997, pp. 40-41. See in this respect below chp. 1.§.4 
where the misappropriation of cultural objects from German Jews is discussed. 
19 Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 149-150; Hipp, A., 2000, p. 56, fn. 40. 
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for the return of a great number of art works and give ample evidence of an emerging 
awareness of the need to protect cultural property against removal.20  
The moment the ban on the looting of cultural property during armed conflict 
started to emerge coincides with the heyday of the colonial empires of Great Britain, 
France, the Netherlands and other European countries. While Western European 
countries started to subject the looting of art works amongst each other to legal rules, a 
similar tendency for cultural objects found in the colonised territories was absent. As a 
consequence, a great number of cultural objects were removed from the colonised 
territories and were brought to the territory of the colonising state where many of the 
objects are still held in public collections as of today. It was not until after WWII and 
the period of decolonisation that the return of cultural property removed during the era 
of colonialism was put on the political agenda. During the 1970s, representatives of 
former colonies began to demand the return of cultural objects from Western public 
collections that had been removed from their territories prior to their independence.21 
While their efforts resulted in a number of UN resolutions appealing for the return of 
objects d’art, monuments, museum pieces, manuscripts and documents to their 
countries of origin,22 the case for the return of cultural objects removed during the 
colonial era soon lost momentum: resolutions became weaker and more indirect in their 
formulation of the claim for the restitution of cultural objects.23 But for a limited 
number of bilateral agreements on the return of objects from public collections to their 
territory of origin24, there are overall very few instances in which cultural objects taken 
during the colonial era have been returned to the now independent State of origin.25 In 
this respect it must not surprise that the most prominent case of cultural property 
removed from a country in a state of occupation, the case concerning the Elgin or 
Parthenon Marbles, has not yet been resolved. The marbles had been removed from the 
Parthenon in Athens by the Seventh Earl of Elgin in the beginning of the 19th century 
and were brought to London.26 At that time, Greece was part of the Ottoman Empire 
                                                     
20 See further on the emergence of a legal ban on looting and the obligation to return looted cultural 
property in chp. 1.§.1. 
21 Cf.: Siehr, K., 1993. A related development, which started from the 1970s /1980s is the civil rights 
movements and the struggle of indigenous peoples for self-determination. See further on intra-national 
claims for the return of cultural objects below in chp. 2.§2.II. 
22 Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation, G.A. Res. 3187, U.N. GAOR, 28th 
Sess., U.N.Doc.A/Res/3187(XXVIII) (1973); Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of 
Expropriation, G.A. Res. 3391, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N.Doc.A/Res/3391(XXX) (1975). See further 
on Resolution 3187: Schulze, D., 1983, pp. 13-14. See further on Resolution 3391: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1983, p. 
802. 
23 Cf.: Schulze, D., 1983, p. 14; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 183. 
24 E.g. during the 1970s, negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia resulted in the transfer of 
historical and archaeological objects in accordance with a specific program. Cf.: Pott, P.H. / Sutaarga, M.A., 
1979, p. 41. See for further examples and references below in chp. 1.§3.  
25 Cf.: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 155, para. 196.   
26 Cf.: Reppas II, M.J., 1999, p. 915; Merryman, J.H., 2000b, p. 24 with further references. 
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and Elgin was the British Ambassador.27 Elgin had received a formal written document 
that granted him permission to take away “any pieces of stone with inscriptions and 
figures from the temple building”.28 As to whether this provision covers the amount of 
objects taken is disputed in the literature.29 The collection was then vested in the 
Trustees of the British Museum in perpetuity and are presently held under the terms of 
the British Museum Act (1963). The British title to the Elgin Marbles and the British 
position with regard to the marbles is decisively challenged by the Greek Government 
that seeks the return of the marble objects to Greece as Greek cultural heritage. For the 
Greek, the marbles represent their identity, their culture and democratic philosophy.30 
During the last fifteen to twenty years, academics, curators, politicians, as well as the 
general public have noticed new impulses for the return of cultural objects. In particular 
two cases have led to a recalibration of the debate on how to deal with objects that have 
been acquired in the past: claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art and claims for the 
return of human remains.31 One of the first and without any doubt the most prominent 
case dealing with Nazi spoliated art within the Netherlands is the Goudstikker case, 
which dealt with some 200 paintings from the former trading stock of the art dealer 
Goudstikker. At the beginning of 1998 the heirs of Goudstikker requested the return of 
all objects that had been part of the trading stock of Goudstikker’s art gallery and which 
had been integrated into the Netherlands Art Property Collection (Nederlands 
Kunstbezit) after the war. In 2006, the paintings were returned to the heirs.32 Claims for 
the return of human remains proliferated after the passing of the ‘Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”) in the United States in 1990.33 
While this federal act is limited in scope of application to the territory of the United 
States, the fact that the US Congress had adopted legislation providing for legally 
enforceable procedures to recover human remains and cultural objects from federally 
funded museums nevertheless sparked the debate on the return of human remains on a 
global scale and inspired claims such as the request received in 2002 by the National 
Museum of Ethnology (Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde) in Leiden to return all Māori 
and Moriori34 remains from its collection to New Zealand.35 
                                                     
27 Cf.: Merryman, J.H., 2000b, p. 37. 
28 Cf.: Ibid., p. 38 who provides for a translation of the only surviving copy of the document. See also for 
further references. 
29 See, e.g.: Cook, B., 1984, pp. 38-39; Reppas II, M.J., 1999, p. 921; Merryman, J.H., 2000b, p. 39; Thorn, 
B., 2005, p. 14; Greenfield, J., 2007, p. 81. In total, Elgin had acquired approximately 247 feet (1ft = 0,305 
m) of the 524 feet long frieze, fifteen of the 92 metopes and seventeen pedimental figures. Merryman, J.H., 
2000b, p. 25. 
30 Speech by Melina Mercouri to the Oxford Union. Available online at:  
http://www.uk.digiserve.com/mentor/marbles/ (last visited: 29.01.2009). The case is further introduced in 
chp. 1§3.I 
31 Cf.: with regard to Nazi looted art: Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 1, 5 & 9.  
32 See for a detailed chronology and analysis of the case below in chp. 4.§1.I.3.b). 
33 The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 25 U.S.C.3001 - 13 (1994).  
34 Māori are the native Polynesian people of New Zealand. Moriori are the native inhabitants of the 
Chatham Islands of New Zealand. Cf.: Moriori (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved April 17, 
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The (re-) emergence of the debate on the return of Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains is particularly interesting in that the restitution after WWII seemed completed 
in the 1960s and was little discussed during the 1970s and 1980s. While the return of 
human remains as human remains has not yet been debated in the past, the present 
developments cannot be seen isolated from the more general issue of the return of 
cultural objects removed during the colonial era. After all, while human remains in 
public museum collections originate from all over the world, including domestic regions, 
the majority of claims focus on human remains that have been acquired in a colonial 
context.36  
§2. THE RESEARCH TASK  EM ERGING  FROM RECENT  DEVELOPMEN TS   
 In light of the developments sketched above, the overall aim of this study is 
three-fold: first, to take stock and analyse present law and practice with regard to the 
return of cultural objects from public collections through the lens of the cases of Nazi 
spoliated art and the holding of human remains. Secondly, to formulate 
recommendations for the future course of restitution in these two specific categories 
and for the protection and return of cultural property more in general. Finally, to reflect 
upon the relevance of the developments with regard to Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains for the protection and return of cultural property more in general. 
In focusing on the cases of Nazi spoliated art works on the one hand and human 
remains on the other hand, it could be argued that the results of the research will be 
difficult to generalize to other objects. Palmer, who examined the fate which befell 
works of art taken during the period 1933-194537, and chaired the United Kingdom 
Working Group on Human Remains38 noted a parallel between requests for the return 
of spoliated objects and human remains in the ways in which the objects are nowadays 
returned (or retained) by holding institutions and the modern initiatives that have been 
taken to assist claimants.39 According to Palmer, this parallel consists in a “closer 
similarity, in terms of the need for sensitivity and recognition and respect between these 
two areas than between any two others”.40 The finding that the cases of Nazi spoliated 
                                                                                                                                          
2009 from Encyclopædia Britannica Online; Maori (2009), In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved April 17, 
2009, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.  
35 See for an analysis of the case below in chp. 4.§2.I.2. 
36 Weeks, J. / Bott, V., 2003, pp. 28-30. 
37 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 109. 
38 As the chairman of the United Kingdom Working Group on Human Remains and member of the United 
Kingdom Spoliation Advisory Pane, Professor Palmer’s working experience, as well as academic interest, 
spans both categories. See: Ibid., p. 169; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 148. 
39 Lijkresten gevonden in depot Tropenmuseum, 2007. The human remains legislation that Palmer refers to 
is a clause in the Tasmanian Museums (Aboriginal Remains) Act 1984 that grants protection to museum 
professionals who deal with or transact in objects that are in the possession of the museum. He further 
points out that “at least two common law countries have legislated for relinquishment by museums”. 
40 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 169; Woodhead, C., C., 2002, pp. 324 & 346. 
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art and human remains are particularly sensitive does not mean, however, that the 
results will be irrelevant to other objects in public collections: as collection items, Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains, or rather claimants challenging their inclusion in the 
collections face the same obstacles that apply to other objects. Secondly, they raise 
critical questions as to how to deal with claims concerning objects acquired in the past 
in a manner that was not unlawful then but that would be unacceptable, if not unlawful, 
today. Consequently, taken together as a diptych, the analysis of the cases of Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains should generate valuable insights for the more general 
debate on the return of objects from public collections.  
I .  ME T H O DO L O G Y  &  D E L I M I T A T I O N 
 Unlike most other social sciences, law is still in the process of reflecting on and 
developing methodologies for legal research. Consequently, in elaborating on the 
methodology applied in the present study, it is not possible to start from a set of 
predefined methodologies but is necessary to depart from the concept of method as 
such. A method is in the first place nothing more or less than answering a question by 
means of obtaining data – information classified into usable conceptual units – and a 
means of ordering and measuring data.41  
Starting from the overall aim of this study, to take stock of and analyse recent 
developments with regard to the return of cultural objects from public collections, the 
present study will rely upon the followings methods /methodologies: first, following a 
rule-based approach, it will analyse the law de lege lata with regard to the protection and 
return of cultural objects. Beginning with the realm of international (public) law and 
European law, it will subsequently address a number of national jurisdictions. In 
analysing the law, it will focus on the rules that are specific to cultural objects rather 
than including law applicable to any chattel. This approach is sometimes referred to as 
the “cultural property or cultural heritage approach”.42 While property law and the law 
of torts are also relevant to cultural property in that cultural property is treated no 
differently than the often quoted example of a bicycle,43 they generally do not offer a 
legal ground for the return of (cultural) property several decades after the original owner 
has lost possession of the object concerned. In fact, the legal principles of good faith 
acquisition, extinctive and acquisitive prescription, limitation periods and laches often 
prevent the restitution of cultural objects.44 Another reason to exclude property law and 
tort law from the present analysis is that there already exists a significant body of 
literature on this aspect.45 For the same reason, the analysis also excludes the human 
                                                     
41 Roberts, G.K., 1972, p. 51; Örücü, A.E., 2006, p. 446. 
42 Cf.: Frigo, M., 2008, p. 438. 
43 Siehr, K., 1999, p. 3. 
44 See on the obstacles of recovery in private law below in chp. 2.§1.II.2.   
45 See, e.g.: Siehr, K., 1993; Bibas, S., 1996; Kaye, L., M., 1996a; Lerner, R., E., 1998; Palmer, N., 1998b; 
Redmond-Cooper, R., 1998; Blom, J., 2000; Müller-Katzenburg, A., 2000; Miller, D.L.C.M., David W. 
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rights approach, according to which the return of cultural objects would be addressed 
through the lens of human rights and in particular the rights of indigenous peoples.46  
In wishing to take stock of the evolution with regard to the return of cultural objects 
more in general, this analysis cannot be limited to the law de lege lata. In order to allow 
for a more substantial assessment, it is also necessary to take note of the initiatives and 
practices that have been introduced in the last two decades in addition to the traditional 
legal rules. Not only may some of the recently introduced instruments and practices 
acquire the status of legal rules over time or may in fact have already done so, the 
initiatives and practices introduced at the international and national level already 
influence and change the current climate and dynamics with regard to the return of 
cultural objects. This study will identify, describe and analyse the instruments introduced 
at the international level, ranging from principles and declarations to resolutions. In 
scrutinising these instruments, particular attention will be paid to the solutions proposed 
for current claims and how these instruments may be qualified from a legal perspective. 
This study will also describe and analyse laws and policies at the national level, in 
particular those adopted in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. While a 
broader country coverage would have been profitable in light of further generalisations, 
it would have been at the expense of preciseness and accurateness as demanded by the 
research subject. The choice of jurisdictions is the result of a number of factors: first, all 
three countries are so-called art market nations. Art market nations are characterized by 
a greater demand than supply in art and cultural objects.47 Next to their vivid art 
markets, the countries also share in the history of the museum as a uniquely Western 
institution.48 Secondly, all three countries have successfully established overseas empires 
during the 17th century outside Europe. This finding is relevant in that the majority of 
claims seeking for the return of human remains concern remains that have been 
acquired in a colonial context.49 Another historical binding factor between the countries 
is the Second World War in that all three countries officially opposed the Axis powers.50 
                                                                                                                                          
&Cowe, Anne L., 2001; Plehwe, T.v., 2001; Hartung, H., 2005, Chps. 5 & 6; Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 
111-157. 
46 See e.g.: Donders, Y.M., 2002; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006; Francioni, F., 2008; Francioni, F. / Scheinin, M., 
2008; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008.  
47 See, e.g.: Merryman, J.H., 1986, p. 832; Mark, L.F., 1990; Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 8. Other typical 
examples of art market countries are Switzerland and the United States. The complement to art market 
nation are source nations (or art-rich nations). Source nations are countries in which the supply of cultural 
objects exceeds the internal demand. There exists a general north-south divide between art market and 
source nations and the latter are often unable to protect their cultural objects against illegal exports to 
market nations. Cf.: Merryman, J.H., 1986, p. 832 
48 Cf.: Carrier, D., 2006, p. 10. See further below on the emergence of public museums in chp. 1§1.I.  
49 Weeks, J. / Bott, V., 2003, pp. 28-30. 
50 While Germany would have been an interesting jurisdiction to be included in the analysis several reasons 
argued against doing so and for leaving Germany as a follow up project. First, the exact same reason that 
makes Germany an interesting jurisdiction to analyse, i.e. its legal succession to the Third Reich and the 
internal dimension of the restoration of rights after WWII, makes the study of Germany significantly more 
complex than that of other countries. See, e.g.: Barron, S., 1991; Rudolph, S., 2007. In addition, when 
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However, different from its continental Allies, the Netherlands and France, 
neighbouring Germany, the UK has not been occupied during World War II. 
Consequently, there have not been any losses of works of art by UK citizens 
comparable to those by French or Dutch citizens, first and foremost Jews. However, 
due to the strength of its art market, the UK attracted a significant number of spoliated 
art works. Either forced sales were directly realised in the UK or spoliated art works 
entered the UK art market at some stage after the forced sale or spoliation.51 Next to 
these characteristics that allow for a certain level of comparability, the jurisdictions have 
also been chosen for their different approaches in protecting their national heritage. The 
Netherlands has adopted a very liberal approach towards the protection of cultural 
property in the sense of restrictions on the disposal and export of objects from public 
collections. The United Kingdom and France, on the other hand, adopted more far-
reaching approach in protecting objects in public collections.  
The analysis of the national jurisdictions is two-fold: on the one hand, the national 
regulation of (objects in) public collections will be scrutinised to identify potential 
obstacles to the return of cultural objects. Obstacles can exist in the form of rules 
limiting the de-accessioning of objects from the collections or in export regulations. On 
the other hand, and more importantly for the present study, the national solutions 
dealing with Nazi spoliated art and human remains will be scrutinised. Where no 
legislation or official policies have been adopted, the study will rely on case studies. Case 
studies are frequently relied upon in the museum sector and in the field of cultural 
property law.52 It is important to note that case studies are first and foremost studies of 
a singular case only: a “[c]ase study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a 
single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”.53 In 
                                                                                                                                          
analysing recent developments and practices within Germany with regard to return of cultural property one 
must take into account the debate on the so-called trophy art. ‘Trophy art’ refers to those cultural objects 
that were removed from Germany at the end of WWII by Soviet “trophy brigades” as war reparations. In 
total, the trophy brigades removed an estimated 2.6 million art objects and archaeological material 
(Mastroberardino, M.M., 1997, p. 322). While a number of objects have been returned by the Russian 
Federation, the majority of objects remain within the territory of the Russian Federation and have been 
legally declared Russian property. The trophy-art debate raises important questions about the legality of 
taking cultural property as restitution in kind but exceeds the scope of the present thesis. The exclusion of 
the subject of Trophy art does not mean that the present thesis does not touch upon it or is irrelevant to the 
debate. In particular chp. 1, mapping the evolution of public international law with regard to the protection 
and return of cultural objects, touches at certain points upon the subject of Trophy art. See further on the 
Russian Trophy art, e.g.: Fiedler, W., 1995; Depta, S., L., 1996; Burchardi, K., 2000; Elmer, T., G., 2000. 
Finally, the complexity of German jurisdiction is compounded by the fact that Germany is a federal state 
with the protection of cultural property falling under the competency of the Länder. The German Basic 
Law does not grant legislative competency to the Government of the German Federal Republic in such 
matters. In accordance with Art. 70 of the German Basic Law competency rests therefore with the sixteen 
states (Länder). 
51 See further below in chp. 4.§1.II.  
52 See, e.g.: Seligman, T.K., 1999; Timmer, P.M.Y. / Gubbels, G.J., 2007; 
http://www.culturalpropertyadvice.gov.uk/public_collections/case_studies (last visited 8 June 2009). 
53 Stake, R.E., 1995, p. xi.  
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addition to their importance in their own right, case studies may also contribute to the 
formulation of models of good practice by raising general problems and helping to 
extrapolate common patterns and principles with regard to the actors involved, the 
interests at stake, and the solutions found.  
I I .  ST R U C T U R E  O F  T H E  B O O K   
 Chapter 1 provides a legal and historical background to the current debate on the 
return of cultural objects from public collections by mapping the emergence of relevant 
rules of public international law. The aim of the chapter is to clarify (the emergence of) 
obligations to return cultural objects and to identify the status of objects in public 
collections in public international law. Five different constellations must be 
distinguished under public international law that may give rise to restitution obligations: 
the restitution of cultural objects removed in times of war, the restitution of illegally 
exported cultural objects, the restitution of cultural objects to their country / territory of 
origin, the restitution of cultural objects to their original owners and finally, the 
restitution of cultural objects to a people. The analysis will at the same time provide an 
introduction to the historical and political background of the colonial era, during which 
many human remains were collected, and the period of Nazi rule.54  
Chapter 2 deals with the origins of recent claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art 
works and human remains. The chapter begins with a description of the background 
and context in which the two cases have emerged during the last decades. In doing so, it 
seeks to explain why these discussions emerged only in the 1990s – some fifty years 
after the end of World War II and thirty years after post-war restitution efforts had 
come to an end and where an even greater time span with regard to active collection of 
human remains for public collections has passed. With regard to human remains, the 
chapter will also reflect upon the past and present reasons for and the contexts of the 
collection of human remains. After sketching the emergence of the debates, Chapter 2 
will situate the two cases in the greater legal- and para-legal framework affecting public 
collections: first, the relationship between the recent “waves of restitution claims” 
concerning Nazi spoliated art and human remains with the existing framework on 
restitution of cultural property under public international law as outlined in Chapter 1. 
Subsequently, the chapter continues by introducing and analyzing various declarations, 
principles and resolutions that have been adopted at the international level since the 
1990s with regard to Nazi looted art and human remains.  
Having explored the international legal and para-legal framework, the subsequent 
two chapters will zoom in on the national dimensions. Chapter 3 analyses Dutch, UK 
and French national laws that govern the position of cultural property in public 
collections. In the context of the present study, the main aspect to be addressed is the 
question whether legal obstacles preventing the return an object from a public collection 
                                                     
54 See with regard to the reactionary nature of rules of international law: Keane, D., 2004, p. 1. 
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exist. Such obstacles could lay in rules with regard to the de-accessioning of objects but 
also in the export regulation. Given the fact that all three jurisdictions addressed are 
Member States of the European Community, the analysis of the export regulation must 
also take into account European law. The analysis of the national laws governing public 
collections will also contribute for a better understanding and assessment of national 
reactions to claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains that will be 
analysed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 4 makes the transition from the analysis of the general legal regulation of 
public collections to the national reactions to claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art 
and human remains. In analysing countries’ reactions to the increase in claims for the 
return of Nazi looted art and human remains, this chapter seeks to provide insights 
about the following aspects: first, what are the policies implemented in these different 
countries? This is an important question as there is often confusion about the nature of 
the policy and its contents.55 The analysis will be fuelled by insights emerging from 
Chapters 1 & 2. Secondly, the analysis of national reactions to claims for the return of 
Nazi looted art and human remains in public collections will allow an assessment of 
whether one can speak of a (n emerging) state practice as an indication of (emerging) 
rules of customary law on the return of cultural property. While customary law with its 
two cumulative elements of opinio iuris and state practice is introduced in Chapter 1 as 
one of the sources of international legal rules, an analysis of the possible existence of a 
rule of customary international law by means of an inductive process starting from the 
current practice at the national level in returning Nazi spoliated art and human remains 
takes place in Chapter 4. The analysis of this chapter might, furthermore, be of 
assistance as a reference guide to the decision-making process in future claims and for 
policy makers and institutions affected by claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art and 
human remains.  
The final Chapter 5 first summarises the main findings before presenting 
recommendations that follow from the present research. The chapter will round off by 
discussing the relevance of the developments in the cases of Nazi spoliated art and 
human remains for the protection and return of cultural objects from museums in 
general: what can be learnt from the solutions developed in the context of the cases of 
Nazi spoliated art and human remains for the protection of cultural property more in 
general and for other disputes concerning cultural property? Have the cases of Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains opened the so-called “floodgates” feared by museum 
directors?56 According to the “flood-gate”, “slippery slope” or “domino” argument, the 
                                                     
55 See, e.g.: Kuitenbrouwer, F., 18 April 2002; Rijghard, R., 7 February 2006.  
56 In 2002, as a strategy of defence against repatriation claims, more than thirty of the world’s most 
renowned museums signed a declaration stressing their status as “universal” museums. The declaration is 
available online at:  
http://www.clemusart.com/ASSETS/37CD35CFA0F6454EAFE2C5EAA2714919/UniversalMuseums.pd
f (last visited 17.06.2009). See further on the declaration, e.g.: O'Neill, M., 2004. 
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return of an object from a collection will set an irreversible precedent “forcing museums 
all over the world to return their holdings”.57 
I I I .  TE R M I N OL O G Y 
 In the previous section a number of terms crucial for this study have been used as 
if they have an accepted meaning. In the following, we will elaborate on these terms and 
their use in the context of the present study.  
1.  ‘MU S E U M  &  PU B L I C  COL L E CT I O N’  
 In the course of this study the terms ‘museum’ and ‘public collections’ will be 
used as synonyms. The term museum is not legally protected.58 Where we speak of 
museums or public collections we understand, in line with the definition of public 
collections provided by Council Directive 93/7/EEC, that:  
 
“the property of a State, local or regional authority or an institution situated in the territory of a state and 
defined as public in accordance with the legislation of that state, such institution being the property of, or 
significantly financed by, that state or a local or regional authority”.59  
 
The definition clarifies that public collections are not limited to state museums but 
includes foundations, trusts, or companies that are indirectly controlled by the state and 
are subsidized by public money.60 The reason for focusing on public rather than private 
collections lies in the role of public collections to assemble, conserve and preserve the 
national cultural heritage for the benefit of the public.61 Objects in public collections 
may be owned by the State or lower public authority but in a larger sense the object 
                                                     
57 Joyce, R., http://www.uk.digiserve.com/mentor/marbles/ethics.htm; Shek, T., 2000, p. 280. Cf.: 
Simpson, M., 1997, p. 80; Specht, J., 2008, p. 449. The floodgate argument is borrowed from American 
courts that use the “opening of the floodgates of litigation” as reason not to allow a certain case to proceed 
for fear that it would trigger a new class of lawsuits and therewith overburden the courts. Cf.: Bazyler, M., 
2001, p. 5. 
58 Waidacher, F., 2000, p. 1. 
59 The definition is derived from Art. 1(1) of the Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the 
return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, OJ L 74/74 of 27.3.93 
Cf.: Art 3(7) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, which 
defines a public collection as consisting of a group of inventoried or otherwise identified cultural objects 
owned by: (a) a Contracting State; (b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting State; (c) a religious 
institution in a Contracting State; or (d) an institution that is established for an essentially cultural, 
educational or scientific purpose in a Contracting State and is recognised in that State as serving the public 
interest. The definitions of Council Directive 93/7/EEC and the UNIDROIT Convention both start from 
a Western European understanding, according to which museums are or were, for the most part, state 
institutions. However, by including foundations, trusts, or other institutions that are to some extent 
financed by public money, the definition is much broader than the mere inclusion of state museums. See 
further on the Directive and on the UNIDROIT Convention below in chp. 1.§2.III / VI.   
60 Siehr, K.G., 2005, p. 1086. See, e.g. below the Toorop Case in chp. 4.§1.I.3.c).   
61 Cf.: Wood, J.N., 2003, p. 106; Weiss, L.J., 2007, p. 837.  
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belongs to the general public.62 For public museum collections, claims challenging the 
presence of an object in their collection imply a process inimical to the entire purpose of 
museums.63 Furthermore, there exists a practical reason for focusing on public 
collections: due to their accessibility, which is a consequence of their public role, public 
collections are particularly prone to claims for the return of objects from their 
collection.64 For these reasons, this research brackets objects held in public collections 
on loan from private collectors.  
2.  ‘CU L T U RA L  PRO P E R T Y ’   
 There exists consensus in the literature that no universally valid definition of 
cultural property can be given.65 It is, however, possible to extract common elements 
from the use of the term “cultural property” in national, European and international 
norms as has been undertaken by Odendahl in her study on the multi-level system of 
the protection of cultural property.66 Based on the common elements extrapolated from 
international, European and national law she derived the following characterisation of 
cultural property:  
 
“[o]bjects qualifying as cultural property are corporeal objects, movable or immovable, either unique or 
consisting of collections / ensembles, which have been either created, changed or formed by human effort or which 
represent human cultural development, and which are accorded historical, artistic, scientific, architectural, archaeological or 
any other cultural value of different dimensions” (emphasis added).67  
 
The characterisation “created, changed or coined by human effort or which 
represent human cultural development” indicates that cultural property cannot exist 
without an anthropocentric element. In other words, the object must have a link with 
human kind. Furthermore, an object must also be “accorded historical, artistic, 
scientific, architectural, archaeological or any other cultural value of different 
dimensions”.68 According to Odendahl, the accordance of value to an object by a 
                                                     
62 Cf.: Meyer, K.E., 1977, p. 13.   
63 Cf.: Wilson, D.M., 1989, p. 23; Becker, A., 1994, p. 16; Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 239; 
Woodhead, C., C., 2002, p. 326; Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003, pp. 1 & 8; Delingpole, J., March 17 2006; Vrdoljak, 
A.P., 2006, p. 277. 
64 See for further differences between public museum collections and private collections: Pomian, K., 1998, 
pp. 67-68.  
65 Cf.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 82; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 6 with further references; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 
30; Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 44. 
66 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 386.  
67 Ibid., p. 387.  
68 The same approach has been adopted by UNESCO in its Recommendation for the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Property as adopted by the UNESCO’s General Conference on 28 November 1978. 
According to its first paragraph, “'movable cultural property' shall be taken to mean all movable objects 
which are the expression and testimony of human creation or of the evolution of nature and which are of 
archaeological, historical, artistic, scientific or technical value and interest (…)”.  
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society (rather than a single human being) constitutes the most important element in the 
definition of cultural property.69 Consequently, the crucial criterion as to whether or not 
an object qualifies as cultural property is not an inherent characteristic of the object as 
such but is externally imposed.70  
As an external subjective process, the accordance of cultural value to an object may 
be subject to change: an object can at one point in time be a simple tool and at a later 
stage qualify as cultural property of eminent value.71 Likewise, the cultural value 
accorded to an object can diminish over time. By referring to “culture value of different 
dimensions”, Odendahl clarifies that it is irrelevant for the qualification as cultural 
property whether an object is of value (only) for a certain group of the population, a 
people, a continent or humanity as a whole. Neither is it crucial for the qualification of 
an object as cultural property that it is of outstanding cultural relevance: cultural 
property may be of outstanding, special, extraordinary or any other cultural value.72 
Consequently, territorial and qualitative dimensions are irrelevant to the qualification of 
an object as cultural property. They become relevant when it comes to the question of 
whether an object falls under the scope of application of a specific legal norm.73  
The reflection on the constitutive elements of cultural property, as provided by 
Odendahl, helps to grasp the characteristics of cultural property but cannot (and does 
not attempt to) take away a certain degree of subjectivity and legal uncertainty.74 
However, in most cases the question of whether or not an object qualifies as cultural 
property does not constitute a problem.75 Whether this is also the case for human 
remains in public collections, as the remains of once sentient beings, requires some 
further reflection. For this reason, we will postpone this question until a later stage of 
the analysis (Chapter 2.§2.III.2). 
3.  ‘NA Z I  SP OL IA TE D  A R T ’   
 Nazi spoliated art refers to cultural objects, especially works of art, which were 
stolen, or which were otherwise taken from their owners, during the period of the Nazi 
                                                     
69 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388.  
70 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 48-51. Schönenberger discusses a number of elements, such as age, 
origin, uniqueness, authenticity, aesthetic or financial value and comes to the conclusion that none of these 
elements can serve as defining element singling out cultural property from other goods.  
71 Cf.: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 31 gives the example of an antique goblet.  
72 Cf.: Müller-Katzenburg, A., 1996, p. 140 This interpretation is also supported by the analysis of O’Keefe 
on the definition of cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. While its first Article seems to introduce a rather high standard by 
requiring an object to be of “great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”72, O’Keefe came to 
the conclusion “that the Convention applies to all movable (…) property considered by each respective 
state to form part of its national cultural heritage”. O'Keefe, P., 1999b, p. 36. 
73 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388.  
74 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 51. 
75 Cf.: Ibid., p. 47.  
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   41 12-10-2009   12:08:56
42  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
reign (1933-1945).76 In the present debate, the understanding of that which constitutes 
“spoliated” art is not limited to confiscations and plunder but includes also involuntary 
losses that are considered as being precipitated by the Nazi Regime. An example of a 
loss precipitated by the Nazi Regime is the sale of a work in exchange of an exit visa. At 
the end of World War II, a substantial number of these spoliated cultural objects were 
not reunited with their former owners or their heirs, some of which became part of 
public collections.  
4.  ‘HU M A N  R E M A I N S ’  
 As for the understanding of ‘human remains’, we rely on the definition as 
provided for by the United Kingdom Working Group on Human Remains. The 
Working Group was established in 2003 and thoroughly examined the legal status of 
human remains within the collections of publicly funded museums and galleries in the 
United Kingdom.77 Based on its research, the Working Group decided that ‘human 
remains’ should be understood as including all forms of human material in public 
collections and should be specifically taken as including:  
 
“all forms of human material, in particular osteological material (skeletons, but also individual bones and 
even fragments of bones and teeth); soft tissue such as organs, skin, hair, nails both preserved in spirit or 
wax and dried/ mummified); slide preparations of human tissue; as well as artefacts made wholly or largely 
from any of the above”.78  
 
5.  ‘RE S T I T U T I O N ’ ,  ‘RE S T O R A TIO N’ ,  ‘RE T U R N’ ,  ‘RE C O V E R Y ’ ,  ‘RE P A T RI A T ION ’  
 Legal instruments and academic writings discussing the return of cultural 
property show little coherence in the usage and application of terms such as 
“restitution”, “repatriation”, “restoration”, “recovery”, and “return”.79 Only restitution 
is a “term of art, either in international law or in national law”80. In public international 
law, restitution seeks to remedy the consequences of an internationally wrongful act. 
The commitment of an internationally wrongful act by one subject of international law 
against another brings about liability for reparations.81 The duty to provide reparation is 
a new and separate obligation arising from the breach of international law.82 Reparations 
are guided by the Latin maxim restitutio in integrum: the state “must, as far as possible, 
                                                     
76 Cf.: The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press: "spoliate, v." .  
77 The Working Group on Human Remains was established in the United Kingdom in May 2001. See: 
Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 1, para. 1 for the exact terms of reference. The Working 
Group and its findings are further discussed below in chp. 4.§2.II.1.   
78 Ibid., pp. 7-8, para. 19.  
79 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 802; Turner, S., 2002, p. 1, fn.1.  
80 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 835. 
81 Wolfrum, R., 1987, p. 352.  
82 Ibid. 
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wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.83 According 
to Art. 34 of the ILC Articles84, reparations can take the form of “restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction85, either singly or in combination (…)”.86 While 
restitution is only one form that reparations for the injury caused by an internationally 
wrongful act can take, it is the most adequate form of reparations where it concerns 
cultural property, which is characterised by its unique character.87  
With regard to municipal law, restitution is “the return or restoration of some 
specific thing to its rightful owner or status”.88 Consequently, under municipal law 
restitution seeks to protect property rights. Depending on whether a case is of intra-
state relevance only or touches upon more than one jurisdiction it will be solved 
according to the respective national private law or will rely upon the rules of private 
international law (“conflict of laws”) to determine the national legal order to determine 
questions concerning ownership. As a general rule, public international does not 
interfere with property rights as an internal affair of sovereign states. The protection of 
property in form of restitution is not a task of public international law. The latter’s role 
in protecting property has traditionally been limited to the protection of property in 
armed conflicts in the sense of protecting property against destruction, damage and 
removal (preventive protection).89 However, the separation between national law and 
public international law with regard to ownership structures is not waterproof. In 
reaction to the atrocities of the Nazis committed both in the occupied countries and 
within German territory the Allied Forces decided to disregard the distinction between 
external and internal restitution and to adopt measures under public international law 
also with regard to internal restitution.90 Consequently, the notion of restitution under 
public international law has come to include also to a limited extent the protection of 
property rights. 
Different from restitution the terms “repatriation”, “restoration”, “recovery”, and 
“return” do not have a technical legal meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
repatriation as “return or restoration to one's own country”.91 Consequently, while the 
terms are to some extent synonyms, repatriation emphasises the link with a country – 
                                                     
83 Crawford, J., 2002, pp. 47-48. Cf.: Wolfrum, R., 1987, p. 352. 
84 International Law Commission, 2001, p. 28.  
85 See further on satisfaction as a means of reparation: Shaw, M., N., 2003, p. 719-720, See: Brownlie, I., 
1983, pp. 441 & 443-444.  
86 Brownlie, I., 2003, p. 442 furthermore lists: “apology, the punishment of the individuals responsible, the 
prevention of a reoccurrence of the breach in the future, as well as any other form of satisfaction”.  
87 Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 211. 
88 Garner, B., A., 1999, “restitution”, sub. 3.  
89 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005.  
90 Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 26. 
91 The Oxford English Dictionary defines repatriation as “return or restoration to one's own country”. 
"Repatriation" The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 17 
May 2007, http://dictionary.oed.com. Available online at: http://dictionary.oed.com, last visited on 17 May 
2007. 
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patria. Compared with “restitution”, the terms “return”, “restoration” as well as 
“recovery” are more neutral: while they do convey a certain geographical and restorative 
direction, they do not imply any legal obligations. Of these three neutral terms, the term 
“return” is used most frequently. It has become a catch-all concept for those cases in 
which the displacement of a cultural property does not constitute a clear violation of a 
legal obligation.92 In the following chapters we will use the terms ‘return’ and 
‘restitutions’ interchangeably.93 Where a return / restitution is based on a legal claims 
right it shall be indicated.  
In anticipation of sketching the genesis of claims in Chapter 2 and the case studies in 
Chapter 4 we would like to state a few words on the terminology used in relation to 
human remains. Claimants seeking the return of human remains often claim for the 
“reburial” of the remains. In the dictionary term reburial is defined as "a second 
interment (of a corpse)".94 This understanding is too narrow in this context, as not all 
human remains in public collections have had a first burial.95 The Latin prefix re- must 
not only be understand as meaning 'again', or 'anew', but also in its original sense of 
‘back’ or ‘backwards’, that is back to the original place. Reburial must also be 
understood to include any cultural practices related to the deposing of the human body 
after death, such as burial, interment, cremation, and sky-burial. In this thesis, the terms 
'repatriation', and 'return' shall be used as synonyms. 'Reburial' shall be reserved for 
claims explicitly motivated by the wish to (re-)bury the remains. With regard to claims 
not stressing this aspect we will use the term return or one of its synonyms such as 
repatriation.  
6.  ‘DE-A C C E S S I O N I N G ’  
 De-accession refers to the procedure to remove an object from a public 
collection. The expression is mainly used in the United States96 but has been adopted by 
                                                     
92 Kowalski, W.W., 2004, p. 49. See for an analysis of the gradual restriction of the term “restitution”: Prott, 
L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, pp. 834-835. 
93 Other authors opted for the term ‘restitution’ as general term comprising different claim categories. See, 
e.g.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 43; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 182. 
94 Gerstenblith, P., 2001. See for a discussion of the term ‘repatriation’: Kowalski, W.W., 2001. Kowalski 
understands ‘repatriation’ as “a return to patria, which means fatherland understood as a State”, p. 163. 
95 Cf.: below the case study on the return of Saartjie Baartmans, better known as the 'Vénus hottentote' 
from the French National Museum of Natural History. Immediately after her death in 1815, Baartman’s 
corpse was taken to the laboratory of anatomy in the Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle. A plaster cast 
of her body was made, and after dissection of the body several organs and body parts were conserved in 
glass jars with alcohol. Baartman’s remains were kept in the museum collection until 2002. Hence her 
remains were never buried strictly speaking when her “re-burial” was discussed in the French Senate. 
96 The expression is mainly used in the United State as referring to the “removal of an entry from the 
accessions register of a museum, library, etc., usually in order to sell the item concerned”. "de-accession, v." 
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, 29 June 2009, . See, 
e.g: Calhoun, A., 1985; Park, G.S., 1985; Weil, S., 2000.  
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the museum sector outside of the US.97 For this reason, we will use the term as 
synonym for the disposal of objects from public collections, regardless of the actual 
reason for the removal (e.g. transfer, sale, intentional destruction). 
IV .  SU M M A R Y  O F  TH E  R E S E A R C H  A I M  A N D  S P E CI F I C  R E S E A R CH  Q U E S T I O N S   
 The overall aim of this book is three-fold: first, to take stock of and to analyse the 
present law and practice with regard to the return of cultural property from public 
(museum) collections through the lens of the cases of Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains. Secondly, to reflect upon the relevance of the developments with regard to 
Nazi spoliated art and human remains for the protection and return of cultural property 
more in general. The final aim of this study is to make recommendations for the specific 
cases of Nazi spoliated art and human remains, as well as the return of cultural objects 
more in general. In order to be able to give a substantiated view on this matter the 
following more specific research questions will be addressed in the course of this 
research:  
 
Chapter 1: 
What rights and obligations for the return of cultural property are recognized in 
public international law?  
What were the guiding principles in restituting cultural property after WWII? 
What is the status of (public) museum collections in public international law? 
 
Chapter 2:  
What are the developments underlying the recent emergence of the debates on 
the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains?  
To what extent is public international law relevant for current claims seeking 
the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains?  
Which instruments have been introduced in reaction to the rise in claims and 
what is their legal status and relevance?  
To what extent do the solutions proposed at the international level with regard 
to Nazi spoliated art take account of the restoration of rights as affected 
during the post-WWII period?  
 
Chapter 3: 
What are the applicable national regimes with regard to cultural property in 
public museum collections? 
What obstacles to or prohibitions on returns can be identified?  
 
                                                     
97 See, e.g.: Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, 
Cultural Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 166; Palmer, N., 2001; Instituut Collectie Nederland, 
2006 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   45 12-10-2009   12:08:56
46  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Chapter 4:  
What laws and policies were introduced at the national level in reaction to 
claims seeking the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains? How 
do they relate to the solutions proposed at the international level? 
Specifically for Nazi spoliated art, what is the relevance accorded in present 
solutions to compensation payments possibly received in the past?  
Specifically for human remains, what is the relevance accorded to the fact that 
they are the remains of once sentient human beings? Put differently, can 
one denote a greater urgency to return human remains compared to other 
cultural objects? 
Do national practices allow for the suggestion of (an emerging) rule of 
customary international law in constituting settled state practice?  
 
Chapter 5:  
What are the main findings with regard to the cases of Nazi spoliated art and 
human remains?  
Which recommendations can be made? 
For the specific cases of Nazi spoliated art and human remains? 
For the development of the law more in general? 
What is the relevance of the developments with regard to Nazi looted art and 
human remains to other claims seeking the return of cultural objects?  
V .  RE A D I N G  IN S TR U C T I ON S   
 This PhD thesis follows the bad habit of doctoral dissertations of exceeding the 
number of recommended pages.98 As pointed out by van der Veen, and earlier by 
Michiels,99 this is not a catastrophe but the author “will have to accept the economic 
usage of the book” in the sense that not all readers will read the book integrally but will 
pick those aspects that they find most interesting. According to the above cited authors, 
such economic use of the thesis can be facilitated by the provision of reading 
instructions as well as an index. 
In line with this advice, the following reading instructions may be suggested: law 
students and others interested in the historical evolution of cultural property law and the 
existing legal framework as offering enforceable rights may be particularly interested in 
Chapter 1. Furthermore, the extended bibliography may refer them to other interesting 
publications in the field of cultural property law. Academics, lawyers, claimants, or 
museum workers who are interested in the particular case of Nazi spoliated art are 
advised to focus on § 1 in Chapters 2 and 4. Those interested in the case of human 
remains are advised to focus on § 2 of those chapters. Curators and others interested in 
                                                     
98 Cf.: Polak, J.M., 1992, p. 1176; Kortmann, C.A.J.M., 1996, p. 345. “Angst voor een “dun” proefschrift” as 
referred to by Nieskens-Isphording, 1996, p. 150 did not play a role.  
99 Michiels, F.C.M.A., 1994, p. 227; Veen, G.A.v.d., 1997, p. 14. 
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de-accessioning of cultural property from public collections more in general may find 
Chapter 3 most interesting. The final Chapter 5 will be relevant to all readers in that it 
summarizes the main findings of the research, presents recommendations, as well as 
beginning ideas for future research steps. As a final “reading instruction” we use ‘he’ to 
include ‘she’ whenever gender is unknown or irrelevant.  
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C H A P T E R  1   
Analysis of International Law with regard to the Rise of 
Obligations to Return Cultural Objects  
 In this chapter we will analyse public international law in view of the emergence 
of rules on the protection of cultural property. International rules on the protection of 
cultural property can be roughly divided into two categories: rules dealing with the 
preventive protection of cultural property on the one hand and norms providing for the 
restitution (or return) on the other hand. The preventive protection of cultural property 
against damage or destruction (preservation) is considered as the primary aim of cultural 
property law.100 It corresponds to the uniqueness and irreplaceability of cultural 
property.101 The protection of an object of cultural relevance against removal, such as 
looting in times of war as well as theft and (illegal) exports in times of peace, can be seen 
as subsidiary means to support the objects’ preservation. This view also exists for the 
return of cultural property that has been removed despite any preventive measure of 
protection. While the return of a cultural object does not necessarily contribute to its 
preservation, it is more and more recognised as another facet of the protection of 
cultural property and is sometimes referred to as restorative (protection).102  
It is the category dealing with the return of cultural objects that lies at the heart of 
the present analysis. The focus on the return of cultural objects to a certain state, people 
or private individual does not mean that rules on the preventive protection of cultural 
property will be excluded. In fact, given the interdependence of the two sets of 
categories, an analysis of the applicable rules with regard to the return of cultural objects 
presupposes the analysis of rules of preventive protective character.103 Furthermore, the 
analysis of rules dealing with the preventive protection of cultural property will also 
                                                     
100 Fechner, F.G., 1998, p. 382. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 162. 
103 Cf.: Ibid. 
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allow us to identify specific protection granted under public international law to public 
collections as institutions in the service of society, established for and dedicated to the 
conservation and exhibition of (cultural) objects.104  
In short, the aim of this chapter is to situate public collections in the context of 
public international law with special attention paid to potential obligations arising from 
public international law return cultural objects while also taking into account the specific 
status granted to public collections originating from the same source.  
The two main sources of public international law are treaty law and customary law.105 
In the last three decades treaty law has replaced customary law as primary source of 
international law.106 For this reason, as well as the relevance of treaty law in establishing 
the existence of an opinio iuris, we will first concentrate on obligations created in treaty 
law before addressing the existence of obligations of customary law.107  
The structure of this chapter follows the chronology of the development of rules on 
the protection of cultural property in international law. Starting with the protection of 
cultural property in times of war (§ 1), the analysis will then turn to the protection of 
cultural property in time of peace. The latter consists of rules for the protection of 
cultural property against illicit trafficking, especially illegal exports (§ 2). Furthermore, 
the question of the legal status of (cultural) objects removed during the colonial era also 
belongs to this category (§ 3). Although it seems odd from the present perspective to 
discuss the removal of (cultural) objects during the colonial era in the context of 
peacetime, the colonial activities do not fall under armed conflict in the legal sense.108 
After having discussed the more classical fields of cultural property protection in public 
international law as constellations between states, the analysis will discuss the relevance 
of public international law with regard to the restitution of cultural objects to private 
individuals (§4) or a people (§ 5). Historically, only states qualified as subjects of 
international law as is captured in the German designation of public international law as 
“Völkerrecht” – the law applicable between states.109 It was only during the 20th century 
that a growing body of international law was devoted to defining the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals. The broadening of the scope of public international law 
from its focus on states to including individuals has been characterised as the most 
                                                     
104 Cf.: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=35032&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 26 January 2009).  
Cf.: Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 239 where it is suggested that the return of cultural property 
is "inherently undesirable" because it implies a process inimical to the entire purpose of museums. Cf.: 
Becker, A., 1994, p. 16. 
105 Cf.: Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
106 Dixon, M., 2007, p. 30. 
107 See further below chp. 1§1.VIII where we discuss the existence of customary law with regard to the 
restitution of cultural objects for an introduction to the two elements a rule must fulfill in order to qualify as 
customary law – opinio iuris and state practice.  
108 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 181. 
109 This is equally true for the Scandinavian and Slavonic language area. 
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important change in public international law over the past century.110 This shift in the 
focus of public international law occurred inter alia in response to the Holocaust.111 Since 
the first “codification” of this development in the form of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the rights of individuals under international law have 
been the subject of various human rights instruments and agreements considerations.  
After an intermediary conclusion of the analysis of the existing legal framework 
under public international law with regard to the protection of cultural objects, 
especially with regard to the obligation to return them (§ 6), the chapter will round off 
with a reflection on the special status granted to public collections.  
§1. THE PROTECT ION  OF  CULTURAL  OBJECTS  IN  T IMES  OF  WAR 112  
I .  FR O M  ANCIENT  T IM ES  UN T IL  THE  EN D OF  THE  19TH CENTURY 
 Accounts of looting of objects of cultural relevance date back to Ancient Times. 
Amongst the Ancient Greeks and Romans, looting was not considered illegal.113 On the 
contrary, the ius praedae, the right of the victorious party to loot, was often the reason to 
wage war in the first place.114 Consequently, the looting of cultural objects was a well-
established practice115 and early accounts on the return of looted objects are sporadic.116 
Where an object was returned at all, it was only in exchange for another object.117  
In fact, it is not until the adoption of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that the 
literature notes the first signs of an emerging ban on the looting of cultural property. 
However, to interpret this early-modern peace treaty as providing for the restitution of 
cultural property disregards political reality.118 While it is true that the Treaty of 
                                                     
110 Less, S., 2008. 
111 See for a concise summary of other relevant influences and schools of thoughts: Partsch, K.J., 1987. 
112 The analysis is structured according to chronology, thereby integrating multilateral treaties and peace 
treaties rather than discussing them separately from one another. This approach allows for the best 
overview of the historical development of the ban on looting and the obligation to restitute cultural 
property, while highlighting the reactionary nature of the international rules. Cf.: Keane, D., 2004, p. 1. 
113 See, e.g.: Xenophon, Cyropaedia (VII, 5, 73): UNESCO, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf; Hedrick, L., 2006.  
It was only with regard to sacred objects that some authors, such as the historian Polybius in 146 BC, 
pleaded for restrictions of the right to pillage. See, e.g.: Nahlik, S.E., 1976, p. 1069; Krause, K.-J., 1986; 
Hammer, F., 1995, p. 9; Toman, J., 1996, p. 4; Merryman, J.H., 2005, p. 13 with further references to 
antique scholars.  
114 Kowalski, W.W., 1996a, p. 1. 
115 Ibid., pp. 1-2; Toman, J., 1996, pp. 3-4. See for examples of looting and looted objects e.g.: Engstler, L., 
1964, pp. 80-83; Fuhrmann, M., 1995, IV, 58, 94, 98, 33, 39. 
116 Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 80-83. Engstler discusses a number of returns of cultural objects but stresses that 
the return of cultural objects was the exception rather than the rule in antique times. 
117 Rudolf, W., 1989, p. 856; Jote, K., 1994, pp. 263-264; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 114; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 
14.  
118 The Treaty of Westphalia actually consists of two treaties, the Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (Treaty of 
Osnabrück) and the Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis (Treaty of Münster). The Treaties ended the series of 
wars fought by various nations during the first half of the 17th century that went down in history as 
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Westphalia provides for the “restoration of records, writings, documents, and other 
movables” that have been removed from places such as towns and castles119 it is 
anachronistic to understand the Treaty of Westphalia as providing for the restitution of 
cultural property as such: while several international conventions yet to be adopted 
throughout the 20th century explicitly refer in their definition of cultural property to 
“manuscripts, incunabula, books, documents, publications and archives”120, this does 
not make the Treaty of Westphalia the first instrument of international law to provide 
for the restitution of cultural property as such as it is often stated.121 In particular such 
an interpretation disregards the fact that “records, writings, documents” are of direct 
relevance for a state’s administration, which is the reason for these type of documents to 
be included in the Treaty of Westphalia.122  
In the developments towards the emergence of a ban on the destruction and looting 
of cultural objects and obligations to restitute objects removed in spite of such a ban the 
18th century played an important role. During the 18th century new notions about the 
role of states and the ius in bello emerged. Different from the practice during the 17th 
                                                                                                                                          
the Thirty Years’ War (1618- 1648) and the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648). The Treaty of Osnabrück 
regulates the matters of dispute between the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II and Sweden; the Treaty of 
Münster regulates the relationship between the Holy Emperor and France. See further on the qualification 
of the Treaty of Westphalia as early-modern peace treaty: Lesaffer, R.C. / Broers, E.-J., 2007, p. 2, 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1002389. 
119 § 108 of the Treaty of Münster reads in an anonymous English translation: “That the Records, Writings 
and Documents, and other Movables, be also restor’d; as likewise the Cannon found at the taking of the 
Places, and which are still in being. But they shall be allow’d to carry off with them, and cause to be carry’d 
off, such as have been brought thither from other parts after the taking of the Places, or have been taken in 
Battles, with all the Carriages of War, an what belongs thereunto (…)”. Die Westfälischen Friedensverträge 
vom 24. Oktober 1648. Texte und Übersetzungen. Anonymous English Translation from 1710 (available 
online at: http://www.pax-westphalica.de/ipmipo/pdf/m_1710en-treatys.pdf Last visited 14 May 2008), 
2004. Art. XVI, 15 of the Treaty of Osnabrück is identical in wording. The finding that the provisions of 
the treaty did not provide for the return of cultural property as such is also true for the Treaty of Olivia 
(1666), the Treaty of Nijmegen (1678–79), and the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697). However, similar to the Treaty 
of Westphalia, they provide for the return of archives, libraries and other documents of importance. See 
further on the treaties and their provisions to return archival material and books: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 88-
89; Kowalski, W.W., 1996b. See more in general: Meyer-Landrut, J., 1953.  
120 Cf.: the definitions of cultural property as provided for by the 1954 Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. The 1954 Hague Convention is discussed in 
chp. 1.§1.VI.1. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are discussed in 
chp. 1.§2.III /IV.  
121 See, e.g.: Schulze, D., 1983, p. 31; Jote, K., 1994, p. 264; Maurer, C.H.M., 1997, p. 9; Odendahl, K., 2005, 
p. 14. 
122 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 121; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992; Schorlemer, S.v., 1996; Schorlemer, S.v., 1998, p. 
318; Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 153-154 & 185. See for a clear separation between the restitution of archival 
material and the emergence of a principle providing for the restitution of cultural property: Jenschke, C., 
2005, p. 117 ; Nahlik, S.E., 1958, p. 133 (quoted by Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 8). Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 
93 where he discusses the requests of pope Pius VII in 1814 for the restoration of historical archives rather 
than the restitution of looted art works.  
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century, there exists little evidence of looting during the 18th century.123 Rather, a general 
shift in the perception concerning the ius in bello and the ius ad bellum can be noted. In 
particular the works by Jean Jacques Rousseau and Emer de Vattel reveal a revised 
notion of war: as a result of changing perceptions of the “State” and greater attention 
for human rights, war came to be regarded as a relationship between states only.124 
Consequently, warfare started to distinguish between the civilian population and the 
army.125 As a result of the greater respect for the lives of the civil population, there was 
also an increase in the protection of private property. Whereas the legality to loot state-
owned property, in particular material of military relevance, was confirmed126, the 
looting of private property and property of non-military relevance, such as cultural 
property, became subject to growing criticism. However, before these developments 
would result in a proper legal ban on the looting of cultural property they were 
challenged by Napoleon’s massive looting campaigns in the period 1792-1815.  
Roughly at the same time, towards the end of the age of Enlightenment the first 
public collections were established. After princes and noblemen had started collecting 
rare and exotic objects for their cabinets of curiosities during the Renaissance (14th-16th 
centuries) it was during the Enlightenment that the collections were made available to 
the public.127 The first public museum to be opened to the public in 1759 was the 
British Museum in London.128 The first museum to open in the Netherlands was the 
Teylers Museum in Haarlem in 1784, when the private collection of Pieter Teyler van 
der Hulst was made accessible to the public.129 The Musée Français, better known under 
its current designation the “Louvre” opened its ports to the public in 1793; only one 
year after the start of Napoleon’s looting campaigns.130  
The practice of art looting under Napoleon was unmatched in history.131 The French 
troops were accompanied by art historians that picked the most valuable cultural objects 
to be transferred to the Louvre.132 Despite the extent of Napoleon’s looting the 
                                                     
123 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 91. Engstler reports that during the Seven Years’ War the belligerent parties 
refrained from taking any paintings from the picture galleries in Berlin and Dresden despite various chances 
of doing so. See also: McGuire, T., 1990, p. 35. 
124 Rousseau, J.-J., 1762, Book 1, chp. IV (“La guerre n’est donc une relation d’homme à homme, mais une 
relation d’État à Etat”) ; Vattel, 1758, Book 3, chp. 9, para. 168. Cf.: e.g.: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 21-22.  
125 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 89. 
126 Vattel, 1758, Book 3, chp. 8, para. 138. 
127 Cf.: Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003, p. 19. 
128 The nucleus of its collection was the formerly private collection of Sir Hans Sloane. After Sloane's death 
his trustees sold his collection to the Crown. Pancaldi, G., 2003, p. 550.  
129 Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003. 
130 See further: McClellan, A., 1994. 
131 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 19. See for historical accounts on the looting: Vogt, H., 1956; Engstler, L., 1964, 
pp. 91-92; Wescher, P., 1976; Chamberlin, R., 1983; Toman, J., 1996, p. 6; Gould, C., 2007; Quynn, D.M., 
2007.  
132 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 19; Gould, C., 2007, p. 4-6. One example that must be mentioned here is the 
mosasaurus that had been discovered in 1770 in Maastricht and that had been taken by Napoleon’s troops 
to Paris in 1794 where it since belongs as national treasure to the collection of the Museum of Natural 
History. From 8 March - 21 2009 June the mosasaurus could be admired in the exhibition ‘Darwin, Cuvier 
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literature also denotes signs of an emerging awareness on the illegality of the removal of 
cultural objects. In a number of peace treaties the transfer of cultural objects has been 
explicitly addressed.133 This practice, which was unprecedented in history, is interpreted 
in the literature as indirect recognition of a(n emerging) ban on the looting of cultural 
objects.134  
Equally important with regard to the emergence of a ban on looting and the 
obligation to restitute looted objects is the change in attitude of the Allies after they had 
defeated the French troops in the Battle of Paris. During the first round of negotiations 
at the Congress of Vienna (September 1814 - June 1815) the return of cultural objects 
was not an interest shared by the Allies.135 The primary aim of all Allies was the stable 
reorganisation of the distorted map of Europe and the prevention of future wars.136 In 
fact, the British firmly rejected the recovery of cultural objects in order not to risk the 
restoration of peace in Europe.137 Prussia, however, attached great value to the 
“restitution of the nations’ looted art treasures to the nations”. Its negotiations with 
France resulted in the return of one third of the cultural objects looted from Prussia.138 
The return was based upon a French proposal according to which only those cultural 
objects were to be returned that had not been placed in a museum by the time the Peace 
Treaty of Paris was concluded on 30 May 1814.139  
It was only after the return of Napoleon from Elba and the Battle of Waterloo of 18 
June 1815 that the attitude of the Allies, in particular of the British, changed towards 
                                                                                                                                          
et le Grand Animal de Maestricht’ on the basis of a loan to the Natural History Museum Maastricht. See 
further: http://www.nhmmaastricht.nl/nederlands/exposities/darwin/index.html (last visited: 21 March 
2009). See for information on further ethnographic objects that had been taken by Napoleon’s army: 
Campen, J.v., 2000, pp. 282-286.  
133 See e.g.: Peace Treaty of Tolentino between the Holy See and the French Republic, Tolentino, 18th 
February, 1797, Art. 8. See further: Vogt, H., 1956, p. 141; Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 109-110; Kowalski, W.W., 
1996b; Poulos, A., Helleni, 2000, p. 12. 
134 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 19.  
135 See for an historical account on the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna: Zamoyski, A., 2007.  
136 Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 95 & 97. This does not mean that no agreement was reached during the first 
round of negotiations. According to a report dating from March 1815, one third of the cultural objects 
looted from Prussia had been returned in response to the agreement that came to be known as (part of the) 
“Vienna Acte Final of 9 June 1815” (Acte du Congrès à Vienne du 9 juin 1815, in: Israel, F.L., et al., 1967, 
p. 519). However, most of the returns were based upon a French proposal according to which only those 
cultural objects were to be returned that had not been placed in a museum by the time the Peace Treaty of 
Paris was concluded on 30 May 1814 (Engstler, L., 1964, p. 96). Further negotiations resulted in the 
restitution of a number of specifically designated objects (e.g. three works by Voltaire with handwritten 
comments of the author himself, which had been taken from Berlin and other “works of art”. See further: 
Engstler, L., 1964, p. 97 and Müntz, 1895, p. 707 & 714. Also, the German Princes negotiated for the return 
of some cultural objects).  
137 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 95 and according to the latter: Webster, C., 1947-1950, p. 189. 
138 See: Acte du Congrès à Vienne du 9 juin 1815, in: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 100; Israel, F.L., et al., 1967, p. 
519. 
139 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 96. Further negotiations resulted in the restitution of a number of specifically 
designated objects (E.g. three works by Voltaire with handwritten comments of the author himself, which 
had been taken from Berlin and other “works of art”. See further: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 97 and Müntz, 
1895, p. 707 & 714. Also, the German Princes negotiated for the return of some cultural objects).  
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attaching significance to the return of cultural objects and that there was greater 
emphasis put on the (territorial) link between a cultural object and its country of origin. 
Subsequent to the Allied victory of the Battle of Waterloo, the question of how to 
proceed with cultural objects looted by France was discussed by the Allies during their 
Ministerial Conference which took place in Paris between 12 July 1815 and 21 
September 1815.140 At first, there was great variance in the attitude of the Allies: whereas 
Prussia confirmed its interest to have all objects restituted141, Russia opposed the idea of 
restitution and stressed the overriding interest in restoring peace within Europe.142 In 
the end, the attitude of the British proved decisive.  
Despite the rejection of the recovery of cultural objects only a couple of months 
earlier, the British representatives Castlereagh and Hamilton had in the meantime 
adopted the view that the looted cultural objects should not be left in France. A letter of 
Prime Minister Liverpool to Castlereagh clearly expressed the need to remove the looted 
cultural objects from France.143 At this point, however, removal from France did not 
necessarily mean that the objects were to be returned to the countries from where they 
had been looted (status quo ante). Rather, the letter clearly mentions the redistribution of 
looted works amongst the Allies (including Britain) as an option.144 The final British 
position according to which cultural objects were to be restituted to the country from 
where they had been looted was formulated by Castlereagh in his response to Prime 
Minister Liverpool’s letter. Castlereagh wrote that “only the principle of restitution 
could reconcile politics with justice”.145 On 11 September 1815, the British delegation 
communicated its revised point of view to the Allied parties. The note, which has been 
qualified as a key element in the negotiations, constitutes the first explicit recognition of 
the existence of link between cultural objects and the country where they have been 
removed from:  
 
                                                     
140 The delegations of England (Wellington and Castlereagh), Austria (Metternich and v. Schwarzenberg, 
later on Wesenberg), Prussia (von Hardenberg and Wilhelm von Humboldt), Russia (Count Rasumoffski 
and Count Nesselrode) met in 53 sessions. Smaller nations, e.g. The Netherlands, were represented by one 
of these delegations. Engstler, L., 1964, p. 105. 
141 Ibid., p. 100. 
142 Ibid., p. 105; Sandholtz, W., 2008, p. 113.  
143 Letter of Prime Minister Liverpool to Castlereagh: “The reasonable part of the world are for general 
restoration to the original possessors, but they say with truth that we have a better title to such objects; and 
they blame the policy of leaving the trophies of the French victories in Paris (…). It is most desirable, in 
point of policy, to remove them if possible from France, as whilst in that country they must necessarily have 
the effect of keeping up the remembrance of their former conquests and of cherishing the military spirit and 
vanity of the nation”. Vane, C., 1852, p. 435 quoted by: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 105-106. See also: Harold 
Nicholson, 1946, p. 99 quoted by Hollander, B., 1959, p. 24.  
144 The distribution of cultural objects amongst the Allies rather than restitution to the countries of origin 
was also discussed by the representative of the Pope, Canova and the British representatives 
Wellington and Hamilton in September 1815. See further: Vogt, H., 1956, p. 132; Engstler, L., 1964, p. 
107. 
145 Vogt, H., 1956, p. 132.  
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“(…) upon what principle deprive France of her late territorial acquisitions, and preserve to her the 
spoliations appertaining to those territories, which all modern conquerors have invariably respected, as 
inseparable from the country to which they belonged?”146 
 
Consequently, the Allies no longer accepted the French argument of the integrity of 
French Public institution, museums and libraries147 but instead engaged in the recovery 
of cultural objects. By the end of 1815, an essential part of the cultural objects removed 
during the Napoleonic Raids had been returned to their countries of origin. This was 
even true for cultural objects whose removal had been sanctioned by documenting and 
legalising their transfer in (peace) treaties. The return of cultural objects was, however, 
not complete: excluded were cultural objects held in public collections other than the 
Louvre.148 Therefore, the French emphasis of the integrity of its public collections was 
to some extent recognised, despite their recent establishment only and the foreign origin 
of part of the objects. Also excluded were objects held in public collections which, after 
the rearrangement of the map of Europe, no longer fell on French territory.149 
Consequently, whereas the beginning of the 19th century saw the rise of the notion of a 
territorial link between cultural objects and their countries of origin, the notion did not 
yet translate into a full principle. For the confirmation of such a principle we need to 
jump to the beginning of the 20th century when the ius in bello became the subject of 
multilateral negotiations unrelated to any specific armed conflict.  
I I .  THE 1899 AND 1907 HAGUE  CONVENTIONS 
 In 1899, following the initiative of Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, the First Hague 
Peace Conference was convened with the object of seeking the most effective means of 
ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, above all, of limiting 
the progressive development of existing armaments.150 The initiative of the Tsar was 
inspired by the US American Lieber Code of 1863 and the Brussels Declaration of 
1874.151 The non-binding Brussels Declaration was the result of the initiative of Tzar 
                                                     
146 Note to the Allied Ministers and placed upon their Protocol, Paris, 11 September, 1815. Reproduced in: 
Martens, Nouveau Recueil de Traités, II (1814-1815), Goettingen 1887, pp. 632-642. See therein also the 
note by Wellington to Castlereagh, Paris 23 September 1815, p. 642. The extract of the note quoted above is 
quoted by: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 108. 
147 Quynn, D.M., 2007, p. 7. 
148 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 20. 
149 Ibid. Odendahl gives Mainz as an example, in particular its Landesmuseum. Mainz had been occupied in 
1797 when the Napoleon’s army occupied the German territory to the west of the Rhine River. With the 
Treaty of Campo Formio (17 October 1797) France was awarded this entire area. In 1803 Mainz was 
awarded a collection of art works by the French government which built the fundament of its current 
museum Landesmuseum. See further on the museum and the collection: Paas, S. / Mertens, S., 2003.  
150 Russian note of 30 December 1898/11 January 1899; referenced by Schindler, D. / Toman, J., 2004, p. 
41. 
151 The Lieber Code of 1863, in full: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field by order of the Secretary of War, 24.4.1863, contained instructions for the government of armies of 
the United States of America. The Code played a significant role in the development of the modern 
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Alexander II of Russia to arrive at an ‘International Declaration concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War’.152 While the Hague Conference, with twenty-six governments 
present, failed to reach agreement on the Conference’s primary object – the reduction of 
armaments, it did result in the adoption of number of conventions dealing with the 
regulation of armed conflict. One of these conventions, the 1899 Hague Convention on 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land153 (hereinafter: “the 1899 Hague Convention”) 
is relevant also for the protection of cultural property. Furthermore, provision was made 
during the conference for the convening of a second conference, which took place in 
1907. One of the results of this Second Hague Conference was the adoption of the 1907 
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land154 (hereinafter: “the 1907 
Hague Convention”), which, like its 1899 predecessor, contains provisions relevant for 
the protection of cultural property. The adoption and entry into force of the 1907 
Hague Convention would not annul the 1899 Hague Convention. While it supersedes its 
predecessor in situations where all belligerents have become a State Party, the 1899 
Hague Convention remains in force between those State Parties that did not become a 
State Party to the 1907 Convention.155  
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention show great similarity in structure and 
content: both consist of a general part and an annex that contains the actual rules on 
warfare. Two sections of these annexed ‘Regulations respecting the laws and customs of 
                                                                                                                                          
international laws of war, as it was the first attempt of codification. While its Art. 31 recognises the 
appropriation of public property, Art. 34 excludes the following objects from public property as defined in 
Art. 31: the property belonging to churches, to hospitals or other establishments of an exclusively charitable 
nature, to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public 
schools, universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific 
character. Moreover, Art. 35 determines that “classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections or 
precious instruments (…) must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in 
fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded”. A next step heightening the awareness for the protection of 
cultural property, was the Brussels Conference held in 1874. Initiated by Henry Dunant and supported by 
the Russian Emperor, the aim of the conference was the adoption of an international declaration on the 
laws and customs of war. Art. 8 of the draft-declaration stipulated that “the property of municipalities, that 
of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, 
shall be treated as private property. All seizure or destruction of, or wilful damage to, institutions of this 
character, historic monuments, works of art and sciences, should be made the subject of legal proceedings 
by the competent authorities”. Furthermore the draft declaration introduced a marking-system, that is the 
marking of buildings dedicated to art, science or charitable purposes by distinctive and visible signs. While 
the besieged had the duty to mark the buildings and to inform the enemy about the signs, the attacking 
force on the other hand had the corresponding plight to spare these buildings. Although the declaration has 
never been ratified, as the first international attempt to provide for the protection of cultural property, it did 
have influence on the development of the codification of laws (Toman, J., 1996, p. 9).  
152 Projet d’une déclaration internationale concernant les lois et coutumnes de la guerre (Brussels 
Declaration) from 27 August 1874. See further on the Brussels Declaration: Ibid; Kaye, L., M., 1997, pp. 
101-102; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 28 with further references to English and German literature. 
153 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899..  
154 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.  
155 Ibid., Art. 4. 
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war on land’ hold provisions relevant for the protection of cultural property both 
against destruction and removal. In the following, the relevant articles from Section II 
on hostilities and Section III on military authority over hostile territory will be discussed. 
Given the close similarity between the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention they can be 
discussed simultaneously.156 In the few instances that the protection granted by the 1907 
Hague Convention surpasses the level of protection of the 1899 Hague Convention it 
will be indicated and discussed.  
In analysing the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions as to the protection granted to 
cultural property during hostilities one must distinguish between articles of general 
application that apply to any objects, including cultural objects and articles dealing 
specifically with cultural property. Art. 23 is an article that belongs to the first category. 
It prohibits the destruction and seizure of the enemy's property unless it is imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. Hence, Art. 23 indirectly protects cultural objects 
against destruction and seizure. The protection is, however, limited by the exception of 
military necessity. According to the legal concept of military necessity the rules of the ius 
in bello may be overridden where imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. 
Art. 27 deals specifically with the protection of different objects of cultural relevance 
against destruction during attack.157 It requests that “all necessary steps should be taken 
to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity (…), 
provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes (…)”. Under Art. 27 
in the version of the 1907 Hague Convention, the protection is extended to historic 
monuments.158 While Art. 27 aims at the protection of specific categories of immovable 
property, including buildings housing public collections, against damage and destruction, 
it indirectly contributes to the protection of movable cultural heritage included in these 
buildings. One last article that must be mentioned as being relevant for the protection of 
cultural property during hostilities is Art. 28 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, 
which prohibits the pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault. As an Article 
of general application, Art. 28 also prohibits the pillage of cultural property held within 
these towns or places.  
                                                     
156 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 110-111. See also: Schindler, D. / Toman, J., 2004, pp. 55-87 where the 
provisions of the 1899 and the 1907 conventions are printed next to each other, allowing for more 
convenient comparison.  
157 Art. 27 must be read in conjunction with Art. 25. While Art. 25 prohibits the attack of undefended towns 
or villages, Art. 27 seeks to limit the destructive impact of such attacks where they are not prohibited. Art. 
27 is hence relevant for the protection of property of cultural relevance against damage or destruction when 
defended towns or villages are attacked. 
158 Art. 27(1) of the regulation annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention reads: “In sieges and bombardments 
all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments (Emphasis added) (…) provided they are not being used at the time 
for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by 
distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand”. See further on the 
preventive protection against removal, destruction and damage of cultural property under the 1907 Hague 
Conventions, e.g.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, pp. 263-265; Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 8-9. 
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Section III of the Conventions deals with the rights and duties of the occupying 
authorities. Art. 46 clearly prohibits the confiscation of private property. Art. 47 
prohibits any form of pillage more in general. The prohibition of Art. 47 is, however, 
compromised by Art. 53 that enumerates a number of categories of public property that 
may be requisitioned by the occupying army. Cultural property is not amongst the 
property listed. On the contrary, Art. 56(1) extends the protection granted to private 
property to public property that is of religious, charitable and educational character or 
that is dedicated to the arts and sciences. Furthermore, Art. 56(2) specifically bans any 
seizure of, or wilful destruction or damage to religious, charitable, and educational 
institutions, as well as to historical monuments, works of art or science, and makes them 
subject of legal proceedings.159  
Whereas the previous sections discussed a number of rights and duties of belligerent 
parties and occupying authorities, they did not discuss the question of restitution. It is 
with regard to state liability that the wording of the 1899 and the 1907 Hague 
Conventions differ. While the 1899 Hague Convention does not elaborate upon the 
consequences in case its provisions have been breached160, the 1907 Hague Convention 
includes a provision on state liability. According to its Art. 3 “[a] belligerent party which 
violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation (…)”. While Art. 3 must not be underestimated for the development of 
international law161, its relevance lies essentially in its signalling function rather than in 
introducing a different regime compared to its 1899 predecessor. This point can be 
illustrated with reference to the Chorzów Factory Case, which was ruled shortly after 
the Hague Conventions have been adopted.162  
In the Chorzów Factory Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
confirmed the principle that for the obligation to make reparations it is sufficient that a 
breach of a treaty-provision has occurred. There is no need for the treaty to state that 
the failure to apply the convention results in an obligation to make reparations:  
 
“[i]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of the law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation (...). Reparation is the indispensable complement of a 
failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself”.163  
 
                                                     
159 See further on the preventive protection against removal, destruction and damage of cultural property 
under the 1899 Hague Convention in particular Toman, J., 1996, pp. 10-13; Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 102; 
Jenschke, C., 2005, pp. 38-47.  
160 See, e.g.: Körbs, H., 1996, p. 146; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 47; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 163. 
161 Cf.: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 9 with quotations from and references to Garner, J., 1920, p. 469; 
Freeman, A.V., 1955, p. 324.  
162 Chorzów Factory Case (Germany v. Poland) PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, p. 29. The fact that the ruling 
postdates the adoption of the Hague Conventions does not take away that the principle that lies at the heart 
of the case was valid already prior to the Hague Conventions’ adoption. 
163 Ibid., § 103. Cf.: Henckaerts, J.-M. / Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, 2005, p. 537. 
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Put differently, for an obligation to make reparations to exist, there is no need for 
what Jenschke calls a “primary restitution right”. A primary right is a right explicitly 
provided for in treaty. Instead, the mere breach of a treaty provision suffices for the 
emergence of a right to reparations as “secondary right”.164 If one applies this finding to 
the present analysis of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention, it appears that the 
inclusion of Art. 3 in the 1907 Hague Convention is not a necessary precondition for 
the obligation to make reparations. Instead, behaviour in breach of a treaty provision 
suffices as trigger for the obligation to make reparations. Consequently, such an 
obligation was implied in the provisions of the 1899 Hague Convention as secondary 
right. 
Further to clarifying the relationship between breaching treaty provisions and the 
obligation to make reparations, the PCIJ in the Chorzów Factory Case also confirmed 
the primacy of restitution over other forms of reparations. The PCIJ held that the mere 
fact that a treaty obligation has been breached requires the state responsible to “wipe 
out, as far as possible, all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed”.165 The responsible State was under “the obligation to restore the 
undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the 
indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has 
become impossible”.166  
With regard to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions this primacy of restitution as 
established by the PCIJ means that despite Art. 3 not being tailored to cultural objects 
but constituting an abstract liability for violating one of the annexed provisions167 it 
provides for the physical restitution of cultural property. Only where restitution is 
impossible, can the responsible State take to other forms of reparations.168 Putting this 
finding together with the first finding of the Chorzów Factory Case, according to which 
the obligation to make reparations does not depend on being spelled out in a treaty 
provision, the supremacy of restitution applies also to the 1899 Hague Convention. 
Consequently, the obligation to restitute looted cultural property existed already under 
the 1899 Hague Convention despite the absence of an explicit provision in this respect.  
The above analysis revealed that no material difference exists between the 1899 and 
the 1907 Hague Convention.169 While it is true that the 1899 Hague Convention misses 
                                                     
164 Jenschke, C., 2005, pp. 32-33. 
165 Crawford, J., 2002, pp. 47-48.  
166 Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ Series A, No. 17 (1928), pp. 47-48. Cf.: International Law Commission, 2001, 
pp. 96-97.  
167 Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 364. 
168 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 77; Freytag, C., 1996, p. 180; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 48; Berezowski, C., 1948, p. 
132(quoted by Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 9); Körbs, H., 1996, p. 146; Schorlemer, S.v., 1998, pp. 327 & 330; 
See for a different opinion, according to which the provision cannot be interpreted as providing for the 
legal obligation to physically restitute cultural property: Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 102; Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 
10.  
169 An exception is the inclusion of historical monuments in Art. 27 of the 1907 Hague Convention. 
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an explicit provision comparable to Art. 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention, this does not 
mean that the obligation to make reparations, i.e. to restitute cultural property removed 
in breach with the convention, was inexistent already under the 1899 Hague 
Convention. It is hence the 1899 Hague Convention that constitutes a watershed for the 
protection of cultural property in times of war as the first international legally binding 
instrument holding provisions relevant for the protection of cultural objects.170 
Consequently, as per 4 September 1900, the date when the 1899 Hague Convention 
entered into force, a ban existed on looting of cultural property in armed conflicts and 
an obligation to restitute objects taken in breach of the 1899 Hague Convention. 
The ban on looting and the obligation to restitute looted objects applied, however, 
only to State Parties of the Conventions. The Conventions’ scope of application is 
furthermore limited by the so-called “general participation clause”, according to which 
the rules of the Conventions apply only in the situation that all belligerents are state 
party.171 The influence of the Hague Conventions was put to a test only shortly after 
their entry into force with the outbreak of the First World War.172  
I I I .  PE A C E  TR E A T I E S  C O N CL U D I N G  T H E  F I R S T  WO RL D  WA R 
 Accounts of the First World War (1914-1918) generally stress the destructive 
impact of the war as the first major conflict fought in the technological age. The rapid 
development of technology also resulted in massive destructions of cultural property.173 
One prominent example is the destruction of the University Library of Louvain.174 
While the First World War had devastating effects on the physical integrity of cultural 
property; it is generally portrayed as a war without remarkable looting of cultural 
                                                     
170 Schulze, D., 1983, p. 33; Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 100; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 47; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 109. 
The relevance of the 1907 Hague Convention, which entered into force on 26 January 1910, lies essentially 
in extending the preventive protection regime to historical monuments (Art. 27 of the annexed Regulations) 
and in reminding the state parties in its Art. 3 of the consequences when failing to comply with the 
provisions. Its application is subject to the same limitations, in particular the “general participation clause” 
as its predecessor.  
171 Art. 2 of the 1899 Convention reads: “The provisions contained in the Regulations mentioned in Art. 1 
are only binding on the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of them. These provisions 
shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between Contracting Powers, a non-Contracting 
Power joins one of the belligerents”. Art. 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention reads:” The provisions 
contained in the Regulations referred to in Art. 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except 
between Contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention”. Cf.: the 
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict discussed below 
in chp. 1.§1.VI.1 that does not contain such a general participation clause. 
172 All powers of the Allied Entente were State Parties to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. 
From the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary were also State Parties to both Conventions. Italy, 
that later joined the Allies, as well as the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria that both joined the Central Powers 
were only State Parties to the 1899 Hague Convention. Source: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=195&ps=P  
and http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=150&ps=P (last visited 4 August 2008).  
173 See, e.g.: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 112; Poulos, A., Helleni, 2000, p. 19.. Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 163.  
174 See further on the destruction of the library, e.g.: Schivelbusch, W., 1988.  
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property.175 Regardless of the fact that looting of cultural property did not reach the 
intensity known from the Napoleonic raids, the restoration of culturally relevant objects 
was addressed in the peace treaties. All of the peace treaties concluded (Versailles176, St. 
Germain177, Trianon178, Neuilly179, Sèvres/Lausanne180 and Riga181) include provisions 
on the restitution of cultural objects, as well as reparations concerning cultural 
objects.182 
In the following paragraphs, the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles signed 
between the Principal Allies, the associated powers and Germany shall be discussed.183 
We will discuss specific obligations for Germany as provided for in the Artt. 245-247 
and show that the articles encompass a variety in obligations. Before turning to these 
articles, which explicitly deal with specific objects of cultural relevance, reference should 
be made to Art. 238 of the Treaty holding a general provision on restitution.184 
Providing for the restitution of “objects of every nature”, the Article is also relevant for 
cultural objects provided they could be identified in German territory or that of the 
German Allies.185  
                                                     
175 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 122; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 139. 
176 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles, June 28th, 
1919.  
177 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and 
Special Declaration signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919.  
178 Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary; Protocol and Declaration 
signed at Trianon, 4 June 1920. 
179 Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia, and Ukraine signed at Riga, 18 March 1921. 
180 See on the failure and content of the Treaty of Sèvres and the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne: Jenschke, 
C., 2005, pp. 144-145.  
181 Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia, and Ukraine signed at Riga, 18 March 1921.  
182 E.g. the Treaties of Saint Germain and Trianon included provisions under which Austria and Hungary 
had to: “to surrender to each of the Allied and Associated Powers respectively all records, documents, 
objects of antiquity and of art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded 
territories, whether they belong to the State or to provincial, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical 
administrations or other public or private institutions” (Art. 175 of the Treaty of Saint German. Art. 177 of 
the Treaty of Trianon provides that “[w]ith regard to all objects or documents of an artistic, archaeological, 
scientific or historic character forming part of collections which formerly belonged ot the Government or 
the Crown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and are not otherwise provided for by the present Treaty, 
Hungary undertakes to negotiate, when requuired, with the States concerned for an amicable arrangement 
whereby any portion thereof or any objects or documents belonging thereto which ought to form part of 
the intellectual patrimony of the said States may be returned to their country of origin on terms of 
reciprocity”. Cf.: Jote, K., 1994, p. 265; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 163; Prott, L.V., 2008, p. 176 
183 For elaborations on the other peace treaties see: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 129-131; Jote, K., 1994, pp. 265-
269; Jenschke, C., 2005, pp. 142-149; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, pp. 80-86. 
184 Art. 238 reads: “In addition to the payments mentioned above Germany shall effect, in accordance with 
the procedure laid down by the Reparation Commission, restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or 
sequestrated, and also restitution of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or 
sequestrated, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in territory belonging to Germany or 
her allies (…)”. See also: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 124. 
185 Ibid; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 140. 
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Art. 245 stipulates that Germany should restore to France “the trophies, archives, 
historical souvenirs or works of art” that had been removed during the war years 1914-
1918, as well as cultural objects that had been removed previously during the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-1871. The exact scope of the objects to be returned was yet to be 
communicated by the French Authorities to the German Government.186 Noteworthy 
about this Article is that it orders not only the restitution of cultural objects that have 
been looted by the Germans during the First World War. Instead, the Article also 
provides for the return of “the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art” 
that had been removed during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.187 While the 
looting of “trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art” during the First 
World War breaches Art. 23 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions188, the removal 
during the Franco-Prussian War in the years 1870-1871 preceded the adoption of the 
Hague Conventions. However, regardless of the fact that the removal did not constitute 
a breach of an international treaty189, the Parties to the Versailles Treaty could of course 
include a retroactive provision due to their contractual freedom. Rather than restitution 
the return of the objects removed during the Franco-Prussian War must be considered 
as a form of reparations for the losses suffered by France. After all, from a strict legal 
point of view the taking of the objects the Franco-Prussian War occurred before the 
formulation of the ban on looting.190  
Art. 246 consists of two obligations, each providing for the return of one specifically 
denoted object.191 According to the first obligation, Germany has to return a rare and 
ancient Quran to the King of the Hedjaz. The Quran originally belonged to the Caliph 
                                                     
186 Art. 245 reads: “Within six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty the German 
Government must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works 
of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870-1871 and 
during this last war, in accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by the French Government; 
particularly the French flags taken in the course of the war of 1870-1871 and all the political papers taken by 
the German authorities on October 10, 1870, at the chateau of Cercal, near Brunoy (Seine-et-Oise) 
belonging at the time to Mr. Rouher, formerly Minister of State”. 
187 Jenschke reports that Germany first protested against the restitution of objects that had been it its 
possession for some fifty years but finally gave in. Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 140.  
188 Both Germany and France were state parties to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. Germany had 
ratified the 1899 Convention on 04.09.1900 and the 1907 on 27.11.1909. France had ratified the 1899 
Convention on 04.09.1900 and the 1907 Convention on 07.10.1910.  
189 In the section discussing the emergence of customary law further below (chp. 1.§1.VIII) it will be shown 
that the Franco-Prussian War also preceded the existence of a ban on looting of customary international 
law. 
190 See below on the Development of Customary Law. 
191 Art. 246 reads: “Within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Germany will 
restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was 
removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor 
William II. Within the same period Germany will hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the 
skull of the Sultan Mkwawa which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to 
Germany. The delivery of the articles above referred to will be effected in such place and in such conditions 
as may be laid down by the Governments to which they are to be restored”. 
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Osman and had been removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities.192 Whether the 
Quran was ever presented to the Emperor William II, as is presumed in the Article, is 
not established.193 The German State held that the Quran had never been given to the 
Emperor, nor had it been taken to Germany.194 In any event, the Quran was never 
returned by Germany.195 What is noteworthy about this obligation is the fact that the 
party to receive the Quran was not amongst the parties negotiating the Versailles Treaty. 
Instead, the Quran was to be returned to the king of Hedjaz, Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali. The 
inclusion of this provision as lobbied for by the British must be understood as being in 
the general interest of the British in supporting the Hedjaz revolt against the Turkish 
rule.196 In how far such a provision must be considered as a form of reparation will be 
discussed further below, together with the question in how far the second obligation 
qualifies as a form of reparation. 
The second obligation of Art. 246 was also lobbied for by the British. According to 
the second part of Art. 246, Germany had to return the skull of Sultan Mkwawa to his 
Britannic Majesty’s Government in Tanganyika.197 When the Versailles Treaty was 
                                                     
192 The literature does not specify the period in time. 
193 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 127.  
194 Letter by the German Delegation dated 21 January 1921 to the President of the Peace Conference 
(Department of State Publication 2724, Conference Series 92, The Treaty of Versailles and After, 
Annotations of the text of the Treaty, Washington 1947, p. 523) quoted by: Ibid. 
195 Ibid. The current whereabouts of this Quran are unknown. An inquiry with the Research Center for 
Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA) in Istanbul did not confirm that the rare and ancient copy of the 
Quran, attributed to Caliph Osman that is presently held at Topkapı Palace in Istanbul is the same Quran as 
referred to in Art. 246 of the Versailles Treaty. According to the information received from IRCICA, the 
Quran held at Topkapi Palace “has been safeguarded in Istanbul for more than one century prior to the 
First World War. For this reason there is no chance that the Topkapı Mushaf is the same one that is 
referred to in the Treaty of Versailles”. Information received by email dated 28 May 2008, on file with the 
author. 
196 The Hedjaz region in western Saudi Arabia (now included in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) was occupied 
in 1517 by the Turks. Nominal rule remained in the hands of the sharīfs (“nobles”) of Mecca until the 
religious upheavals at the beginning of the 19th century. The Ottomans directly controlled the Hedjaz after 
1845. In 1916, during World War I, Sharīf Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, who claimed lineal descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad, revolted against Turkish rule. Hedjaz. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 12, 
2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online,  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/259797/Hejaz. In 1916, an agreement was concluded 
between the Hedjaz and the British. The agreement concerned alleged assurances made by the British to 
support the founding of an independent Arab kingdom stretching from Damascus to Palestine. In 
particular, Britain had expressed its preparedness to recognize the independence of the Arabs across the 
Middle East. Ratliff, W., 1996, p. 185.  
197 Under British Administration, former German East Africa was renamed as Tanganyika Territory. 
Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961 and in 1964 the United Republic of Tanzania was 
founded by the presidents of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanzania (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Retrieved May 16, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-
37594. 
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negotiated, Great Britain had just taken over the rule over Tanganyika, the former 
German East Africa from the Germans.198  
In the literature, Art. 246 and the obligation to return Mkwawa’s skull receive little 
attention. While Art. 246 has raised academic legal interest for its specificity199, the 
subject matter and the motivation of the British for including such a provision has 
received little interest.200 Where Art. 246 is mentioned in the literature, it is in the 
context of Art. 245 and Art. 247, as articles “providing for the restitution of works of 
art”201 or cultural property202 respectively as articles holding “specific obligation for 
Germany concerning cultural property”.203 However, none of the obligations constitute 
a form of restitution or reparation: none of the obligations contained in Art. 246 
contributes to “wiping out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed”.204 For this reason, neither the provision on the return of the Quaran nor 
the provision on the sultan’s skull constitutes a form of reparation.205 Instead, both 
provisions are essentially unrelated with the subject-matter of the peace treaty but were 
included in the treaty due to the British negotiating power.206  
Art. 247 holds obligations for Germany with regard to the destruction of the Library 
of Louvain and specific artworks.207 In the first place, Germany had to provide the 
University of Louvain with “manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps and objects 
of collection corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning of 
                                                     
198 See Art. 119 of the Versailles Treaty and Art. 22(5) of the Convenant of the League of Nations. On May 
7, 1919, the Supreme War Council of the Allied Powers decided on the allocation ofthe Geman colonies to 
the various mandatories.  
199 See, e.g.: Wilson, G.G., 1939, p. 337 who uses the example of the skull to underline his main thesis that 
during the twentieth century there has been a change in international agreements from general topics and 
provisions to specific ones. See also: Bottom, W.P., pp. 16-17.  
200 Winans, E.V., 1994, p. 234. See for a more elaborate discussion of the provision and the motivation of 
the British below in chp. 2.§2.III.1.  
201 See, e.g.: Hollander, B., 1959, p. 32. 
202 See, e.g.: Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5; Birov, V.A., 1998, p. 209; Keane, D., 2004, pp. 7-8. 
203 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 126; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 139; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 164. An exception is Siehr 
who discusses only Artt. 245 and 247 but does not mention Art. 246: Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 116-117.  
204 Crawford, J., 2002, pp. 47-48. Cf.: Wolfrum, R., 1987, p. 352. 
205 Cf.: Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5. 
206 Cf.: Bottom, W.P., p. 16 who comments upon the Article as “being of secondary importance, to say the 
least”.  
207 Art. 247 reads: “Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain, within three months after a 
request made by it and transmitted through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, manuscripts, 
incunabula, printed books, maps and objects of collection corresponding in number and value to those 
destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain. All details regarding such replacement will 
be determined by the Reparation Commission. Germany undertakes to deliver to Belgium, through the 
Reparation Commission, within six months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, in order to 
enable Belgium to reconstitute two great artistic works:  
(1) The leaves of the triptych of the Mystic Lamb painted by the Van Eyck brothers, formerly in the Church 
of St. Bavo at Ghent, now in the Berlin Museum;  
(2) The leaves of the triptych of the Last Supper, painted by Dierick Bouts, formerly in the Church of St. 
Peter at Louvain, two of which are now in the Berlin Museum and two in the Old Pinakothek at Munich”. 
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the Library of Louvain” (first paragraph). The library had been burned at the end of 
August 1914 by German Soldiers.208 As an “edifice devoted to science” the library of 
Louvain was granted protection under the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (Art. 
27).209 For this reason, the destruction of the library qualifies as violation of the Hague 
Conventions.210  
Given the impossibility for Germany to physically restitute the burned collection, 
Belgium could only seek reparations. Rather than seeking financial compensation, Art. 
247 obliges Germany to replace the lost collection. This measure clearly qualifies as a 
measure of reparations as it seeks to re-establish (in as far as it is possible) the situation 
which would have prevailed if no breach of an international obligation had occurred.211 
Siehr fittingly qualifies the reparation as “compensation in specie”212; Gattini speaks of 
“replacement in kind”.213 
According to the second obligation of Art. 247, Germany had to hand over panels 
from polyptychs by Van Eyck, respectively by Dierick Bouts. The panels had originally 
been placed in the church of St. Bavo in Ghent, respectively the church of St. Peter in 
Louvain.214 At the time when the Versailles Treaty was drafted, the panels had been held 
in the Bode Museum in Berlin (The panels of the Mystic Lamb by Van Eyck plus two 
panels from the polyptych of Bouts), respectively the Old Pinakothek at Munich (the 
other two panels from the polyptych The Last Supper by Dierick Bouts).215 The panels 
had not been looted during the First World War but instead had been legally transferred 
to Germany prior to the war.216 For this reason, the return of the panels to Belgium 
does not qualify as restitution but as reparation for the serious losses suffered by 
Belgium during the war.217 
The legal analysis of Artt. 245-247 reveals a more nuanced picture with regard to 
their substance than it is generally sketched in literature according to which provisions 
                                                     
208 The library and some 300.000 books and 500 manuscripts were destroyed. See further: Garner, J., 1920, 
p. 438; Schivelbusch, W., 1988. 
209 Both Germany and Belgium had ratified the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Convention.  
210 The Germans sought to justify the act by claiming that Belgian civilians were using the building to shoot 
at German troops. In other words, the Germans sought to invoke the exception of Art. 29 in case buildings 
were used for military purposes. Eirinberg, K.W., 1994, p. 27.  
211 Wolfrum, R., 1987, p. 352. Graham, G.M., 1987, p. 760; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 141, fn. 549.  
212 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 116. For the reasons set out above the term is more appropriate than “restitution in 
kind” as proposed by Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 35. 
213 Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5.  
214 As for the panels of the Mystic Lamb it is known that they had been acquired by King Fredrick William 
III in 1821 from an English collector. Ibid. See further: Visscher, C.d., 1935.  
215 Art. 247 sub 1 and 2 Versailles Treaty.  
216 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 152; Siehr, K.G., 2006, p. 128. See further on the sale of the panels: Thalheimer, S., 
1967, pp. 119-121. The return of the panels by Germany to Belgium would not be the first time that the 
panels were returned: in 1794, the panels had been looted by the French Revolutionary Troops from the St. 
Bavo Cathedral in Ghent (then still falling under the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands) and were 
taken to Paris. Engstler, L., 1964, p. 108. See further: Gheyn, C.v.d., 1945. 
217 Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5; Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 36; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 141. 
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provide for the “restitution” of “works of art” or “cultural property”.218 According to 
our analysis, only Art. 245, which provides for the restoration of cultural objects to 
France, provides for the restitution in the strict legal sense. This statement must be 
further narrowed down to the objects that were removed during the war years 1914-
1918. Art. 246 and Art. 247 do not provide for restitution in the strict legal sense. Art. 
247 does, however, constitute a form of reparation. For this reason, we will first turn to 
Art. 247 before making some concluding remarks on Art. 246, which neither provides 
for restitution nor another form of reparation.219 Art. 247, concerning the burned 
collection of the library of Louvain and the polyptychs by Van Eyck and Bouts, 
provides for two different forms of reparations: first, the obligation to provide the 
University of Louvain with “manuscripts, incunabula, printed books etc.” qualifies as a 
reparation measure for replacement/ compensation in kind. It does not provide for 
restitution in kind. The second obligation provided for by Art. 247, to return valuable 
polyptychs by Van Eyck and Bouts to Belgium constitutes a specific obligation of 
reparation.220 As the works had been legally acquired already prior to the war, their 
return does not qualify as restitution. As a form of reparation it falls in the same 
category as the obligation of Art. 245 providing for the return of the cultural objects 
removed during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871.  
Art. 246, finally, concerning an ancient Quran and the skull of Mkwawa, cannot be 
understood as a form or reparation. Reparations seek to “wipe out all the consequences 
of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed”.221 The obligations to return the Quran to 
the King of Hedjaz and to transfer the skull of Mkwawa to the British do not seek to re-
establish the situation as it existed prior to the war. Instead, the obligations imposed on 
Germany seek to improve British political ties with the Hedjaz and the Uhewe in 
Tanganyika. Consequently, the Article has to be understood as the result of British 
negotiating power in the context of the peace treaty negotiations.  
In conclusion, Artt. 245 – 247 of the Treaty of Versailles have in common that they 
provide for transfers of culturally relevant objects. However, not all deal with the 
restitution of cultural property. This is only the case for that part of Art. 245 that deals 
with the restitution of cultural property removed during the war years 1914-1918. The 
provision with regard to objects removed prior to the emergence of the ban on looting 
                                                     
218 Merryman, J.H., 2007, pp. 57-58. 
219 Cf.: Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5 where he states that “of the three relevant Artt. (Artt. 245-247 K.L.) only one 
seems to be connected with the issue of reparations”. 
220 The polyptychs have been returned to the churches where they had originally been held. The polyptych 
by Van Eyck is in the St. Bavo Cathedral in Ghent whereas the polyptych by Bouts is in the Church of St. 
Peter at Louvain. Both works are protected by the Belgian Monument Decree of 3 March 1976 as later 
amended (Decreet tot bescherming van monumenten en stads- en dorspgezichten”). The Belgian act for the 
protection of immovable cultural property includes movable works that form an integral part of an 
immovable structure in its scope of protection. See further on the Belgian Monuments act: Draye, A.M., 
2007, pp. 62-68. 
221 Crawford, J., 2002, pp. 47-48. Cf.: Wolfrum, R., 1987, p. 352. 
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in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions qualifies as a form of reparation, as it is also 
the case with for Art. 247. 
IV .  TH E  IN T E R B EL L U M   
 Artt. 245-247 of the Versailles Treaty have been characterised as having created 
“a positive precedent for the restitution of cultural property following conflict”.222 In 
first instance, however, the developments following the Treaty of Versailles did not 
change the protection available. Attempts taken during the Interbellum to improve the 
protection of cultural property by legal means failed.223 The only treaty of relevance for 
the protection of cultural property in times of war concluded in this period is the 
Roerich Pact on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic 
Monuments.224 It constitutes the first treaty ever adopted that was dedicated to the 
protection of cultural objects.225 The Roerich Pact, which covers both situations of war 
and peace, seeks to protect historic monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, 
educational and cultural institutions (Art. 1). Its relevance and significance is, however, 
limited due to its geographical application: as a multilateral treaty concluded between the 
United States of America and the other American Republics it applies only to the 
protection of cultural property on the American continent. Furthermore, it is very 
general in approach and does not provide for the restitution of cultural property.226  
Consequently, in respect of treaty law, the legal situation at the outbreak of the 
Second World War was unchanged from the time of the First World War. The relevant 
treaties in force were the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land.227  
V .  RE S T O R A T I O N  O F  R I G H T S  A F TE R  WO RL D  WA R  I I   
 The destruction and displacement of cultural property during the Second World 
War (1939-1945) dwarfed any previous looting or destruction of cultural property.228 
                                                     
222 Birov, V.A., 1998, p. 209. 
223 See further on the draft convention considered by the League of Nations ‘for the Protection of Historic 
Buildings and Works of Art in Time of War’: Strebel, H., 1955/56, p. 41-44; Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 103; 
Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 112-115. This convention must not be confused with three other draft conventions 
discussed by the League of Nations during the period 1933-1939 which concerned the return of cultural 
objects removed against national export rules in times of peace, which are discussed in chp. 1.§2.I. dealing 
with the protection of cultural objects in times of peace. 
224 Roerich Pact: Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Montevideo, 
April, 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, TS No. 899, 167 LNTS 279. 
225 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 131. 
226 See further: Merryman, J.H., 1986, p. 835; Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 115-116. 
227 See further below in chp. 1.§1.VIII on the question in how far the legal situation had changed due to the 
developments of rules of customary law.  
228 See, e.g.: Nicholas, L., H., 1997, p. 39; Schmidt, W., 1997, p. 95.  
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World War II is especially associated with the looting of cultural property, which is a 
result of the looting’s extent, its organisation, as well as the underlying intent.229  
Estimates and figures of the looting may vary, however, they all confirm that the 
Nazi art deprivation by far exceeded earlier lootings, including the campaigns of 
Napoleon outlined above.230 In the following, background information to the looting of 
the Nazis in the occupied territories will be given before turning to the question of 
restitution. The question of the “internal Nazi art looting”, i.e. the confiscation of 
Jewish property within German state borders from 1933 onwards and the internal 
restitution will be discussed separately below.231  
The art looting by the Nazis was outstanding both for the amount of looted cultural 
objects and for the professional and bureaucratic organization of the raids. Never before 
had the “looters” been that well trained in the fields of the fine arts.232 The Nazi art 
looting constitutes “the most coherent attempt by one group of people to loot material 
on a systematic basis and on a breathtaking (…) scale”.233 Out of Hitler’s obsession for 
art, the megalomaniac illusion to establish a Führer-Museum in Linz as the world’s 
richest gallery had been born. The museum’s collection was to include only the finest art 
of Europe. The exhibits were to be compiled by either purchase, barter or simple 
theft.234 The establishment of the Führer-Museum was of such priority that it influenced 
the organisational structure of Hitler’s executive forces: within the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party (NSDAP), there was a genuine looting bureaucracy: well 
organized, powerful, and answering only to the top leaders of the party.235 In January 
                                                     
229 Cf.: Clay, L.D., 1950, p. 341; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 117. 
230 An often quoted figure for the number of works of art spoliated from the occupied countries speaks of 
more than three million works of art, which corresponds to about “one-fifth of the world’s entire art” 
(Chesnoff, R.Z., 2000, p. 38). Another source states that the Nazi loot “totalled more than 21,000 item of 
art, paintings, furniture, textiles and similar valuable antiquities”, suggesting a number less great 
(Marchisotto, 1974, p. 701). Another author speaks of an estimated of 220,000 stolen works or art from 
museums and private collections throughout Europe (Kempster, N., 1998). As for France, one source 
speaks of some 21,000 art objects that were gathered during the four years of the plundering under the 
Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) (Chamberlin, R., 1983, p. 161). Another source speaks about 
100.000 works of art that have been clearly identified as being stolen during the years 1941-1944 (Mattéoli 
Report I, p. 80 cited by Anglade, L., 1999, p. 301). The value or the stolen works has been set at $2.5 billion 
in 1945 which corresponds to $20.5 billion in 2000 (M.B., November 7 1998 & Bazyler, M., 2001, p. 161). 
The difference in estimates and figures can to some extent be explained both by different understandings of 
what constitutes a cultural object and whether a figure aims solely at straightforward thefts and 
confiscations or whether it covers also forced sales and other involuntary form of loss. See for further 
details and specification: Petropoulos, J., 2000, para. 369.  
231 Whereas it might surprise the reader at first sight that questions of internal looting and restitution are 
discussed in a chapter dealing with the emergence of rights and obligations with regard to the protection of 
cultural objects under public law there are several reasons to include these subjects. At this point, we limit 
ourselves to referring to the fact that the internal restitution was to a great extent brought about by public 
international law. 
232 Nicholas, L., H., 1997, p. 39. 
233 Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p.ix. 
234 Weil, S., 1999, p. 287.  
235 Turner, M.I., 1999, p. 1512. 
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1934, Alfred Rosenberg received orders by Hitler to command the ‘Dienststelle des 
Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und 
weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP’ (DBFU).236 To carry out this 
mission, Rosenberg turned the DBFU into an extremely well- organized apparatus by 
introducing several (sub-) offices. In July 1940, the notorious Einsatzstab Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg (ERR) was established. As the largest and most powerful of all organizational 
units dealing with arts it became the Reich’s art plunder instrument in the occupied 
territories.237 Its official mission was the tracking and seizure of works of art and the 
transfer of these objects to Germany.238 At first, the mission of the ERR focussed on 
“ownerless” Jewish propery.239 However, within two months, the mission was extended 
to cover any “ownerless” cultural property.240 The ERR consisted of several 
‘Sonderstäbe’ (individual command forces) each responsible for a specific field of 
expertise. As to the relation between the ERR and the DBFU, each office of the DBFU 
was supported by one corresponding Sonderstab, which moved parallel to the German 
occupation forces. The occupied territories became scene of the greatest systematic 
theft of cultural property ever to occur in history.  
Another aspect making the looting by the Nazis exceptional is the fact that the 
looting formed an explicit part of the policy of Hitler.241 Art was instrumentalised to 
serve the bigger, political and ideological end of Hitler.242 Not only did the amassing of 
works of art seek to glorify the German people243, it was simultaneously used as an 
instrument to dehumanize non-Aryan races, in particular the Jews.244  
In the Eastern European countries, especially the Soviet Union, the Nazi looting 
revealed its most destructive character.245 The occupation of the U.S.S.R, seen as 
inferior culture, was marked by wilful and systematic looting. Everything of the Eastern 
cultures was to be destroyed and the only objects to be spared were those of ‘Germanic 
origin’. The invasion of Russia started in 1941 and in the following three years, the 
Nazis destroyed more than 1200 churches, 500 synagogues, and 500 museums.246 The 
ERR confiscated objects without caring at all about any justification. A special 
commission established after the war to investigate the looting in the Soviet Union came 
                                                     
236 In English: “Plenipotentiary of the Führer for the Supervision of the Entire Intellectual and Ideological 
Enlightenment of the Nazi Party”. 
237 Poulos, A., Helleni, 2000, p. 34. 
238 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 7. 
239 Führerbefehl of 5 July 1940. Cf.: Petropoulos, J., 1996, p. 128. 
240 Order of Field Marshal Keitel, High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 17 September 1940. Cf.: 
Petropoulos, J., 1996, p. 130. 
241 Nicholas, L., H., 1997, p. 39.  
242 See in general: Petropoulos, J., 1996. 
243 Ibid., p. 308.  
244 Petropoulos, J., 1997, p. 111. Cf.: Nicholas, L., H., 1997, pp. 40-41. See in this respect below chp. 1.§.4 
where the misappropriation of cultural objects from German Jews is discussed. 
245 Kowalski, W.W., 2000, p. 218. 
246 Elmer, T., G., 2000, p. 119. 
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to the conclusion that about 546,723 museum objects worth $1.25 billion had been 
removed, destroyed, or damaged.247  
In contrast to the operations in the Eastern occupied territories, the looting of 
artworks by the ERR in the Western occupied territories was less overtly in the sense 
that transactions were often disguised as sales transactions and focused more on private 
collections. Needless to say, the price often corresponded only to a fraction of the real 
market value. Palmer refers to these purchases as “pseudo-consensual transactions”.248 
Public collections were hardly affected, as the museums and public collection were 
expected to become part of the Reich anyway.249  
Due to the increasing of Allied bombings in 1943 and the advance of the Allies from 
summer 1944 onwards, the situations of the Nazis turned from aggressor into defender. 
Art treasures be it looted, purchased or originally in the possession of German museums 
had to be evacuated. Vast quantities of cultural objects, amongst it looted art, were 
transferred from Berlin to other parts of the Reich, especially to Upper Silesia, where 
the objects were hidden in churches, castles, depots, etc.250 The salt mine at Alt Aussee 
was only one of the more than thousand safeguarding places.  
1.  RE S T I T U T I O N  O F  CU L T U RA L  OB J E C T S  L O O TE D  F R O M  T H E  O C C U P I E D  
TE R R I TO R I E S  (“E X T E R N A L  R E S T I T U T I O N”)   
 Given the complexities and the extent of the looting in the occupied territories 
the restitution of looted art works constituted a complex and difficult sub-task of the 
greater reparations to be paid by Germany.251 The (external) restitution regime splits in 
two phases. The first phase lasted until the early 1950s and consisted of the shaping and 
execution of the restitution under the auspice of the Allied countries occupying 
Germany. The second phase commenced in 1955 after Germany had regained its status 
as sovereign state with full responsibility for outstanding external restitutions.  
The first phase breaks down into two sub-phases. At first, the Allied Forces closely 
cooperated during the preparatory process of agreeing on how restitution should be 
organised. During the second sub-phase, when the agreed principles had to be translated 
into legally binding instruments the Allies no longer acted in unison. In light of the 
rising tensions of the Cold War, the Allies introduced different laws in their respective 
Occupational Zone.  
The Allied deliberations on how to shape restitution started already prior to the end 
of the war. On 5 January 1943, the Allies signed the ‘Inter-Allied Declaration against 
                                                     
247 Fiedler, W., 1997, p. 153; Wilske, S., 1998, p. 229. 
248 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 59. 
249 Wilske, S., 1998, p. 227. 
250 Vries, W.d., 1995, pp. 4-8.  
251 Cf.: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 37. 
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Acts of Dispossession committed in territories under Enemy Occupation or Control’.252 
The declaration, generally known as the ‘London Declaration’, warned the Axis powers 
and neutral countries that the signatory countries had the right to declare invalid any 
transaction within an occupied territory, regardless of the circumstances of the 
transaction.253 The London Declaration as such did not declare any transactions as 
invalid. With regard to the transactions possibly affected, the London Declaration 
covered outright confiscations, forced sales, forced donations and abandonments.254 
The Explanatory Note to the London Declaration confirms that the Declaration covers 
“all forms of looting to which the enemy has resorted. It applies, e.g., to the stealing or 
forced purchase of works of art just as much as to the theft or forced transfer of bearer 
bonds”.255 The denunciation of forced sales and other forms of misappropriation other 
than confiscations is particularly important as these transactions are not covered by the 
ban on confiscation and pillage from the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.  
The warning that acquisitions might be declared invalid, also in neutral countries, was 
especially important in respect of bona fide third parties who might have acquired 
looted cultural objects in the meantime. While a great number of cultural objects had 
been gathered by the Germans in caves and other protected sites to hide and shelter the 
objects from the Allies other cultural objects had spread over collections in Germany, 
Europe or worldwide.256 This is especially the case for cultural objects that had been lost 
not as result of direct Nazi intervention but whose loss was nevertheless precipitated by 
the political, social and economical exclusions of the persecuted groups, in particular the 
Jews (e.g. forced sales). 
As a declaration the London Declaration is not legally binding. This does not mean, 
however, that its provisions did not affect the course of restitution. On the contrary, the 
London Declaration significantly influenced the restitution regime and its provisions 
were referred to in numerous instruments and agreements dealing with the restitution of 
(cultural) property such as the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference, the Paris 
Conference on Reparations that are elaborated in the following.257 It is for this reason 
that the London Declaration has been coined the “nucleus of the restitution laws”.258 
                                                     
252 Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy 
Occupation or Control, 8 Dep't St. Bull. 21 (1943). 
253 The full text of the London Declaration is available online at:  
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration (last visited: 6 July 2008). The London 
Declaration is not numbered; hence no specific reference to the quoted passage can be given. 
254 Cf.: Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 15.  
255 Para. 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum (Emphasis added). Online available at:  
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration (last visited: 6 July 2008). See further: 
Palmer, N., 2000a; Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006a, p. 23, p. 61.  
256 In 1943, with the increase of the Allied bombings of Germany the Nazis started to move and evacuate 
cultural objects, be it looted, purchased or from German collections, to hiding places in churches, castles 
and depots. Vries, W.d., 1995, pp. 4-8. One of the most prominent hiding places was the salt mine at Alt 
Aussee. It was, however, only one of some 1800 caches. Wilske, S., 1998, p. 228.  
257 Not further discussed here are the national laws adopted by countries not belonging to the main four 
Allies. It should, however, be pointed out that Sweden, Portugal and The Netherlands adopted national laws 
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In July 1944, the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference was adopted during 
the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference.259 While the Act as such does 
not include an explicit reference to the London Declaration, the latter was referred to by 
the participants of the conference.260 Also, Section VI of the Final Act on ‘Enemy 
Assets and Looted Property’ alludes to the London Declaration in emphasising that 
further to “open looting and plunder”, property had been taken by “transfers under 
duress, as well as by subtle and complex devices (…) to give the cloak of legality to their 
robbery”. Based on this awareness and in anticipation of the pending defeat of Nazi 
Germany and its Allies, the forty-four participants of the conference agreed to  
 
“take immediate measures to prevent any disposition or transfer within territories subject to their 
jurisdiction of any (…) looted gold, currency, art objects, securities, other evidences of ownership in 
financial or business enterprises, and of other assets looted by the enemy”.261  
 
One of the measures to preserve and protect property, including cultural property, 
until concrete regulations on restitution had been adopted was Law No. 52 concerning 
the blocking and control of property.262 Law No. 52 was adopted by the Allied 
Governments in 1944. Due to its early adoption, Law No. 52 entered into force the 
moment the Allies started the military occupation of Germany.263 The aim of Law No. 
52 was to safeguard external restitution by bringing all property under the control of the 
Military Government.264 In accordance with the one but last sentence of the 1943 
London Declaration265, Law No. 52 was directed not only at property that had been 
                                                                                                                                          
implementing the London Declaration. None of these were, however, as extensive in scope as the London 
Declaration. See further: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 810, Veraart, W., 2005, p. 59. The influence of 
the London Declaration furthermore extended to the protection of cultural property in times of peace. See 
futher below on the UNESCO Resolution 3.428 that explicitly refers to the London Declaration. Cf.: Prott, 
L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 816. 
258 Schmoller, G.v., et al., 1957, § 53, p. 56. 
259 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 1 July to 22 July 
1944. ‘Final Act and related documents. VI: Enemy assets and looted property’1946, p. 4.  
260 Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 42. 
261 Section VI, sub 2 of the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference 
262 Military Government for Germany. U.S. Zone. Law No. 52: ‘Blocking and control of property’, Military 
Government Gazette (Germany, U.S. Zone, issue A). See for the full text of the Law No. 52: Kowalski, 
W.W., 1998, pp. 108-109, Annex 107. See further: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 140; Schwarz, W., 1974, pp. 25-28. 
263 Law No. 52 as amended 3 April 1945. See for full text of the Law: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 108-109, 
Annex 107. See further: Dölle, H. / Zweigert, K., 1947; Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 25.  
264 Art. 1(2) of Law No. 52 reads as follows: “Property which has been the subject of duress, wrongful acts 
of confiscation, dispossession or spoliation from territories outside Germany, whether pursuant to 
legislation or by procedures purporting to follow forms of law or otherwise, is hereby declared to be equally 
subject to seizure of possession or title, direction, management, supervision or otherwise being taken into 
control by Military Government”. Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 25. 
265 The relevant sentence of the 1943 London Declaration reads: This warning applies whether such 
transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder or of transactions apparently legal in 
form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected. The Declaration has been discussed in detail 
above. 
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taken from territories outside Germany under a form of open looting but applied 
equally to objects that had been taken pursuant to legislation.  
Half a year after the German capitulation in May 1945, the question of German war 
reparations was addressed by eighteen Allied countries that had convened for this 
purpose in Paris.266 In particular, the Paris Conference focussed on the policies and 
procedures to be established for the division of German assets among the eighteen 
governments. The conference resulted in the passing of a Final Act with an annexed 
‘Resolution on the Subject of Restitution’.267 The principles contained in this Resolution 
would serve as the basis for the later acts adopted by the Allied Control Council for 
Germany.268  
According to the Resolution all cases of property loss precipitated by the Germans 
had to be examined in light of the 1943 London Declaration. Any identifiable object 
that had been removed from an occupied territory with or without payment was to be 
restituted. Where objects (not qualifying as cultural property) had been removed by the 
enemy but could not be located, the claims were to be taken into account under the 
general reparation claim. Claims concerning cultural property were explicitly exempted 
from the previous rule. Instead, the Resolution suggested compensation in specie / 
restitution in kind as appropriate remedy.269  
The restitution policies were further shaped in meetings of the Co-ordination 
Committee of the Allied Control Council.270 The Allied Control Council had been 
established by the Governments of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the French Republic in August 1945.271 The Council’s task was the 
central administration of Germany following the latter’s unconditional surrender and the 
formal abolition of any German governance over the nation. In view of restitution, 
agreement had to be reached upon the definition of the term ‘restitution’. In January 
1946, the Allied Control Council issued a ‘Declaration on the Definition of the Term 
                                                     
266 Paris Conference on Reparation (9th November, 1945, to 21st December, 1945). 
267 Final Act and Annex of the Paris Conference on Reparations, 14 January 1946, Annex: Resolution on the 
Subject of Restitution, p. 131, sub a)-d).  
268 Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 42. See further below on the Allied Control Council’s Handout on the 
Definition of the Term “Restitution”.  
269 The relevant provision reads: “As an exception to the above principle, objects (including books, 
manuscripts and documents) of an artistic, historical, scientific (excluding equipment of an industrial 
character), educational or religious character which have been looted by the enemy occupying Power shall, 
so far as possible, be replaced by equivalent objects if they are not restored”.  
270 See further: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 45-46. 
271 Control Council Proclamation No. 1 from 30 August 1945. Available online at:  
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01INT02.pdf (Last visited: 20 June 2008). The 
American, British, and French zones together made up the western two-thirds of Germany, while the Soviet 
zone comprised the eastern third. Berlin, the former capital, which was surrounded by the Soviet zone, was 
placed under joint four-power authority but was partitioned into four sectors for administrative purposes. 
Germany. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-58214.  
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“Restitution”’.272 The Declaration essentially follows the ‘Resolution on the Subject of 
Restitution’ as annexed to the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparations.273 
Both, the Declaration and the Resolution, confirm the principles of the 1943 London 
Declaration in limiting restitution to identifiable objects. The general rule for objects 
whose loss was documented but that could not be identified was compensation in the 
form of reparation payments. Unique objects, however, were exempted from this rule. 
Rather than adding their value to reparation payments, these missing objects were to be 
replaced by equivalent objects.274  
The preparatory instruments discussed above not only demonstrate awareness of the 
extent and form of the looting, they also reveal general agreement about the shaping of 
the external restitution. Furthermore, the preparatory instruments suggested that 
cultural objects that could not be restituted should be replaced by an equivalent object 
rather than addressing the claim by compensation. This preparatory stage constituted, 
however, only the first step towards the shaping of the restitution framework. In order 
to take effect, the principles agreed needed to be implemented in restitution laws.  
While the Allied Forces initially intended to introduce one regime applicable to the 
entire territory of occupied Germany, the common approach did not outlast the 
preparatory stage. During the last phase of consolidating the agreed principles into 
binding laws, the Allied Forces no longer acted in concert. Consequently, the four 
military governments each introduced their own laws applicable in their respective 
Occupational Zone.275 The Soviet regime completely differed from the regimes adopted 
in the American, British and French Zones, which largely coincided.276 
The subsequent analysis focuses on the U.S. implementation of restitution for the 
following reasons: not only did the regimes adopted in the Western Allied Zones largely 
coincide, the majority of looted cultural property was found in the U.S. Occupation 
Zone.277 Furthermore, the U.S. Government proved to be the most active proponent of 
                                                     
272 Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 45. For the full text of the document titled ‘Definition of the Term 
“Restitution’”, Press Handout No. 151 see Annex 5 of Kowalski’s book (p. 106).  
273 Final Act and Annex of the Paris Conference on Reparations, 14 January 1946, Annex: Resolution on 
the Subject of Restitution, p. 131. See further above at fn. 267.  
274 While the agreement did not further define unique objects it called for a special instruction to do so. The 
instruction fixing the categories of unique goods subject to replacement was issued in April 1947 by the 
Allied Control Authority and listed the following categories as qualifying for objects of a unique character: 
a) works of art of the masters of painting, engraving and sculpture; b) the most important works of 
distinguished masters of applied art and outstanding anonymous examples of national art; c) historical relics 
of any kind; d) manuscripts, books (such as rare incunabula), books having an intrinsic value or historical 
character, or constituting rare examples even of modern times; e) objects of importance to the history of 
science. For the full text of the document titled ‘Restitution: Objects of a Unique Character’ from April 
1947 see: Annex 6 in Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 107. 
275 Kurtz, M., J., 1997, p. 113. An exception was the area of Great Berlin that was governed by a joined law 
of all Western Allies: Anordnung BKO (4) 180 of 26.7.1949. See further on the regime in the British Zone: 
Bentwich, N., 1955-56. See further on the failure of drafting laws applicable in all zones and the subsequent 
developments per zone: Schwarz, W., 1974, pp. 23-59. 
276 Cf.: Heuer, C.-H., 1999, p. 2562; Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 243. 
277 See, e.g.: Hall, A.R., 1951, p. 337, Kurtz, M.J., 1998, p. 632; Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., 1999, p. 164.  
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an effective restitution regime and significantly influenced the other Western restoration 
regimes.278 The attitude by the United States can be explained by the fact that different 
from France and the United Kingdom it had not suffered destructions on its territory 
and therefore could act independently of any interest in reparation payments.279 On 12 
February 1947, ‘Military Government Regulations: Title 18: Monuments, Fine Arts and 
Archives’ (hereinafter: “MGR Title 18”) was adopted for the U.S. Military Zone.280 
Further to implementing the provisions of Law No. 52281, MGR Title 18 also contained 
provisions on the preservation and administration, as well as on the exchange and 
replacements of cultural material.282 Part 1 of the title on “Policy and Organization” 
contains the provisions that are relevant for the restitution of cultural objects. According 
to Art. 18-106 “[i]dentifiable looted works of art and cultural materials will be restituted 
to the governments of the countries from which they were taken”. With regard to the 
understanding of what constitutes ‘looting’, MGR Title 18 adopts a broad vision. The 
Art. 18-104 not only refers to acquisitions “directly by duress (…) or confiscation, 
dispossession or spoliation” but also refers to any “purchase or transaction regardless of 
whatever consideration may have been employed”. Consequently, any transfer of an 
object qualifying as cultural material during the Nazi reign was considered as a form of 
looting and qualified for restitution to the governments of the countries from which 
they were taken.  
The term ‘cultural material’ is defined in Art. 18-101 as including “all movable goods 
of importance or value either religious, artistic, documentary, scholarly or historic, the 
disappearance of which constitutes a loss to the cultural heritage of the country 
concerned (…)”.283 The restitution practice of the Military Government, however, went 
further than only restituting objects of national relevance:284 until 1951 more than one 
million cultural objects had been identified and restituted on the basis of MGR Title 
18.285  
                                                     
278 Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 24. 
279 Cf.: Lillteicher, J., 2003, p. 95 
280 Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S. Military Government Regulations, Title 18: 
‘Monuments, fine arts and archives’, February 12, 1947. For the full text see: Annex 10 in Kowalski, W.W., 
1998, pp. 153-160. 
281 See above for short description of Law No. 52: ‘Blocking and control of property’, Military Government 
Gazette (Germany, U.S. Zone, issue A). 
282 The provisions of MGR Title 18 dealing with aspects of protection of cultural property different from 
the question of restitution will not be further discussed here. 
283 The Article lists the following examples: “recognised works of art, as well as such objects as rare musical 
instruments, books and manuscripts, scientific documents of a historic or cultural nature, and all objects 
usually found in museums, collections, libraries and historic archives”.  
284 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 143. The Military Governor for the U.S. Zone in Germany, General Clay stated that 
“restitution of all cultural objects was self-evident”. Clay, L.D., 1950, p. 342. 
285 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 149; Final Report – Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section, 30 December 
1948, File “Final Reports – Reparations and Restitution”, Record Group 260, Records of Property Division, 
Records of the Reparations and Restitution Branch, Reports and Related Records Re: Restitution, 1945-
1950, cited in Kurtz, M., J., 1997, p. 116. See also:  
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Restitution after the Bonn Treaty 
So far, the principles of the Allies with regard to the restitution of cultural objects 
looted by the Nazis from their occupied territories, as well as the U.S. implementation in 
the form of MGR Title 18 have been outlined. The fact that each Occupation Zone 
introduced its own implementation regime did not mean a definitive end to common 
action in respect of the restitution of cultural property, at least not for the three Western 
Allies. With regard to the Soviet Union, however, the different perception of how to 
reconstruct the post-war world, including the restitution of cultural property, became 
ever more apparent. The cooperation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union 
ended in March 1948, when the Soviet representative left the Allied Control Council, 
which resulted in an intensification of the Cold War. Consequently, the following 
elaborations apply only to the Federal Republic of Germany that was established by the 
three Western Allies on 23 May 1949 and not to the German Democratic Republic, 
which was established by the Soviet Union on 7 October 1949.  
With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Western Allied 
Forces had laid the foundations for re-integrating their individual restitution regimes on 
the basis of an international treaty. In 1952, the Western Allies took the initiative for 
such a treaty that would serve as explicit legal basis for further external restitutions from 
Germany.286 The ‘Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and 
the Occupation’ (hereinafter: “the Bonn Treaty”) was signed on 26 May 1952.287 The 
Bonn Treaty did not stand by itself but was one of the “satellite conventions” to the 
‘Germany Treaty’ that ended Germany's status as an occupied territory and re-
established it with the rights of a sovereign state.288 The Bonn Treaty entered into force 
only after the adoption of a Protocol signed on 23 October 1954 in Paris.289 In the 
following, the Bonn Treaty as amended by this 1954 Protocol will be discussed in as far 
as it is relevant for the restitution of cultural objects.290 
The Bonn Treaty deals with a range of subjects both future-oriented and directed at 
the “liquidation of the past”.291 Section V of the Bonn Treaty determines how Germany 
had to carry out the external restitutions of cultural objects that had been taken from the 
                                                                                                                                          
http://149.217.72.46/ww/en/pub/research/details/publications/institute/prax/pr98.cfm?fuseaction_prax
=act&act=pr98_53 (Last visited: 30 June 2008).  
286 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 165.  
287 Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (Vertrag über 
die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Mächten), signed at Bonn, 26 
May 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1955  II. 29.03.1954, No 3). 
288 Vertrag über die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Mächten 
("Deutschlandvertrag") vom 26. Mai 1952 in der Fassung vom 23. Oktober 1954, 332 U.N.T.S. 219. Cf.: 
Engstler, L., 1964, p. 144.  
289 Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 Oct. 
1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 327. 
290 The 1952 Convention never entered into force in the original version. Hollander, B., 1959, p. 42.  
291 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 144.  
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occupied territories.292 The implementation and execution of these provisions became 
the responsibility of the Federal Office External Regulations, the establishment of which 
had been required by Art. 1(1) of Section V.293 
The Bonn Treaty distinguishes between two categories of cultural objects: “jewellery, 
silverware and antique furniture”294 on the one hand and “cultural property” on the 
other. Cultural property is defined in Art. 1(4) as comprising: “movable goods of 
religious, artistic, documentary, scholarly or historic value, or of equivalent importance, 
including objects customarily found in museums, public or private collections, libraries 
or historic archives”. Both categories could be reclaimed by the government from 
whose territory the cultural object in question had been removed during the occupation 
by the German or Allied Forces or their individual members.295 Restitution was ordered 
for acquisition by duress (with or without violence), by theft, requisition or other forms 
of dispossession by force.296  
With regard to “cultural property”, Art. 1(2) extended the restitution regime to apply 
also to cultural property that was acquired by way of gift made under direct or indirect 
pressure or in consideration of the official position of the recipient. Furthermore, 
cultural property that had been acquired by way of purchase was to be restituted unless 
it had been brought into the country concerned for the purpose of sale. A precondition 
for the extended restitution regime to apply to cultural property was its presence in the 
respective territory at the start of the occupation.297 
Different from “cultural property”, restitution of jewellery, silverware or antique 
furniture could be denied if it was established that the object concerned was removed 
after acquisition from the original owner for value by way of a regular commercial 
transaction, even if payment was made in occupation currency.298 The burden of proof, 
however, rested upon Germany, as a result of which there was a great likelihood that the 
objects would be restituted.299 The possibility for governments to assert claims was 
                                                     
292 All references to specific articles must be understood as referring to articles from Section V. (Each 
Section in the Bonn Treaty restarts the numbering of the articles with the consequence that each of the 
twelve sections has an Art. 1). See further below in chp.1.§4.III on Section III of the Bonn Treaty dealing 
with questions of internal restitution.  
293 Art. 1(1) requires the Federal Republic to establish an administrative agency to search for, recover, and 
restitute cultural objects as provided for in Section V of the Bonn Treaty. The Federal Office External 
Restitutions (Bundesamt für äussere Restitutionen was founded by Law dating from 8 June 1955 (BGBl. II, 
p. 700). Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 146. 
294 Art. 1(4) specifies the term "antique" as “property which upon the entry into force of the present 
Convention is one hundred or more years old. The term "substantial value" shall mean a value of not less 
than 200,000 French francs at the 1 January 1951 purchasing power”. 
295  Art. 1(1) and Art. 3 (1) of Section V of the Treaty of Bonn. 
296 Art. 1(1) and Art. 3 (1) of Section V of the Treaty of Bonn. 
297 See for the relevant dates for the different territories: Art. 5(1).  
298 Art. 1(3) of Section V of the Treaty of Bonn.  
299 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 146.  
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subject to time limitations. The deadline to filing a claim lapsed on 8 May 1965 (Art. 
2(1)).300 
Art. 4(1) of Section V of the Bonn Treaty deals with the situation that cultural 
property, which had been identified in Germany as qualifying for restitution301 was 
destroyed, stolen, lost or otherwise disposed before it could have been restituted. In 
those cases, the person who was entitled to restitution will be granted financial 
compensation.302 According to Art. 4(5), the amount of the compensation was to be set 
at the replacement value of the object at the time of the decision granting 
compensation.303 
With the adoption of the Bonn Treaty, responsibility for the external restitution of 
cultural property was handed over to Germany.304  
2.  EX T E R N A L  R E ST I T U T I O N  F R O M  T H E  AL L I E S   
 In the following, the restitution of cultural objects by the United States on behalf 
of Germany will be addressed.305 Cultural property was not only looted by the Nazis, it 
was also taken by (members of) the Allied Forces from German territory during the 
                                                     
300 Next to governments, the Bonn Treaty also granted certain restitution rights to private individuals who 
had lost their possession during the occupation due to theft or duress to German or Allied Forces or 
individual members (Art. 3). However, different from claims asserted by the governments, the right to claim 
does not exist where the present possessor had possessed the object in good faith for at least ten years or 
until 8 May 1956. This limitation was an important aspect for claimants to take into account, the more as 
Art. 2(4) of the Bonn Treaty ruled out a double claim from a dispossessed individual and a Government 
(Art. 2(4) reads: “Submission of a claim for restitution pursuant to Art. 1 of this chapter on behalf of any 
person or entity shall preclude such submission pursuant to Art. 3; likewise, action for restitution pursuant 
to Art. 3 shall preclude submission of a claim for restitution pursuant to Art. 1”). In those cases where 
restitution was not prevented by the protection of a subsequent good faith possessor, it was nevertheless 
subject to the requirement that the holder is reimbursed for expenditures. Furthermore, if the claimant had 
previously received any financial consideration for the loss, the amount had to be repaid to the German 
authorities. While the rights that the Bonn treaty accords to private individuals is secondary in standing 
compared with the rights of governments, the fact that it does accord rights to private parties is remarkable 
in that it deviates from general restitution practise that is limited to the relationship between governments. 
301 See for an elaboration on the meaning of “identifiable”: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 147-149. Engstler 
elaborates upon the difference between the identification of an object and the mere theoretical possibility to 
identify an object. In order to qualify for restitution only de facto identification is relevant. 
302 Art. 4(1) reads in German: “Ist eine zu restituierende Sache nach ihrer Identifizierung in Deutschland, 
aber vor Rückgabe an den Restitutionsberechtigten entweder in Deutschland verwendet oder verbraucht 
worden, oder vor ihrem Eingang bei der den Anspruch erhebenden Regierung oder bei einer zuständigen 
Dienststelle einer der Drei Mächte zwecks Ablieferung an den Restitutionsberechtigten zerstört oder 
gestohlen worden oder abhanden gekommen, so wird die Bundesrepublik die Personen entschädigen, die 
sonst gemäß Artikel 1 und 3 dieses Teils restitutionsberechtigt wären oder deren Restitutionsansprüche bei 
Inkrafttreten dieses Vertrags durch eine der Drei Mächte bereits gebilligt waren”. 
303 Art. 4(5) reads in German: “Die in diesem Artikel vorgesehene Entschädigung ist in der Höhe des 
Wiederbeschaffungswertes der Sachen zur Zeit der Entscheidung darüber zu leisten”. 
304 See further below in chp. 1.§4.III on the relevance of the Bonn Treaty for internal restitutions. 
305 See further on restitutions from the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 
170-174. 
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liberation and after the end of the war. In respect of the Western Allies, the looting of 
cultural property was officially banned and remained limited to actions by individual 
soldiers.306 In respect of the Soviet Union, official “trophy brigades” had been 
established to seize works of art from Germany as war reparations.307 While the taking 
of cultural objects by (members of) the Allied Forces differed from the seeking of 
reparations by the Soviet Union to personal enrichment of individual soldiers from all 
Allied Armies, it did not have the ideological baggage of the looting under the Nazi 
Regime. The absence of such ideological baggage does not mean that the taking did not 
breach the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The restitution by the US Allies 
constitutes the first time that cultural objects were restituted to a former aggressor 
state.308 The only incident in which cultural objects had been returned to a former 
aggressor state in the past was in the context of restitutions after Napoleon’s campaigns: 
in 1816, the Allied Powers returned a number of art works to France. However, the 
return is different from the restitution by the US Allies in that the objects returned to 
France were objects that had mistakenly been restituted from France to the Allied 
Powers rather than objects that had been looted by the Allied Powers from France.309.  
The first official document touching upon U.S. restitutions of cultural objects 
removed from Germany dates from 1945. It concerns a circular issued by the American 
Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War 
Areas that appealed to everybody to return cultural objects removed from Germany to 
its rightful owner.310 On 28 January 1947, the War-Navy-Coordinating-Committee 
issued guidelines for the return of “Looted Objects of Art to Countries of Origin”.311 
The guidelines declared it the responsibility of the United States Government “to return 
to their countries of origin those cultural objects which have been wrongfully taken and 
brought to the United States during and after the War”.312 The guidelines were followed 
up with a circular from the State Department that was sent to all universities, museums, 
                                                     
306 See for an example of private looting the case of the Quedlinburg Treasure (Siehr, K., 1992a; 
Kogelfranz, S. / Korte, W., A., 1996; Kline, T., R., 1997; Weil, S., 1999).  
307 In total, the trophy brigades removed an estimated 2.6 million art objects and archaeological material 
(Mastroberardino, M.M., 1997, p. 228).  
308 The Treaty of Versailles concluding the First World War only dealt with the restitution of cultural 
property from Germany. The analysis of restitutions preceding the Treaty of Versailles, starting with the 
Treaty of Westphalia also did not reveal any restitutions on behalf of an aggressor state. Odendahl, K., 
2005, p. 170. See further for a few more examples of restitutions to a defeated party: Walter, B., 1988, p. 80. 
309 Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. 28. 
310 Hall, A.R., 1951, p. 340. See also: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 168. Another document that should be 
mentioned here is the so-called Wiesbaden Manifest that was published by officers of the Monuments Fine 
Arts and Archives section working in the Wiesbaden Central Collecting Point on 7 November 1945 as 
protest to the order to ship a selection of German "works of art of greatest importance" to the United 
States. See further: Siehr, K., 1998, pp. 275-276. 
311 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 168. 
312 Department of State Bulletin, February 23, 1947, pp. 358-360.  
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libraries and art dealers in the United States with the request to contribute to the 
restitution of the dispersed cultural objects.313 The circular stated that  
 
“it is the responsibility and desire of the Government of the United States to recover and return to owner 
nations those cultural objects, including works of art, archival material and books, looted, stolen or 
improperly dispersed from public and private collections in war areas and brought to the United States 
during and following World War II”.314  
 
The assessment of the actual cases and subsequent restitutions followed the regime 
as provided for under the ‘Military Government Regulations: Title 18: Monuments, Fine 
Arts and Archives’, which has been outlined above.315 
By providing for the restitution of cultural property looted from public and private 
German collections, the United States lived up to its obligations under the 1907 Hague 
Convention and confirmed the principle that all cultural property looted during 
hostilities or under occupation must be restituted, also to a former aggressor state.  
3.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  O F  T H E  EX T E R N A L  R E S T I T U TI O N S  A F T E R  WO R L D  
WA R  I I   
 When World War II broke out in 1939, the only relevant treaties in force were 
the 1899 /1907 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The 
failure of the two Hague Conventions in protecting cultural objects both against 
destruction and removal was evident long before the German surrender in May 1945. 
Against this background it must not surprise that the Allied Forces started with 
preparing the post-war restitutions already prior to the end of the war. There was no 
debate whether cultural objects should be restituted. Instead, the discussions focussed 
on the form that restitution should take.316  
The final restitution regime as introduced by the Allied Forces accords great 
relevance to the restitution of cultural objects. By stressing the need to restitute cultural 
objects rather than subsuming the loss under the sum of reparations to be paid, the 
restitution measures recognised the uniqueness of cultural objects. The understanding 
and respect of the uniqueness of cultural objects was consequentially followed, also with 
regard to those cultural objects that could not be physically restituted. While the 
instruments from the preparatory phase317 suggested meeting the inability to restitute 
cultural objects that had been destroyed or were in any event not traceable by 
                                                     
313 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 168. 
314 See for full text of the document: Hall, A.R., 1951, p. 344. 
315 Ibid., p. 340. See for examples of affected restitutions of cultural objects that originated first and 
foremost from public German Collections: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 169-170.  
316 Cf.: Sandholtz, W., 2008, p. 121.  
317 See ‘Resolution on the Subject of Restitution’ annexed to the Final Act of the Paris Conference on 
Reparations and the 1946 Allied Control Council’s ‘Declaration on the Definition of the Term “Restitution” 
further discussed above. 
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compensation in specie / restitution in kind318 this idea was not realised in the restitution 
regime as finally introduced by the Western Allies.319 While the renunciation of 
compensation in specie / restitution in kind at first sight seems to dismiss the perception 
of the uniqueness of cultural objects, it is the only logically sound consequence in that it 
recognises the uniqueness of cultural objects that would have served as replacements.  
The restitution regime furthermore stands out for corresponding with the reality of 
Nazi art looting and for its efficiency: until 1952 more than 90% of the cultural objects 
that had been removed from the occupied territories had been returned to the state of 
origin.320 To conclude this section discussing the external restitutions of cultural objects 
to the countries from where they had been taken during World War II it must be 
emphasised that the restitution under public international law is completed the moment 
that the object concerned was handed over to the claiming state.321  
VI .  TH E  A F T E R MA T H  O F  WO RL D  WA R  I I :  1954 HA G U E  CON VE N T I ON  A N D  I TS  
P R O T O COL S   
1 .  TH E  1954  HA G U E  CON V EN T IO N 
 The massive looting of cultural property during World War II had painfully 
highlightened the need to improve the legal protection of cultural property.322 It must 
therefore not surprise that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) looked into improving the protection of ‘objects of cultural 
value’.323 In 1954 UNESCO accepted an offer from the Dutch government to hoist an 
intergovernmental conference on this matter.324 The conference was held in April - May 
1954 in The Hague and resulted in the adoption of the Hague Convention of May 1954 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereinafter: 
“the 1954 Hague Convention”) and the (First) Protocol for the Protection of Cultural 
                                                     
318 For those cases in which the original object has been destroyed the expression “compensation in specie” 
as suggested by Siehr (Siehr, K., 1993, p. 116) or “replacement in kind” as suggested by Gattini (Gattini, A., 
1996, p. 5) is more appropriate than “restitution in kind”. See further on the choice of terminology in 
chp.1.§1.III discussing Art. 247 of the Versailles Treaty.  
319 See Military Government Regulations: Title 18: Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives and the Bonn 
Treaty, in particular its Art. 4 further discussed above. Cf.: Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 140. 
320 Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 149-150; Hipp, A., 2000, p. 56, fn. 40. 
321 Readers interested in the implementation of the Allied restitution regime may be referred to e.g.: Smyth, 
C., Hugh, 1988; Farmer, W.I., 2000. 
322 Toman, J., 1996, p. 21.  
323 UNESCO was founded in November 1945 as result of a conference held by United Nations on the 
establishment of an educational and cultural organization. One of the purposes of UNESCO is to “assure 
the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of 
history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions” 
(Art. I.2 (c) of the UNESCO Constitution). See for early initiatives of UNESCO on the protection of 
cultural objects e.g. resolution 6.42 adopted by UNESCO at its fourth session in Paris 1949. See further on 
the resolution and subsequent preparatory works: ibid., p. 22. 
324 Ibid., p. 23. 
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Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.325 The 1954 Hague Convention was the first 
truly international treaty dedicated to the protection of cultural property.326  
The adoption of the 1954 Hague Convention did not abolish the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions, nor did it make them redundant. While the 1954 Hague 
Convention introduced novel concepts and concrete measures for the protection of 
cultural property, it is supplementary to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.327 In 
the following, the improvements that were introduced by the 1954 Hague Conventions 
for the protection of cultural property will be outlined. 
The most innovative aspect of the 1954 Hague Convention was the introduction of 
the concept of “common property”.328 The protection of cultural property law under 
public international law was no longer based upon the notion that cultural property was 
first and foremost the property of a single state, but instead assumes that cultural 
property is the property of all mankind.329 Merryman has coined this perception of 
cultural property as “cultural internationalism”.330  
The understanding of an object as cultural property or cultural heritage of mankind 
implies two sets of obligations. First, it puts greater responsibility on a belligerent or 
occupying force for the protection of cultural property located in the battlefields, 
respectively in the occupied territories of another State Party. Secondly, the qualification 
of cultural property as the heritage of mankind also increases the responsibility of the 
holding state. With cultural property situated in its own territory being understood as 
the property of all mankind the holding state is required to take protective measures for 
the safeguarding of cultural property.  
                                                     
325 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The 
Hague, 14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 215); Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 358); Schindler, 
D. / Toman, J., 2004, pp. 999-1025. 
326 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 119. While the Roerich Pact on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific 
Institutions and Historic Monuments preceded the 1954 Hague Convention it applied only between the 
United States of America and the other American Republics.  
327 See Art. 36 of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Convention’s relation to previous conventions.  
328 Vernon, C., 1994, p. 457; Kastenberg, J., E., 1997, p. 277. Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 118. 
329 See, in particular the preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention that reads: “[b]eing convinced that 
damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of 
all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world”. To be precise, the notion 
of cultural property being the heritage of mankind had been introduced already at the end of the 19th 
century in the correspondence between Quatremère de Quincy and General Miranda and had been included 
in a number of declarations and international treaty drafts. The 1954 Hague Convention was, however, the 
first adopted and legally binding instrument that was based upon the notion that cultural property belonged 
to all mankind. See further: Quatremère de Quincy, 1796, Lettres à Mirande sur le déplacement des d'Art de 
l'Italie. See further on the draft conventions that were not adopted: Strebel, H., 1955/56, p. 41-44; Kaye, L., 
M., 1997, p. 103; Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 112-115 on the draft by the League of Nations ‘for the Protection 
of Historic Buildings and Works of Art in Time of War’). See further on the 1939 (draft) ‘International 
Convention for the Protection of National Collections of Art and History: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 49-52. 
330 Merryman, J.H., 1986, p. 836. The other “way of thinking about cultural property” according to 
Merryman is “cultural nationalism” according which conceives cultural property as part of a national 
cultural heritage (p. 832).  
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Further to introducing the notion of cultural heritage of mankind, the 1954 Hague 
Convention constitutes the first international treaty to provide for a definition of 
“cultural property”.331 The definition of “cultural property” in Art. 1 comprises three 
categories of cultural objects:332 first movable or immovable property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people, secondly buildings whose main and 
effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit movable cultural property (that is of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people) and finally centres containing a large 
amount of cultural property from the previous two categories.  
The requirement of Art. 1 that a cultural object must be of “great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people”333 in order to qualify as cultural property in the sense of 
the Convention suggests a rather high threshold. However, the analysis of the evidence 
available “points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the Convention applies to all 
movable (…) property considered by each respective state to form part of its national 
cultural heritage”.334 Put differently, the reference to “every people” must be understood 
as referring to “each respective people”.335 Consequently, states enjoy a great margin of 
appreciation in determining which cultural objects qualify as cultural property in the 
sense of the Convention.336 In conclusion, the definition of cultural property of the 
1954 Hague Convention allows for a broad, almost unlimited interpretation of the 
objects that can qualify as cultural property.337  
                                                     
331 Boguslavsky, M., M, 1994, p. 5; O'Keefe, P., 1999b. 
332 Art. 1 reads: “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term `cultural property' shall cover, 
irrespective of origin or ownership:  
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of 
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other 
objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important 
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;  
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property 
defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges 
intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph 
(a);  
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be 
known as `centers containing monuments'”. 
333 (Emphasis added). 
334 O'Keefe, P., 1999b, p. 36. The broad interpretation is furthermore supported by the listing of examples 
of (movable) cultural property in Art. 1 a) of the Convention such as: “works of art; manuscripts, books and 
other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important 
collections of books or archives or reproductions (…) of cultural property”. 
335 Ibid. O’Keefe points for further support of the finding of his analysis to the Preamble of the 1954 Hague 
Convention, para. 2: “Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution 
to the culture of the world”.  
336 Ibid. In the literature, the broad understanding of the definition is generally confirmed: see, e.g.: Toman, 
J., 1996, p. 54; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 59; Draye, A.M., 2007, p. 29; Memorie van Toelichting, 30 165, no. 3, 
p. 5. 
337 Cf.: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 59. 
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The Convention’s scope of protection applies both to situations of international and 
non-international character. 338 Situations of international character are not limited to 
armed conflicts but include situations of occupation even when met by no armed 
resistance. Different from the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the application of the 
1954 Hague Convention is not limited by a “general participation requirement”. Instead, 
in situations where not all parties to a conflict are State Parties, the Convention applies 
in the mutual relation between State Parties.339 
The scope of protection granted by the 1954 Hague Convention is outlined in its 
Artt. 2-7. In order to ensure for an efficient protection, and in light of the notion of 
common heritage, the obligations of State Parties commence already prior to the 
outbreak of a conflict. State Parties are required to take (preparatory) measures in 
peacetimes to allow for the most effective protection during armed conflicts and 
occupations.340 Once an international or internal conflict has erupted and endangers 
cultural property, the Convention seeks to protect the objects against destruction, as 
well as against looting. While the emphasis of the Convention is on the physical 
protection of cultural property against damage or destruction341, the Convention also 
provides for a ban on the looting of cultural property. With regard to the looting of 
cultural property in the event of armed conflict342, Art. 4(3) of the 1954 Hague 
Convention provides that: 
 
“[t]he High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any 
form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. 
They shall refrain from requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High 
Contracting Party”.  
 
If one squares this provision with the protective regime introduced by the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions, it becomes evident that Art. 4(3) of the 1954 Hague 
Convention constitutes on the hand a positive re-formulation of Artt. 23 and Art. 28 of 
the Hague Conventions. On the other hand, it exceeds the protection granted by the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions: first, the 1954 Hague Convention does not allow 
                                                     
338 Art. 19(1) declares the provisions of the Convention to apply to conflicts not of an international 
character. This provision was crucial with regard to the destructions in former Yugoslavia. See further: 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, para. 98 (Oct. 2, 1995). See further: Abtahi, H., 2001.  
339 Art. 18(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention.  
340 See Artt. 3, 6, 7 of the 1954 Hague Convention.  
341 With regard to protection of cultural property during armed conflict / occupation Art. 4(1) provides: 
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as 
well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and 
its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to 
expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of 
hostility, directed against such property”. 
342 Cf.: Art. 4(1) that speaks only of the situation of armed conflict and not about occupation. Art. 5, on the 
other hand, focuses on the protection of cultural property under occupation.  
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for military necessities to constitute a waiver of the safeguarding of cultural property: 
the ban on looting as formulated by Art. 4(3) is absolute.343 Secondly, Art. 4(3) 
introduces new obligations: further to prohibiting State Parties from requisitioning 
movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party, it 
also introduces a duty of care for State Parties in that they must “undertake to prohibit, 
prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of 
(…) cultural property”. Put differently, Art. 4(3) not only regulates the active behaviour 
of State Parties and takes away the military necessity waver clause with regard to looting 
of cultural property during armed conflict; it also requires State Parties to monitor and 
regulate the behaviour of third parties. The latter is again an expression of the 
understanding of cultural property as the heritage of mankind.  
Art. 5 complements this regime with rules applicable during periods of occupation. 
The article requires the State Parties to support the national authorities in the protection 
of their cultural heritage:  
 
“[a]ny High Contracting Party in occupation of the whole or part of the territory of another High 
Contracting Party shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country 
in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property”.344  
 
It should be pointed out that while Art. 5 does not explicitly provide for a ban on 
looting, the ban on looting as introduced in Art. 4(3) applies also to situations of 
occupation. Art. 5 functions in addition to Art. 4 rather than as lex specialis. 345 What is 
missing in the 1954 Hague Convention with regard to objects removed during armed 
conflict and occupation is a provision providing explicitly for the restitution of removed 
cultural objects.346 The reason that the 1954 Hague Convention does not include such a 
provision stems from the objections voiced by a number of states against such provision 
especially with regard to the return of cultural property removed from occupied 
territories.347 
The absence of such a primary right for restitution does not mean that cultural 
property requisitioned in breach of Art. 4(3) must not be restituted. As outlined above 
with reference to the Chorzów Factory Case 1928 the breach of a treaty-provision is 
                                                     
343 Cf.: Jenschke, C., 2005, pp. 60-61. It should be noted here that the military necessities clause is not fully 
abolished under the 1954 Hague Convention. It may still be evoked in cases where military necessity 
imperatively requires the damaging or destructing cultural property.  
344 The other provisions of Art. 5 read: (2). Should it prove necessary to take measures to preserve cultural 
property situated in occupied territory and damaged by military operations, and should the competent 
national authorities be unable to take such measures, the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in 
close co-operation with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation.  
(3). Any High Contracting Party whose government is considered their legitimate government by members 
of a resistance movement, shall, if possible, draw their attention to the obligation to comply with those 
provisions of the Convention dealing with respect for cultural property. 
345 Cf.: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 61. 
346 Cf.: Kennon, H., 1996, pp. 385-386; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 62. 
347 Nahlik, S.E., 1976, p. 1083; Boylan, P.J., 1993, p. 99, para. 10.93. 
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sufficient for an obligation to make reparations to arise.348 Consequently, cultural 
property requisitioned in breach of Art. 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention must be 
restituted.349 This is, however, not the case for cultural objects removed during a period 
of occupation. The more indirect application of Art. 4(3) to situations of occupation and 
the fact that the loss of cultural objects during occupation is often caused also by 
civilians stand in the way of such an effect. The obligation to restitute cultural objects 
that have removed from an occupied territory has, however, been included in a protocol 
that was adopted simultaneously with the 1954 Hague Convention.  
2.  TH E  F I R S T  PR O T O C O L  O F  T H E  1954  HA G UE  CO N V EN T IO N 
 The (First) Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (hereinafter: “the (First) Protocol”)350 was adopted together with the 
1954 Hague Convention. It entered into force on 7 August 1956.351 
The (First) Protocol relies upon the definition of cultural property as provided for in 
Art. 1 of 1954 Hague Convention. It deals with the obligations of State Parties with 
regard to the protection of cultural property in an occupied territory and provides for 
the return of cultural property that has been removed nevertheless.  
The key provisions of the (First) Protocol are contained in its Art. I.352 According to 
Art. I 1, which is directed at a State Party occupying another country during an armed 
conflict, any exportation of cultural property from the occupied territories must be 
prevented. For the (First) Protocol to apply it is irrelevant whether the occupied country 
is a State Party; it is sufficient that the occupying country is a State Party. The obligation 
for the occupying State Party to prevent the exportation of cultural property is 
                                                     
348 Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ Series A, No. 17 (1928). See further above in chp. 1.§1.II discussing state 
liability under the 1899 Hague Convention.  
349 See also the Chorzów Factory Case discussed above in chp. 1.§1.II on the primacy of restitution over 
other forms of reparations. 
350 Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, signed at The Hague, 14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 358). When speaking of “Protocol” reference is 
always to the First Protocol.  
351 As of the end of June 2009, 100 countries had become a State Party. See for the actual list: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=410&ps=P. 
352 1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to prevent the exportation, from a territory occupied by it 
during an armed conflict, of cultural property as defined in Art. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague on 14 May, 1954.  
2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to take into its custody cultural property imported into its 
territory either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory. This shall either be effected automatically 
upon the importation of the property or, failing this, at the request of the authorities of that territory.  
3. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to return, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities 
of the territory previously occupied, cultural property which is in its territory, if such property has been 
exported in contravention of the principle laid down in the first paragraph. Such property shall never be 
retained as war reparations.  
4. The High Contracting Party whose obligation it was to prevent the exportation of cultural property from 
the territory occupied by it shall pay an indemnity to the holders in good faith of any cultural property 
which has to be returned in accordance with the preceding paragraph.  
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complemented with obligations concerning cultural property that was nevertheless 
exported from the occupied territories. These obligations, which consist of taking the 
objects into custody (Art. I 2) and of returning them at the close of hostilities (Art. I 3) 
apply to all State Parties, rather than only the occupying one.353 
According to Art. I 3, the obligation to return cultural property at the close of 
hostilities to the competent authorities of the formerly occupied territory is absolute: it 
is neither subject to any prescription, nor does it recede from any rights that might have 
been acquired after the export by a bona fide purchaser.354 The obligation of a State 
Party to return an object even in the case that one of its own citizens has in the 
meantime acquired the object in good faith or even acquired full legal title is 
complemented by the obligation for the (formerly) occupying State Party to pay 
compensation to the potential good faith purchaser.355 The amount and modalities of 
the compensation depend on the respective national laws.356  
Intermediary conclusions and Application of the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocol 
The 1954 Hague Convention was the first truly international treaty dedicated to the 
protection of cultural property.357 It is hailed as a mile stone for the protection of 
cultural property.358 This qualification is based both on abstract and concrete changes 
brought about by the convention for the protection of cultural property: on a more 
abstract level, the 1954 Hague Convention is relevant from a conceptual point of view 
in stressing the notion that cultural property is not only the property of one nation but 
instead is the property or heritage of humankind. Further to introducing the notion of 
“cultural internationalism”359 the 1954 Hague Convention was also the first truly 
international binding instrument to provide for a definition of the term “cultural 
property”. The definition as provided for in Art. 1 is particularly relevant for explicitly 
mentioning movable cultural objects and for its broad understanding of cultural 
property: prior to the 1954 Hague Convention movable objects of cultural relevance 
were protected only indirectly via the protection of the immovable structures in which 
they were housed. The broadness of the definition of cultural property as provided for 
                                                     
353 Further to the obligations provided for under Art. I 2 and Art. I 3, the (First) Protocol holds another 
obligation in Art. II 5 that did not exist under the 1954 Hague Convention. According to Art. II 5, cultural 
property that had been deposited with a State Party for reasons of safeguarding must be returned at the end 
of the hostilities. This obligation is, however, less significant than Art. I 3 that seeks to address situations of 
long-lasting occupations as it had been the case during World War II. During the occupation of e.g. The 
Netherlands and France numerous works of art were acquired by the Nazi leaders, as well as by German 
museums and private collectors. Engstler, L., 1964, p. 151. 
354 Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 66.  
355 Toman, J., 1996, p. 346; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 69. 
356 Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 69.  
357 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 119. While the Roerich Pact on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific 
Institutions and Historic Monuments preceded the 1954 Hague Convention it applied only between the 
United States of America and the other American Republics.  
358 Toman, J., 1996, p. 24; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 118. 
359 Merryman, J.H., 1986, p. 836. 
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by the 1954 Hague Convention is not only the result of comprising both movable and 
immovable property. Instead, it also the result of the significant margin of appreciation 
granted to State Parties for determining which objects are of great importance to “its 
people”. By combining universal protection with decentralised decision-making of what 
constitutes cultural property the definition fits the notion of cultural internationalism: 
not only are all State Parties obliged to protect the cultural heritage of humankind, they 
also have to respect different views on what constitutes cultural heritage.  
Concrete improvements of the protection of cultural property lie in the following 
characteristics of the conventions: first, the absence of a “general participation 
requirement”.360 Secondly, Art. 4(3) formulates an explicit ban on the looting of cultural 
property. While looting was already banned under the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions, the ban was not explicitly expressed with regard to cultural objects but 
was contained in more general bans on looting (Art. 23 and Art. 28 of 1899 and 1907 
Hague Convention). Thirdly, the 1954 Hague Convention offers greater protection than 
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention in that it does not allow for the protection against 
looting to be waived in case of military necessity. Finally, Art. 4(3) of the Hague 
Convention extends the obligation of State Parties of refraining from requisitioning 
movable cultural property to monitoring and regulating the behaviour of third parties.  
The previous passage reflected upon the most significant improvements brought 
about by the 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property against 
looting.361 Despite generally supporting the praise for the 1954 Hague Convention, the 
analysis also showed that the Convention does not explicitly provide for the restitution 
of cultural property looted during armed conflicts or removed from a territory under 
occupation. Such a provision has, however, been included in the (First) Protocol to the 
Hague Convention, which has been adopted to absorb the gaps of the 1954 Hague 
Convention.  
The (First) Protocol significantly extends the protection of cultural property situated 
in occupied territories. Not only does it explicitly ban any removal of cultural property 
from an occupied territory and obliges State Parties to actively prevent such removal, it 
also provides for the restitution of cultural property whose removal from a territory 
under occupation during an armed conflict could not be prevented. The obligation to 
restitute cultural property as provided for in Art. I 3 is far-reaching: it applies also to a 
State Party that is not involved in the occupation; it is not subject to prescription, and 
works also against a bona fide purchaser. The (First) Protocol hence significantly 
improved the protection of cultural property against removal during occupations and 
the chances for the restitution of the removed objects.  
                                                     
360 Cf.: Art. 2 of the Regulations annexed to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions discussed above. 
361 The relevance of the 1954 Hague Convention was emphasised with the inclusion of Art. 53 in the first 
and Art. 16 in the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Cf.: Wyss, M.P., 1994, p. 92. 
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The rules as provided for in the 1954 Hague Convention and the (First) Protocol 
have been confirmed in reaction to the conflicts in the Middle East, in particular the 
(First) Gulf War (1990–91).362 The United Nations Security Council Resolution from 
March 1991363 determined that Iraq, which had ratified the 1954 Hague Convention and 
its (First) Protocol in 1967, had to return to Kuwait, which had accessed to the 1954 
Hague Convention in 1969 and to the (First) Protocol in 1970, all looted (cultural) 
property.364  
In response to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and United Kingdom 
(also referred to as Second Gulf War) UN Security Council Resolution 1483 was 
adopted.365 This resolution, which resolved a number of ambiguities that resulted from 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and United Kingdom, requires Member 
States: 
 
“to take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and other 
items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from 
the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and other locations in Iraq by establishing Iraq since the 
adoption of resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, including a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such 
items and items with respect to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed 
(…)”.366  
 
What is interesting about the provision is that it applies not only to objects that were 
illegally removed from 2003 onwards but instead applies to all objects illegally removed 
since 6 August 1990. This retroactivity is strictly limited to the legal situation addressed 
by Resolution 1483. While the Resolution, being adopted under chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, is binding on all Member States of the United Nations367 its 
legal force is limited to the specific legal situation it addresses, i.e. cultural property 
                                                     
362 During the Iran – Iraq War of 1980 belligerents in general lived up to the obligations of the 1954 Hague 
Convention. No looting of cultural objects worth mentioning occurred (Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 174). With 
regard to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (or Second Gulf War) it has been stated that the main looting occurred 
by the civil population of Iraq (Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 176; Zelig, J.M., 2005, p. 289 ). With the United States 
not being a State Party to the 1954 Hague Convention, which imposes on State Parties a specific obligation 
not only to refrain from looting but also to “prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of 
theft, pillage or misappropriation of (…) cultural property”, the question whether the provisions of the 
1954 Hague Convention have become binding of customary law becomes relevant not only from a 
theoretical point of view. See further below in chp. 1.§VIII.   
363 Resolution S/RES/686-1991, para. 2 (d) reads: “(…) that Iraq immediately begin[s] to return all Kuwaiti 
property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period”.  
364 See further on the relevance of the 1954 Hague Convention to the 1990-1991 (First) Gulf War: Oyer III, 
H.E., 1999. 
365 Security Council Resolution 1483, P 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).  
366 Ibid., para. 7. For Member States of the European Community Resolution 1483 was implemented by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003.  
367 This is particularly relevant for those countries that are not a State Party to the 1954 Hague Convention 
and particular its (First) Protocol, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States 
adopted the ‘Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act’ to implement the Resolution whereas the UK adopted 
the ‘Iraq Order 2003’.  
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illegally removed, or suspicioned to be illegally removed from Iraq since the adoption of 
resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990. As a resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council, it does not have the same legal relevance as an international treaty that seeks to 
provide a more general and future oriented solution.  
The fact that the 1954 Hague Convention and its (First) Protocol have been 
confirmed by these resolutions of the Security Council must not hide the fact that 
especially the (First) Protocol’s practical relevance has been very limited. In his 1993 
Report on behalf of UNESCO Boylan concludes that  
 
“(…) I have not seen or received evidence of a single example of State Parties to the Protocol taking action 
of any kind in order to bring its provisions into practical effect in order to ‘freeze’ trade in, or other 
transfers or movements of, cultural property from areas affected by either international or internal armed 
conflicts. (…) The almost universal ignoring by actual or potential ‘importing’ countries of the principles of 
the 1954 Hague Protocol is one of the most serious breaches of the fundamental principles and objectives 
of the 1954 Convention, and all High Contracting Parties should be asked to review their policy and 
practice in this respect.”368 
 
In reaction to Boylan’s finding and the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia that 
arose in 1991, and which involved deliberate destructions of cultural property, triggered 
the initiative for a Second Protocol to the Hague Convention.369 
3.  TH E  SE CO N D  PR O T O CO L  O F  T H E  1954  HA G U E  CON V EN T IO N 
 The Second Protocol, which was adopted on 26 March 1999 and entered into 
force in 2004,370 enhances the protection of cultural property against damage and 
destruction. In particular, the Second Protocol provides for a clearer definition of 
military necessity, an improved system of enhanced protection, the extension of the 
application to non-international armed conflicts, and the reinforcement of individual 
criminal responsibility.371 
                                                     
368 Boylan, P.J., 1993, p. 101, para. 110.109. See also: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 168.  
369 Keane, D., 2004, p. 36. See further on the destructions of cultural property during the war in the former 
Yugoslavia, e.g.: Detling, K.J., 1993, pp. 65-72; Destruction of cultural property report (Annex XI) to the 
Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992) S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. V), 1994; Abtahi, H., 2001.  
370 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 26 March 1999. The exact date of entry into force was 9 March 
2004. See Art. 43 according to which the Second Protocol shall enter into force three months after twenty 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession have been deposited. As of June 2009, 53 
countries had become a State Party. See for the actual list:  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=590&ps=P. 
371 Cf.: Schindler, D. / Toman, J., 2004, pp. 1037 & 1038-1052 for the text of the Second Protocol. These 
points correspond to the key areas that had been identified by a meeting of twenty government experts in 
1997. According to the experts the Second Protocol needed to address: institutional aspects, precautionary 
measures to be taken in peacetime, the “military necessity” exception, the system of special protection and 
individual criminal responsibility. Cf.: Keane, D., 2004, pp. 27-28. 
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The relevance of the Second Protocol with regard to the protection of cultural 
property against removal lies in the introduction of criminal responsibility for “theft, 
pillage or misappropriation of (…) cultural property protected under the Convention” 
(Art. 15 (1) sub e). The Second Protocol thereby complements the 1954 Hague 
Convention, which requires its State Parties to introduce criminal reasonability but does 
so without explicit reference to the removal of cultural property.372 Furthermore, with 
regard to the protection of cultural property in occupied territories, Art. 9 of the Second 
Protocol extends the protection granted to archaeological excavations.373 Hence, while 
the Second Protocol touches upon the question of looting of cultural property by 
reinforcing criminal responsibility and by extending the protection granted to cultural 
property during occupations to archaeological excavations, its main contribution lies in 
the realm of protecting (the substance of) cultural property against damage and 
destruction.374 
VI I .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  O N  T H E  R E S T I T U T I O N  O F  C UL T U R A L  O B J E CT S  I N  
T H E  C O N T EX T  O F  A R M E D  C O N F L I C T S  UN D E R  T R E A T Y  L A W 
 The analysis of the protection of cultural property started with the ius praedae, the 
right of the victorious party to loot as the prevailing attitude during Ancient Times and 
traced the evaluation of treaty law from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia onwards. 
Scrutinizing both peace treaties and multilateral treaties, it became evident that it was 
only at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century that public international law provided for 
a ban on the looting of cultural objects and the obligation to restitute looted cultural 
objects.  
The relevant legal instruments were the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land. While the literature so far pushed the 1907 Hague 
Convention as watershed in establishing a ban on the removal of cultural property and 
the obligation to restitute cultural property that had been removed in spite of such a 
ban375, the results of the present analysis point to the 1899 Hague Convention as being 
the crucial legal instrument. Not only was the 1899 Hague Convention the first treaty to 
introduce a ban on the removal of property of cultural relevance in times of war376, it 
also provides for the restitution of cultural objects. Hence, as of 4 September 1900, the 
date when the 1899 Hague Convention entered into force, Member States to the Hague 
Convention had to refrain from destroying and removing cultural property, and had to 
                                                     
372 Art. 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention.  
373 Art. 9 reads: 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Artt. 4 and 5 of the Convention, a Party in 
occupation of the whole or part of the territory of another Party shall prohibit and prevent in relation to the 
occupied territory: a. any illicit export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property; b. any 
archaeological excavation, save where this is strictly required to safeguard, record or preserve cultural 
property. (…). 
374 See further on the Second Protocol: Desch, T., 1999; Hladík, J., 1999; Gioia, A., 2003; Hladík, J., 2004.  
375 Cf.: Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, 2000, para. 371. 
376 Schulze, D., 1983, p. 33; Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 100; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 47; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 109.  
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restitute cultural objects they had removed nevertheless. The relevance of this finding is 
not so much the fact that the ban on the removal of cultural property and the obligation 
to return removed objects emerged ten years earlier than assumed.377 Rather, the 
relevance lies in the principle of international law according to which the obligation to 
restitute cultural property is implied in treaty provisions banning the removal of cultural 
property.  
For failure of the attempts to improve the protection of cultural property during the 
Interbellum, the rules of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention governed not only the 
legal situation of the First World War but also that of the Second World War. While the 
First World War had no significant effect on the future course of restitutions, the 
Second World War did. This must not surprise given the extensive art looting by the 
Nazis and the great effort undertaken by the Allied Forces to arrive at restitution. The 
restitution measures not only comprised objects that have been looted in the narrow 
sense of the term but also comprised objects that had been subject to forced sales and 
other forms of transactions unless their voluntary character could be confirmed. 
Interesting, also with regard to the Soviet Trophy Art debate is the finding that the 
Allied Forces had favoured for a short time during the preparatory process the idea of 
restitution in kind in situations where cultural objects could not be physically 
restituted.378 However, in the restitution regime as finally realised by the Western Allies, 
the idea of restitution in kind was renounced therewith thinking the notion of the 
uniqueness of cultural objects to its logical conclusion. Finally, the restitutions as 
affected after the Second World War also constitute the first that cultural objects were 
restituted to a former aggressor state. 
An important development in the post-war era was the adoption of the 1954 Hague 
Convention and its protocols. While the main focus of the 1954 Hague Convention lies 
on explicating and re-enforcing the protection against destruction and damaging of 
cultural objects, it also prohibits the confiscation of cultural property during armed 
conflict and occupation and seeks to prohibit removal by third parties. More important 
with regard to the restitution of objects that have been looted in spite of the ban on 
removal is the (First) Protocol. In fact, the (First) Protocol not only requires the 
restitution of looted cultural objects but requires also the return of cultural objects that 
have been removed from a territory under occupation. According to Art. I 3, the 
obligation to return cultural property at the close of hostilities is absolute: it is neither 
                                                     
377 The 1899 Hague Convention entered into force in 1900 whereas the 1907 Hague Convention entered 
into force in 1910.  
378 While the analysis does not further discuss the Russian trophy art debate the research suggests that 
Russia has objected consistently to the idea that restitution in kind is illegal thus possibly being able to rely 
upon the concept of “persistent objector”. Where a state behaves as persistent objector, i.e. showing initial 
and sustained objection to a rule, it will not be bound by a rule of customary law. Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, pp. 
32-33. 
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subject to any prescription, nor does it recede from any rights that might have been 
acquired after the export by a bona fide purchaser.379 
VI I I .  CU S T O M A R Y  L A W 
 Next to treaty law, customary law is one of the sources of international law 
recognised in Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. While treaty 
law has replaced customary law over the last three decades as primary source of 
international law, customary law is nevertheless still important for the development of 
general principles and to fill in voids left by treaty law.380 It has the advantage of 
applying to all States regardless of their adherence to relevant treaty-law.  
Customary law consists of two cumulative elements: an objective element in the 
form of the actual behaviour of states and a subjective element or belief that this 
behavious is ‘law’.381 The second element, the opinio iuris is more difficult to establish 
than state practice in that it is a subjective element and to some extent paradoxical in 
stating that something must be considered as law in order to become law.382  
Taking account of the greater difficulty to assess the existence of an opinio iuris the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has suggested that “a set of customary rules whose 
presence in the opinio iuris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a 
sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived 
ideas”.383 Consequently, the analysis of the existence of a rule of customary law is an 
inductive process based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing state 
practice.384  
1.  ST A T E  P R A C T I C E  
 In order to qualifiy as state practice as required for the creation of a rule of 
customary law the state practice concerned must be constant and uniform.385 This does 
not mean that the state practice needs to be “perfect”: instances of inconsistent state 
conduct do not necessarily undermine the validity of a given rule.386 With regard to the 
time period that must have passed in order to speak of a settled state practice, it is is not 
                                                     
379 Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 66.  
380 Dixon, M., 2007, p. 30. Cf.: Shaw, M., N., 2008, pp. 73-74. 
381 Shaw, M., N., 2008, p. 74. 
382 Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, p. 35. 
383 Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United 
States of America), ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 246, para. 111.  
384 Cf.: Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., 2005, p. 107; Shaw, M., N., 2008, p. 73. 
385 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266, p. 277. 
386 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14, para. 186.  
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required that the practice must go back to “times immemorial”.387 The ICJ held in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: 
 
“[a]lthough the passage of only a short period of tim is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of 
a new rule of customary international law (…), an indispensable requirement would be that within the 
period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interest are 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform (…): - and should moreover have 
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved”.388 
 
Examples of rules of customary rule that have been established within a short period 
of time are the right of a coastal state to explore and exploit the resources of its 
continental shelf and the freedom to explore outer space.389 
As for the question which kind of behaviour qualifies as ‘state practice’ evidence can 
be derived from the following sources: administrative acts, legislation, decisions of 
courts and activities on the international stage, such as treaty-making.390 Obviously, a 
state is not a living entity but is a complex composition of governmental departments, 
legislative institutions, courts, diplomatic agents, political leaders and thousands of 
officials.391 Furthermore, state practice can be obtained from resolutions in the United 
Nations General Assembly, comments made by governments on drafts produced by the 
International Law Commission, decisions of the international judicial institutions, 
decisions of national courts, treaties, and the general practice of international 
organisations.392 Put differently, state practice covers any act or statements by an organ 
or actor that is qualified to represent the state from which views about customary law 
may be inferred.393 
2.  OP IN IO  I U R I S   
 The element of opinio iuris has been explicated by the ICJ.394 According to the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, for a rule of customary law to exist  
 
                                                     
387 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, Advisory Opinion, 
PCIJ, Series B, No. 14 (1927), p. 105, p. 105. 
388 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3, para. 74.  
389 Cf.: Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., 2005, p. 106. 
390 Shaw, M., N., 2008, p. 82. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Ibid. Cf.: Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., 2005, p. 108; Dixon, M., 2007, p. 31. Bossuyt remarks that it is 
not entirely clear whether, in the eyes of the ICJ, the resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly 
provide evidence of state practice or of an opinio iuris (or both). 
393 Shaw, M., N., 2008, p. 84. 
394 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; Lotus 
Case PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1827, p. 18; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116. Cf.: 
Dixon, M., 2007, p. 31. See further on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and the “mysterious process” 
by which rules of customary law evolve: Nelson, L.D.M., 1972; Brownlie, I., 2003, pp. 6-12. 
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"the acts concerned must not only amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried 
out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a 
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in 
the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitaties. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is 
not in itself enough".395 
 
According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, opinio iuris could be found, among other 
things in General Assembly resolutions, statements made by state representatives and 
the existence of treaties covering similar grounds.396 When analysing treaties, different 
weight must be accorded to peace treaties and multilateral treaties: peace treaties are 
directed at a specific armed conflict and cannot be generalised. Multilateral treaties, on 
the other hand, are not limited to one specific occasion but instead seek to provide a 
more general and future oriented solution.397 Consequently, multilateral treaties play a 
more important role in providing evidence of an opinio iuris than peace-treaties. No clear-
cut answer can be given to the question in how far the existence of an opinio iuris must 
be proven once evidence of a state practice has already been provided. On this point, a 
majority within the ICJ held in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that the frequency 
or even habitual character of a practice is not enough to establishish opinio juris. The 
majority did not reflect as to how the existence of opinio iuris can otherwise be 
established. A minority of the Court found that opinio iuris could be presumed from 
consistent practice, unless a contrary intentention was apparent.398 In light of these two 
approaches to the relevance of establishing opinio iuris independantly of the element of 
state practice the following view has become accepted as compromise: the degree of 
proof required for opinio iuris will vary according to the subject matter of the disputed 
customary rule.399  
Having elaborated on customary law and its two constitutive elements we can now 
apply the findings to the international instruments and the restitution of cultural objects 
in the aftermath of the different conflicts outlined above. Most evidence points to the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions as manifestations of a rule of customary 
international law providing for a ban on removal and the restitution of removed cultural 
objects. The view of a number of scholars that such a rule emerged as early as during 
the Vienna Congress in the beginning of the 19th century400 must be refuted. While it is 
true that by the end of 1815 an essential part of the cultural objects removed during the 
Napoleonic Raids had been restituted, this does not suffice for a rule of customary law 
to emerge instantaneously. As the analysis of the negotiations above showed, neither a 
                                                     
395 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3, p. 44, para. 77. 
396 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14. Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, p. 36. 
397 Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., 2005, p. 109.  
398 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3, dissenting opinion of judge Lachs. 
399 Dixon, M., 2007, p. 35.  
400 See, e.g.: Fiedler, W., 1989, p. 217; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 113 & 129.  
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settled state practice, nor an opinio iuris in this respect existed. In as far as the element of 
settled state practice is concerned the analysis of the acts of the Government 
representatives did not reveal a commonly shared support in favour of restitution.401 
Furthermore, it was not until the last round of negotiations that there was a certain 
consensus favouring restitution. This finding must, however, be evaluated against the 
background that the negotiations took place in the context of peace treaty negotiations, 
which means that they were significantly influenced by the self-interest of the Allies. In 
any event, the acts leading to restitution as affected subsequent to the Napoleonic wars 
cannot meet the requirement of a certain duration, uniformity and spreading of state 
practice. 
With settled state practice as one of the two cumulative elements necessary for the 
emergence of a rule of customary law being absent402, it has already been established 
that such a rule could not have emerged during the Vienna Congress. Consequently, 
instead of characterising the Vienna Congress as constitutive moment for the 
formulation of a rule of customary law providing for the restitution of cultural property 
in times of war it is more correct to characterise the Vienna Congress as a first stage in 
the emergence of such a rule.403  
For better situating the emergence of rules of customary law on the protection of 
cultural property against looting and on restitution, we can take to the findings of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The International Military Tribunal was 
established in agreement with the London Agreement of 8 August, 1945 to bring the 
major war criminals of the European axis to justice.404 When dealing with war crimes 
                                                     
401 Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 105; Sandholtz, W., 2008, p. 112-114. According to Sandholtz, Tsar Alexander 
argued in 1814 that the Allies could have relied upon their right of conquest to reclaim the works of art 
seized by France during the wars. Sandholtz refers to: Russian Memoir from 1815, .  
402 With regard to the existence respectively absence of an opinio iuris we limit ourselves to pointing to the 
Prussian “Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten” (ALR) as an example of national legislation 
that contradicts the existence of an opinio iuris. The ALR dating from 1794 explicitly mentions looting that is 
permitted by the State or commander-in-chief as mode of legal acquisition of ownership. Hattenhauer, H. / 
Bernert, G., 1970, Part I, title 9, §§ 193-219. See further on the role of the Allgemeines Landrecht e.g.: 
Lokin, J.H.A. / Zwalve, W.J., 1992, pp. 198-207. While the relevance of the ALR must not be 
overestimated, it indicates that the right of pillage had not vanished at the turn of the 18th to the 19th 
century. Cf.: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 111. 
403 Cf.: the witness statements of Professor Petropoulos in the context of the evidence gathering for 
Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000 where Petropoulos refers to the 1907 Hague Convention on the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land as watershed between the era in which there exists no obligation to 
restitute cultural property (e.g. the Elgin Marbles) and the era in which such obligations come into existence: 
Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, 2000, para. 371. See further on the variety of modes and 
stages of formation of customary international law: Verdross, 1969; Villiger, M.E., 1985, pp. 29-30.  
404 Ibid, preambula. See for the Charter of the International Military Tribunal:  
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited: 14 August 2008). At this point 
we would like to make a short comment on the question whether the looting of art works qualifies as crime 
against humanity as is sometimes argued (see, e.g. Lecture by Dr. A. Goepfert on "Art trade in works 
removed in times of wars; art trade in nationalized and expropriated works of art" held in Maastricht on 5 
March 2008). The argument is interesting in that it is generally acknowledged that no limitation period exists 
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covered by Artt. 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, the International 
Military Tribunal had to take to customary law as a number of belligerents were not a 
State Party to the Convention.405 The International Military Tribunal held with regard to 
the 1907 Hague Convention that  
 
“[t]he rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing 
international law at the time of their adoption. (…) but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention 
were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of 
war (…)”.406  
 
The International Military Tribunal hence recognised that by 1939, at the outbreak of 
World War II, all rules of the Hague Conventions also constituted rules of customary 
law. The finding that the rules of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention are binding of 
customary law is generally accepted in the literature.407 There exists, however, 
disagreement as to when exactly the rules became legally binding as rules of customary 
law.408 If one approaches the emergence of rules of customary law as a process409, the 
results of our analysis allow us to date the emergence of such rules between the 
restitutions subsequent to the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions and the outbreak of 
World War II.  
As to the content of the rules of customary law with regard to protection granted 
against the removal of cultural objects during international armed conflicts and 
occupation and with regard to restitution, these can be summarised as follows:410 enemy 
property, including cultural objects, may not be seized or pillaged during armed 
                                                                                                                                          
for crimes against humanity (see, e.g.: Bazyler, M., 1999, p. 154). The term crimes against humanity was 
defined by the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950. The Principles were adopted by the International Law Commission, 
acting under instructions from the United Nations General Assembly and set down the laws and procedures 
by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. According to Prinicle VI (c) crimes against humanity 
are: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian 
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such 
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime". 
The looting of art works consequently does not qualify as crime against humanity. It does, however, qualify 
as war crime.  
405 The application of the 1907 Hague Convention was doubtful given the “general participation clause” in 
Art. 2 according to which the Convention only applies when all belligerents to a conflict are State Parties. 
See further on the “general participation clause” above in the paragraph discussing the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Convention. 
406 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 1st October 1946, 1947, pp. 248-
249. Cf.: Giovannini, T., 2002, p. 264.  
407 See, e.g.: Fiedler, W., 1989, p. 199; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 298; Phuong, C., 2004, p. 986; Odendahl, 
K., 2005, p. 125. 
408 Some authors argue that the rules of the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions were declaratory of customary 
law when they were adopted. See, e.g.: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 223; Fiedler, W., 1989, p. 217. Others point to 
the turn of the 19th to the 20th century as the moment in time when the rules manifested themselves of 
customary law. See, e.g.: Doehring, K., 1987, p. 139; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 298. 
409 See, e.g.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 125. 
410 See for a summary including also the (preventive) protection against destruction: Ibid., p. 126. 
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conflicts.411 While a waiver exists in case of military necessity, it is difficult to think of a 
situation where seizure of cultural objects is imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
war.412 Furthermore, during occupation following the hostilities, neither private property 
nor public property of cultural relevance may be confiscated, requisitioned or seized.413  
The rules of customary law on the protection of cultural objects against removal 
during armed conflict and occupation are complemented by the obligation to restitute 
objects removed in breach of these rules.414 With regard to the obligation of customary 
law to restitute looted objects, a distinction must be drawn between the defeated and the 
victorious powers: until World War II the obligation to restitute looted cultural objects 
concerned only the defeated parties. It was only in reaction to the developments 
towards the end and after World War II that the obligation to restitute looted objects of 
customary law became fully applicable to the victorious powers also.415  
The literature is divided as to whether the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention 
constitute customary law.416 Boylan in his study for UNESCO came to the conclusion 
that the 1954 Hague convention is so well established that it must be regarded as an 
integral part of customary law.417 Given the convention’s focus on the protection of 
cultural property against damage and destruction the status of its provisions of 
customary law is, however, less relevant for the present study. Of greater relevance is 
the (First) Protocol whose provisions extend the restitution regime in particular with 
regard to objects removed from occupied territories. Given the “almost universal 
ignoring” of its principles418, however, the provisions of the (First) Protocol do not (yet) 
constitute rules of customary law.  
§2. PROTECT ION  OF  CULTURAL  OBJECTS  IN  T IMES  OF  PEACE 
 Cultural property is not only endangered in times of war. Destruction, damaging 
and removal of cultural objects are also problems in times of peace. Given the subject of 
the present thesis we will not further address the protection of cultural objects against 
destruction or damage but will focus on the relevance of public international law in 
fighting the illicit art trade.419 The need to take redress to public international law to 
                                                     
411 Cf.: Art. 23 and Art. 28 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention.  
412 Cf.: the 1954 Hague Convention where the exception of military necessity applies only to cases of 
damage or destruction and is no longer mentioned with regard to removal. 
413 Cf.: Art. 46 juncto Art. 56 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Convention.  
414 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 78 & 80; Rudolf, W., 1989, p. 860; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 170 with further 
references. 
415 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 170. Odendahl refers to the 1943 London Declaration as evidence of an opinio 
iuris.  
416 Cf.: Ibid., p. 126 with further references. 
417 Boylan, P.J., 1993, p. 7. 
418 Ibid., p. 101, para. 110.109. See also: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 168.  
419 See on protection against damage or destruction e.g.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1996. 
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fight the illegal art trade became apparent especially with the intensification of 
globalisation.420  
The category of illicit trade comprises various categories. An object being illicitly 
trafficked is one in respect of which some offence has been committed: such an offence 
is defined by the laws of the country of origin and may include clandestine excavation, 
theft, breach of inalienability or rights of pre-emption, failure to comply with trading 
regulations or violation of export control.421 The category of illicit trade thus combines 
offenses of public laws (e.g. illegal export) with offences of laws vesting ownership 
(theft). From an international legal perspective this difference is crucial: whereas courts 
of all countries are in theory open to actions for the recovery of stolen property, not 
only to domestic but also to foreign owners, they will not enforce another state’s penal 
or public laws. As a result of the latter an object may well be legally owned or traded in 
one country even though it has at some stage been the object of a violation of criminal 
or administrative provision in another country.422 Consequently, there is a greater need 
for measures under public international law with regard to the return of cultural objects 
removed from one country in breach of a public law than is the case with regard to the 
restitution of stolen objects. Where a case of a stolen cultural object involves a foreign 
law element and where a difference in result will occur depending on which law will be 
applied private international law or the law of conflicts will be adhered todecide the 
case. In the context of this chapter we will not further discuss the restitution of stolen 
cultural property unless where public international law provides for specific, more 
favorable rules for restitution. The main focus of this chapter is on the existence or 
emergence of rules of public international law for the return of cultural objects that have 
been illegally exported.  
Given the international dimension of the illicit art trade driven by the demand from 
the art market nations423 and reinforced by the North-South divide424 the problem of the 
illicit trade can only be addressed at the international level. In the following, we will 
scrutinise public international law (treaty law and customary law) as to the (coming into) 
existence of binding rules on the return of illicitly removed cultural objects. The analysis 
is structured according to chronology, unless where coherence is better served by 
discussing international treaties separate from regional ones. 
                                                     
420 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 171-172. While it is impossible to estimate the size of the illicit trade an 
estimate given in the 1999 United Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice nevertheless gives an idea of 
the extent: according to the report the current annual trade in illicit antiquities is estimated at around $ 7.8 
billion, ranking behind drugs ($ 160 billion) and arms ($ 100 billion) as the most profitable black market.  
421 Cf.: Prott, L.V., 1989, p. 561; Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 3.  
422 Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 3. 
423 See above in the introduction §2.I for an explanation on the difference between art market and source 
nations.  
424 The North-South Divide is the socio-economic and political division that exists between the wealthy 
developed countries, known collectively as "the North", and the poorer developing countries (least 
developed countries), or "the South". 
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I .  FI R S T  A T T E M P T S  B Y  T H E  IN TE R N A T I O N A L  MU S E U M S  OF F I CE  
 The first attempts to adopt an international treaty on the protection of cultural 
objects in times of peace date from the 1930s.425 On the recommendation of the League 
of Nations, the International Museums Office (IMO)426 presented three draft 
conventions:427 the 1933 (draft) ‘Convention on the Repatriation of Objects of Artistic, 
Historical or Scientific Interest, which have been lost, stolen, or unlawfully alienated or 
exported’428, the 1936 (draft) ‘International Convention for the Protection of National 
Artistic and Historical Treasures’429, and finally, the 1939 (draft) ‘International 
Convention for the Protection of National Collections of Art and History’.430 
The circle of cultural objects that fell under the draft conventions’ scope of 
application was narrowed with each revised draft. While the first draft applies to objects 
of “artistic, historical or scientific interest” which are not further qualified, the second 
draft applied to “objects of particular palaeontologic, archaeological, historical or artistic 
interest”.431 The 1939 draft applied to “objects of particular palaeontologic, 
archaeological, historical or artistic interest” but limited the scope of application by 
requesting the objects to be the property of a state or a public institution, to be held in 
public collections and to be mentioned in the collections’ inventory.432  
Further to the circle of objects concerned, the three draft conventions differed in the 
extent to what cultural objects had to be returned. According to the first draft State 
Parties would be required to consider transfers of cultural objects undertaken in breach 
                                                     
425 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 173 
426 The International Museums Office (IMO) had been established in 1926 by the Sub-Commission on Arts 
and Letters of the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation, which existed since 1921 under 
the umbrella of the League of Nations as a predecessor of the later United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”). The task of the IMO was to enhance the cooperation between 
museums internationally, to support international agreements and international exhibitions. Engstler, L., 
1964, p. 49. There exists no link between IMO and the later established ICOM (International Council of 
Museums), which will be introduced in chp. 2.§2.IV.3. IMO went out of existence in 1946. ICOM was 
established the same year as a non-governmental organisation.  
427 These draft conventions must not be confused with the draft convention prepared simultaneously for 
the League of Nations ‘for the Protection of Historic Buildings and Works of Art in Time of War’, which 
has been introduced above in 3.1.I. 
428 Mouseion, Vol. 23-24, Nos III-IC, 1933, pp. 243-244.  
429 United States Department of State, Documents and State Papers, Vol. I, No 15, June 1949, p. 866 ff.; 
Mouseion, Vol. 33-34, Nos I-II, 1936, p. 283-289.  
430 United States Department of State, Documents and State Papers, Vol. I, No 15, June 1949, p. 869 ff. Cf.: 
Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 49-52. 
431 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 130-131. 
432 Cf.: Ibid., p. 131. See for a detailed discussion of the drafts: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 49-53; Schorlemer, 
S.v., 1992, p. 420-423. A similar approach has been chosen in the EC Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 
March 1993. A cultural object in the sense of the Directive is either classified by a Member State as 'national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value' within the meaning of Art. 30 of the EC 
Treaty, provided it also belongs to one of the categories listed in the Annex or forms an integral part of a public 
collection and is listed in the institution’s inventory (Art. 1). See further below in chp. 1.§2.VI for an analysis of the 
Directive. 
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of national export rules as void and to cooperate in the return of the object. A potential 
good faith purchaser was to be granted compensation from the returning state. The 
second draft version did not contain the obligation to consider transfers undertaken in 
breach of national export rules as void. Nevertheless, the right of State Parties to claim 
cultural property that had been lost, stolen or illegally transferred or exported from its 
territory was confirmed. The third draft version further limited the envisaged recovery 
regime. The state of origin could only reclaim property that had been removed in breach 
of national rules of penal character. This very limited recovery regime was, however, 
complemented by the possibility to reclaim cultural objects that had been lost on foreign 
territory e.g. in the context of exhibition. The returning state was granted the possibility 
to make the return subject to compensation payments from the requesting state to a 
bona fide possessor.433 
While none of the drafts was ever adopted due to outbreak of the Second World 
War434 and the dissolving of the League of Nations in 1946, they mark the beginning of 
the regulation of the restitution of cultural objects in times of peace under public 
international law. Also, the efforts undertaken for the draft conventions were not 
completely futile as they contributed to the preparatory works for the adoption of an 
international convention at a later stage. Before turning to this convention, the 1970 
UNESCO Convention435, the first legally binding instrument on the protection of 
cultural property in peacetime of regional relevance will be discussed. 
I I .  TR E A TY  O F  WA S H I N G T O N ,  1935 
 The first treaty that outgrew the stage of preparations and good intentions was 
the ‘Treaty on the Protection of Movable Property of Historic Value’.436 The treaty, 
which is generally known as “Treaty of Washington” entered into force on 1 May 
1936.437 It regulates the export and import of a set of narrowly defined cultural objects 
between North America and countries in Middle and South America.438  
The Treaty of Washington grants protection by making the import of specific groups 
of cultural objects dating from the pre-Columbian, Colonial or the “period of 
emancipation and the republic” (Art. 1) dependent on the presentation of valid export 
license from the country of origin (Artt. 2 and 3). In case an attempt to import an object 
                                                     
433 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 174. 
434 Cf.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 422; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 131. 
435 In full: 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 
436 Treaty on the Protection of Movable Property of Historic Value, April 15, 1935, OASTS 28. Cf.: Walter, 
B., 1988, p. 46. The full text of the treaty is reprinted in: Hudson, M.O., 1972, pp. 59 ff. 
437 It was signed by the member states of the Pan-American Union, the precursor of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) on 15 April 1935. It was ratified by Chile (1936), El Salvador (1936), Guatemala 
(1936), Mexico (1939), and Nicaragua (1935) and went into force on 1 May 1936. 
438 See for the different categories of “movable monuments”: Art. 1 of the Treaty of Washington. The 
categories are further elaborated upon in: Walter, B., 1988, p. 47. 
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without a valid export license was thwarted, the object will be confiscated and returned 
to the public authorities of the country of origin (Art. 5). For those cases in which the 
illegal import could not be prevented, Art. 6 of the Treaty of Washington provides the 
countries of origin with the right to turn to the state into whose territory the objects has 
been illegally imported to seek its return (Art. 6). The holding state has to undertake the 
necessary steps to return the object to the applicant (Art. 7).439 The applicant state’s 
right to restitution is supported by the possibility to start a procedure in the civil courts 
of the holding state for the restitution of illegally exported and imported “movable 
monuments”.440 
The Treaty of Washington is the first multilateral treaty solely dedicated to the 
protection of cultural property in times of peace.441 It stands out for introducing a 
workable enforcement mechanism that complements the obligations to return cultural 
property. In particular, granting State Parties the possibility to start a procedure in the 
civil courts constituted an innovative and effective mechanism. While this mechanism 
would eventually also be employed in an international convention442, the Treaty of 
Washington is as of today unmatched in making the legality of an import of a cultural 
object dependant on the existence of a valid export license.443 The relevance of the 
Treaty of Washington is, however, limited by its application to specifically designated 
cultural objects, as well by its regional rather than international character.444 
I I I .  1970 UNESCO CO N V EN T I ON 
 After the attempts to adopt an international convention under the umbrella of the 
League of Nations had failed and the organisation itself was dissolved, the movement 
towards greater protection of cultural objects at the international level was given new 
impetus during the 11th session of UNESCO’s General Assembly in 1960 in the form of 
two resolutions made by Mexico and Congo.445 In 1962, the impetus was reconfirmed 
                                                     
439 Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 53-54; Walter, B., 1988, pp. 46-48; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, pp. 423-234.  
440 According to Art. 4 of the Treaty of Washington “the signatory countries understand that those who 
have objects declared to be movable monuments, can only enjoy the usufruct, which is transferable only 
within the same country and the undertake to legislate to that effect”. What Art. 4 effectively does is to 
qualify the objects as defined under Art. 1 as rei extra commercium. Private property is not possible as a 
consequence of which the state of origin can pursue its claim to the object in the national courts. Cf.: 
Walter, B., 1988, pp. 46-47.  
441 Cf.: the elaborations in chp. 1.§IV on the Roerich Pact, which was the first multilateral treaty ever 
dedicated to cultural property. Its focus lies on the protection of cultural property in armed conflicts but 
does not provide for the restitution or return of removed cultural property.  
442 See further below in chp. 1.§2.IV for the analysis of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.  
443 See further below in chp. 1.§2.III discussing the February 1970 Draft UNESCO Convention for the 
failure to introduce this mechanism at the international level. 
444 The Treaty of Washington has been ratified by Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua. 
Cf.: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/c-4.html (last visited: 23 June 2009. The information has 
been confirmed by the OAS Department of International Law.  
445 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 56.  
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by UNESCO Resolution 4.413.446 During the 13th General Assembly of UNESCO in 
1964 the ‘Recommendation on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit 
export, import and transfer of ownership of cultural property’ was adopted.447 The 
Recommendation appealed to State Parties to agree upon measures to allow for the 
return of illegally exported cultural objects.448 However, the Recommendation was 
limited in seeking for close collaboration between the State Parties in accordance with 
the respective national laws rather than pleading for the adoption of rules under public 
international law.  
Not being satisfied with the limitation of the protection of cultural objects to the 
collaboration on the basis of national laws the UNESCO Secretariat developed a 
proposal for a convention which was presented in February 1970.449 The proposal was 
based on the preparatory work undertaken in the 1930s by the predecessor of UNESCO 
under the League of Nations.450 This proposal, which Bator referred to as “a document 
designed for a Heavenly City in which everything is utterly orderly, tidy, and subject to 
perfect and all-encompassing controls”451 proved to be too ambitious for a number of 
State Parties, above all the United States.452 In particular Art. 7 of the proposal 
according to which Member States were obliged to amend their national laws to render 
any export of cultural property subject to an export license, was rejected.453  
In reaction to the concerns about Art. 7, the requirement of rendering all exports 
subject to an export license was dropped in the ‘Revised Draft Convention concerning 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property’.454 Instead, the convention as adopted in November 
1970 (hereinafter: 1970 UNESCO Convention)455 required Member States to undertake 
certain measures with regard to illegally exported and stolen cultural property as will be 
outlined below. The 1970 UNESCO Convention is not self-executing but requires the 
State Members to change their domestic laws in accordance with its provisions (Art. 3).  
                                                     
446 Resolution 4. 413, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twelfth session, p. 51 f. Cf.: 
Walter, B., 1988, p. 49.  
447 Recommandation concernant les mesures à prendre pour interdire et empêcher l’exportation, 
l’importation et le transfert de propriété illicites des biens culturels, adoptée par la Conférence Générale de 
l’UNESCO à sa 13e session, Paris, 19 Novembre 1964. UNESCO, Records of the General conference, 13th 
session, 1964, Resoutiens, p. 1481 and Conventions and Recommendations p. 137ff. Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, 
p. 49.  
448 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970 (823 U.N.T.S. 231). Cf.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, 
p. 425. 
449 UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 (1970). Walter, B., 1988, p. 49; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 134. 
450 Walter, B., 1988, p. 49; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 134. 
451 Bator, P.M., 1993, p. 95. 
452 Walter, B., 1988, p. 50; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 428. 
453 Cf.: Abramson, R. / Huttler, S., 1973, p. 956-957; Edelson, S., 1984, pp. 1038 ff..  
454 Cf.: Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 431. 
455 Cf.: Ibid., p. 425. 
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Before further addressing the measures introduced by the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention with regard to stolen cultural property (transfer of ownership) and illegal 
exports and, if applicable illegal imports, the definition of cultural property as provided 
for in Art. 1 shall be addressed.456 According to this Article cultural property is:  
 
“property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of 
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science”. 
 
The six disciplines (archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science) are 
further explicated in a list of eleven categories.457 Given the broad range of categories, 
the requirement that an object must belong to one of these categories is not restrictive. 
In fact, the quality of the list of categories is more illustrative than defining.458 
One aspect that deserves further consideration is the question whether the definition 
of cultural property requires any special relation between the object and the State where 
the object is held.459 Of the categories listed in Art. 1 only sub b), property relating to 
the history of a country, makes special reference to a national link between the object 
                                                     
456 The 1970 UNESCO Convention also works with the term “cultural heritage”, which is defined in Art. 4. 
Given the definition is relevant only for the domestic activities aimed at the protecting of cultural heritage 
(see Arts. 5 and 14), it will not be further discussed here. See instead: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 206. 
457 (a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological 
interest;  
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and military and social 
history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of national importance;  
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological 
discoveries;  
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered;  
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;  
(f) objects of ethnological interest;  
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:  
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any material 
(excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand);  
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;  
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs ;  
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;  
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of special interest (historical, 
artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;  
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;  
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;  
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments. 
458 Cf.: the comment of the Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport of the House of Commons on 
the concept of cultural property of the 1970 UNESCO Convention as being “extremely broad and 
subjective, in that it is assumed that importance is to be defined by a State. Objects that can be subject to 
trading restrictions or prohibitions range from human remains to postage stamps”. Seventh Report of the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural Property: Return and Illicit 
Trade, 2000, para. 124. 
459 Cf.: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 204. 
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and the state460 All other categories do not require a special link between the object and 
the state. Consequently, cultural objects do not have to originate from the territory of a 
state to qualify them as its cultural property. There is no legal or moral test that 
challenges the link between an object and a state.461 
With the definition of cultural property being clarified, we can now look at the 
protective regime brought about by the Convention. The most relevant provisions are 
Artt. 3, 6 and 7. According to these provisions an illegal export from one country 
constitutes an illegal import in other Member States. The latter have to accept the 
national export limitations of other Member States regardless of whether their own 
export control supports such regime. The provisions thus break with the general 
principle of public international law that denies the extraterritorial application of 
national law.462 This finding does not, however, answer the question what happens 
where cultural property has nevertheless been imported into a Member State in breach 
of another Member State’s national law. For this aspect we need to turn to Art. 7, which 
deals both with illegally exported cultural property (sub a) and cultural property stolen 
from further defined institutions (sub b(i)):  
 
“The States Parties to this Convention undertake:  
(a)  
To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar 
institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another State Party which 
has been illegally exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever 
possible, to inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such cultural property illegally 
removed from that State after the entry into force of this Convention in both States;  
 
(b) 
(i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public 
monument or similar institution in another State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this 
Convention for the States concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the 
inventory of that institution;  
 
                                                     
460 Art. 1 (b) refers to “property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and 
military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of 
national importance. 
461 This point can be illustrated with the example of the Rosetta Stone from the collection of the British 
Museum. The Rosetta Stone, which became famous for allowing the deciphering of the hieroglyphs, 
originates from Egypt from where it had been removed under the British occupation during the 19th 
century to England. Despite originating from Egypt and its eminent relevance for the latter’s cultural and 
history, the Rosetta Stone qualifies as cultural property of the United Kingdom under Art. 1 of the 
UNESCO Convention. See further on the Rosetta Stone: Giblin, J.C., 1992; 
http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/Alley/4482/Rosetta.html (Last visited: 30 June 2008). Whether 
the Rosetta Stone would qualify as “cultural heritage”in the sense of Art. 4 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention is a different question but as Art. 4 is irrelevant for protection against exports and questions of 
restitution the question will not be further addressed here. 
462 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 134. 
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(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such 
cultural property imported after the entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned, provided, 
however, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a person who 
has valid title to that property. Requests for recovery and return shall be made through diplomatic offices. 
(…).463 
 
The Article, which deals both with illegally exported and stolen cultural property, 
does not stand out for its clarity.464 In particular, the relationship between Art. 7 sub (a) 
dealing will illegally exported cultural property and Art. 7 sub (b)(ii) introducing the 
regime for the recovery and return of “any such cultural property” is unclear: does the 
obligation to recover and return (Art. 7 (b)(ii)) apply only to cultural property stolen 
from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution (Art. 7 
(b)(i)) or does it extend also to cultural property that has been illegally exported from 
another State Party (Art. 7 (a))? The literature disagrees as to whether the obligation of 
Art. 7 (b)(ii) to recover and return cultural property applies both to illegally exported 
and stolen cultural property or only to the latter. While some authors argue for a more 
extensive interpretation of Art. 7(b)(ii) applying also to illegally exported cultural 
property465, others hold the obligation only applicable to the objects stolen under the 
circumstances outlined in Art. 7 (b)(i).466  
Different available methods of interpretation support the more limited 
understanding of Art. 7(b)(ii) according to which it applies only to a narrowly defined 
group of stolen objects - i.e. cultural objects stolen from a museum or a religious or 
secular public monument or similar institution. It does not include unlawfully excavated 
cultural objects nor does it include illegally exported cultural objects.467 Where stolen 
                                                     
463 (Emphasis added). 
464 See in particular for a critical discussion: Siehr, K., 1993, p. 203 and p. 211 who states that the 
Convention is not a perfect specimen of an international convention: “too many cooks spoiled the broth 
and too many different meals were prepared at the same time”.  
465 See, e.g.: Ibid., pp. 207-208. 
466 Walter, B., 1988, p. 51, Freytag, C., 1996, p. 181; Merryman, J.H., 2007, p. 187; Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 
90. 
467 The general rule of treaty interpretation, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969, states that treaty provisions are to be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” (Art. 31(1) of Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969). As restated by the International Court of Justice “interpretation 
must be based above all upon the text of the treaty. As supplementary measure recourse may be had to 
means of interpretation such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion” 
(Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 21, para. 41). A literal 
interpretation is not conclusive but there are nevertheless some aspects that speak against the subsection’s 
application to illegally exported cultural property. While the English version leaves some doubts as to 
whether “any such cultural property imported after the entry into force of this Convention” refers only 
“cultural property stolen form a museum or a religious or secular public monument (…)” (Art. 7(b)(i)) or 
applies also to “cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally exported (…)” 
(Art. 7(a)), the French and Spanish versions, which are authoritative texts next to the English and Russian 
versions, are less ambiguous. Art. 7(b)(ii) in the French and Spanish version refers to “tout bien culturel 
ainsi volé et importé après l’entrée en vigueur de la présente Convention” respectively “todo bien cultural 
robado e importado despues de la entrada en vigor de la Convencion”. Both the French and the Spanish text 
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objects have in the meantime been acquired by good faith purchaser or valid title has 
been vested, the requesting state has to pay just compensation.468 As none of the other 
Articles of the Convention introduce a basis for a claim the Convention’s relevance for 
the return of illegally exported cultural objects lies essentially in awareness raising.469  
As far as the Convention’s application in time is concerned, Art. 7 leaves no doubt 
that the 1970 Convention does not apply retroactively. During the drafting process 
China had proposed the inclusion of an article providing for retroactive effect:   
 
“(…) any State party which, when the Convention comes into force, is in possession of important cultural 
property, illicitly acquired, inalienable to, and inseparable from, the history and civilization of another State, 
shall, in the interest of international goodwill, endeavour to restore such property to that State”.470  
 
The article was not incorporated in the final text; it was not even included in the 
1969 draft version. On the contrary, the preliminary draft did include a provision 
according to which State Parties were required to recognize the ownership vested in 
each State or its nationals acquired before the Convention entered into force for the 
state concerned.471 After significant debate on the recognition of the status quo 
                                                                                                                                          
speak exclusively of stolen cultural property that has been imported after the Convention’s entry into force. 
The finding of the literal analysis that subsection (b)(ii) of Art. 7 does not provide for the return of illegally 
exported cultural property is supported by a contextual / systematic analysis: Art. 7 consists of two sections 
that are marked by the use of the letters a) and b). Subsection a) obliges State Parties to take legal measures 
to prevent a limited circle of potential buyers from acquiring illegally exported cultural property. Subsection 
b)(i) obliges State Parties to prohibit the import of stolen cultural property originating from specifically 
designated collections. With the obligation to return “any such property” being situated in subsection b), the 
system of the Article suggests that the provision on the recovery and return applies solely to stolen cultural 
property (See further for a critical discussion of the requirements stolen cultural property has to fulfill in 
order to be eligible for return: Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 94). A look at the preparatory instruments of the 
Convention also speaks in favour of the more limited interpretation. As seen above, the original draft for 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention was considered too all-encompassing for a number of State Parties, above 
all the United States. The delegation of the latter had complemented its criticism with detailed suggestions 
to amend the proposal. In particular, the circle of cultural objects affected by the convention should be 
limited by introducing a clause according to which the convention should “prohibit the importation into 
one country of cultural property stolen from a museum or a similar institution in another country, and 
providing for the recovery and return of such property” (Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, pp. 50-51; Schorlemer, S.v., 
1992, p. 428; Bator, P.M., 1993, p. 97). It was this proposal that is reflected in the current form of Art. 7. In 
conclusion, the interpretation of Art. 7 in accordance with the rules on interpretation as contained 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 suggests that the obligation to return cultural property 
as provided for by Art. 7(b)(ii) is limited to a narrowly defined group of stolen objects - i.e. cultural objects 
stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution. It does not include 
unlawfully excavated cultural objects nor does it include illegally exported cultural objects. 
468 See Art. 7(b)(ii). Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 175. 
469 Cf.: Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 94 who remarks that “the protection afforded by the Convention to source 
States is so narrow that it seems the US courts and the UK legislature have moved beyond it of their own 
accord”.  
470 UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 10. Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 813. 
471 Art. 4(f). UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 10. 
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ownership of cultural ownerships (draft) Art. 4(f) was deleted by the Special Committee 
of Governmental Experts in 1970.472 
In the final and adopted version of the 1970 UNESCO Convention Art. 15 is the 
only reminder of this discussion on the application of the convention for cultural 
objects removed prior to its entry into force. Art. 15 emphasizes the general principle 
that  
 
“nothing (…) shall prevent States Parties (…) from concluding special agreements among themselves or 
from continuing to implement agreements already concluded regarding the restitution of cultural property 
removed, whatever the reason, from its territory of origin, before the entry into force of this Convention for 
the States concerned”. 
 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention entered into force on 24 April 1972. This date is 
crucial only for those states that had deposited their instruments of ratification, 
acceptance or accession by that date.473 For all other states, the Convention enters into 
force three months after their respective instruments have been deposited.474 Until 
recently, countries, in particular art market nations were reluctant to ratify the 1970 
UNESCO Convention.475 Art market nations, in contrast to source nations, are 
characterized by a greater demand than supply in art and cultural objects. Typical 
examples are the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the United States. Until the early 
1980s not one art market nation had become a State Party to the Convention. In 1983, 
the United States of America was the first art market country to become State Party.476 
Over the last decade there was a significant increase in ratifications, including art market 
countries. In 1997, France ratified the Convention and more art market countries, 
including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, Germany followed.477 By the end of 
2008, more than 100 countries had become a State Party, including the most prominent 
art market countries. The Netherlands finally ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
on 9 June 2009.  
                                                     
472 See: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, para. 1416. Unesco Doc. 16 C/17 Annex II, 4.  
473 The States that had deposited their instruments of acceptance respectively ratification were: Ecuador, 
Bulgaria, Nigeria and the Central African Republic. See for a chronological overview of State Parties to the 
Convention: http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited: 21 July 
2008).  
474 See Art. 21 which sets the date of the Convention’s entry into force at three months after the date of the 
deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession.  
475 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 179. See above in the introduction (§2.I) for an explanation on the difference 
between art market and source nations. 
476 The U.S. Instrument of Acceptance was deposited on 2.09.1983. The 1970 UNESCO Convention hence 
entered into force for the U.S. on 2.12.1983. It should be mentioned that the increase in art market 
countries becoming State Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention started the year after the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, discussed in the next section, was adopted. Whether there exists any correlation 
or whether this is simply coincidence cannot be discussed here and requires are more sociological research 
approach.  
477 See for a chronological overview of State Parties to the Convention: 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited: 21 July 2008).  
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One of the main reasons for countries not to become a State Party to the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was the fact that the Convention interferes with the private laws 
of State Parties, especially the rules on good faith purchase.478 For this reason, 
UNESCO decided to call in the help of UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law for the creation of an additional harmonized system of 
private law.479 
IV .  1995  UNIDROIT  CO N V EN T IO N 
 In 1984, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(hereinafter: UNIDROIT)480 was approached by UNESCO with the request to 
complement the rules of public international law of the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
with harmonized rules of private law, in particular in respect of bona fide purchase. 
Preliminary research led to the conclusion that rather than amending the 1970 
UNESCO Convention or adding a protocol harmonising rules of private law a separate 
convention should be introduced.481 After the first draft was presented in 1990482 the 
final version of the ‘UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects’ (hereinafter: 1995 UNIDROIT Convention) was adopted in 1995.483 
As the title of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention indicates, it speaks of “cultural 
objects” rather than following the terminology of the 1970 UNESCO Convention that 
speaks of “cultural property”. There exists, however, no conceptual difference between 
“cultural objects” as defined by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and “cultural 
property” as defined by the 1970 UNESCO Convention.484 
According to Art. 1, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention applies to “claims of an 
international character for (a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects” and “(b) the 
return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State contrary to 
its law regulating the export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural 
heritage”. In line with the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention deals both with stolen and illegally exported cultural objects. As will be 
shown below, the protection afforded by the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention goes 
further than the protection afforded by the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Moreover, the 
                                                     
478 Reichelt, G., 1994, p. 68. 
479 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 176. 
480 UNIDROIT was founded in 1926 with the aim to draft uniform private law legislation. Siehr, K., 1993, 
p. 95. See further on the history and aim of UNIDROIT: David, R., 1971.  
481 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 177. 
482 Preliminary Draft Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (approved by 
the UNIDROIT Study Group on the International Protection of Cultural Property at its Third Session on 
26 January 1990). See for the full text: Siehr, K., 1992b. See for comments on the draft: Siehr, K., 1992c; 
Reichelt, G., 1994. 
483 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects signed at Rome, 24 June 1995. 
484 See Art. 2 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and the list of categories of cultural objects included in 
the Convention’s annex.  
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protection afforded is available even when State Parties fail to implement the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention (correctly) as its provisions are self-executive. 
The applicable regimes for stolen and illegally exported cultural objects are outlined 
in two separate chapters of the Convention. The rules concerning the restitution of 
stolen cultural objects are contained in Chapter II. The possessor of a stolen cultural 
object has to return it but is granted a fair and reasonable compensation if he had acted 
in good faith (Art. 3(1) and Art. 4(1)).485 Different from the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention grants State Parties access to the 
national courts, rather than limiting the possibility of recovery through diplomatic 
channels.486 Furthermore, it extends this right to seek restitution to private parties (Art. 
3) rather than reserving it to contracting states. 
The possibility to recover a cultural object is, however, not unlimited in time. The 
claiming party has to bring its claim within a period of three years from the moment the 
location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor are known (Art. 3(3)). 
This relative limitation period of 3 years is complemented by an absolute limitation 
period of fifty years from the time of the theft after which no claim can be brought (Art. 
3(3)). Cultural objects stolen from a public collection are exempted from the absolute 
limitation period (Art. 3(4)): a claim for restitution of a cultural object belonging to a 
public collection, an identified monument or archaeological site is not subject to any 
time limitation other than a period of three years from the time when the claimant knew 
the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor. The same applies for 
claims for restitution of a sacred or communally important cultural object belonging to 
and used by a tribal or indigenous community in a Contracting State provided that it has 
been stolen (Art. 3(8)). Member States are granted discretion to subject claims for the 
restitution of a cultural object from a public collection to an absolute limitation period. 
The period may not undercut a period of seventy-five years (Art. 3(5)). Where a 
Member State chooses to subject claims from another Member States for the restitution 
of a cultural object from a public collection to a time limitation the same period is held 
applicable where the former claims objects from public collections abroad.487  
The regime applicable to the return of illegally exported cultural objects is provided 
for in Chapter III of the Convention. The key provision is Art. 5, which requires State 
Parties to act differently from the general rule according to which no state is required to 
enforce another state’s export controls.488 According to this Article a State Party may 
request the courts in another State Party to order the return of cultural objects that have 
                                                     
485 The compensation is to be paid by the person who transferred the cultural objective to the possessor if 
permitted by the law of the State in which the claim is brought (Art. 4(2)). 
486 See Art. 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  
487 See further for an analysis of the relevance of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention further to existing 
rights in law: Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 95. 
488 Merryman, J.H., 2007, p. 215. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   111 12-10-2009   12:09:01
112  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
been illegally exported from its territory (Art. 5(1)).489 Different from the case of stolen 
cultural property, the return of illegally exported cultural objects is not automatic but 
requires active intervention between State parties. Furthermore, and different from the 
regime governing stolen cultural objects outlined in Chapter II, the right to seek return 
of illegally exported cultural objects is limited to State Parties. As such a claim is brought 
on the ground of breach of public laws; the drafters of the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention explicitly ruled out that private owners may bring a claim.490 Furthermore, 
the State Parties’ right to claim for the return is limited: the court has to order the return 
of the requested object only if the requesting state establishes that the object is of 
“significant cultural importance” or if the removal of the object impairs one of the 
interests listed in Art. 5(3): 
 
a. the physical preservation of the object or of its context;  
b. the integrity of a complex object;  
c. the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific or historical character;  
d. the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community. 
 
The interests listed sub (a), (b) and (c) correspond with the main general aims of the 
protection of cultural property – the physical preservation of original objects and the 
preservation in the original context.491 What is interesting about the interest listed sub 
(d) – the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community – is 
that it seeks to protect an interest of a different order. Rather than seeking to protect the 
object as such it seeks to protect its traditional or ritual use. In this respect the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention anticipates the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage that was adopted in October 2003. For those cultural 
objects that do not fit into any of these four categories, the general interest of 
“significant cultural importance” has been introduced.492  
In case the court orders the return of an illegally exported cultural object, the current 
possessor, provided he acted in good faith, is granted fair and reasonable compensation 
to be paid by the requesting state (Art. 6(1)).493 A state’s ability to seek the return of an 
illegally exported cultural object is subject to the same limitation periods that apply to 
stolen cultural objects (Art. 5(5)). Different from the case of stolen cultural objects, 
                                                     
489 The same applies to cultural objects whose export might have been lawful but which are not returned in 
accordance with the export permit (Art. 5(2)). 
490 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: Explanatory Report prepared 
by the UNIDROIT Secretariat, 2001, p. 526. 
491 See further on the main aims of cultural property law: Fechner, F.G., 1998, pp. 382-383. 
492 Cf.: UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: Explanatory Report 
prepared by the UNIDROIT Secretariat, 2001, p. 530. The explanatory report refers to the Taranaki 
sculptures in the case of Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] 1 A.C 1, 35 (H.L.) as an example of 
objects that would be caught be the general category.  
493 Art. 6(3) mentions a number of alternatives to the payment of compensation to meet the interest of the 
bona fide possessor provided the latter agrees. 
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objects from public collections are not exempted from the absolute limitation period 
after which no claim can be brought.  
The provisions in Chapter II on stolen cultural objects and Chapter III on illegally 
exported cultural objects are complemented with articles further regulating the 
implementation of the Convention. Art. 10 of Chapter IV on General Provisions 
stresses that the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does not apply retroactively. Its 
provisions apply only to cultural objects that have been stolen or illegally exported after 
the entry into force of the Convention for the requesting State Party and the holding 
State. The entry into force of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on 1st July 1998 is 
hence only relevant for the first five countries that ratified the Convention.494 In case of 
illegal export both States must have ratified the Convention prior to the illegal export. In 
case of theft, it suffices if the holding State Party ratified the Convention before the 
stolen object was brought into its territory.495 Art. 10(3) emphasizes that while the 
Convention cannot be used to remedy illegal transfers that occurred prior to the entry 
into force of the Convention (for the respective State Party), it does not legitimize these 
transfers nor does it prevent any remedies available outside of its own regime.496 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is the first international convention to introduce 
a legal right to seek the return of illegally exported cultural objects. While legally 
enforceable, this right is rather limited both in scope and practical relevance. As outlined 
above, Art. 5(3) makes the return dependant on the relevance of a cultural object. As for 
the practical relevance, this may change over time as has been experienced with the 1970 
UNESCO Convention. Currently, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention counts only 29 
State Parties.497 All of the State Parties are source nations or at least not typical art 
market nations. The latter have so far refused to become State Parties for reasons that 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention would mean a disproportionate interference in legal 
trade.498 
                                                     
494 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention entered into force on that date for the following countries: Cyprus, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Pakistan, Paraguay and Romania. Art. 12 states that the Convention enters into force 
on the first day of the sixth month following the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.  
495 Art. 10 (1) and (2). 
496 This convention does not in any way legitimise any illegal transaction of whatever nature which has taken 
place before the entry into force of this Convention or which is excluded under paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this article, nor limit any right of a State or other person to make a claim under remedies available outside 
the framework of this convention for the restitution or return of a cultural object stolen or illegally exported 
before the entry into force of this Convention. 
497 See for an alphabetical overview of State Parties to the Convention:  
http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf (last visited: 23 July 2008). In an email received from 
the UNIDROIT Secretariat dated 23 July 08 the list was confirmed as being up-to-date. 
498 See, e.g.: Lalive, P., 1999; Kuitenbrouwer, F., 16 May 2003. 
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V .  EU R O P EA N  CON V EN T IO N  O N  OF F EN C E S  R E L A T I N G  TO  CU L T U R A L  PR O P ER T Y  
(1985)  
 The European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property (hereinafter: 
“the 1985 European Convention”) was drawn up by the Council of Europe in 1985.499 
While the 1985 European Convention was adopted in the period between the 1970 
UNESCO Convention and the 1985 UNIDROIT Convention, we have chosen to wait 
with its analysis until after the evaluation of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Not 
only does the latter complement the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which asks for joint 
evaluation; the 1985 Convention is also different in that it is an instrument of regional 
relevance only.500 Furthermore, the 1985 European Convention has not yet entered into 
force despite its adoption more than twenty years ago.501 
The 1985 European Convention provides for a basis to claim for the return of 
cultural property where the objects concerned fall under the definition of cultural 
property as provided for in Annex II to the Convention and that have been brought 
into a State Party’s territory in breach of one of the offences listed in Annex III to the 
Convention (Art. 8(2))502. The exportation of cultural property in breach of national 
laws is listed as one of the relevant offences in Art. 2(h) of Annex III.503 Different from 
the international treaties discussed above the 1985 European Convention does not rely 
on a breach of a national export law. Instead, it relies upon the committing of an 
offence as defined in its catalogue of offences (Annex II).504 While this approach 
circumvents the problems generally encountered in the realm of illegal exports, i.e. the 
unwillingness of countries to enforce other national public laws, the agreement on a 
common catalogue of offences is complicated to an extend that experts fear that the 
                                                     
499 European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, signed at Delphi, 23 June 1985 (ETS 
No. 119). Available online at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/119.htm (last visited: 
6 July 2009). 
500 See for a list of the current Member States of the Council of Europe:  
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/ (last visited: 23 July 2008). 
501 At the end of June 2009, not a single state had ratified the Convention. See for an update: 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=119&CM=8&DF=6/17/2009&CL=EN
G. The convention requires 3 ratifications to enter into force. 
502 Art. 8(2) reads: “Each Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory 
relating to proceedings addressed to it by the competent authorities of a Party that is competent in 
accordance with Art. 13 for the purpose of seizure and restitution of cultural property which has been 
removed to the territory of the requested Party subsequent to an offence relating to cultural property. 
Restitution of the property in question is however subject to the conditions laid down in the law of the 
requested Party”. 
503 List of legal provisions that provide for offences other than offences dealt with under criminal law: actual 
or attempted exportation of cultural property the exportation of which is prohibited by the law of a Party 
(2(h)(i)); exportation or attempted exportation, without authorisation of the competent authorities, of 
cultural property the exportation of which is made conditional on such an authorisation by the law of a 
Party (2(h)(ii)).  
504 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 176. 
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1985 European Convention will never enter into force.505 As to the question to what 
extent the 1985 European Convention would alter the protection available to illegally 
exported cultural objects should it eventually enter into force the prognosis is limited: as 
an instrument of penal character it can only be applied against the person who 
committed an offence listed in the annex. Consequently, only cultural property still 
possessed by the offender could be seized and returned. 506 
VI .  EEC RE G U L A TI O N  NO  3911/92  A N D  EC  DI R E C T I V E  93/7/EEC 
 In 1992 and 1993, the European Community adopted two measures to reconcile 
the fundamental principle of European Community Law of the free movement of goods 
with the protection of objects classified as "national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value" in the sense of Art. 30 EC Treaty507: Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods (hereinafter: “the 
Regulation”) and Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of 
cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State (hereinafter: 
“the Directive”).508 
The adoption of these two related measures occurred against the background of the 
completion of the internal market in December 1992.509 With the opening of the 
internal borders within the European Community the national export regulations as a 
policy measure to protect the national heritage lost some of the effectiveness given the 
possibility of a “cultural drain”510 to third countries via the borders of Member States 
with less stringent export restrictions.511 The Regulation, which came into force on 30 
March 1993, seeks to counteract such “cultural drainage” by introducing EU wide 
uniform export controls at the external borders.512  
                                                     
505 Ibid., p. 176 & 275. 
506 Freytag, C., 1996, p. 182. 
507 Art. 30 EC Treaty grants an exception to the provisions of Artt. 28 and 29, in prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of (…)the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value (…) that shall not precluded (…).  
508 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods, OJ No L 
395, 31.12.1992, p. 1, as amended by information of 27 March 1993, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 80; Council 
Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the 
territory of a Member State, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74. 
509 The completion of the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital” was provided for under the Single European Act, which had been 
signed in 1986. See Art. 8a of the Rome Treaty as inserted by the Single European Act and Artt. 3(1)c) and 
14 of the EC Treaty.  
510 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 226.  
511 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 212.  
512 In order to facilitate uniform controls, the Regulation introduces an EU wide system of export licenses 
for the export of cultural goods outside the customs territory of the Community. The system of export 
licenses is further outlined in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 752/93 of 30 March 1993. See further on 
the Regulation below in chp. 1§2.VI & 3.§1.I. 
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More important in the context of the present chapter is the Directive, which 
introduces domestic obligations in all Member States to return cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from another Member State.513 According to Art. 1(2) of the 
Directive unlawful removal means removal in breach of EEC Regulation No 3911/92, 
in breach of national laws or that an object is not returned after temporary lawful 
removal. The protection under the Directive is only available for cultural objects in the 
sense of the Directive, which have been removed after 1 January 1993 (Art. 13). A 
cultural object in the sense of the Directive is an object that is classified by a Member 
State as 'national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value' within the 
meaning of Art. 30 of the EC Treaty, provided it either belongs to one of the categories 
listed in the Annex or forms an integral part of a public collection and is listed in the 
institution’s inventory (Art. 1).  
The general obligation of the Directive to return unlawfully removed cultural objects 
to their Member State of origin is put into more concrete terms in Art. 7: in particular, it 
clarifies that the obligation to return unlawfully removed cultural objects is not absolute 
but is subject to two different kinds of time limits. In the first place, a Member State 
looses its right to seek return of a cultural object if it does not start return proceeding 
within one year after becoming aware of the whereabouts of the object and the identity 
of the possessor / holder. In the second place, Art. 7 introduces an absolute time limit 
irrespective of the knowledge of the Member State seeking a return: after the lapse of 
thirty years for objects from private collections and after the lapse of 75 years for public 
collections a Member State can no longer seek the return of an object, unless the 
legislation of the Member State in which the object is residing does not know time limits 
for such proceedings or in case of bilateral agreements stating otherwise. Art. 8 of the 
Directive clarifies that there can be no bona fide acquisition of a cultural object in the 
sense of the Directive. However, Art. 9(1) of the Directive takes the interest of a bona 
fide possessor into account in determining that he or she must be awarded a fair 
indemnity.514  
VI I .  BI L A T E R A L  T R E A T I E S   
 Further to the international and regional instruments discussed above, there exist 
a number of bilateral treaties that provide for the return of cultural property.515 Most of 
                                                     
513 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 232. 
514 The European Commission is currently working on a (re-) codification of Council Directive 93/7/EEC 
of 15 March 1993. The new Directive will supersede the various acts incorporated in the Directive in order 
to make it clearer and more accessible. The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State 
(COM/2007/0873 final - COD 2007/0299) fully preserves the content of the acts. 
515 E.g.: Treaty of Cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States 
Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties; 
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Government of Spain and the Government of the 
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these treaties are concerned with cultural property originating from the American 
continent516 and oblige the State Party into whose territory stolen or illegally exported 
cultural property has been brought to return the object in accordance with its national 
laws.517 Similar to the multilateral treaties discussed above, the bilateral treaties do not 
apply retroactively. By relying on the protection afforded under national laws and 
different from the multilateral treaties, the bilateral treaties do not afford protection in 
case of a bona fide purchase or in case of prescription.518 
VI I I .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  W I T H  R EG A R D T O  T H E  R E T UR N  O F  I L L I C I TL Y  
T R A D E D  C UL T UR A L  O B J E C T S  UN D E R  T R EA T Y  L A W   
 The analysis of the available protection of cultural property in times of peace 
revealed that public international law is less developed when it comes to the restitution 
or return of cultural objects removed outside the context of armed conflicts. This does 
not mean that public international law is irrelevant for the restitution or return of 
cultural objects removed during peacetimes or put less euphemistically as a result of the 
illicit trade. While the restitution of stolen cultural objects is first and foremost an 
activity that falls under private (international) law, the analysis revealed a number of 
contributions of instruments of public international law to the restitution of cultural 
objects.  
With regard to stolen cultural objects, the legal instruments analysed do extend the 
protection offered under private (international) law. However, one must distinguish 
between different categories of stolen objects: the greatest protection is granted to 
cultural objects stolen from institutions recognised as housing such objects. Art. 7(b) of 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides for the return of cultural property stolen from 
a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another 
State Party after the convention’s entry into force. While the return is to be achieved by 
diplomatic channels, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention grants State Parties access to 
the national courts. Under the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention stolen cultural property 
has to be returned, even when acquired in good faith. The possibility to recover a 
cultural object is, however, limited in time. The claiming party has to bring its claim 
within a period of three years from the moment the location of the cultural object and 
the identity of its possessor are known (Art. 3(3)). This relative limitation period of 3 
years is complemented by an absolute limitation period of fifty years from the time of 
the theft after which no claim can be brought (Art. 3(3)). Cultural objects stolen from a 
public collection or certain objects of important cultural relevance for a tribal or 
indigenous community are exempted from the absolute limitation period (Art. 3(4)); 
                                                                                                                                          
Republic of Venezuela. No. 14947, signed at Madrid on 28 June 1973. See for more examples of bilateral 
treaties: Walter, B., 1988, pp. 62-70. 
516 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 178. 
517 Freytag, C., 1996, p. 182. 
518 Ibid. 
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they are subject only to the subjective period of three years from the time when the 
claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor. 
Member States are, however, granted discretion in introducing an absolute limitation 
period for the recovery of objects from public collections, albeit no shorter than 75 
years. 
With regard to the return of illegally exported cultural objects or other illicitly traded 
object other than being stolen the international instruments are more reserved in 
granting protection: only the 1935 Washington Treaty, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention and the EC Directive 93/7/EEC provide for obligations to return illegally 
exported cultural objects. According to the 1935 Washington Treaty, which is limited in 
geographical application certain categories of objects that have been illegally exported 
(and hence illegally imported) must be returned to the country of origin. The first 
international rather than only multilateral treaty that provides for the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects is the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. While its definition of 
cultural objects is broader than the range covered by the 1935 Washington Treaty the 
obligation to return illegally exported cultural objects is available only to a small portion 
of cultural objects: only where objects are of significant cultural importance or whre 
their removal impairs one the four listed interests in Art. 5(3) (physical preservation, 
integrity, preservation of information, traditional use by indigenous community) will the 
court in the holding state order for their return.  
Amongst EU Member States EC Directive 93/7 covers a broader range of objects 
and situations in which objects must be returned to the Member State of origin: the 
obligation to return cultural objects extends to all objects that have been classified in 
national law as ‘national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value’. 
The obligation to return cultural objects exists not only where objects have been illegally 
exported under national law but also where the removal breached Regulation 3911/92 
or where an object was not returned after a temporary lawful removal. However, while 
Directive 93/7 goes further in scope of application than the other two instruments, it 
must be stressed that it applies only amongst EC Member States and is thus regionally 
limited. Consequently, international law, at least as far as treaty law is concerned, is very 
reserved in providing for the return of illegally exported cultural objects. 
IX .  CU S T O M A R Y  L A W 
 In light of the very reserved obligations under treaty law with regard to the return 
of illegally exported cultural objects a number of authors have tried to identify such an 
obligation of customary international law.519 The majority of scholars, however, deny the 
existence of such an obligation of customary law.520 The results of our analysis of the 
                                                     
519 Seferiades, S., 1932, p. 69; Becher, K., 1974; Zschiedrich, K. / Hoffmann, E., 1984, p. 87. 
520 Engstler, L., 1964; Goy, R., 1979, p. 966; Walter, B., 1988, p. 71; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 419; 
Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 179. 
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existence of a uniform state practice of certain duration and spreading and an opinio iuris 
with regard to the return of illegally exported cultural objects will be summarised in the 
following.521 
1.  ST A T E  P R A C T I C E   
 Scrutinising the activities that amount to the element of state practice, i.e. actual 
activity (acts and omissions), statements made in respect of concrete situations or 
disputes, statements of legal principle made in the abstract, national legislation and the 
practice of international organisations does not allow but the conclusion that at present 
one cannot speak of state practice of a certain duration, uniformity and spreading with 
regard to the return of illegally exported cultural objects. So far, only a limited number 
of returns of illegally exported cultural objects have been effected.522 The analysis of 
national legislation providing for the return of illegally exported cultural objects revealed 
only a limited number of jurisdictions that have introduced such legislation. Examples 
of such national laws are the Canadian Cultural Property Export and Import Act523, and 
the US Statute on the importation of pre-Columbian monumental or architectural 
sculpture or murals.524 The limited number of jurisdictions with little geographical 
spreading is not sufficient to speak of state practice. Furthermore, the legal provisions 
are often limited to specifically designated cultural objects, such as pre-Columbian 
artefacts or objects originating from certain jurisdictions only. Consequently, with none 
of the activities discussed in this section amounting to state practice (actual acts in the 
sense of returns, national legislation and the practice of international organisations) the 
existence of state practice concerning the return of illegally exported cultural objects 
must be clearly rejected.525  
                                                     
521 See above in chp. 1§1.VIII discussing the restitution of cultural property removed during armed conflict 
for an analysis of opinio iuris and state practice as the two constitutive elements of customary law. 
522 Greenfield, J., 1989, pp. 5 & 260-261 & 264-266; Freytag, C., 1996, p. 183. 
523 Cultural Property Export and Import Act ( R.S., 1985, c. C-51 ), Section “Foreign Cultural Property”, 
which prohibits the import of cultural property that has been illegally exported from a country with which 
Canada has a cultural property agreement on illicit traffic, including the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
524 Act on the Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or 
Murals, 19 USCA § 2091-2095 (1976). See further: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1982, p. 191; Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 172-
176. 
525 This conclusion is also supported by the analysis included in the next section (chp. 1.§3) where we 
discuss the relevance resolutions and developments within the framework of UNESCO for the return of 
cultural objects that have been removed during the colonial era. While some the resolutions and the 
‘Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or 
its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation’ are also relevant for the return of illegally exported cultural 
objects they do not provide for legally binding obligations nor do they give sufficient evidence of constant 
and uniform state practice.  
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2.  OP IN IO  I U R I S  
 Given the cumulative relationship between state practice and opinio iuris no rule of 
customary can have evolved in the absence of the former. While we will not further 
elaborate upon the element of opinio iuris in the absence of a settled state practice, we 
would like to recall the results of our analysis of treaty law above. Treaty law is one form 
that can give rise to opinio iuris where it covers similar grounds as the potential rule of 
customary law.526  
With regard to the relevance of the 1970 UNESCO Convention we must first recall 
the results of the analysis of its scope of application undertaken above. By various 
means of interpretation it was established that the 1970 UNESCO Convention does not 
oblige State Parties to return illegally exported cultural property. The obligation to 
return cultural property as provided for by Art. 7(b)(ii) does not include unlawfully 
excavated cultural objects nor does it include illegally exported cultural objects.527 
Against this background the 1970 UNESCO Convention cannot serve as proof of State 
Parties’ convictions with regard to the restitution of illegally exported cultural object, 
despite the significant increase in ratifications. 
Different from the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
does provide for an obligation to return illegally exported cultural objects in its Art. 5. In 
evaluating the relevance of this provision as proof of an (emerging) opinio iuris to return 
illegally exported cultural objects, attention must be paid to the fact that by the end of 
2008 only 29 State Parties had ratified the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, all of which 
are source nations. The obligation to return illegally exported cultural objects in 
accordance with Art. 5 of the Convention has not been put forward as an obstacle. 
Consequently, while the behaviour of the art market nations does not give evidence of 
the (emergence) of an opinio iuris, it does not contradict it. However, given the limited 
number of State Parties to the Convention, it is premature to speak of more than an 
emerging opinio iuris on the return of illegally exported cultural objects.  
This finding that the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention do not give evidence of an existing opinio iuris to return illegally exported 
cultural objects, but at the utmost allow to conclude for an emerging opinio iuris is 
supported by the analysis of supranational, multilateral, as well as bilateral instruments. 
At the supranational level we have discussed Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 
1993 (hereafter: the Directive). The Directive introduces domestic obligations in all 
Member States to return cultural objects illegally removed from another Member 
State.528 However, as the Directive must be understood as a reaction to the European 
                                                     
526 Freytag, C., 1996, p. 188; Dixon, M., 2007, p. 36. 
527 Cf.: Mackenzie, S., 2005, p. 90.  
528 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 232. The obligation equally applies to cultural property removed from or a contracting 
party to the European Economic Area Agreement. The Agreement on the European Economic Area 
entered into force in 1994. Its current relevance for the protection of cultural objects is that Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein are able to participate in the Internal Market, while not assuming the full 
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Single Market, which was realised by 1 January 1993529, the provisions of the Directive 
seek first and foremost to prevent the drainage of the Member States’ national cultural 
heritage due to the abolition of customs inspection.530  
As for multilateral instruments, the 1935 Treaty of Washington and the 1985 
European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property were discussed. Both 
are regional treaties that are limited in geographical application to the Americas, 
respectively to the Europe of the Council of Europe. Of all instruments discussed here, 
the Treaty of Washington provides for the most elaborate system to grant the return of 
illegally exported cultural objects. Not only does it allow applicant states access to civil 
courts, it also makes the legality of an import dependant on the legality of the export. 
The Treaty of Washington, hence, can be understood as being supportive of an 
(emerging) opinio iuris. The 1985 European Convention, on the other hand, does not 
support the evidence to an opinio iuris. In the first place, the Convention has not entered 
into force despite having been adopted more than twenty years ago. Furthermore, 
experts are pessimistic that the Convention will never enter into force. Even then, the 
convention would provide only for a very limited regime under which cultural property 
has to be returned.  
The analysis of international treaties as to the question whether and in how far they 
give evidence of an opinio iuris on the return of illegally exported cultural objects revealed 
that while there is not sufficient evidence to speak of an opinio iuris, there might be 
evidence of an emerging opinio iuris. The finding is supported by the tendency in national 
case law to provide for a remedy in cases where cultural objects have been removed 
from a country of origin after having been illicitly excavated.531 Traditionally, and in line 
with the principles of state sovereignty national courts refused to order the return of the 
                                                                                                                                          
responsibilities of EU membership. Hence, the protection available to cultural objects originating from EU 
Member States as discussed in this section, is also available to objects originating in these three countries.  
529 See Art. 8a of the Single European Act (SEA).  
530 Freytag, C., 1996, p. 189. 
531 A few comments must be made at this point on the role and relevance of national case law in the 
creation of customary law. In the past national case law was considered to constitute only evidence of 
custom but could not constitute a force of creating custom (Nollkaemper, A., 2003, p. 282, fn. 217). This 
view closely followed the role accorded to judicial decisions in Art. 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court according to which judicial decisions may be used (only) as a “subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law”. At present, international law scholarship accepts the idea that national case law can be an 
element in the formation of customary law (Jennings, R.Y., 1996, p. 41; International Law Association 
(ILA), 2000, principle 9. Cf.: Nollkaemper, A., 2003). National case law can qualify as both state practice or 
opinio iuris (Nollkaemper, A., 2003. The idea that State practice can consist only of the practice of organs 
that normally enter into binding relations with other states is no longer generally supported. See with regard 
to the element of opinio iuris: Freytag, C., 1996, p. 184). In the present analysis, however, national case law 
falls short of both elements. As for state practice the cases reported in the literature (Greenfield, J., 1989, 
pp. 328-329; Freytag, C., 1996, pp. 184-185; Siehr, K.G., 2006, p. 121; Merryman, J.H., 2007, pp. 247-280) 
cannot constitute state practice for lack of a certain duration, uniformity and spreading. As for the element 
of opinio iuris none of the cases allowed for the return of illegally exported cultural objects as such. It is only 
where the foreign national law allows for reconceptualising the removal as theft, i.e. removal in breach of 
laws vesting ownership in a state that national courts have been willing to offer a remedy. 
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objects in cases dealing with illegally exported cultural objects as this would constitute 
the enforcement of a foreign public law.532 Starting with the case United States v. 
McClain and leading to the recent case of Iran v Barakat Gallery courts in the United 
States and the United Kingdom have adopted a more nuanced position towards the 
return of cultural objects that have been removed from their country of origin after 
having been illegally excavated.533 The cases United States v. McClain, Peru v. Johnson, 
United States v. Schultz, and Iran v The Barakat Gallery all allowed for the return of 
cultural objects that had been removed from a foreign country of origin after having 
been clandestinely excavated. It is important to note that the courts did not provide for 
the return of illegally exported cultural objects as such, but provided for the return on 
the basis of laws vesting ownership of the objects with the states. By relying on foreign 
laws vesting ownership in cultural objects the courts were able to construe the cases as 
dealing with stolen cultural objects rather than objects that had been illegally exported. 
Further to extensively interpreting “stolen” cultural objects, the case law also indicates 
                                                     
532 See for a typical case in this respect the Ortiz Case: Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] 1 
A.C 1, 35 (H.L.). In this case, which was tried in the early 1980s in the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
sought the return of Maori panels that had been illegally exported under its cultural property export law in 
the early 1970s. Aware of the reluctance of courts to enforce public (export) laws, the Attorney General of 
New Zealand presented the case as a private law suit for recovery of State property (See presentation of the 
facts by Lord Denning: [1948] 1 AC at pp. 13 et seq. (CA). Also reproduced in: Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 184-
186). The reason that this strategy failed was that New Zealand law (See the New Zealand Historic Articles 
Act 1962, Section 5 and Section 12(2) and the New Zealand Customs Act 1939, Section 274) died not 
provide for automatic forfeiture. Consequently, the title to the panels had not been vested in the 
government of New Zealand. With the panels’ exit of New Zealand territory, the authorities of New 
Zealand authority to seize the panels ceded. Under public international law, seizure is limited to the territory 
of the sovereign state. With the option of solving the case via the New Zealand Historic Articles Act and 
the New Zealand Customs Act, the court had to address the question as to the enforcement of New 
Zealand’s export prohibitions. While the judge in first instance, Judge Slaughton held that “comity requires 
that we should respect the natural heritage of other countries by according both recognition and 
enforcement to their laws” (ILR 78, 591, 607. See further: Shyllon, F., 1998, pp. 114-115), the House of 
Lords declined to order the return of the panels due to the classification of the export rules under 
international law as being de ‘jure imperii’. Acts that are done by a sovereign ‘jure imperii’ are those acts done 
by virtue of this sovereign authoritiy. The others are acts which are done ‘jure gestionis’. With regard to the 
Maori penals Lord Denning reached the conclusion that legislation forbidding export of works of art and 
providing for automatic forfeiture to the state when exported fell into the category of “other public laws” 
(next to penal and revenue laws) and therefore would not be enforced by foreign courts. Cf.: Barker, I., 
2006, p. 146. See for another case in which the Kingdom of Spain anticipated that the English courts would 
not order the return of an illegally exported painting: Kingdom of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ldt. 
[1986] 1 W.L.R. 1120 (Ch.D). Instead the Kingdom of Spain asked for a declaratory judgment that the 
painting, which had been consigned with Christie’s, had been illegally exported therewith tainting the 
painting’s provenance. Cf.: Siehr, K.G., 2006, p. 121.  
533 See cases United States v. McClain 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) and 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(decided in two stages).; Government of Peru v Benjamin Johnson 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989); US v. 
Schultz 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 333 F.2d 393 (2nd Cir. 2003). 147 L.Ed 2d 891 (2004); 
Government of Islamic Repub. of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd., [2007] EWHC 705 (Q.B.D. 2007), 
March 29; Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374, 21 December, 
[2008] 1 All E. R. 1177. See further on the cases, e.g.: Mastalir, R.W., 1993, p. 1052; Merryman, J.H., 2000a; 
Gerstenblith, P., 2002; Gerstenblith, P., 2003; Lufkin, M., 2003. 
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significant good will of the courts in addressing the question whether the national laws 
vesting ownership were sufficiently clear in vesting title with the State.534 While this 
tendency to return cultural objects that have been illegally excavated and subsequently 
removed from their country of origin where the respective national law vests ownership 
in the state constitutes a step towards greater respect for the national cultural heritage 
and should be taken into account also by national legislators, especially of source 
countries, this tendency does not alter the general finding that international customary 
law does not presently provide for a rule providing for the return of illegally exported 
cultural objects.  
§3. RETURN OF  CULTURAL  OBJECTS  TO  THEIR  COUNTRY  /  TERRITORY  OF  ORIG IN   
 In the previous section we have discussed public international law – both treaty 
law and customary law as to the existence of rules providing for the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects. The question to be addressed in this section is whether 
international law provides for an obligation to return (cultural) objects that have been 
removed from their country of origin during the colonial era. At first, this question 
might seem counter-intuitive: did not the analysis of the previous section indicate that 
there exist only limited obligations to return cultural objects that have been illegally 
exported? Why then discuss the question whether obligations exist for the return of 
cultural objects that had been removed long before any of the international instruments 
were adopted? The reason for doing so is twofold: first, while the international 
instruments adopted since the 1970s did not apply retroactively they also did not rule 
out the return of cultural objects removed prior to their entry into force. Secondly, a 
number of authors explicitly pleaded for the possibility that a specific rule dealing with 
the return of cultural objects removed from formerly colonised countries could have 
come into existence or was emerging. Both aspects shall be further introduced before 
turning to the actual analysis of the question whether international law provides for an 
obligation to return (cultural) objects that have been removed from their country of 
origin during the colonial era. 
Commenting upon the discussions with regard to the question of retroactivity during 
the drafting process of the 1970 UNESCO Convention it was noted that the  
 
“debate (…) made it clear that, by 1970, title to cultural property taken from colonies and recognized to that 
date by the domestic law of the holding States, and by that version of international law which they had 
insisted upon in the preceding centuries, was subject to substantial opposition and that nothing in the 1970 
Convention settled the question”.535  
 
                                                     
534 Government of Islamic Repub. of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd., [2007] EWHC 705 (Q.B.D. 2007), 
March 29; Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374, 21 December, 
[2008] 1 All E. R. 1177, para. 96. 
535 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 813. 
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During the drafting process of the 1970 UNESCO Convention China had proposed 
the inclusion of an article providing for retroactive effect: “(…) any State party which, 
when the Convention comes into force, is in possession of important cultural property, 
illicitly acquired, inalienable to, and inseparable from, the history and civilization of 
another State, shall, in the interest of international goodwill, endeavour to restore such 
property to that State”.536 The article was not incorporated in the final text; it was not 
even been included in the 1969 draft version. On the contrary, the preliminary draft did 
include a provision according to which State Parties were required to recognize the 
ownership vested in each State or its nationals acquired before the Convention entered 
into force for the state concerned.537 After a significant debate on the recognition of the 
status quo ownership of cultural ownerships (draft) Art. 4(f), which would have put an 
end to the claiming of cultural objects removed during the colonial era, was deleted by 
the Special Committee of Governmental Experts in 1970.538  
In the final and adopted version of the 1970 UNESCO Convention Art. 15 is the 
only reminder of this discussion on the application of the convention for cultural 
objects removed prior to its entry into force. The Article emphasizes the general 
principle that  
 
“nothing (…) shall prevent States Parties (…) from concluding special agreements among themselves or 
from continuing to implement agreements already concluded regarding the restitution of cultural property 
removed, whatever the reason, from its territory of origin, before the entry into force of this Convention for 
the States concerned”.  
 
The Article does not change the status quo – of course State Parties are free to enter 
into agreements outside of the scope of a convention. 
With regard to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention attention must be drawn to Art. 
10(3). The article emphasizes that while the Convention cannot be used to remedy 
illegal transfers that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention (for the 
respective State Party), it does not legitimize these transfers nor does it prevent any 
remedies available outside of its own regime.539 Consequently, both the 1970 UNESCO 
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention take a neutral position with regard to the return 
of cultural objects removed prior to their entry into force: they neither constitute an a 
posteriori legitimation of the removals nor do they introduce obligations to return the 
removed objects.  
                                                     
536 UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 10. Cf.: Ibid. 
537 Art. 4(f). UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex II, 10. 
538 See Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, para. 1416. Unesco Doc. 16 C/17 Annex II, 4.  
539 This convention does not in any way legitimise any illegal transaction of whatever nature which has taken 
place before the entry into force of this Convention or which is excluded under paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this article, nor limit any right of a State or other person to make a claim under remedies available outside 
the framework of this convention for the restitution or return of a cultural object stolen or illegally exported 
before the entry into force of this Convention. 
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The second reason for investigating the question as to the existence or emergence of 
a rule of international law providing for the return of cultural objects removed from 
formerly colonised countries lies in the perception of a number of eminent legal 
scholars. Bernhard Walter, e.g., who refutes the existence of a rule of customary law 
providing for the return of illegally exported cultural objects, states that “(...) such a rule 
of customary law on the return of cultural objects could, however, have come into 
existence with respect to formerly colonised countries”.540 Kurt Siehr, another eminent 
German scholar finds that there is an “(…) emerging rule of international law that 
cultural treasures lost in times of occupation or dependence have to be returned to the 
countries of origin”.541 
In the following we will scrutinise whether any of the following doctrines can 
provide a basis for claims for the restitution of cultural objects removed during the 
colonial era. First, we will scrutinize the resolutions adopted within the frameworks of 
the United Nations and UNESCO and other developments within UNESCO. Secondly, 
we will focus on the rules of state succession. Finally, we will discuss whether a 
reassessment of the circumstances of acquisition of the (cultural) objects during the 
colonial era, both prior and past the establishment of colonial rule may give rise to an 
obligation for the return of objects removed during the colonial era.  
I .  TH E  W O R K  O F  T H E  UN I T E D  NA T I ON S  A N D  UNESCO 
 Following the decolonisation in the 1960s-70s, many former colonies began to 
demand the restitution of cultural objects that had been misappropriated by the colonial 
powers or their subjects. The discussion was triggered in September 1973 by the request 
made by the then president of then Zaire (now Congo) Mobute Sese Seko during the 3rd 
Conference of the International Association of Arts Critics for the restitution of all 
cultural objects that had been removed under Belgian Colonialism.542 Zaire subsequently 
repeated the request during the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 
October 1973.543 As a result, on 18 December 1973, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 3187 on the “Restitution of Works of Art to Countries 
Victims of Expropriation”544. Resolution 3187 was “crude and unconditional” in its 
wording.545 It regrets “the wholesale removal, virtually without payment, of “objects 
d’art” from one country to another, frequently as a result of colonial or foreign 
occupation” and “recognizes the special obligations in this connection of those 
countries which had access to such valuable objects only as a result of colonial or 
                                                     
540 Walter, B., 1988, p. 71.  
541 Siehr, K.G., 2006, pp. 133-134. 
542 Cf.: Ganslmayr, H., 1980, p. 88. 
543 Walter, B., 1988, p. 93. 
544 Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation, G.A. Res. 3187, U.N. GAOR, 28th 
Sess., U.N. Doc.A/Res/3187(XXVIII) (1973). 
545 Cf.: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1983, p. 802. 
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foreign occupation”.546 The resolution was adopted by 113 votes in favour to none 
opposing it with 17 abstentions. Most of the abstainers were the countries referred to by 
the Resolution as having special obligations.547  
While UN Resolution 3391 dating from 1975 slightly sharpened the appeal to States 
to return objects d’art, monuments, museum pieces, manuscripts and documents to 
their countries of origin,548 subsequent resolutions became weaker and more indirect in 
their formulation of the claim for the restitution of cultural objects.549 At first, the 
argumentation of returns as reparations for damage done was changed due to the 
improvement of international relations between developing countries and developed 
countries.550 Subsequently, the explicit appeal to return cultural objects that had been 
obtained as result of colonial or foreign occupation was dropped completely. Instead, 
the emphasis of the resolutions shifted to curbing the ongoing illegal trafficking of 
cultural objects in general.551 One commentator stated that the resolutions “very simply, 
(…) have become less strident and more accommodating of the interests of the target 
states”.552 Only one provision can be identified in the resolutions adopted since the 
1980s that resisted the trend of moderation:553 Paragraph 7 of the 1985 UN Resolution 
 
“[a]ppeals to museums and public and private collectors to return totally or partially, or make available to 
the countries of origin, particularly the items kept in the store-houses of such museums and help the 
countries of origin, with the co-operation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, in their endeavours to formulate an inventory of these collections”.554  
 
A separate vote was undertaken on this provision, which received fewer votes in 
favour than the other provisions and also a vote against.555  
Within UNESCO, the adoption of the 1973 UN Resolution 3187 first resulted in the 
passing of Resolution 3.428 in 1974 by the 18th General Assembly.556 The Resolution 
invited the Director-General to take up and contribute to the aims set out in the 1973 
                                                     
546 See further on Resolution 3187: Schulze, D., 1983, pp. 13-14. 
547 The abstainers were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  
548 Resolution 3391 stresses the “need for prompt restitution of cultural property, without charge, as just 
reparation for damage”. Restitution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of Expropriation, G.A. Res. 
3391, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N.Doc.A/Res/3391(XXX) (1975). Cf.: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1983, p. 802. 
549 Cf.: Schulze, D., 1983, p. 14; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 183. 
550 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 183. 
551 Cf.: Thomason, D., 1990, pp. 55-60; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 213. 
552 Cf.: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1983, p. 803. 
553 Cf.: Ibid. 
554 UN Resolution 40/19 from 21.11.1985. 
555 The United States voted against. 19 U.N. Monthly Chronicles, February 1982, at 49. See further: 
Nafziger, J.A.R., 1983, p. 803. 
556 Resolution 3.428 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its eighteenth session in 
UNESCO.  
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UN Resolution 3187.557 While Resolution 3.428 referred to the London Declaration 
signed by the Allies in 1943 as to the right to declare certain transactions null and void558 
its concrete demands were more conservative: Resolution 3.428 asked for a definition in 
general terms of the most suitable methods for the “return” of cultural objects and 
suggested the convening of an expert group for this purpose.559  
In 1976, the expert group which became known as the ‘Venice Committee of 
Experts’ was set up. Its mandate was to investigate the restitution or return of cultural 
property lost either due to foreign or colonial occupation, or following illicit traffic 
before the entry into force of relevant international treaties and to identify legal and 
practical problems.560 One result of the Experts Committee’s report was the 
“codification” of the linguistic turn from “restitution” as previously employed by the 
United Nations to a dual system employing both “restitution” and “return” depending 
on the alleged illegality of the original taking under international law. “Restitution of 
cultural objects” was to be reserved to those cases in which the original taking of the 
objects was illegal under international law. In respect of cultural objects that had been 
lost during the colonial era, or due to illegal export outside of the international treaties’ 
scope of application the term “return” was to be employed to signify the absence of any 
illegal behaviour.561 The suggested dichotomy between restitution and return was 
employed in all subsequent UNESCO resolutions.562 By employing the proposed 
dichotomy between restitution and return in Resolution 3.428 and all subsequent 
UNESCO resolutions UNESCO implicitly stated that the removal of cultural objects 
during the colonial era had not been illegal.  
                                                     
557 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 815.  
558 Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy 
Occupation or Control, 8 Dep't St. Bull. 21 (1943). Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 816. See for an 
analysis of the London Declaration above in chp. 1.§1.V. 
559 UNESCO, Section ‘Second Legal Development: The institutional response of the International 
Community within UNESCO, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf. 
560 Unesco Doc.SHC-76/CONF.615/3. Cf.:  
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=36194&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited: 28 July 2008). 
561 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 817; Kowalski, W.W., 2004, p. 49. See further on the development of 
the terminology: A Brief History of the Creation by UNESCO of an Intergovernmental Committee for 
Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit 
Appropriation, 1979; Ganslmayr, H., 1980, p. 88; Thomason, D., 1990.  
562 Resolution 4128, UNESCO, 19th Session, Nairobi 1976, p. 48; Resolution 4/7.6/5 adopted at the 20th 
session of the General Conference (October – November 1978) Records of the General Conference, 
Resolutions, p. 92; Resolution 4/09, UNESCO, 21 Session, Belgrad 1980, p. 62; Resolution 2/11, 
UNESCO, 4th extraordinary Session, Paris 1982, p. 39 ff.; Resolution 11/9, UNESCO, 22nd Session, Paris 
1983, p. 59 ff. From 1979 onwards, the use in terminology was also adopted by the United Nations. Cf.: 
Walter, B., 1988, p. 94. Most prominently, however, the terminology is reflected in the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. The Convention provides for the restitution 
of stolen objects (Art. 3) but for the return of illegally exported cultural objects (Art. 5). See for an analysis 
of the different regimes introduced by the Convention above in chp. 1.§2.IV.  
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The linguistic dichotomy is also reflected in the name of the ‘Intergovernmental 
Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or 
its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (hereinafter: “the Intergovernmental 
Committee”)’ that was set up in reaction to the Venice Experts Committee’s 
recommendation to establish a permanent international body to further research the 
ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations for the restitution or return of 
cultural property and to encourage the countries concerned to reach agreements. The 
Intergovernmental Committee was established in 1978.563 It consists of elected members 
from the UNESCO Member States (Art. 2 Statutes). According to Art. 1 of its Statutes, 
the Intergovernmental Committee has solely an advisory role. It cannot impose a 
resolution on the parties.564 Instead, Art. 4 of its Statues lists a number of tasks that 
might contribute to finding agreement on returns and restitutions whether it concerns 
individual cases or the cause more in general.565 In line with its two guiding principles – 
the coherence of reconstituted heritage and the primacy of cultural objects566 - the 
Intergovernmental Committee only deals with disputes concerning still-existing objects. 
It does not consider claims for restitution in kind or compensation.567  
The services of the Intergovernmental Committee are limited to States that are 
Member States or Associate Members of UNESCO.568 As indicated by its name, the 
Intergovernmental Committee cannot be called upon by non – State groups.569 Art. 3 of the 
Statutes furthermore restricts the services of the Intergovernmental Committee to “any 
                                                     
563 Resolution 4/7.6/5 adopted at the 20th session of the General Conference (October – November 1978) 
Records of the General Conference, Resolutions, p. 92; See further: A Brief History of the Creation by 
UNESCO of an Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its 
Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, 1979. 
564 See further: UNESCO Doc. CLT 83/ Conf. 216/ 8 p. 4-6 where the use of the term arbitration was 
explicitly refused as the Intergovernmental Committee was not supposed to function as an arbitrating body. 
Instead “its path is that of mediation and moral pressure”. Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 98. 
565 The Committee shall be responsible for: 1. seeking ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations 
for the restitution or return of cultural property to its countries of origin when they are undertaken 
according to the conditions defined in Art. 9; 2. promoting multilateral and bilateral co-operation with a 
view to the restitution and return of cultural property to its countries of origin; 3. encouraging the necessary 
research and studies for the establishment of coherent programmes for the constitution of representative 
collections in countries whose cultural heritage has been dispersed; 4. fostering a public information 
campaign on the real nature, scale and scope of the problem of the restitution or return of cultural property 
to its countries of origin; guiding the planning and implementation of UNESCO’s programme of activities 
with regard to the restitution or return of cultural property to its countries of origin; encouraging the 
establishment or reinforcement of museums or other institutions for the conservation of cultural property 
and the training of the necessary scientific and technical personnel; 7. promoting exchanges of cultural 
property in accordance with the Recommendation on the International Exchange of Cultural Property; 8 
reporting on its activities to the General Conference of UNESCO at each of its ordinary sessions.  
566 See ICOM Study, Annex 1, paras. 9-20. Cf.: Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 217. 
567 UNESCO Doc. 21C/83, para. 29 & 31. Vrdoljak reports of a Peruvian draft resolution covering 
compensation (UNESCO Doc. DR. 346) that was unsuccessful: UNESCO Doc. CC-81/CONF. 203/4, 
Annex 1, 2, para. 257. Cf.: Ibid., p. 216. 
568 Art. 3(2), Committee Statute, UNESCO Doc. CC-79/CONF.206/4, Annex, para. 343. Cf.: Ibid., p. 214. 
569 Ibid., p. 215. 
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cultural property which has a fundamental significance from the point of view of the 
spiritual values and cultural heritage of the people”.570 However, this limitation is less 
relevant than it appears at first sight as it is the claiming state that determines the 
significance of an object.571 In its recommendations the Intergovernmental Committee 
is not limited to legal standards but may apply moral and ethical standards.572 
UNESCO Documentation573 and the literature generally focus on two cases when 
discussing the work of the Intergovernmental Committee: the case of the Elgin Marbles 
and the case of the Boğazköy Sphinx. The Elgin or Parthenon Marbles lie at the centre 
of a dispute between Greece and the United Kingdom, which has become “a metaphor 
for repatriation and relocation claims at large”.574 The dispute concerns parts of the 
frieze, metopes and pediments of the Parthenon in Athens.575 After individual claims for 
the return of the objects date back to the first half of the 19th century the Greek 
Government first sought the return in 1965. After the fall of the military dictatorship in 
Greece in 1974, the Parthenon sculptures began to take on a new role as a symbol of the 
revived democracy and from 1982 were championed by the Greek Government. Since 
then, the claim has been a feature of Greek Government policy, national and 
international. In 1984, the request for the return of the Parthenon Marbles has been 
filed with the Intergovernmental Committee by Greece and is still pending.576  
The case of the Boğazköy Sphinx concerns a dispute between Turkey and Germany. 
Back in 1986, Turkey field a request with the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
return of the Sphinx then kept in the collection of the Staatliches Museum 
Vorderasiatische Abteilung, Berlin in the former German Democratic Republic. 
Whereas Germany has since been unified, the dispute is unresolved as of today. 
                                                     
570 Art. 3 of the Statue reads: 1. For the purposes of these statutes, “cultural property” shall be taken to 
denote historical and ethnographic objects and documents including manuscripts, works of the plastic and 
decorative arts, palaeontological and archaeological objects and zoological, botanical and mineralogical 
specimens.  
2. A request for the restitution or return by a Member State or Associate Member of UNESCO may be 
made concerning any cultural property which has a fundamental significance from the point of view of the 
spiritual values and cultural heritage of the people of a Member State or Associate Member of UNESCO 
and which has been lost as a result of colonial or foreign occupation or as a result of illicit appropriation. 
3. Cultural property restituted or returned shall be accompanied by the relevant scientific documentation. 
571 Goy, R., 1979, p. 969; Schulze, D., 1983, p. 26; Walter, B., 1988, p. 15 & 96. 
572 UNESCO Doc. CC-79/CONF. 206/4, Annex, para. 348. 
573 UNESCO, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf in the section titled 
“Examples of cases pending before the Committee”. 
574 Palmer, N., 2000b, p. 343.  
575 The frieze originally extended 524 feet (ca. 160 m) around the Parthenon’s main inner chamber and 
depicted the Panathenaic Procession. It is three-foot-high and carved in low relief. The metopes, a series of 
ninety-two four-foot square panels surrounded the top of the Parthenon’ outer colonnade and depicted 
historical and mythical battles. The pediments, the low triangles at the ends of the building formed by the 
pitch of the roof, were filled with sculptures. Cf.: Merryman, J.H., 2000b, p. 25. 
576 See further on the dispute concerning the Elgin or Parthenon Marbles, e.g.: Reppas II, M.J., 1999; 
Merryman, J.H., 2000b. 
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What the literature does not mention, at least not explicitly, is the fact that the cases 
of the Elgin Marbles and the Boğazköy Sphinx were, until recently, the only cases heard 
by the Intergovernmental Committee. In 2006 the United Republic of Tanzania filed a 
request concerning a Makonde Mask located in Switzerland. While the mask is privately 
owned the Swiss State nevertheless expressed its willingness to facilitate negotiations 
with a view to restitution.577 Until present, the cases brought to the attention of the 
Intergovernmental Committee did not concern illegally exported cultural objects but 
mainly deal with objects removed in the past. 
Other cases that have been brought to the Intergovernmental Committee’s attention 
were never officially filed with the Committee. Some cases failed as the current location 
of the object sought after is unknown.578 Other cases were referred back for bilateral 
negotiations.579 With an output of three unresolved cases over the thirty years of its 
existence the output of the Intergovernmental Committee, at least with regard to 
individual cases, is disappointing. While its existence and work on general issues on the 
subject of return and restitution contributed to engross the debate and bilateral 
negotiations, there is clearly need to strengthen the mandate and raison d’être of the 
Intergovernmental Committee. 
It is in this light that one must see the adoption of 33 C/Resolution 44 during the 
33rd session of UNESCO’s General Conference: the resolution adds mediation and 
conciliation to the mandate of the Committee.580 At present, the (draft) rules of 
procedure are being examined.581 Whether UNESCO’s Member States or Associate 
Members will make use of the possibility of mediation and conciliation remains to be 
seen in the future. As of today, the resolutions and developments within the framework 
                                                     
577 Cf.: Report on the 2006/2007 Activities of the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return 
of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation, 34 
C/REP/14, paras 10-11. See further on the case: Shyllon, F., 2006, p. 140. 
578 See, e.g.: Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return of Cultural Property to 
its Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation on its Activities (1990-1991), 26 
C/92, para. 9 where the request for help by Egypt for the recovery of three stolen documents could only be 
met by circulating information on the stolen objects.  
579 See Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return of Cultural Property to its 
Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation on its Activities (1991-1993), 27 C/102, 
para. 4 on a request by the Union of Myanmar in April 1991 seeking help in retrieving eleven golden royal 
statues said to be held in the United Kingdom. UNESCO asked Myanmar to first initiate bilateral 
negotiations. According to para. 5 Zambia requested help with the return of the 'Broken Hill' skull from the 
United Kingdom in 1991. Zambia was informed to first enter into bilateral negotiations. See further on the 
'Broken Hill' skull: Greenfield, J., 1989, p. 159. See further on the Broken Hill Skull below in chp.2.§2.III.1. 
See also: Walter, B., 1988, pp. 98 -99 who reports of a request by Sri Lanka and of a request by Jordan on 
the return of the “sandstone panel of Tyche with the Zodiac” from the United States that were referred 
back for bilateral negotiations. Cf.: UNESCO Doc. CLT 85/ Conf. 202 / 7 Annex 1. The latter case was 
resolved between the parties with the United States providing Jordan with plaster copies of the original. Cf.: 
UNESCO Doc. 24 C/94 p. 2; UNESCO Doc. CC 87/ Conf. 207/3, pp. 1-2.  
580 Cf.: Report on the 2006/2007 Activities of the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return 
of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation, 34 
C/REP/14, para. 12. 
581 Ibid. The reference to the draft rules of procedure is CLT-2007/CONF.211-COM.14/3. 
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of the United Nations and UNESCO, including the work of the Intergovernmental 
Committee do not provide for legal obligations with regard to the return of cultural 
objects removed during the colonial era.  
I I .  RU L E S  O N  STA T E  S U C C E S S I O N:  T H E  C R EA T I O N  O F  L EG A L L Y  B I N DI N G  R I G H T S  O R  
O B L IG A T I ON S?   
 The process of decolonisation, which was based upon the principle of self-
determination laid down in the UN Charter and in Art. 1 of the 1966 International 
Human Rights Convenants582, was one of the most important structural transitions of 
the international legal system subsequent to the end of World War II.583 The colonial 
empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands and other European countries eroded with 
the political independence of their former colonies.584 By the 1960s, the decolonisation 
process had reached its climax and resulted in an increase of the total number of states 
by almost one hundred.585 
The process of decolonisation falls under the greater notion of state succession. State 
succession has been defined as “the replacement of one state by another in the 
responsibility for the international relations of territory”.586 Decolonisation as a process 
in which only a part of a State’s territory (i.e. the territory of the colonising state) is 
detached and makes up a new international subject (the newly independent state) 
qualifies as a form of partial succession.587 
The law of state succession deals with the legal problems arising from the transfer of 
territory between two subjects of international law.588 Where territory is transferred 
from the predecessor State (here: the colonising country) to a successor state (here: the 
formerly colonised country) the question arises how to treat bilateral and multilateral 
treaties concluded by the former state, as well as public and private property (which 
includes cultural objects), national archives, and the national debt.589 In most cases of 
state succession these questions are regulated in bilateral agreements.590  
                                                     
582 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International Convenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.  
583 Cf.: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 28. 
584 Cf.: Ibid. 
585 Cf.: Bleckmann, A., 1987, p. 76. 
586 Art. 2(1)a) of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts. Done at Vienna on 8 April 1983. Cf.: Ipsen, K., 2004, p. 307. 
587 Cf.: Fiedler, W., 1987, p. 447. 
588 Cf.: Ibid., p. 446. 
589 See for further questions concerning the succession of rights and obligations: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, 
M.B., 1997, p. 161.  
590 See for examples of these agreements: Documentation concernant la succession d’états, Serie législative 
des Nations Unies, 1967 and Documentation concernant la succession d’états dans les materières autres que 
les traités, Serie législative des Nations Unies, 1978; Engstler, L., 1964, p. 229 ff. 
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In the 1970s, in reaction to the process of decolonisation, and in order to bring some 
structure in the “chaotic” law on state succession591, the International Law Commission 
(ILC) was asked by the United Nations to work on a codification of the law on state 
succession. The ILC was asked to pay appropriate attention to the attitude of those 
(successor) states that had reached independence only after WWII.592 As result and 
based upon the draft text presented by the ILC’s work593, the Vienna Convention on 
State Succession in Respect of Treaties was adopted in 1978. A second convention 
followed in 1983: the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts (hereinafter: the 1983 Vienna Convention on State 
Succession).  
With regard to the present study only the 1983 Vienna Convention on State 
Succession is relevant, albeit only indirectly. Each part of the Convention deals with a 
specific matter of state succession (Part II: State Property; Part III: Archives; Part IV 
State Debts). The 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession introduces general rules 
on allocation, as well as more preferential rules for “newly independent states”.594 
According to Art. 2(1) (e) a “newly independent state”, is a “successor State the territory 
of which, immediately before the date of the succession of States, was a dependent 
territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible”. 
The introduction of specific rules with regard to newly independent States was the ILC’s 
implementation of the United Nations request to pay specific attention to the attitude of 
the newly independent States. In the following section we will shortly discuss the general 
and preferential rule on the passing of movable State Property, which is the relevant 
category with regard to cultural objects in the absence of specific provisions comparable 
to that of archives. 595  
As general rule, states are free to arrange for the passing of State property by mutual 
agreement (Art. 14(1)). For those cases where such an agreement is absent the article 
determines that “movable State property of the predecessor State connected with the 
activity of the predecessor State in respect of the territory to which the succession of 
States relates shall pass to the successor State” (Art. 14(2) (b)). This rule, which deviates 
from former state practise according to which only state property situated in the 
territory concerned596 passed from the predecessor to the successor State was declared 
mandatory for successions involving newly independent States (Art. 15 (d)). Thus with 
regard to newly independent states movable property is to be passed independent of the 
                                                     
591 Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 161.  
592 A /Res/1686 (XVI); A/Res/1765 (SVII); 1902 (XVIII); 2272 (XXII); 2926 (XXVII) Cf.: Schulze, D., 
1983, pp. 118-119. 
593 Cf.: YBILC 1967 II/2, 368.  
594 See Artt. 15; 28; 38 of the Convention.  
595 Different from cultural objects the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession does contain specific 
rules on the passing of State Archives. See Artt. 19-31 of the Convention. In the following we will only 
discuss State property as the relevant category comprising cultural property. 
596 Cf.: Schulze, D., 1983, pp. 115-116; Walter, B., 1988, p. 130. 
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question whether it is situated in the territory of the successor State or of the 
predeccessor State.597 The preferential position granted to newly independent states 
furthermore consists in the provision according to which “movable State property, 
having belonged to the territory to which the succession of States relates and having 
became State property of the predecessor State during the period of dependence, shall 
pass to the successor State” (Art. 15(1) (e)). 
The preferential treatment of newly independent states, as well as the general rule on 
the allocation of movable State property reaching out to property located in the territory 
of the predecessor State (Art. 14(2) (b) & Art. 15 (d)) were the main reason for most 
Western States to vote against the adoption of the treaty in 1983.598 While the 1983 
Vienna Convention on State Succession was nevertheless adopted, it has not entered 
into force as of today.599 However, even if the Convention had entered into force at the 
earliest date conceivable it would not have applied to the majority of state successions 
that took place during the process of decolonisation, which had attained its climax by 
1960.600 While an initial draft of the ILC did include a provision according to which the 
scope of application of the convention was not limited to future cases of state 
succession but did include “newly independent states” of recent origin the provision it 
was not included in the final draft.601 Instead, Art. 4(1) of the 1983 Vienna Convention 
on State Succession as finally adopted clearly rules out any retroactive application of the 
Convention’s provision. Hence, the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession as 
such does not introduce legally binding rules on the return of cultural objects removed 
during the colonial era. 
In the absence of any other multilateral treaty on state succession that are relevant 
for the return of (cultural) property, a general obligation to return cultural objects could 
only be based on customary law. The relevance of customary law as source of 
international law and its cumulative elements of settled state practise and opinio iuris have 
already been introduced above.602 In order to speak of a settled state practice, relevant 
acts of the state executives and other state organs representing stately interests in 
international relations must show a certain duration, uniformity and spreading.603 The 
                                                     
597 Walter, B., 1988, p. 130; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 202. 
598 The Convention was adopted with 54 votes in favour against 11 votes and with 11 abstentions. The 
following countries voted against adoption: Belgium, Germany, France, Israel, Italy, Canada, Luxemburg, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States. Cf.: Ipsen, K., 2004, p. 311. 
599 The 1978 the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties entered into force on 6 
November 1996. With regard to the entry into force of the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession its 
Art. 50 requires the deposit of fifteen instruments of ratification or accession. By the end of June 2009, 
seven countries (Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Liberia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Ukraine) had ratified / accessioned the convention. See for an update: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-12&chp.=3&lang=en.  
600 Cf.: Bleckmann, A., 1987, p. 76. 
601 Cf.: Report of the International Law Commission on works of its 28th session in: Yearbook of the ILC 
1976, Vol. II, p. 141. See also Yearbook of the ILC 1981, Vol. II, p. 8 ff.  
602 See above chp. 1.§1 on the Restitution of Cultural Objects removed in Times of War. 
603 Cf.: Freytag, C., 1996, p. 183. 
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literature reports of a number of instances in which cultural objects have been returned 
to newly independent states in reaction to or shortly after their independence. In 1950 
France and Laos concluded a bilateral agreement on the return of works of art to 
Laos.604 In 1954, Great Britain returned to Burma jewellery known as the crown 
jewels.605 In 1968, France and Algiers concluded an agreement on the return of cultural 
objects that had previously belonged to the collection of Algerian museums.606 In 1970, 
the governments of Belgium and the Republic of Zaire (formerly the Belgian colony 
Congo) concluded a bilateral agreement providing for the transfer of cultural objects 
from Belgium to Zaire.607 By the end of 1979 some 1000 cultural objects, including 
works of art had been returned to Zaire.608 Also during the 1970s, negotiations 
commenced between the Netherlands and Indonesia and resulted in the transfer of 
historical and archaeological objects in accordance with a specific programme.609  
The mere existence of cases in which cultural objects have been returned does not 
mean that one can speak of state practise as is required for the existence of customary 
rules. The returns do not fulfil the requirements of a certain duration, uniformity and 
spreading to qualify as settled state practise.610 Not only is the greater share of cultural 
objects that have been removed during the colonial era still in Western museum 
collections; returns – when effected - are often the result of cooperation between 
museums rather than being concluded on a state basis. Actions of museums do not 
necessarily reflect the views held by the national government.611 This is especially the 
case where the museums are not restricted by national rules on inalienability.612 
In the absence of settled state practise no customary law could have developed. For 
this reason, we will not further address the question of an opinio iuris in this respect but 
will confine ourselves to referring to the significant resistance of Western States against 
the adoption of the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Convention and the fact that it 
has still not entered into force. In conclusion, the analysis of the process of 
decolonisation and rules on state succession did not reveal a legal obligation to return 
cultural objects removed during the colonial era: no such basis for a claim could be 
                                                     
604 Ganslmayr, H., 1980, p. 91. 
605 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 124. 
606 Ganslmayr, H., 1980, p. 91. 
607 Cf.: Geluwe, H.v., 1979, p. 35. 
608 Cf.: Ibid., p. 37. See for a critical discussion of the agreement between Zaire and Belgium: McGuire, T., 
1990, pp. 63-64.  
609 Cf.: Pott, P.H. / Sutaarga, M.A., 1979, p. 41. Further to this list of bilateral arrangements one can add 
more examples of returns or transfers of cultural objects to formerly colonised territories: in 1977, the 
Australian Museum Trust returned to the national Museum and Art Gallery of Papua New Guinea a 
number of ethnographic objects. In 1979 the Trust presented a number of cultural objects to the Solomon 
Islands Museum. Specht, J., 1979, p. 28. 
610 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 124.  
611 Cf.: Specht, J., 1979, p. 28.  
612 See further on municipal rules governing public collections in the Netherlands, France and the United 
Kingdom and the question in how far disposal is prohibited in chp. 3.   
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identified in treaty or customary law against a predecessor state, let alone against a third 
country.613  
I I I .  RE C O N C E P T U A L I S A T I O N  O F  C I R C U M S T A N C E S  O F  A CQ U I S I T I O N  A S  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
W R ON G F UL  A CT?  
 In this section we will discuss whether the removal could be qualified as an 
international wrongful act. Every internationally wrongful act of state entails its 
international responsibility and requires the responsible state to make reparations.614 The 
state responsible has to “wipe out, as far as possible, all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed”.615 Put differently, the responsible State has the obligation to 
physically restituted removed objects. Only where physical restitution has become 
impossible the state is required to compensate for the loss in an alternative way.616 
In order to qualify certain behaviour as an international wrongful act the following 
elements must be present: the act in question must constitute a breach of an 
international obligation by a state and it must be attributable to the state.617 
Furthermore, the act must be committed against another subject of international law.618 
Conseqeuntly, we first need to establish whether the colonised countries qualified as 
subject of international law before it makes sense to address the question whether the 
removal of (cultural) objects during the colonial era qualified as an attributable wrongful 
act. In addressing this question one must distinguish between the situation prior to the 
European “civilised” powers’ establishment of colonial rule, and the situation once 
colonial rule had been established until the colonies’ independence. 
In analysing the status of formerly colonised countries both prior and post the 
establishment of colonial rule one must observe the principle of inter-temporal law 
according to which "(…) a juridical fact must be appreciated in light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to 
it arises or falls to be settled."619 Put differently, the situation in question has to be 
examined according to the conditions and rules in existence at the time it was made or 
                                                     
613 Cf.: Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 205. 
614 PCIJ, Chorzów Factory case (Merits) (ibid. § 103). Cf.: Henckaerts, J.-M. / Comité international de la 
Croix-Rouge, 2005, P. 537. See also International Law Commission, 2001, Art. 1.  
615 Crawford, J., 2002, pp. 47-48. 
616 Chorzów Factory Case (Germany v. Poland) PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, p. 29, pp. 47-48. Cf.: 
International Law Commission, 2001, pp. 96-97.  
617 Cf.: International Law Commission, 2001.  
618 German scholars speak of "passive Deliktsfähigkeit“. Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, pp. 105 & 108.  
619 Island of Palmas case (The Netherlands v. USA, 1928), 2 RIAA, p. 829. See further on inter-temporal 
law: Shaw, M., N., 2003, pp. 429-430; Brownlie, I., 2008, pp. 124-125 both with further references. 
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occurred and not at a later date.620 Similar cases may have different legal consequences 
depending on the time period. The law changes.621  
Prior to /during the process of colonisation 
The principle of inter-temporal law leads us to examine the state of public 
international law at the time of colonisation, in order to verify whether the countries in 
the process of being colonised by the European powers qualified as subjects of 
international law.  
For a political entity to qualify as a state and therewith as an international legal 
person it had to fulfil the criteria of a permanent population, a defined territory and a 
government.622 Where a political entity met these criteria it also had to take the hurdle of 
recognition. Recognition refers to the willingness of the international community to 
accept a certain entity that fulfils the criteria of statehood as a member of the 
international community.  
There exist two competing theories on recognition: the declaratory theory and the 
constitutive theory. The names of the theories refer to the legal effect that is accorded to 
the recognition of a state: according to the declaratory theory recognition of a state is no 
more than a formal acceptance of already existing facts. Its origin lies in the naturalist 
school of law. The constitutive theory, on the other hand, is based on the positivist 
school and considers the act of recognition as necessary in creating the new state as an 
international legal person.623  
Whereas the declaratory theory has become the dominant rule as of today624 it is the 
constitutive theory that was predominant during the era of colonisation.625 
Consequently, and in line with the doctrine of inter-temporal law one would expect the 
constitutive theory to govern the decision whether the formerly colonised countries 
qualified as subjects of international law prior and during the process of colonisation, i.e. 
whether the requirement of recognition had been met. According to the constitutive 
theory the status of subject of international law would be denied. However, one must 
take into account that the currently prevailing doctrine of recognition, the declaratory 
                                                     
620 Cf.: Shaw, M., N., 2003, p. 429.  
621 Walter, B., 1988, p. 109. 
622 Cf.: Jellinek, G., 1914, pp. 396-398; Berber, F., 1975, pp. 115-117; Rotter, M., 1982; Walter, B., 1988, p. 
105. See also: Stengel Freiherr von, K., 1901, p. 8. Present legal doctrine also mentions the capacity to enter 
into relations with other States as an additional cumulative criterion for statehood. This element as laid 
down in Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in particular in reaction 
to South American legal doctrine does not yet reflect general state practice. Cf.: Ipsen, K., 2004, p. 55. 
623 Cf.: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 83; Shaw, M., N., 2003, pp. 368-369; Brownlie, I., 2008, pp. 
86-87.  
624 Cf.: Brownlie, I., 2008, pp. 88-89 with further references to modern adherents in fn. 7; Walter, B., 1988, 
p. 108; Shaw, M., N., 2003, p. 370; Ipsen, K., 2004, p. 234. See also: 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, Artt. 3 & 6.  
625 Walter, B., 1988, p. 108; Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 83. Well-known adherents of the 
constitutive doctrine include: Bluntschli, J., 1878, p. 72; Stengel Freiherr von, K., 1901, p. 8; Anzilotti, D., 
1929, p. 160; Lauterpacht, 1939-1940; Kelsen, 1967, pp. 387-416. 
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theory, is based on a naturalist perception of the law. One of the characteristics of 
natural law is that is static. While the eternal applicability of the natural law originated in 
the idea that it formed part of the law of God, Grotius, the father of international law 
stated that “natural law is to such a degree unchangeable that not even God can change 
it”.626  
If one accepts that under the present rule, the declaratory theory, a state becomes a 
subject of international law on the ground of natural law and that natural law is not 
subject to changes or fluctuations one has to accept that the political entities at the dawn 
of the colonial era also qualified as states possessing international legal personality.627 
Consequently, rather than evaluating the status of the formerly colonised countries prior 
and during the process of colonisation by the constitutive theory, the current 
endorsement of the declaratory theory also changes the evaluation of past situations. 
While this indirect effect of the declaratory theory may at first sight seem to conflict 
with the doctrine of inter-temporal rule this is not the case: rather than directly applying 
the declaratory theory to the past situation in question the current endorsement of the 
declaratory theory results in the withdrawal of the issue of recognition from a positivist 
approach to the law and subsumes it under natural law.628 The doctrine of inter-
temporal rule deals with the collision of different legal rules in time; it does not prevent 
the subsumption of a subject matter under natural law that was previously dealt with 
under the positivist approach.  
In conclusion, due to the indirect effect of the present declaratory doctrine on the 
recognition of states, the formerly colonised countries did qualify as subjects of 
international law (provided they fulfilled the three criteria on statehood). Therewith, at 
least with regard to the situation prior to the ultimate establishment of the colonial rule, 
the preliminary requirement for the removal of (cultural) objects to constitute an 
international wrongful act has been fulfilled. Whether the removal did constitute an 
international wrongful act must yet be addressed. Before, however, we will discuss 
whether and in what respect the ultimate establishment of the colonial rule did affect the 
status of the colonised under public international law. This question is important in that 
the repression might have effects on the international legal personality of the colonised 
countries and therewith for the question of whether the removal of (cultural) objects 
during the period of colonial rule qualifies as wrongful act and thus can give rise to 
restitution.  
Once colonial rule had been established  
In this section the status of a colony subsequent to the establishment of the colonial 
rule by the colonising state will be discussed. The term “colony” in a broad sense 
                                                     
626 Grotius, H., 1625, p. 51. Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 109.  
627 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 110.  
628 Cf.: Ibid. 
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comprises different types of dependant territories:629 colonies in the narrow sense, 
protectorates, mandated territories and trust territories. A colony in the narrow sense is 
an entity which is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the colonising State and which 
is a part of that State.630 As a consequence, colonies do not qualify as separate 
international legal personalities different from the colonising state.631 They are not 
subjects of international law and thus cannot suffer from an internationally wrongful act. 
The legal relationship between the colony and the colonising state is governed by the 
municipal law of the latter.632 Consequently, the removal of (cultural) objects after the 
colonial rule has been established cannot give rise to restitute as the removal could not 
constitute an internationally wrongful act.633 Whether the removal during the period 
prior to the establishment of colonial rule qualifies as breaching international law will be 
discussed in the following.  
International wrongful act? Reconceptualisation of the process of colonisation as war  
If one accepts the international legal personality of the political entities prior to the 
establishment of the colonial rule one must qualify the violent contentions with the 
European powers during the process of colonisation as armed conflict.634 Consequently, 
the removal of (cultural) objects during the process of colonisation may constitute a 
breach of the ius ad bellum or the ius in bello and thus an internationally wrongful act. 
The ius ad bellum, or rather the limitation of the right to resort to war developed only 
after the First World War. The Convenant of the League of Nations was the first 
multilateral treaty to limit the right to resort to war.635 The impetus led to the banning of 
war in the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 and culminated in Art. 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter according to which every threat or use of force is prohibited.636 Given the fact 
that the ius ad bellum started to develop only during the beginning of the 20th century the 
waging of war upon the formerly colonised countries, which occurred prior to the 
emergence of limitations on the rule of force, does not constitute a breach of 
international law. According to the law in force during the process of colonisation 
                                                     
629 Cf.: Ibid., p. 113. 
630 Cf.: Bleckmann, A., 1987, p. 75. 
631 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 113. 
632 Cf.: Ermacora, F., 1987, p. 41. Different from colonies in the narrow sense, protectorates, mandated 
territories and trust territories do possess international legal personality. A protectorate is the legal 
relationship between a “protector” State and a “protected” State or group of States. A protectorate is 
established by a treaty concluded between the protector and the “protected” State (also called the 
protectorate). Before and after the establishment of a complete protectorate the protected State is a subject 
of international law. During the protectorate for which it transferred to the protector the competence to act 
on its behalf in foreign relations, its sovereignty is restricted but the State nevertheless remains a subject of 
international law. Cf.: Hoffmann, G., 1987; Walter, B., 1988, p. 114. 
633 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 111. 
634 Cf.: Ibid. 
635 Cf.: Meng, W., 1982, p. 283.  
636 Cf.: Ibid. 
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European powers were allowed to wage war upon non-European countries just like they 
were not limited in waging war upon each other.637 
The ius in bello, the rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict developed 
some hundred years earlier than the ius ad bellum. The first international treaties 
regulating the behaviour of state during an armed conflict were the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter: the Hague 
Conventions).638 Since the Hague Conventions’ entry into force in September 1900 
respectively January 1910 there existed a ban on looting of cultural property in armed 
conflicts and an obligation to restitute objects taken in breach of the Conventions’ 
provision. The ban on looting and the obligation to restitute looted objects applied, 
however, only to State Parties of the Conventions. The Conventions’ scope of 
application is furthermore limited by the so-called “general participation clause” 
according to which the rules of the Conventions apply only in the situation that all 
belligerents are state party.639 Consequently, with the formerly colonised countries not 
being state parties to the Hague Conventions they could not rely on their protection 
even were the colonising state was a State Party. The only remaining option for formerly 
colonised countries to establish that the removal of cultural objects constituted a breach 
of international law and thus gives rise to restitution lies in the existence of binding rules 
of customary law.   
There exists agreement in legal doctrine that the rules of the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Convention are binding of customary law.640 There exists, however, disagreement as to 
when exactly the rules became legally binding.641 If one approaches the emergence of 
rules of customary law as a process642, the results of our analysis above allows us to date 
the emergence of such rules between the restitutions subsequent to the Hague 
Conventions and the outbreak of World War II. The International Military Tribunal at 
                                                     
637 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 112. 
638 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 29 July 
1899 and Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. See for a more extensive 
analysis of the Hague Conventions above in chp. 1.§1.II on the restitution of cultural objects removed in 
times of war. 
639 Art. 2 of the 1899 Convention reads: “The provisions contained in the Regulations mentioned in Art. I 
are only binding on the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of them. These provisions 
shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between Contracting Powers, a non-Contracting 
Power joins one of the belligerents”. Art. 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention reads: "The provisions 
contained in the Regulations referred to in Art. 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except 
between Contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention”. Cf.: the 
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict discussed in chp. 
1.§1.VI.1 that does not contain such a general participation clause. 
640 See, e.g.: Fiedler, W., 1989, p. 199; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 298; Phuong, C., 2004, p. 986; Odendahl, 
K., 2005, p. 125. 
641 Some authors argue that the rules of the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions were declaratory of customary 
law when they were adopted. See, e.g.: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 223; Fiedler, W., 1989, p. 217. Others point to 
the turn of the 19th to the 20th century as the moment in time when the rules manifested themselves of 
customary law. See, e.g.: Doehring, K., 1987, p. 139, Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 298. 
642 See, e.g.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 125. 
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Nuremberg held that by 1939 all rules of the Hague Conventions constituted rules of 
customary law.643  
At that point, however, the process of colonisation, i.e. the period of establishing 
colonial rule, had long ended. An exeption is the relationship between Ethiopia and 
Italy.644 Around the end of the 19th century many territories in Africa and Asia had been 
divided among the European States.645 The fact that the colonial rule might have 
continued once the obligation to restitute cultural objects had manifested itself for the 
victorious party is irrelevant with regard to restitution as the absence of international 
legal personality of the colony stands in the way of qualifying an act no matter how 
wrong as an illegally wrongful act. In conclusion, the question as to the existence of 
restitution rights with regard to objects removed from former colonies both during the 
process of colonisation and the period of established colonial rule on the grounds of an 
international wrongful act must be answered in the negative.  
IV .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  O N  T H E  L EG A L  B A S E S  T O  R EC L A I M  O B J E C TS  
R E M O V E D  D U RI N G  C O L O N I SA T I O N 
 None of the doctrines addressed - the resolutions adopted within the frameworks 
of UNESCO, the rules on state succession, and the analysis of the circumstances of 
acquisition as potentially constituting an international illegal act – provide a basis for 
claims for the restitution of cultural objects removed during the colonial era.  
The resolutions and developments within the framework of the United Nations and 
UNESCO, including the work of the Intergovernmental Committee do not provide for 
a legal obligation. While the resolutions and the existence of the Intergovernmental 
Committee are important for keeping the problem of removed cultural objects on the 
political agenda outside of bilateral disputes, their relevance lies essentially with the 
fighting of ongoing illicit transfers rather than in addressing removals that occurred 
prior to the entry into force of any legal instruments banning the removal of cultural 
objects. 
In the specific context of decolonisation, we analysed rules on state succession as to 
whether they provide for a claim for restitution. The analysis revealed that while the 
letter of the provisions of the 1983 Vienna Convention on State Succession does 
provide for the transfer of movable property, which includes cultural property, even 
when it is located in the territory of the predecessor State, the 1983 Vienna Convention 
is irrelevant for the present debate for various reasons: not only has it not entered into 
force, it also does not apply retrospectively nor did it contribute to the emergence of a 
similar rule of customary law. Consequently, the legal regime of decolonisation does not 
                                                     
643 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 1st October 1946, 1947, pp. 248-
249. Cf.: Giovannini, T., 2002, p. 264.  
644 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 112. 
645 Cf.: Bleckmann, A., 1987, p. 76. 
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provide for a basis for an obligation to return cultural objects removed from the 
colonised territory by the former colonial ruler, let alone by a third country.  
With regard to the circumstances of acquisition, the analysis revealed that the 
removal does not constitute an internationally wrongful act. Even where one accepts, 
realying on natural law, that the formerly colonised countries did possess international 
legal personality prior to the establishment of colonial rule, the qualification of the 
removal does not constitute an internationally wrongful act as no limitations of the ius ad 
bellum existed at that point in time. While the ius in bello did provide for rules limiting the 
removal of cultural property and providing for its return as of the beginning of the 20th 
century for State Parties to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and for the state 
community as rule of customary law as of the 21st century, this finding is not relevant 
with regard to the removal of cultural objects during the colonial era as once colonial 
rule was fully established, the territory concerned becomes part of the state territory of 
the colonial power, therewith standing in the way of applying rules on the ius in bello. 
§4. RESTITUT ION  OF  CULTURAL  OBJECTS  TO THEIR  ORIG INAL  OWNERS   
 As a matter of principle, ownership structures are governed by national law:646 
intranational situations are governed by the private law applicable, whereas situations 
involving a "foreign" law element are solved by taking to private international law (or 
Conflict of laws).647 As a consequence, the restitution of objects that have been 
misappropriated or lost is governed by national rules. The principle of the separation 
between national law and public international law with regard to ownership structures 
has, however, been deviated from in reaction to the atrocities of the Nazis committed 
also within German territory. Different from earlier international conflicts set out above, 
the Nazi looting of cultural property was not confined to the territories it occupied from 
1939 onwards but in fact started with the misappropriation of Jewish (cultural) property 
within the German territory after Hitler’s rise to power.  
Several phases and categories of Nazi art deprivation can be distinguished:648 the first 
phase consisted of the destruction and liquidisation of the so-called "degenerate art" 
from public collections in Germany 1936/1937. The term “degenerate art” refers to 
works of art that depicted Jewish subjects, works of art that were critical of Germany or 
                                                     
646 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 187. The separation between national law and public international law does of 
course not prevent the adoption of treaties whose provisions oblige state parties to harmonise their private 
laws. In chp. 1.§1.IV discussing the restitution of illegally exported cultural objects the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention was discussed. The UNIDROIT Convention requires state parties to mutually amend the 
national rules concerning the acquisition of and the transfer of property rights. It does not provide for a 
superimposed regulation of ownership structures under public international law or an obligation to return 
certain objects to private individuals. 
647 Depending on the legal theory adhered to private international law is either considered as part of 
international law (“universalism”) or as part of national law with each state creating its own unique norms of 
Conflict of Laws pursuing its own policy ("particularism").  
648 Cf.: Petropoulos, J., 1999, pp. 444-446.  
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that contradicted the Nazi ideology.649 Subsequently, Jewish people and their (cultural) 
property were targeted. At first, directly after the annexation of Austria into the German 
Reich (the “Anschluss”) in March 1938 artworks from private Jewish collections in 
Austria were misappropriated.650 Within the borders of the German ‘Altreich’, the 
expropriation of Jewish property started in the wake of the November 1938 
Kristallnacht pogrom.651 Legal measures were adopted that targeted the Jewish 
population. Two instruments in particularly enabled the “aryanisation” of Jewish 
businesses (including art galleries) and the seizure of Jewish property, including works of 
art and other culturally valuable objects: the Law for the Attachment of the Property of 
the People’s and State’s Enemies652 and the Ordinance for the Employment of Jewish 
Property.653  
The Nazi art deprivation within the German borders did not stay limited to outright 
confiscations and expropriations by the Nazi Party. A great number of losses occurred 
not as the result of direct Nazi intervention but were nevertheless precipitated by the 
political, social and economical exclusions of the persecuted groups, in particular the 
Jews. The passing of laws such as the Law for the Reestablishment of the Professional 
Civil Service654 had drastic impacts on the economical situation of the Jews. Excluded 
from the possibility of earning their living Jewish people were forced to sell their 
property in order to buy food or to finance their emigration or flights.655  
                                                     
649 In the decree issued by Goebbels on June 30, 1937 “degenerate” art was defined as art that either 
“insulting German feeling, or to destroy or confuse natural form, or simply reveal an absence of adequate 
manual and artistic skill”. See: Barron, S., 1991, p. 19. See for a broader definition of degenerate art 
including any art work in Jewish private collections: Merryman, J.H., 2007, p. 16. The purging of 
“degenerate art” from German state museums and galleries culminated in the 1937 Degenerate Art 
Exhibition. See further on the subject of degenerate art: Barron, S., 1991; Petropoulos, J., 1996, pp. 51-74; 
Petropoulos, J., 1997, pp. 106-107; Kunze, H.H., 2000. The sale of the confiscated “degenerate” artworks 
was based on a law passed by the Nazis on May 31st 1938. The law, which legalized the sale, was confirmed 
in the post-war era and no claims seeking restitution have been filed. Petropoulos, J., 1999, p. 444. For this 
reason, the subject of “degenerate art” will not be addressed in the present study. 
650 See further on particular collections: Lillie, S., 2003. See on a case involving art works removed from a 
Viennese Jewish Collector after the Anschluss: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008. A summary of this case 
dealing with porcelain spoliated from the Rothberger collection is included in chp. 4.§1.II.1.h) where we 
discuss the work of the Spoliation Advisory Panel.  
651 Petropoulos, J., 1997, p. 107. 
652 Gesetz über die Einziehung volks- und staatsfeindlichen Vermögens vom 14. Juli 1933 (RGBl. I. S. 479). 
See further: Hirsch, M. / Majer, D., 1997, pp. 133-134.  
653 Verordnung über den Einsatz des jüdischen Vermögens (RGBl. 1938 I. S. 1709) vom 3. Dezember 1938. 
Petropoulos, J., 1997, p. 107. See further on the German misappropriation of Jewish property, e.g.: (in 
general): Schleunes, K.A., 1970; Hirsch, M. / Majer, D., 1997; Goschler, C., et al., 2003 and more 
specifically concerning cultural property: Petropoulos, J., 1996. 
654 Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums vom 7 April 1933. See further on laws providing 
for the removal of Jews from other profession, e.g.: Edelheit, A.J. / Edelheit, H., 1994. 
655 The proceeds for sales of artworks were generally far below the market value regardless of whether it 
concerned a private sale or sale in auction given the great offer of artworks on the market. See for an 
analysis of the development of sales prices for works of art and antiquities sold in auction: Rapport omtrent 
prijzenverloop kunstwerken op kunstveilingen etc. opgesteld door drie deskundigen voor de Raad voor het 
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Technically speaking the looting of Jewish property within the German Territory was 
an internal affair of the German State.656 Different from the confiscation of private 
(cultural) property in the occupied territories the looting of Jewish property within 
Germany was not prohibited by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.657 While the 
Allied Forces observed this principle of State sovereignty in the beginning658 they soon 
extended the restitution measures to the restitution of internal misappropriations.659 The 
reason for doing so lay in the fact that the instrumentalisation of cultural deprivation of 
the Jewish people for the bigger political and ideological end of Hitler applied 
indiscriminately of state borders. The looting was employed to enhance the Aryan race 
and to weaken the non-aryan ones both within Germany and the occupied countries.660 
It was the expression of a “superior claim of the Herrenvolk and the German State to 
property held by what was conceived as inferior types of people”.661 Against this 
background, any distinction between external and internal restitution was perceived as 
artificial. Consequently, the Allied Forces disregarded this general principle of public 
international law and initiated internal restitutions parallel to the external ones.662  
In the following, the influence of public international law on the internal restitution 
regime will be outlined. The relevant legal instruments of the occupying forces that will 
be further explored are Law No. 52 concerning the Blocking and Control of Property663, 
which has already been introduced in the context of external restitutions664, U.S. Military 
                                                                                                                                          
Rechtsherstel, Afdeling Rechtspraak Amsterdam, 29 October 1947. It must be noted that the analysis is 
limited to the period 1940 - 1945. 
656 Cf.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 105.  
657 See for the provision banning confiscations of private property in an occupied territory Art. 46 of the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Convention. See above in chp.1.§1.II for an analysis of the Hague Conventions. 
658 See e.g. above on the London Declaration whose scope of application does not extend to transfers of 
property within the German territory.  
659 It should be mentioned here that the category of degenerate art was generally not affected by this 
extension in restitution measures. Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 225.  
660Nicholas, L., H., 1997, p. 39; Kowalski, W.W., 1998, p. IX; Petropoulos, J., 1999, p. 443. See further: 
Petropoulos, J., 1996.  
661 Karasik, M., 1951, p. 448. 
662 Cf.: Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 26.  
663 Military Government for Germany. U.S. Zone. Law No. 52: 'Blocking and control of property', Military 
Government Gazette (Germany, U.S. Zone, issue A). 1 June 1946, p. 24. See for the full text of the Law 
No. 52: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 108-109, Annex 107. See further: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 140; Schwarz, 
W., 1974, pp. 25-28. 
664 See above in chp. 1.§1.V. 
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Government Regulation No. 59 on the Restitution of Identifiable Property665, as well as 
Section III of the Treaty of Bonn.666  
I .  LA W  NO.  52  C O N C E R N IN G  T H E  BL O CK IN G  A N D  CO N T R O L  O F  PRO P E R T Y  
 When Law No. 52 concerning the Blocking and Control of Property667 originally 
entered into force with the military occupation of Germany668 it focused solely on 
safeguarding external restitution by bringing all property under the control of the 
military government.669 Two months after the German surrender, the Allied Forces 
decided to extend the scope of Law No. 52 to apply also to transfers of property within 
Germany.670 Consequently, while Law No. 52 did not provide for the active restitution 
of cultural objects looted within German state borders, it constituted the first step in 
subsuming matters of internal restitution under the policy of the Allied Forces, and 
hence under the field of public international law.671  
                                                     
665 Military Government for Germany, U.S. Are of Control, Law No. 59: 'Restitution of Identifiable 
Property', Military Government Gazette (Germany. U.S. Zone. Issue G) No. 10, November 1947. What is 
held here for the U.S. Military Government Law is also true for the British Military Government Law No. 
59 on the "Restitution of Identifiable Property to Victims of Nazi Oppression', Control Commission for 
Germany. B.E. Law No. 59: "Restitution of Identifiable Property to Victims of Nazi Oppression', Military 
Government Gazette (British Zone of Control), No. 28.  
666 Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (Vertrag über 
die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Mächten), signed at Bonn, 26 
May 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1955  II. 29.03.1954, No 3). 
667 Military Government for Germany. U.S. Zone. Law No. 52: ‘Blocking and control of property’, Military 
Government Gazette (Germany, U.S. Zone, issue A). 1 June 1946, p. 24.  
668 Law No. 52 as amended 3 April 1945. See for full text of the Law: Kowalski, W.W., 1998, pp. 108-109, 
Annex 107. See further: Dölle, H. / Zweigert, K., 1947; Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 25.  
669 Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 25. Art. 1(2) of the law reads: Property which has been the subject of duress, 
wrongful acts of confiscation, dispossession or spoliation from territories outside Germany, whether pursuant to 
legislation or by procedures purporting to follow forms of law or otherwise, is hereby declared to be equally 
subject to seizure of possession or title, direction, management, supervision or otherwise being taken into 
control by Military Government (Emphasis added). See further on Law No. 52 and its relevance for external 
restitutions above in chp. 1.§1.V.1 where the Common Allied Restitution Regime is discussed. 
670 Military Government for Germany. U.S. Zone. Law No. 52: 'Blocking and control of property', Military 
Government Gazette (Germany, U.S. Zone, issue A). 1 June 1946, p. 24. In the U.S. Occupational Zone the 
U.S. version of the Law implemented the revision by deleting the words “from territories outside Germany” 
whereas the British edition explicitly included reference to property that has been affected within German 
territory. See further: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 140; Schwarz, W., 1974, pp. 25-28. 
671 Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 26.  
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I I .  MI L I T A RY  GO V E R N M E N T  REGU L A TI ON  NO.  59  O N  T H E  RES T I T U T I O N  O F  
ID E N T I F I A B L E  PR O P E R TY   
 The most relevant act regulating (internal) restitution of cultural objects in the 
U.S. occupied zone was Law No. 59 on the ‘Restitution of Identifiable Property’.672 The 
main purpose of the law, which was enacted on 10 November 1947, was to effect:  
 
“to the largest extent possible the speedy restitution of identifiable property (tangible and intangible 
property and aggregates of tangible and intangible property) to persons who were wrongfully deprived of 
such property within the period from 30 January 1933 to 8 May 1945 for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, ideology or political opposition to National Socialism” (Article 1(1)).  
 
By addressing the deprivation of property within the period 1933-1945 Law No. 59 
explicitly extended the scope of restitutions to comprise also deprivations that occurred 
within German State territory since the Nazi’s rise to power. The restitution regime as 
introduced by Law No. 59 is characterised by the following aspects: first, its 
understanding of what constitutes wrongful deprivation is very broad (Art. 2). 
Furthermore, Art. 3 of the Law provides for the presumption that all transactions made 
in the period 1933-1945 by a person belonging to a persecuted group qualify as an act of 
confiscation. Only if positive evidence was provided according to which the transfer 
would also have taken place in the absence of National Socialism or resulted in the 
successful protection of a property interest of the original owner could the presumption 
be refuted (Art. 4). Moreover, the restitution right existed irrespective of the interest of a 
potential good faith purchaser (Art. (2)).673 The initial deadline to file a claim with the 
Central Filing Agency until 14 May 1948 was extended until 14 August of the same 
year.674 By November 1948, more than 11,000 claims had been filed.675 Their settlement, 
however, would take many more years during which Germany regained its sovereignty 
as state. By complementing external restitution to foreign governments with provisions 
on the internal restitution, Law No. 59 was crucial in allowing for the termination of 
military government responsibility for property control and thus for ending the 
occupational status of Germany in the medium-term.676 
                                                     
672 Military Government for Germany, U.S. Are of Control, Law No. 59: 'Restitution of Identifiable 
Property', Military Government Gazette (Germany. U.S. Zone. Issue G) No. 10, November 1947. 
673 See for the discussion of Art. 10 of Law No. 59 below in chp. 1.§5. Given the scope of Art. 10, which 
deals with unclaimed objects and their restitution to a Jewish successor organisation, the provision must be 
discussed in the context of restitutions to a people rather than to a state or individuals. 
674 Kurtz, M.J., 2006, pp. 149-150. 
675 Ibid., p. 150. 
676 Cf.: Ibid. 
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I I I .  TH E  TR E A TY  O F  BON N:  S E C T I O N  I I I   
 The adoption of the ‘Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the 
War and the Occupation’ (hereinafter: “the Bonn Treaty”) on 26 May 1952 was the 
decisive step to conferring on Germany the responsibility for both external and internal 
restitution. Further to the Bonn Treaty’s section V on external restitutions, which has 
been discussed above677, section III of the Bonn Treaty obliges Germany to arrange for 
internal restitution in full agreement with the regulations as issued by the Allied Forces 
(Art. 2 of section III).678 Put differently, the Bonn Treaty superimposed rules of public 
international law character on the internal restitution within Germany.   
IV .  BRÜG:  T H E  FE D E R A L  RE S T I T U T I O N  LA W 
 An important instrument to enforce the regulations concerning internal 
restitution as issued by the Allied Forces was the Federal Restitution Law (BRüG), 
which was adopted in 1957.679 At that point, the return of still-existing property had to a 
great extent been realised by the Allied restitution statutes. Consequently, the BRüG was 
in particular relevant for those claims dealing with property that no longer existed or 
which had disappeared. Compensation for lost property was calculated according to the 
estimated replacement value as of April 1, 1956.  
The BRüG legislation represented the official recognition by the Federal Republic of 
Germany as successor state to the “Dritte Reich” of its obligation to pay compensation 
for lost or destroyed (cultural) objects. Initially, the BRüG legislation dealt only with the 
restitution of property that had been lost within the German territory. Its scope of 
application was, however, extended in four supplementary laws to comprise also losses 
of (cultural) property that had occurred outside of the German territory. In theory, any 
person who had suffered a loss of property for racial, ideological or religious reasons 
under the German occupation could profit under the BRüG legislation. In practise, the 
application of the BRüG legislation was more limited: first, claims had to be filed within 
the period of a year until 1 April 1958.680 Secondly, a claimant had to prove that there 
was a great likelihood that the object concerned had been brought into (West) German 
territory or Berlin. Furthermore, the question whether claimants could benefit from the 
BRüG legislation depended on their whereabouts at the time of making the claim. 
Claimants who lived in countries with whom Germany did not have diplomatic ties 
could not receive financial compensation for their losses.681 Thus, the restitution under 
                                                     
677 See above in chp. 1.§1.V. 
678 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 188.  
679 Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz (BRüG) 19 July 1957, BGBl. I-734. 
680 § 27(2) BrüG. Cf.: Heuer, C.-H., 1999, p. 2562; Blume Huttenlauch, A., 2006, p. 822. 
681 § 34 BRüG. The countries affected were: Cambodia, North-Korea, Laos, Nepal, Taiwan, the countries of 
the Eastern Block with the exception of the Soviet Union. Cf.: Lillteicher, J., 2003, pp. 99-100. 
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the BRüG legislation was significantly influenced by the intensification of the Cold War 
and remained limited to the formerly occupied territories in Western Europe. 
V .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  
 The initiatives after WWII providing for the restitution of (cultural) property to 
dispossessed private owners, both within Germany and in the occupied territories 
constituted novel developments of public international law. At first, the restitution to 
private individuals started in the context of the internal restitution of cultural objects 
looted within German state borders. Given the atrocities by the Nazis and their racial, 
ideological and religious motivation the Allies decided to complement external 
restitutions with internal ones. In the organisation of the internal restitution program the 
Allies closely followed the principles adhered to with regard to external restitutions. The 
second novel development followed in the late 1950s after Germany had been conferred 
responsibility for restitution. With the extension of the BRüG legislation restitution 
claims could also be filed by private persons for losses that had occurred outside of the 
German territory. The decision to extent the scope of application of the BRüG 
legislation had not been requested by the Allies but was an independent decision by 
Germany which must be understood in the context of an increasing awareness and 
historical insights of the atrocities of the Second World War. Another factor that might 
have contributed to Germany’s decision to extent the restitution regime were the 
negotiations with the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany.682 The 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, also known as “the Claims 
Conference” was founded in 1951 as a body to engage the German government in 
negotiations for material compensation for Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. The 
Claims Conference had been formed by numerous Jewish organisations of different 
political and ideological orientations in order to establish a more powerful negotiating 
position.683 
While the restitution to private persons in the formerly occupied territories remained 
subject to significant limitations, especially in Eastern Europe, it nevertheless confirmed 
the development of restitutions of cultural objects moving beyond state actors to 
include individuals.684  
§5. RESTITUT ION  OF  CULTURAL  OBJECTS  TO A  PEOPLE  
 Further to innovations with regard to the restitution of cultural objects to private 
individuals, the restoriation of rights in post WWII also introduced a novelty with regard 
to ownerless cultural property. According to the classical rules, Germany was obliged to 
                                                     
682 Cf.: Ibid., p. 101. 
683 Barkan, E., 2000. 
684 Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 146.  
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return objects looted outside of its territory to the respective country of origin. 
Ownerless cultural objects from German Jews, however, would have fallen to the 
German State.685 
As result of the genocide and the expulsion of Jews from Germany and the occupied 
territories the number of Jews had been drastically reduced in these countries. 
Consequently, Jewish successor organisations, especially those based in the United 
States sought to be transferred responsibility for ownerless cultural objects in order to 
distribute them amongst the Jews in their new places of residence. While this idea was 
initially rejected by Germany and Eastern European Countries, it was finally accepted.686 
The plan of the successor organisations materialised in the form of Art. 10 of Law 
No. 59 on the ‘Restitution of Identifiable Property’.687 According to this provision, the 
entire unclaimed estate of persecuted persons should be granted to a successor 
organisation to be appointed by the Military Government.688 By appointing a successor 
organisation rather than letting the unclaimed objects fall to the German State, Art. 10 
represents a departure from how the disposition of unclaimed property has been treated 
in the past.  
The return of cultural objects to the Jewish people is also dealt with in the 
Luxembourg Agreement. The Luxembourg Agreement was concluded between the 
State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany on 10 September 1952.689 Under 
the terms of the Luxembourg Agreement, Germany bound itself to improving the 
existing legislation on restitutions and to pay close to 3.5 billion Deutschmarks (DM)690 
to the State of Israel as reimbursement for the costs of accommodating Jewish 
emigrants from Germany and the occupied territories.691 Furthermore, in a Protocol to 
the Agreement, Germany agreed to pay 450 million DM to the Conference on Jewish 
Material Claims against Germany for the support of resettling Jewish emigrants world-
wide.692  
It is the monetary payment to Israel and the Claims Conference, rather than the 
promise to improve existing restitution legislation that makes the Luxembourg 
Agreement relevant with regard to return of cultural objects. While it did not create 
                                                     
685 Cf.: Hilberg, R., 1985, p. 1160. 
686 Cf.: Kurtz, M.J., 1985, p. 211, p. 217, p. 220; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 192. 
687 Military Government for Germany, U.S. Are of Control, Law No. 59: 'Restitution of Identifiable 
Property', Military Government Gazette (Germany. U.S. Zone. Issue G) No. 10, November 1947.  
688 For the U.S. American Zone this was the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO). Schmoller, 
G.v., et al., 1957, § 53, p. 15. 
689 Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, No. 4961, signed at Luxembourg, on 
10 September 1952.The full text of the agreement is available online at:  
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/10/12/00018584.pdf (last visited: 08 August 2008).  
690 In 1952, the exchange rate dollar - deutschmark (dm) was 1 $ = 4,2 dm. See further: R.L. Bidwell, 1970, 
pp. 22-24.  
691 Müller-Marsall, M. / Coenen, M., 2000, p. 803. 
692 German restitution for National Socialist crimes, 1998, p. 287; Müller-Marsall, M. / Coenen, M., 2000, p. 
804. 
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obligations under public international law to restitute cultural objects, the Luxembourg 
Agreement is relevant at a more abstract level. The monetary payments to Israel and the 
Claims Conference constituted a “radical innovation”693, a “res nova in international 
law”694. It was the first time that a state not only paid reparations to the “victors” of the 
war but also to its victims.695 According to Peresztegi, it opened a new chapter in the 
history of reparation and established a moral rule of reparation.696 Barkan describes the 
conclusion of the agreement between Germany and Israel as “the moment at which the 
modern notion of restitution for historical injustices was born”.697 Thonke characterises 
it as a “change in paradigm”.698 According to him, the “genesis of a second wave of 
restitutions”699 as they emerged with regard to Holocaust Era assets since the mid-1990s 
and as outlined below700 - cannot be explained without reference to the Luxembourg 
Agreement.701  
Further to public international law dealing directly with the restitution of cultural 
property or more in general with the protection of cultural property there are other 
fields of public international law that can have an indirect effect on the protection and 
return of cultural property. These are especially the doctrine of the right to self-
determination, human rights, and the protection of minorities.702 Of these three fields of 
public international law it is the right to self-determination that is of most relevance for 
the indirect protection of cultural property.703 In the following, we will shortly reflect on 
ithe relevance of these three fields with regard to the protection of cultural property. It 
is for two reasons that we limit ourselves to a short outline:704 first, while the literature 
generally accepts the right to self-determination, human rights and the right to a cultural 
identity as granting certain rights for participating in a certain cultural life, for accession 
to and preservation of cultural property, it has not yet been established in how far these 
rights could also provide for the restitution of cultural objects.705 Secondly, it is not 
feasible to outline the content of these rights in abstracto.  
                                                     
693 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14.  
694 Joffe, J., 1977, p. 1274. 
695 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14.  
696 Peresztegi, Á. 2005, pp. 136 & 146. 
697 Barkan, E., 2000, p. XXIV. 
698 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14. 
699 Ibid., p. 8. 
700 See below in chp. 2.§1.I for the outline of the (re-) emergence of restitution claims for Nazi looted art. 
701 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14. See also: Barkan, E., 2000, pp. XXIII-XXIV & 159; Levy, D. / Sznaider, N., 
2001, p. 237.  
702 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 204.  
703 Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, pp. 42-46; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 208 & 209.  
704 Cf.: the section on methodology above in the introduction (§2.I). 
705 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005 who explicitly discusses restitution rights with regard to cultural property but 
does not refer to the right to self-determination, human rights and the right to a cultural identity in this 
section. Instead, she discusses these rights in a different section dedicated to international law indirectly 
supporting the protection of cultural property (pp. 204-209) where she stresses the protection of the status 
quo and future cultural expressions rather than a right to cultural property lost in the past. See also above on 
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The right to self-determination was recognised with the adoption of the UN Charter 
in 1945.706 The right to self-determination was incorporated despite significant 
resistance.707 Art. 1(2) and Art. 55 refer to the right to self-determination as an aim 
respectively purpose of the United Nations and its Member States. The right to self-
determination has also been codified in Art. 1 of the International Convenant of Civil 
and political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 1 of the International Convenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICSCR). Further to these codifications the right to self-
determination is referred to in numerous non-binding instruments.708 More importantly, 
the right to self-determination has been recognised as a rule of customary law.709 
Different from the classical rights in international law the right to self-determination 
constitutes a collective right rather than an individual one. Part and parcel of a group’s 
right to self-determination is its right to design its cultural development. Consequently, 
the right to self-determination protects a group’s rights to create their own cultural 
objects, to preserve them and to keep them within their own territory.710  
Several human rights are relevant with regard to the protection of cultural property 
and the enjoyment and expression of culture more in general. First of all and most 
directly related is the right to freely to participate in the cultural life of the community. It 
has been codified in Art. 27(1) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well as 
in Art. 15(1a) of the International Convenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICSCR).711 The right to freely participate in the cultural life comprises the right to have 
access to cultural property. Access to cultural property again implies the preservation 
and protection of the cultural property concerned.712 While the right to freely participate 
in the cultural life is the most evident right with regard to the protection of cultural 
property, human dignity, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
freedom of expression and the right to education may also be relevant.713 
Finally, minorities’ rights are relevant, albeit indirectly, with regard to the protection 
of cultural property.714 One of the key elements of minority rights is the right to enjoy 
ones own culture.715 The enjoyment of ones own culture implies inter alia the 
                                                                                                                                          
the scope of application of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee whose service is not available to 
non-state actors.  
706 Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008, p. 51. 
707 Fitzmaurice, G., 1973, p. 233; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008, p. 51.  
708 See, e.g. the Final Act, 1975 of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Cf.: 
Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 208.  
709 Ibid. See further: Thürer, 2000, pp. 366-367. 
710 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 208. See also Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 44; Sjouke, P.S., 1999. 
711 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 205. 
712 Ibid. 
713 See Artt. 1, 18, 19, 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Artt. 9, 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Cf.: Ibid. See further: Wyss, M.P., 1992, p. 192; Chamberlain, K., 2003. 
714 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 206. 
715 See Art. 27 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 5(1) of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe. Cf.: Ibid. 
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safeguarding of the future existence of cultural objects.716 In how far minorities’ rights, 
human rights and right to self-determination contribute or even provide for an 
obligation to return cultural objects that have been removed in the past, is yet to be 
established.  
§6. CONCLUS IONS  FOR  CHAPTER 1 
I .  LE G A L  O B L I G A T I O N S  TO  R E TU R N  C UL T U R A L  O B J E C T S  
 In this chapter we have sketched and analysed the emergence of the existing legal 
framework under public international law with regard to the protection of cultural 
property, with an emphasis on the restorative protection in the form of returns and 
restitutions. The analysis comprised the development of rules on the protection of 
cultural property in times of war (2.1), as well as in times of peace. The analysis of rules 
for the protection of cultural property in times of peace not only dealt with the 
applicable legal regime in international law for the protection of cultural property against 
the illicit trade, especially the return and restitution of cultural property that has been 
illicitly removed from the territory of origin (2.2), but also addressed the question 
whether international law provides for an obligation to return cultural property that has 
been removed from a territory during the colonial era (2.3).  
The analysis of these three classical categories in the sense of dealing with the 
relationship between state actors revealed that the most extensive rules on the return 
and restitution of cultural property emerged in the context of armed conflicts. By the 
turn of the 19th to the 20th century a ban on the looting of cultural property had come 
into existence in the form of 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. This ban was mirrored 
by the obligation to restitute any cultural object that had been removed in spite of the 
ban. After the adoption of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the protection of 
cultural property in times of war has been extended in further international instruments, 
in particular the 1954 Hague Convention and its protocols and has been confirmed of 
customary law.  
The fact that the protection of cultural property in times of war exceeds the 
protection available in times of peace must not surprise given the origins of international 
law as the law governing the relations of nation states, which were too often dominated 
by armed conflicts. Having said that the protection of cultural property in times of peace 
is nonetheless disappointing. While the relevant international treaties do extend the 
protection offered to stolen cultural property under private (international) law, the 
restorative protection they grant to illegally exported cultural property is rather limited. 
The only truly international legal instrument that provides for obligations to return 
illegally exported cultural property is the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. This finding is 
the more critical if one takes into account the hesitation of countries, especially of art 
                                                     
716 Ibid. See further: Pritchard, S., 2001. 
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market countries, to ratify this instrument. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that this 
void left by treaty law is not filled by a rule of customary law.  
The third constellation scrutinised in this section dealt with cases of cultural property 
that had been removed from their countries of origin prior to the existence of any 
international conventions fighting the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Departing 
from three starting points, first activities within the United Nations and UNESCO, 
secondly the process of decolonialisation and finally the circumstances of acquisition of 
cultural property, we tried to identify a basis for a claim for the restitution of cultural 
property removed during the colonial era. The results of our analysis, however, do not 
support the (coming into) existence of a rule of international law (treaty law or 
customary law) on the restitution of cultural property removed under colonialism. While 
it is theoretically possible to adopt an international binding legal instrument providing 
for the return of cultural property removed during the colonial era717, the likelihood of 
such a step of the state community is nihil as the deliberations during the adoption of 
the 1970 UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT Convention indicated.718 
After we discussed these three constellations dealing with cultural property removed 
during armed conflicts, in peaceful times and during the colonial era (or in any event 
prior to the introduction of international instruments dealing with the protection of 
cultural property outside of armed conflicts) the analysis turned to the restitution of 
cultural property to private individuals (2.4) and a people (2.5). The broadening of the 
scope of public international law from its exclusive focus on states to including 
individuals has been characterised as the most important change in public international 
law over the past century.719 This shift in the focus of public international law occurred 
inter alia in response to the Holocaust. In a sense, one could state that the internal 
restitution of cultural property to Jews that had been dispossessed within the German 
borders was the result of a spill-over from external restitutions while subsequently 
making a back swing to introduce also restitutions to private individuals in external 
constellations. At a more abstract level the restitutions to private individuals both within 
and outside German borders indicate that public international law is less rigid and 
positive than often held. With regard to the restitutions to private individuals public 
international law (was) bent to cover situations that originally did not fall under its scope 
of application. The analysis furthermore revealed that where physical restitution was not 
an available option for the cultural object either being destroyed or lost, great emphasis 
was put on financial compensation. Where compensation was granted, it was calculated 
according to the estimated replacement value at the time of the compensation.720 
                                                     
717 See, e.g.: Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts. 
Done at Vienna on 8 April 1983 with regard to the return of State Archives to newly independent states 
(Art. 28).  
718 See above in the introductory remarks to chp. 1.§3.  
719 Less, S., 2008. 
720 According to the BRüG, which was in particular relevant for those claims dealing with property that no 
longer existed or which had disappeared from either within or outside the German territory compensation 
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However, there are also cases in which the object was neither restituted, nor was 
financial compensation received. 
With regard to the restitution of cultural property to a people, the analysis stressed 
the relevance of the Luxembourg Agreement that was concluded between the State of 
Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany on 10 September 1952. While the 
Luxembourg Agreement could not create a general obligation in public international law 
to restitute cultural property to a people, it is nevertheless considered as an important 
development with regard to the greater question of restitution and reparation. 
According to Peresztegi, the Luxembourg Agreement opened a new chapter in the 
history of reparation and established a moral rule of reparation.721 Barkan describes the 
conclusion of the agreement between Germany and Israel as “the moment at which the 
modern notion of restitution for historical injustices was born”.722 Thonke characterises 
it as a “change in paradigm”.723 According to him, the “genesis of a second wave of 
restitutions”724 as they emerged with regard to Holocaust Era assets since the mid-1990s 
and as outlined below725 - cannot be explained without reference to the Luxembourg 
Agreement.726 Before we will start with the analysis of this new chapter in the history of 
reparation with regard to Nazi looted art and human remains in the following chapters 
we need to round off this chapter by reflecting on the status of public collections in 
international law. 
I I .  SP E C IA L  S TA TU S  O F  P U BL I C  C O L L E C T I O N S  I N  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L A W ?   
 Further to the extrapolation of rules of public international law on the protection 
of cultural property in particular in view of obligations to restitute or return them, the 
analysis also allows us to reflect on the specific treatment granted to public collections.  
The first time that public collections were granted specific treatment dates back to 
the Congress of Vienna addressing among other things Napoleon’s art looting 
campaigns. Despite public collections being a fairly new development at the turn of the 
20th century, they were granted special treatment acknowledging their special character. 
Interestingly, the public collections benefiting from the special treatment were the 
French collections: at first, when France restored cultural property to Prussia, it was 
agreed that only those objects were to be returned that had not been placed in a 
museum by the time of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Paris. After the Battle of 
Waterloo, the French argument of the integrity of its public institutions, museums and 
                                                                                                                                          
for lost property was calculated according to the estimated replacement value as of April 1, 1956. See 
further on the BRüG above in chp. 1.§4.IV.   
721 Peresztegi, Á. 2005, pp. 136 & 146. 
722 Barkan, E., 2000, p. XXIV. 
723 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14. 
724 Ibid., p. 8. 
725 See below in chp. 2.§1.I for the outline of the (re-) emergence of restitution claims for Nazi looted art. 
726 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 14. See also: Barkan, E., 2000, pp. XXIII-XXIV & 159; Levy, D. / Sznaider, N., 
2001, p. 237.  
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libraries was again accepted in that cultural property held in public collections did not 
have to be returned. The only objects that did have to be returned were the objects then 
held in the Louvre. Further to marking the starting point of an development of a rule 
banning looting and providing for restitution of customary law, the return of cultural 
property that had been amassed in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria and Spain 
also constituted an extra stimulus for further (re-) institution of public museums in 
those countries.727 With regard to the legal developments scrutinised in this chapter this 
rising awareness and appreciation of public museum collections soon manifested itself 
in legal obligations to protect these collections against damage and removal. 
The first multilateral treaty to introduce specific protection to public collections was 
the 1899 Hague Convention.728 The protection granted to public collections comprises 
protection against damage and destruction as well as against removal: Art. 27 requests 
that “all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to 
religion, art, science, and charity (…)”. While Art. 27 aims at the protection of specific 
categories of immovable property, including buildings housing public collections, 
against damage and destruction, it indirectly contributes to the protection of movable 
cultural heritage included in these buildings. Art. 56 extends protection by prohibiting 
any seizure of, destruction, or intentional damage done to charitable and educational 
institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science.729 Consequently, while the 
emphasis of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions lies on the protection of edifices 
devoted to the arts and sciences as immovable structures against destruction and 
damage, it is also relevant for the protection of individual collection items against 
seizure.  
Between the adoption of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1954 Hague 
Convention as the next truly international instrument providing for the protection of 
cultural property during armed conflicts, the Roerich Pact was adopted. The Roerich 
Pact is a regional multilateral treaty applying only to the Americas and seeks to protect 
museums and scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions, next to historic 
monuments.730 The Pact, which was initiated by the Roerich museum, seeks to protect 
these institutions at the institutional level rather than the individual objects both in times 
                                                     
727 In 2008, the Huizinga Research Institute of Cultural History, Amsterdam and the Institute for Museum 
Research, Berlin organised a joint conference on the shift in European museums in reaction to Napoleon’s 
looting campaigns: 'Napoleon’s Legacy – The Development of National Museums in Europe 1794-1830', 
31.1. – 2.02.2008, Amsterdam.  
728 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899.  
729 Art. 56 reads in full: “The property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational 
institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. All 
seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done to such institutions, to historical monuments, works 
of art or science, is prohibited, and should be made the subject of proceedings”.  
730 Roerich Pact: Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Montevideo, 
April, 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, TS No. 899, 167 LNTS 279. 
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of armed conflicts and in time of peace by requiring their respectful treatment as neutral 
institutions. 
The protection granted to public museums was extended by the 1954 Hague 
Convention.731 The need for greater protection had become painfully evident during 
WWII. The Nazis looted and destroyed cultural property at unknown level. Ironically, 
the looting was in part motivated by Hitler’s megalomaniac plans to establish a Führer 
Museum in Linz. The looting did not spare public collections, especially in the Eastern 
Occupied Territories. The integrity of public collections was only observed in the 
Western Occupied Territories for they were expected to become part of the German 
Reich. 
Adopted within a decade from the end of WWII the 1954 Hague Convention was 
the first international treaty dedicated to the protection of cultural property and the first 
legal instrument to provide for a definition of cultural property: according to its Art. 1 
the term "cultural property" not only covers “movable (…) property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as (…) works of art; 
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as 
well as scientific collections (…)” but also extends to “buildings whose main and 
effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property such as 
museums, large libraries and depositories of archives (...)”. Consequently, the protective 
regime introduced by the 1954 Hague Convention and its protocols embraces both 
movable cultural property and immovables housing cultural property. While public 
museum collections are granted specific protection in times of armed conflict, objects 
from the collection do not enjoy additional protection with regard to their restitution. 
When it comes to the protection against removal and the obligation to restitute looted 
cultural property, objects in public museum collections are treated on equal footing with 
other cultural property and enjoy special protection only when they qualify as “movable 
property of great importance (…)”.  
Another international instrument that is not limited to cultural property from public 
museum collections is UN Security Council Resolution 1483 that was adopted in 
reaction to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While it explicitly mentions cultural property 
removed from the Iraq National Museum, all cultural property that has been removed 
from Iraq since 1990 must be returned. In practise, objects from the Iraq National 
Museum will profit from the fact that they have been (at least to a certain extend) 
catalogued. Consequently, it will be easier to proof that these objects have been illegally 
removed from Iraq compared to objects that have not been listed in an inventory. Most 
problematic is the situation for illegally excavated objects that have been removed 
before anyone could take note of their existence.  
Next to protection in times of armed conflicts, public museum collections have also 
been granted specific protection in times of peace. In fact, when the International 
                                                     
731 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The 
Hague, 14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 215). 
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Museums Office (IMO) made the first attempt to adopt an international treaty on the 
protection of cultural property in the 1930s its final draft was limited in scope of 
application to objects that were the property of a state or a public institution, that were 
held in public collections and were mentioned in the collections’ inventory.732 This draft 
treaty was however never adopted and it took four decades until the first international 
treaty on the protection of cultural property in times of peace was adopted.   
The 1970 UNESCO Convention grants specific protection to cultural property 
stolen from a museum, a religious or secular monument or similar institution (Art. 7(b)). 
Next to granting specific protection to public museum collections with regard to the 
recovery of the cultural property concerned, the 1970 UNESCO Convention also 
requires its Member States to ensure that museums and similar institutions do not 
acquire cultural property that has been illegally exported from the territory of another 
State Party. Consequently, the 1970 UNESCO Convention stresses the specific role of 
public museum collections not only in confirming the status quo of the collection but also 
in respect of future acquisition policies.  
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention also grants specific protection to cultural objects 
stolen from public collections. While the recovery of stolen cultural objects is not 
limited to cultural objects stolen from public collections but is available to any object 
that qualifies as cultural object in the sense of the convention, objects from public 
collections are granted a preferential treatment with regard to the application of 
limiation periods. As a general rule, the recovery of objects that have been stolen from 
public collections is only subject to the relative period of three years after the location of 
the object and the identity of the current possessor have been known. The recovery is 
not subjected to the effects of an absolute limiation period, thus not limiting the 
recovery right in time unless where the claimant knew the identity of the possessor. 
States are, however, granted the possibility to introduce an absolute limitation period of 
75 years. However, compared to the general limiation period of 50 years that is 
applicable to objects not originating from public collections, this is still a preferential 
treatment for objects from public collections.  
The EC Directive also provides specific protection to cultural objects from the EC 
Members’ public collections. However, theobligations for Member States for return 
cultural objects under the directive does not apply to all objects in public collections but 
applies only to those that have been designated as national treasures in the sense of Art. 
30 of the EC Treaty.  
In conclusion, public collections respectively objects that belong to public collections 
enjoy specific protection in international law, both in times of war and in times of peace. 
The content of the protection corresponds to the main threats of the situation 
concerned. During armed conflict it is in particular the immovable structures that house 
the collections that are granted protection against destruction and damage. However, the 
                                                     
732 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 131. See for a detailed discussion of the drafts: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 49-53; 
Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, p. 420-423. 
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reason for protecting the immovable structures lies in the protection of the movable 
objects they house. Museums as such do not qualify as ‘cultural property’. Put 
differently, while the concept of public museums certainly belongs to European cultural 
heritage, public museums as such do not qualify as cultural property, nor are their 
collections immune to obligations to restitutions. Where objects from public museum 
collections have been looted they must be restituted.  
In times of peace, when the threats of physical damages to cultural property are 
better regulated at the national level international law is first and foremost relevant with 
regard to the return of cultural property that has been illicitly trafficked. While 
international law contains little rules with regard to the return of illegally exported 
cultural property it does extent the restitution regime for stolen cultural property. This is 
especially true for objects that have been stolen from public collections. The analysis 
furthermore revealed that international law, as it presently stands, does not impose any 
conditions with regard to an object’s quality or provenance but accepts the inclusion of 
an object in a public collection (provided it is listed in the institution’s inventory) as 
sufficient proof that it is worthy of protection.  
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C H A P T E R  2   
The Cases of the Recent Debates on the Return of Nazi 
Spoliated Art and Human Remains: Genesis, (legal) Context 
and the Adoption of various international Declarations and 
Principles  
 This chapter focuses on the most prominent developments with regard to claims 
affecting public (museum) collections in the last fifteen to twenty years:733 requests for 
the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. It will sketch the rise of these 
claims, will situate the claims against the background of public international law and will 
discuss the principles adopted at the international level. The subsequent chapters then 
will deal with the national dimensions.  
The present analysis splits in two parts: § 1 of the chapter is dedicated to the case of 
Nazi spoliated art, whereas § 2 deals with the case of human remains. Both parts follow 
a parallel structure in that they first address the developments that led to the recent rise 
in claims. With regard to Nazi spoliated art authors go as far as to speak of a 
“renaissance of restoration of rights”734 or a “genesis of a second wave of restitution”735. 
What is particularly in this respect is the question why the claims and the debate 
emerged only in the 1990s – some fifty years after the end of World War II and thirty 
years after post-war restitution efforts had come to an end. While the events that led to 
the re-emergence of the debate on Nazi spoliated art are rather well-defined and 
occurred in quick succession of one another this is not the case with regard to human 
remains. The developments that led to the emergence of international claims for the 
                                                     
733 See, e.g.: ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (as approved by the 21st General Assembly of ICOM in 
Seoul, Republic of Korea, 8 October 2004); Merryman, J.H., 2002.  
734 Aalders, G., 2001, p. 344.   
735 Thonke, C., 2004, p. 8. Another scholar described the developments as a “reawakening to the ongoing 
dispossession and loss suffered by Holocaust survivors and their heirs. Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 3. 
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return of human remains from Western public collections are more diffuse in time and 
location. Consequently, the outlining of the developments is more extended and 
simplified at the same time. Before looking at the developments as they started in the 
United States and other formerly colonised countries from the 1960s onwards we will 
reflect upon the various circumstances of how human remains have become collection 
items in the first place. Such a background on the history of collecting of human 
remains is necessary to understand the complexities underlying claims for the return or 
repatriation of human remains. 
After the genesis of the current debate is discussed in § 1 and § 2, we will address the 
relationship between the recent “wave of restitution claims” concerning Nazi spoliated 
art and human remains with the existing legal framework on the restitution of cultural 
objects under public international law as outlined in Chapter 1. Such demarcation 
contributes to a better understanding of the present claims and the reactions and 
initiatives by the international community in the form of principles, resolutions and 
declarations that will be addressed subsequently. In scrutinising the principles, 
resolutions and declarations adopted by the international community particular attention 
will be paid to the question whether these instruments introduce new legal rights and 
obligations to claim / restitute cultural objects and which solution they propose for 
current claims (§ 3).  
 
§1. THE CAS E  OF  NAZI  SPOLIATED  ART 
I .  NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T :  G EN ES I S  O F  T H E  D EB A T E  O N  T H E  R E T U R N  O F  NA Z I  
S P O L I A T E D  A R T   
 An important development for the re-emergence of the debate on spoliated 
cultural objects was the end of the Cold War in 1989. The collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Empire allowed for a greater exchange 
of information between East and West. Of particular relevance was the opening up of 
archives in the East. One of the crucial findings in these archives concerned the so-
called Trophy Art.736 The term “Trophy Art” refers to those cultural objects that have 
been removed by Soviet “trophy brigades” at the end of and after the Second World 
War from the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. While the subject of Trophy Art is a 
matter on its own and therefore bracketed from the present analysis737, the discoveries 
                                                     
736 The first publications on “Trophy Art” after the fall of the Iron Curtain were: Akinsha, K. / Grigorii, K., 
1991a; Akinsha, K. / Grigorii, K., 1991b.  
737 The Soviet “Trophy Art” debate focuses on the legality of restitution in kind. While the present study 
does not address the (il-)legality of restitution in kind, the analysis as presented in chp. 1.§1.V on the return 
and restitution of cultural objects removed during armed conflicts suggests that the Soviet Union / Russia 
has consistently objected to the idea that restitution in kind is illegal, thus possibly being able to rely upon 
the concept of “persistent objector”. 
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in the Eastern archives on the fate and whereabouts of the Trophy Art in Russian 
Collections also triggered a more general interest in the fate of cultural objects spoliated 
during World War II.  
The opening of the archives resulted in a plethora of publications on the looting of 
cultural objects during WWII. Two books deserve explicit mentioning here for creating 
public awareness about the nature and quantity of the lootings by the Nazi’s: Lynn 
Nicholas’ ‘The Rape of Europa’738 and Hector Feliciano’s ‘The Lost Museum: the Nazi 
Conspiracy to Steal the World’s Greatest Works of Art’739. Subsequent publications also 
addressed the question of what had happened to cultural objects after the end of the 
war. Both the restitution from Germany to the formerly occupied territories, including 
France and the Netherlands, as well as the internal restitution regimes were analysed and 
criticised for incompleteness and irregularities.740  
While the research of the looting during World War II profited from the opening of 
the Eastern archives, another consequence of the end of the Cold War might have been 
of even greater relevance. It was only after the threat of war between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact countries had diminished that there was political willingness for 
introspection into the past.741 Until the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet threat had 
united Western Europe and the US, making investigations into assets spoliated during 
World War II a sensitive issue or least one that was accorded little relevance.742 The 
question of spoliated cultural objects profited to a great extent from developments with 
regard to other spoliated assets, in particular the so-called ‘dormant Swiss Bank 
accounts’.743 In 1996, the World Jewish Congress, with the support by the Clinton 
administration, had drawn public attention to the issue of the dormant and unclaimed 
Jewish bank accounts.744 Swiss banks were accused, inter alia, of wrongfully withholding 
                                                     
738 Nicholas, L., H., 1995. 
739 Feliciano, H., 1997.  
740 For publications dealing with national approaches to restitution see, e.g.: Simpson, E., 1997. For the 
Netherlands and France the post-war restitution efforts will be summarised below in the respective country 
section of chp. 4.§1.I / III.  
741 The change in the international geopolitical order also contributed to the developments that have been 
coined by proponents and critics as the “Americanization of the Holocaust”. The term has been coined by 
the founders of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and was understood both as mandate and mission. 
See further: Thonke, C., 2004, p. 84; Berenbaum, M. / Kramer, A., 2006. While the Americanization of the 
Holocaust is also considered as an important (pre-) condition of the re-emergence of the discussion on 
World War II Spoils, it will be not further elaborated here. Instead, the reader may be referred to: Novick, 
P., 1999; Eizenstat, S.E., 2003, Piper, E. / Swamy, U., 2001. 
742 Novick, P., 1999, p. 86; Turner, M.I., 1999, p. 1520. The Cold War had also led to the decrease of 
international pressure on Germany to compensate victims of the Nazi-regime. The process of the 
“denazification” of the German society was no longer a priority of the Allies. The integration of the Federal 
Republic of Germany into the transatlantic cooperation of defence and its integration into the Western 
economic and cultural sphere became was pursued equally by the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
three Western Allies. Thonke, C., 2004, p. 44.  
743 Cf., e.g.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 19. 
744 Braillard, P., 2000, p. 33. Amongst other initiatives, Under-Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat was asked 
to engage the US Government in a renewed effort to assist Holocaust victims and to seek redress for Nazi 
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monies that had been deposited by persecuted persons, primarily Jews, for 
safekeeping.745 Holocaust survivors and their heirs filed a federal class action suit in 
New York against Swiss governmental and private entities, in particular Swiss banks.746 
The case ‘In re Holocaust Victims’ Assets Litigation’747, which received extensive media 
coverage, became a milestone for the subsequent development of claims involving 
wrongs committed during the Second World War. Not only was it the first successful 
class action suit in the context of World War II748; its settlement was the largest ever 
achieved in a human rights case in the history of American litigation.749 
Further to the Swiss bank litigation, the developments with regard to the 1953 
London Debt Agreement were relevant with regard to the increase in claims and the 
intensification of the restitution debate, in particular with regard to forced and slave 
labour practices.750 The 1953 London Debt Agreement751 settled Germany's war debts 
in order to allow the country to re-establish its role in international capital markets. The 
Agreement not only wrote-down the overall debt by about 50% but allowed the debtors 
to postpone some payments until such time as re-unification.752 As a result, early 
compensation claims had been thwarted by German courts since the 1950s for being 
                                                                                                                                          
injustices. He co-organized the Washington Conference on Holocaust–era Assets, which is discussed below. 
A Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues was appointed under the chairmanship of Ambassador J.D. 
Bindenagel. Furthermore, research programmes in the National Archives were initiated.  
745 Bazyler, M., 2001, pp. 33-36. 
746 See: Complaint, Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed October 3, 
1996),  which was amended on July 30, 1997. The action was consolidated in April 1997 with two actions 
that were filed against the same defendants later in 1996 and in early 1997 under the title: “In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litigation”. Bazyler, M., 2001, p. 6; Eizenstat, S.E., 2003, p. 76. See further on the 
“phenomenon of class action suits” (Bazyler, p. 6.). See more in general: Mulheron, R., 2004.  
747 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18014 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.7, 1998) (Joint 
Stipulation describing settlement in principle); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp.2d 139 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding fairness of settlement under Rule 23(e)); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 
225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding definition of plaintiff class); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29529 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (dismissing appeal for failure to comply with 
calendar); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) 
(accepting Special Master’s allocation plan); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2001 WL 419967 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001) (defining membership in Slave Labor II class); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 
14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding plan of allocation); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 282 
F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating definition of Slave Labor II class; remand for determination of parties’ 
intentions); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2002) 
(denying risk multiplier). 
748 Bazyler, M., 2001, p. 32.  
749 Ibid. 
750 Cf.: O’Donoghue, G., 2006, p. 1127.  
751 See: Agreement on German External Debts, February 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 445, 449. 
The London Debt Agreement was signed on February 27, 1953 by the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, many of the victorious Allies. The main purpose of the Treaty was to 
enable the FRG to establish normal economic relations with other nations and to settle its external debt. 
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d. at 452-53. 
752 Guinnane, T.W., 2004, p. 1.  
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non-justiciable pursuant to the 1953 London Debt Agreement.753 The adoption of the 
1990 German Unification Treaty put an end to the prescribing of a moratorium on 
victims’ claims against either Germany or its industrial entities.754  
The process of coming to terms with the past did not stay limited to Germany and 
Switzerland. Soon after the German moratorium on victims’ claims under the 1953 
London Debt Agreement had been lifted and Switzerland had been hurtled “into the 
eye of the storm raging over the re-examination of the most wrenching years of the 
century and the Holocaust”755, other countries were questioned over their commercial 
ties with Nazi Germany and their negligence in restoring the rights of Jews.756 Countries, 
including France, and the Netherlands started investigations into the activities of 
(central) banks regarding Jewish financial assets during WWII, and the spoliation of 
Jewish assets more in general.757 
In 1997, the British Government convened a conference in London dealing with the 
so-called “Nazi Gold” (hereafter: “the London Conference”)758. The term refers to the 
gold transferred from the German central bank to Switzerland by the authorities of the 
Third Reich. Among the gold transferred into Switzerland from the German Reichsbank 
were gold reserves seized from the central banks of occupied countries. The transferred 
gold also included gold stolen from individual victims of Nazi persecution.759 The gold 
was either converted by Swiss banks, especially the Swiss National Bank760 into hard 
currency that was used to finance the German war expenditure, or was in transit in 
Switzerland. The Swiss bank affair and the London Conference galvanized attention on 
unresolved aspects of restitution after the Second World War. While the London 
Conference had focused on the looting, movement and disposition of “Nazi gold”, the 
conference proceedings also referred to other assets, such as real property, securities, 
bonds, insurances and works of art (emphasis added). 
While works of art were only one category of assets mentioned in the proceedings of 
the 1997 London Conference they became the centre of attention in the following year. 
The year of 1998 is marked by the first prominent cases dealing with Nazi spoliated art, 
which received great media attention. In reaction to these cases and the great media 
attention they generated a conference was held in late 1998 in Washington D.C. 
                                                     
753 For an account of the early cases see: Ferencz, B.B., 2002. 
754 This has been confirmed in German case law. See for a landmark case: Krakauer v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, LG (District Court) Bonn, 1 0 134/92.  
755 Braillard, P., 2000, p. 33. 
756 Kemenade, J.A.v., 1999a. 757 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1998; Kemenade, J.A.v., 1999b; Study 
Mission on the Spoliation of Jews in France: Mattéoli Commission Final Report (Mission d'étude sur la 
spoliation des Juifs de France. Rapport Général), 2000.  
757 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1998; Kemenade, J.A.v., 1999b; Study Mission on the Spoliation of 
Jews in France: Mattéoli Commission Final Report (Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France. 
Rapport Général), 2000.  
758 Nazi Gold - The London Conference, 2-4 December 1997. See for the conference proceedings: Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office, 1998; Braillard, P., 2000, pp. 143-144. 
759 Rings, W., 1985.  
760 Until October 1941 the gold was also bought by some Swiss commercial banks. 
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dedicated solely to spoliated art works. Before elaborating upon the 1998 Washington 
Conference, we will mention three cases we believe were crucial for the later 
developments: the disputes concerning Degas’ “Landscape with Smokestacks”; the case 
of Schiele’s “Portrait of Wally” and the Goudstikker case. The first two are considered 
in the literature as the first “Nazi-spoliated-art lawsuits”. In August 1998, the dispute 
between the heirs of Fritz and Louise Gutmann and the collector Daniel C. Searle 
concerning the ownership of the painting “Landscape with Smokestacks” by Degas was 
settled on the eve of trial.761 The case is often cited in the literature as prime example of 
a “just and fair” solution:762 the case was settled by a two-step agreement according to 
which ownership of the painting (then worth $ 1,2 million) was equally divided between 
Searle and the Gutmann heirs.763 Searle subsequently donated his share to the Art 
Institute of Chicago, which bought the interest from the Gutmann heirs. The reason for 
lauding the settlement is the fact that the painting did not disappear into a private 
collection but was kept for the general public.764 It is exhibited alongside a label 
commemorating the provenance of the painting.765 
The case dealing with Schiele’s “Portrait of Wally” commenced when the heirs of 
Lea Bondi discovered the portrait when it was exhibited in 1997 in the context of a 
Schiele retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Lea Bondi, a Jewish 
art dealer was forced to sell her art at greatly undervalued prices and to flee Vienna in 
1938. After the war, the portrait was acquired by Viennese eye doctor Rudolf Leopold 
who sold his art collection in 1994 to the Austrian Government. Since then the portrait 
has been part of the collection of the Leopold Museum in Vienna. As of today, more 
than ten years later the case is still unsolved.766 
Claims seeking the return of spoliated art works were not limited to the United 
States. Also in Europe claimants were stepping forward. One of the first and without 
any doubt the most prominent case within the Netherlands is the Goudstikker case, 
which dealt with some 200 paintings from the former trading stock of the art dealer 
Goudstikker. At the beginning of 1998 the heirs of Goudstikker requested the return of 
                                                     
761 See further on this case, e.g.: Weil, S., 1999; Trienens, H.J., 2000. During his presentation on 19 October 
2006 at the Conference on ‘Dispute Resolution Methods for Holocaust Spoliated Art Claims’ organised by 
the Institute of Art and Law (IAL), London Winston Chesterfield analysed the negotiating powers of the 
parties involved and came to the interesting conclusion that had the case been resolved in court it would 
have been likely that Mr Searle’s title had been confirmed. 
762 See, e.g.: Elmer, T., G., 2000, pp. 132-133. Cf.: Hartung, H., 2005, p. 96. 
763 Buomberger, T., 1998, p. 24.  
764 Cf.: Kirby, C.L., 2000.  
765 The label reads: "Purchase from the collection of Fritz and Louise Gutmann and a gift of Daniel C. 
Searle". Email dated 27 August 2002 from Eileen Harakal, Executive Director of Public Affairs, The Art 
Institute of Chicago. 
766 United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by Egon Schiele, No. 99 Civ. 9940--MBM, 2002 WL 
553532 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002). In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served 
on Museum of Modern Art, 677N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1999). See for an 
analysis of the case: Lufkin, M., 1999; Palmer, N., 2001, p. 482; Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, pp. 392-
395. 
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all objects that had been part of the trading stock of Goudstikker’s art gallery and which 
had been integrated into the Netherlands Art Property Collection (Nederlands 
Kunstbezit (hereafter: NK-Collection)) after the war. It was not until 2006 that the 
paintings were finally returned to the heirs.767 In the meantime, the Dutch Government 
had adopted a liberalised return policy with regard to spoliated art works. 
An important element that influenced the perception of national Governments and 
the general public was the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (hereafter: 
“the 1998 Washington Conference”), which was organised in December 1998, one year 
after the London Conference on Nazi Gold, by the U.S. Holocaust Museum.768 The aim 
of the four-day conference was to “dismantle most if not all of the outstanding 
obstacles to a full-scale return of stolen art”.769 The 1998 Washington Conference was 
attended by representatives of forty-four countries and more than a dozen interest 
groups and resulted in the adoption of a number of principles on the identification of 
art works that had been confiscated by the Nazis. The identification of art works as 
demanded by the Washington Principles would not have been feasible without certain 
technological prerequisites: computerised databases, as well as the Internet have made it 
easier if not possible in the first place to conduct research on the provenance of art 
works.770 
While a number of representatives had understood the 1998 Washington Principles 
as final act of the renewed interest for Nazi spoliated art, they were only the first in a 
series of principles, resolutions and declarations to be adopted at the end of the 1990s 
and during the first decade of the new millennium.771 The fate of art spoliated during 
World War II raised and still raises great popular interest, not the least due to the 
flourishing of the art market until fall 2008 and the demand of the market for high 
quality art.772 Against this background the adoption of the 1998 Washington Principles 
marked the transition from the period in which awareness had been raised and 
                                                     
767 See for a detailed chronology and analysis of the case below in chp. 4.§1.I.3.b). 
768 The four-day conference took place from November 30th- December 3rd 1998 and was co-hosted by 
the United States Department of State and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The 
proceedings of the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets are available online at:  
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/wash_conf_material.html (last visited: 19 August 2008). See for a 
conference report: Rascher, A.F.G., 1999. 
769 Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., 1999, p. 342.  
770 Bailey, M., 2005, p. 56. A milestone in the development of current day databases was the ‘relational 
database’ as invented and described by Edgar Codd (Codd, E.F., 1970). The use of databases increased 
drastically during the 1990s, parallel with the computer and internet hype. E.g. the database of the Art Loss 
Register, the content of which was originally based on the art theft archive maintained by the International 
Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) since 1976, dates from 1991. Cf.:  
http://www.artloss.com/content/history-and-business (last visited: 1.4.2009). In 1998 the Art Loss Register 
expanded the register with claims relating to the spoliation of art objects, and particularly those stolen from 
Nazi victims.  
771 Cf.: Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 139. 
772 Weiss, L.J., 2007, p. 868. While the art market seemed less affected by the global financial crisis when it 
emerged in September 2008 auctions and fairs at the end of the year and beginning of 2009 indicated that 
the art market bubble has finally burst after having flourished for years.  
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information on the looting and the international and national restitution regimes had 
been gathered to a period in which the composition of public collections were actively 
challenged.773  
Before discussing the Washington Principles and other principles, resolutions and 
declarations more in detail in Chapter 2.§1.III, we will shortly reflect upon the 
development against the background of public international law, more in specific the 
rights and obligations for restitution and return as extrapolated in Chapter 1.  
 
I I .  TH E  C A S E  O F  NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T  F RO M  T H E  L E G A L  P ER S P E C T I V E   
1 .  PU B L I C  IN T E RN A TI ON A L  L A W 
 In Chapter 1 we have analysed in how far public international law is relevant for 
the return of cultural objects. The analysis distinguished between the following 
categories: the protection of cultural objects in times of war (2.1), the protection of 
cultural objects in time of peace (2.2 & 2.3); the return of cultural objects to private 
individuals (2.4), as well as to a people (2.5). Three of these five categories are relevant 
with regard to Nazi art looting: the restitution of cultural objects removed in times of 
war, the return of cultural objects to their original owners and finally, the return of 
cultural objects to a people.  
The analysis revealed that by the outbreak of World War II in 1939 there existed a 
ban on the looting of cultural objects and an obligation to restitute spoliated cultural 
objects under treaty law as well as customary law. Furthermore, the analysis showed that 
the Western Allies undertook great efforts in restituting cultural objects: first, restitution 
sought to correspond to the reality of looting rather than limiting itself to the letter of 
the law. Restitution was not only effected for confiscated or stolen cultural objects but 
applied also to cultural objects that had been subject to other forms of removal, 
including e.g. forced sales. Also, restitution did not stay within the classical boundaries 
of restitution under public international as a matter in between states only but stretched 
the rules towards the introduction of rules dealing with restitution to private individuals 
as well as the Jewish people as a people.  
In the second place, great relevance was accorded to physical restitution. When 
possible, cultural objects had to be restituted rather than the loss being financially 
compensated. The uniqueness of cultural objects was not only stressed by the emphasis 
put on its restitution but also by the renunciation of compensation in specie or restitution 
in kind. While this may seem paradoxical at first sight, the rejection of compensation in 
                                                     
773 Of course, not only public collections were affected but also private collections. See, e.g. the case in 
which the heirs of Margarete Mauthner sought the return of a painting by Van Gogh from the collection of 
Elizabeth Taylor; the case Gerda Dorothea de Weerth vs Edith Marks Baldinger or the case of the heirs of 
Carlotta Landsberg vs Marilynn Alsdorf. See for a short summary of the cases and a list of further cases: 
Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007. 
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specie or restitution in kind is the only logical conclusion following from the uniqueness 
of cultural property. The Western Allies respected this uniqueness by choosing for 
compensation payments in those cases where cultural objects could not be physically 
returned for having being destroyed or lost.  
Thirdly, the Western Allies not only arranged for the restitution of the cultural 
objects that had been misappropriated by the Nazis; they were also commited to 
restituting cultural objects that had been spoliated by their armed forces from German 
territory. In conclusion, the measures taken in the post-war era at the international level 
to arrive at restitution were remarkable and reveal great determination to reverse, in as 
far as possible, the Nazi art looting. In this respect the restitution measures positively 
mirror the abyss that was opened by the Nazi art looting and sent out positive signals 
for subsequent developments with regard to restitutions of cultural objects. In the light 
of the foregoing conclusion two questions arise: first, why are we presently witnessing 
so many claims?774 And secondly, in how far can claimants still rely on the regime as 
applicable more than half a century ago? 
The first question is an apt illustration of the fact that the law as such is unable to 
lead to appropriate solutions: the mere fact of the existence of restitution rights did not 
result in the re-unification of a spoliated work of art with its former owner or his or her 
heirs: first, those who lost their lives during the Nazi regime could not seek restoration 
of their rights and potential successors in title were not always aware of the lost 
possessions. Secondly, where former owners or their heirs were able to seek restoration, 
physical restitution was often impossible for lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of 
an object. Where the whereabouts of an object were unknown or it was mistakenly 
believed to have been destroyed no physical restitution could have been affected. It is, 
however, possible that the former owner or heir received financial compensation. In 
other cases, restitutions could have been debarred by rules protecting good faith 
acquisitions. Another important factor preventing full restitution was the lapse of the 
terms of application for the filing of restitution claims. Furthermore, one must not 
forget that public international law first and foremost aims at the restitution of spoliated 
cultural objects to the state from whose territory the object had been removed. As a 
result, many cases of cultural objects spoliated in the occupied territories resulted in the 
objects’ restitution, i.e. to the state of origin but did not result in the re-unification of the 
object with its former owner or his or her heirs. The latter aspect is a matter of national 
law. Where objects that have been restituted in the sense of restitution to their country 
of origin but were not returned by the national Governments to their former owners 
there is a significant chance that these objects have been introduced into the public 
                                                     
774 According to some figures more than 90% of the cultural objects that had been removed from the 
occupied territories had been returned to the state of origin by 1952. Cf.: Engstler, L., 1964, pp. 149-150; 
Hipp, A., 2000, p. 56, fn. 40.  
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collections.775 However, objects that had been misappropriated under the Nazi regime 
also entered into public collections as acquisitions during or after the war, as well as 
donations.  
With regard to the second question, as to whether the framework as developed and 
introduced under public international law still offers claimants a basis to make a claim 
the answer depends on the quality of the claimant: above, it has been stressed that the 
introduction of rights for private individuals under public international law for the 
restitution of (cultural) property removed under the Nazi regime qualifies as one of the 
most important changes in public international law over the past century.776 The 
restitution regime as introduced by the Western Allies in Law No. 59 on the ‘Restitution 
of Identifiable Property’777 and as subsequently laid down in the Federal Restitution Law 
(BRüG)778 was, however, limited in time.779 In fact, the period during which claimants 
had to file a claim was short: the deadline to file a claim with the Central Filing Agency 
under Law No. 59 was 14 August 1948.780 Under the BRüG legislation, which had 
entered into force in 1957, claims had to be filed within the period of a year until 1 April 
1958.781 After that date private individuals were barred from seeking the restitution of 
their property. 
Different from private individuals, states are not debarred by expired filing periods 
from seeking the restitution of cultural property. While the subject of prescription in 
international law is controversial782, the specialist literature tends to consider 
prescription with regard to the subject of restitution of cultural property inapplicable in 
the relations between States.783 Consequently, for those cases where the claimant is a 
state and the objects removed are still in the territory of the state that removed the 
objects in breach of international law it would still be possible, at least theoretically, for 
the state to seek restitution on the basis of public international treaty law and customary 
law.784  
                                                     
775 Cf.: Turner, M.I., 1999, p. 1522. See further on the Dutch and French national regimes with regard to the 
restitution of cultural objects below in chp. 4.§1.I / III. See further on the restoration of rights in these two 
countries more in general: Veraart, W., 2005. 
776 Less, S., 2008. 
777 British Military Government Law No. 59 on the "Restitution of Identifiable Property to Victims of Nazi 
Oppression', Control Commission for Germany. B.E. Law No. 59: "Restitution of Identifiable Property to 
Victims of Nazi Oppression', Military Government Gazette (British Zone of Control), No. 28.  
778 Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz (BRüG) 19 July 1957, BGBl. I-734. 
779 Cf.: Blume Huttenlauch, A., 2006, p. 822. 
780 Kurtz, M.J., 2006, pp. 149-150. 
781 Cf.: Heuer, C.-H., 1999, p. 2562. 
782 Gattini, A., 1996, p. 14.  
783 Ibid; Schorlemer, S.v., 1998, p. 333. Cf.: Nahlik, S.E., 1967, p. 100. 
784 See e.g. the restitution of some 140 drawings from the Koenigs collection by the Government of 
Ukraine in 2004 to the Netherlands. Fawkes, H., 20 April 2004. See on the German-Russian trophy art 
debate e.g.: Gattini, A., 1996. The principle that claims between states are not subject to prescription has 
been extended in the first protocol of the 1954 Hague Convention to apply to any object removed during 
armed conflict or occupation also where the object is subsequently located in a third country not having 
been a party to the conflict. 
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However, due to the great efforts put into (external) restitutions by the Western 
Allies the majority of claims between states have been solved; the most prominent 
exception being the ongoing dispute between Germany and Russia on the so-called 
Trophy-Art. Consequently, most of today’s claimants seeking the restitution of cultural 
objects lost during the Nazi regime are private individuals. With the time periods of the 
post-war restitution laws long having lapsed, the claimants can no longer rely on the 
special rules introduced under public international law but instead have to phrase their 
claim within the rules of private law. As the disputes concerning Degas’ “Landscape 
with Smokestacks” and the Goudstikker collection, which have been shortly introduced 
above, indicate, the recovery under private law is significantly hampered by the 
significant period of time that has lapsed since the misappropriation or acquisition of 
the objects concerned.785 Time periods are relevant in view of good faith acquisition, 
prescriptive acquisition and extinctive prescription. In the following we will shortly 
summarise the applicable rules of Dutch, English and French law. The reason to reflect 
upon the national regimes at this point, rather than in one of the next two chapters 
dealing explicitly with the national dimensions, is that the principles to be discussed in 
Chapter 2.§1.III take account of the difficulties if not impossibility for claimants to rely 
upon private national rules.  
2.  A  B R I E F  E X C UR S U S  O N  T I M E  L I M I TA T I O N S  A P P L I C A BL E  T O  R E C O V E R Y  I N  P R I V A T E  
L A W 
a) Dutch Law 
In Dutch private law the most important action for the recovery of a movable object 
is the action of revindication as laid down in Art. 5:2 Dutch Civil Code (hereinafter: 
DCC): “The owner of a thing is entitled to revindicate (recover) it from any person who 
holds it without right”. The action of revindication is, however, subject to an extinctive 
prescription according to which the action is no longer available after a lapse of twenty 
years from the day that a different person from the right holder has taken possession of 
the property (Art. 3:306 DCC juncto Art. 3:314(2) DCC). The moment the original 
                                                     
785 See, e.g.: Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 104; Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 74. It is sometimes argued that the looting of 
art works qualifies as crime against humanity (see, e.g. Lecture by Dr. A. Goepfert on "Art trade in works 
removed in times of wars; art trade in nationalized and expropriated works of art" held in Maastricht on 5 
March 2008). The argument is interesting in that it is generally acknowledged that no limitation period exists 
for crimes against humanity (see, e.g.: Bazyler, M., 1999, p. 154). The term crimes against humanity was 
defined by the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950. The Principles were adopted by the International Law Commission, 
acting under instructions from the United Nations General Assembly and set down the laws and procedures 
by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. According to Prinicle VI (c) crimes against humanity 
are: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian 
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such 
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime". 
The looting of art works consequently does not qualify as crime against humanity.  
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owner looses his right to recover his property the person in possession of the good  will 
become the owner on the grounds of extinctive prescription of the revindication. 
Acquistion occurs “regardless of whether his possession was in good or bad faith” (Art. 
3:105 DCC).786 Put differently, in the Netherlands even a person not acting in good faith 
can eventually the owner of a stolen object. Whether a thief himself can get full legal 
title as it is often claimed787 shall not be further addressed here as it is not relevant in the 
present context.788  
Next to extinctive prescription, the owner may loose his title at an earlier point in 
time due to acquisitive prescription, as will be set out in the following:  
The rules on transferring property are laid down in Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
The general rule on the transfer of property is provided by Art. 3:84 DCC and requires a 
“delivery pursuant to a valid title by the person who has the right to dispose of the 
property”. There are hence three requirements that must be met for a valid transfer of 
property: delivery, valid title and the right to dispose of the object concerned.789 In case 
of stolen objects, and in accordance with the nemo dat rule, the third requirement, i.e. the 
right to dispose of an object, is not met. Consequently, according to the general rule, the 
property cannot be transferred.  
The general rule on the transfer of property is, however, compromised by Art. 3:86 
DCC, which holds a cure to the absence of the right to dispose of a property. According 
to this article, “a transfer (…) of a movable object (…) despite the alienator’s lack of the 
right to dispose of the property is valid, provided that the transfer790 is not by gratuitous 
title and the acquirer acts in good faith”. The requirement that the transfer must not be 
by gratuitous title does not mean that the acquirer has to pay full market value of the 
object to be transferred. As far as the requirement of good faith on behalf of the 
acquirer is concerned, the following aspects should be mentioned: the relevant moment 
that the acquirer must act in good faith is the moment he or she obtains possession of 
the object in question. While the Dutch Civil Code does not spell out what constitutes 
good faith, Art. 3:11 DCC sets out when an acquirer is considered not to act in good 
faith: “Where the good faith of a person is required to give legal effect to something, 
                                                     
786 Under the old Dutch Civil Code, extinctive prescription, i.e. the barring of the original owner’s legal 
action for recovery was not linked with a provision granting the property to the person possessing it the 
moment the limitation period had lapsed. The consequence of a legal vacuum in which no one could 
subsequently acquire full legal title of the object was considered undesirable and hence changed with the 
introduction of the new Dutch Civil Code. Cf.: Klomp, R.J.Q., 2000, p. 61. Yet another interesting change 
concerned the length of the extinctive prescription period. Under the old Dutch Civil Code (Art. 2004) the 
legal action to recovery was barred after the lapse of thirty years from the moment of involuntary loss of the 
possession. 
787 See, e.g.: Brunner, C.J.H., 1992, p. 53.  
788 See further on the discussion: Jansen, J.E., 2005; Salomons, A.F., 2005; Schaik, A.C.v., 2005; Schaik, 
A.C.v., 2005. 
789 In case of movable property, delivery is generally achieved by giving the acquirer physical possession of 
the object. A title must be understood as the legal relationship between the alienator and acquirer that 
justifies a transfer. The most common title being sale.  
790 The transfer must be in accordance with Artt. 3:90, 3:91 or 3:93 DCC.  
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such person does not act in good faith if he or she knew, or ought to have known given 
circumstances, of the facts or the law to which is good faith must relate (…)”.791 
According to Art. 3:11 DCC an acquirer is presumed to have acted in good faith. The 
burden of proof to show that someone did not act in good faith rests upon the party 
seeking revindication (Art. 150 of the Civil Procedure Code).792 In case the acquirer did 
act in good faith and gave some form of remuneration, he or she acquires property 
despite the alienator’s missing right to dispose of it. Consequently, the original owner 
can no longer recover the property.793 
The cure offered by Art. 3:86 DCC against the absence of the right to dispose of a 
property, does not as such apply to cases where the original owner lost his possession of 
the object involuntarily, e.g. due to theft. In case of stolen objects, the original owner is 
granted a period of three years to recover his object as held by Art. 3:86(3) DCC: “(…) 
the owner of a moveable object, who has lost his possession though theft, may 
revindicate it as his property during a period of three years from the day of the theft”. 
However, this exception to the exception knows yet another exception that allows 
immediate transfer of property even of stolen objects. The following requirements, as 
outlined in Art. 3:86(3)(a), must be met for a third purchaser to acquire property of a 
stolen object: the acquirer must be a natural person not acting in the exercise of a 
profession or business. The alienator, on the other hand, must be acting in the normal 
course of his business and must do so in his business premises. If these requirements, 
further to the requirements of non-gratuitous title and good faith on behalf of the 
acquirer are fulfilled, property, even of stolen objects, is directly transferred. In such 
instance, the original owner cannot recover the property.  
As a consequence of the provisions on extinctive and acquisitive protection under 
the Dutch Civil Code claimants seeking the recovery of cultural objects spoliated under 
the Nazi regime will not have a leg to stand on in  most cases to which Dutch law is 
applicable.794 
                                                     
791 Art. 3:11 DCC.  
792 In Dutch: Wetboek Burgerlijke rechtsvordering (Rv). 
793 The possibility that the original owner might address the alienator for indemnity should be mentioned 
here but will not be further elaborated upon given the report’s preoccupation with the protection of the 
cultural object itself rather than indemnity.  
794 HR 8 May 1998, 1st Chamber, Nos. 16.546, C97/025; NJ 1999, No.44, annotated by Th. M. de Boer. In 
a case before the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) between the German Land Saxony, as the successor in 
rights of the former owner and a private individual who had acquired a painting in 1990 in Amsterdam, the 
Court stressed the relevance of extinctive limitation periods in the light of legal certainty. The Court stated 
that the fact that the original owner lost his action to recover his painting before he or she was even able to 
make use of the action (i.e. before he or she learnt about the painting’s location) could not outweigh the 
need for legal certainty in judicial matters. See further for an analysis and discussion of the case: Blom, J., 
2000.  
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b) English / Common Law 
Different from the French and Dutch jurisdictions characterised by the civil law 
understanding of the recovery of tangible movable property as rei vindicatio, the 
English legal system, as a system characterised by common law, provides for a claim in 
tort.795 Under common law, the normal cause of action available for claimants seeking 
the return of an object is a claim for the tort of conversion. Conversion was defined by 
Atkin J. in the case Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company v MacNicoll as:  
 
“(…) dealing with goods in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the true owner (…) provided (…) there 
is an intention on the part of the defendant in so doing to deny the owner’s right or to assert a right which 
is inconsistent with the owner’s right”.796 
 
A claim for the tort of conversion can be grounded on possession at the time of the 
wrongful act or the immediate right to possession at that time. In order to prove his or 
her immediate right to possession a claimant has to prove original title to the object 
concerned. Given the long lapse of time and the circumstances of loss many claimants 
are not able to produce the required documentation in the form of e.g. receipt of 
purchase or insurance records. Where claimants succeed in proving original title and 
there exists no doubts as to the identity of the object, the original title to the Paining is 
unimpeachable.  
Conversion is a strict liability tort. Hence, a current possessor, whether a private 
person or a public institution, cannot argue that he/she or it acted in good faith when 
accepting the object. There exist, however, two defences a present holder can raise to 
resist a claim: the present holder either has to prove that the claimant has lost good title 
in the mean time, and with it the right to immediate possession, or that the limitation 
period to sue for conversion has lapsed.  
The question whether the claimant lost good title, or whether anybody acquired 
better title depends on the circumstances of each individual case. Where an object has 
been the subject of a chain of transactions prior to the acquisition by the present holder, 
especially where such transactions are governed by a civil law country, the original legal 
title may have been invalidated. Depending on the jurisdiction where a transition took 
place the bona fide purchaser acquires ownership immediately797 or after the lapse of a 
certain amount of years.798 In those cases where the original title is not invalided, 
claimants may nevertheless have lost their right to immediate possession, depending on 
the question whether the limitation period to sue for conversion has lapsed.  
Under the Limitation Act 1939, which is the relevant act for cases dealing with works 
of art spoliated during WWII, an owner’s right to sue and his title extinguishes six years 
                                                     
795 Cf.: Siehr, K., 2001, p. 53. 
796 Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry v MacNicholl, (1919) 88 L.J.K.B. 601, para. 605.  
797 See, e.g. Artt. 1153 f. of the Italian Codice Civile. The consequence of this extremely liberal attitude are 
well-illustrated in the infamous case Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., [1980] 1 All ER 1121. 
798 Cf.: the Dutch and French system.  
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after the misappropriation. Different from the Limitation Act 1980, this is also the case 
against a thief. Consequently, all original titles with regard to Nazi spoliated art have 
long lapsed. This does not mean that current possessors required good legal title: under 
the Limitation Act 1939 the lapse of the limitation period merely extinguishes the 
original title without giving new title. However, this leaves unchanged the fact that 
claimants no longer have a valid legal claim to spoliated artworks as any claim is statute-
barred under the applicable English law.  
c)  French Law 
The general starting point for the assessment of the possibility to recover (cultural) 
property under French law is Art. 2279 of the French Civil Code.799 According to the 
article the owner of a lost or stolen good is granted a period of three-years within which 
he has to reclaim the good: “Celui qui a perdu ou auquel il a été volé une chose peut la 
revendiquer pendant trois ans, a compter du jour de la perte ou du vol, contre celui dans 
les mains duquel il la trouve”.800 Where the current possessor is considered to be in 
good faith, the owner seeking recovery has to refund the former the purchase price.801 
The current possessor is profiting from the presumption of good faith as provided for 
in Art. 2279: “En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre”. 
The lapse of the limitation period, which starts to run at the moment of loss, is fatal 
against a good faith possessor. Against a possessor not being considered of having 
acquired the object in good faith, revindication is possible until thirty years after the date 
of loss or theft. Art. 2262 Code Civile bars all claims after the lapse of thirty years: 
“Toutes les actions, tant réelles que personnelles, sont prescrites par trente ans, sans que 
celui qui allègue cette prescription soit obligé d'en rapporter un titre ou qu'on puisse lui 
opposer l'exception déduite de la mauvaise foi”. Consequently, similar to the Dutch 
situation, claimants seeking the recovery of cultural objects spoliated under the Nazi 
regime can no longer enforce their claim in a case where French law is the applicable 
law. 
d)  Intermediary conclusions 
In conclusion, not only can private parties seeking recovery of cultural objects 
misappropriated under Nazi reign no longer rely upon rules under public international 
law, they will also be debarred from recovery under national law. This is true not only 
for civil law countries, which accord great relevance to the protection of good faith 
purchases, but also for English law as a common law jurisdiction. The analysis of 
English law and the Limitation Act 1939 showed that the principle of nemo dat is less 
absolute than often argued.  
                                                     
799 Cf.: Cornu, M., 2008. 
800 Redmond-Cooper, R., 1996, pp. 11-12.  
801 Art. 2280 French Civil Code. 
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While the coincidence of different legal systems sometimes allows for a successful 
claim in court802 and there exist jurisdictions outside of the scope of the present study 
where a claim for the return of spoliated art works may still be successful803, litigation is 
generally considered as flawed medium for resolving claims concerning spoliated works 
of art.804 Given the complexity of the cases, due to the variety of jurisdictions often 
involved and the passage of time805, litigation is a time-intensive and costly solution.806 
In the following, we will adress the solutions proposed by the principles, resolutions and 
declarations adopted since the end of the 1990s.  
I I I .  RE C E N T  D E V E L O P M E N T S :  P R IN C I PL E S ,  R E S OL U T I ON S  A N D  D E C L A RA T ION S  
A D O P T E D  B Y  TH E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O M M U N I T Y  I N  R E A C T I O N  TO  T H E  R E-
E M E R G E N C E  O F  T H E  D E B A T E  O N  NA Z I  S P O L I A T E D  A R T 
 In this section, the principles, declarations and resolution that have been adopted 
by different international fora and organisations with regard to the restitution of 
spoliated cultural objects some fifty years after the end of World War II will be 
discussed. When the debate on Nazi spoliated art re-emerged in the 1990s the post-war 
restitution laws as outlined in Chapter 1.§1.V /§4 had long expired. Consequently, the 
international community adopted a number of new instruments that will be analysed in 
the following. Particular attention will be paid to the question whether the instruments 
introduce new legally enforceable rights and duties with regard to the return of Nazi 
spoliated art. The creation of new rights in the form of treaties or customary rules is still 
reserved to states, regardless of the fact that individuals and other none-state actors have 
gained a certain level of international legal personality since World War II.807  
A second point of attention is the relevance the various instruments accord to 
financial compensation that might have been received by the original owners or their 
heirs in the immediate post-war era. This aspect is interesting given the findings of the 
analysis of the post war restitution regime in Chapter Chapter 1.§1.V /§4 with regard to 
the principles that guided the Allied and German external and internal restitution regime 
during the post-war years. The analysis revealed that where physical restitution was not 
                                                     
802 See, e.g. the case of City of Gotha and Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby's and Cobert Finance 
S.A..  
803 See, e.g.: Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 42, 431 (N.Y.1991) where the New 
York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff demands the 
return of her artwork, regardless of how many years have passed or whether the plaintiff has been diligent 
in seeking her property. While the case was not about Nazi spoliated art but about normal theft the findings 
are nevertheless relevant for Nazi spoliated art cases. Cf.: Kaye, L., M., 1996b, p. 35; Kennon, H., 1996, p. 
374; Lowenthal, C., 1996, p. 10. 
804 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 49. 
805 Weil, S., 1999, p. 290. 
806 Cf.: Lerner, R., E., 1998, p. 36. E.g. in an American case it took the court eight years to clarify the issues 
dealing with the statue of limitation (Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536F.Supp.829 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981), aff’d, 678 F2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)). Cf.: Kaye, L., M., 1997, p. 104. 
807 Cf.: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, pp. 103-104; Dixon, M., 2007, pp. 3 & 20. 
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an available option for the cultural object either being destroyed or lost, financial 
compensation was paid. Compensation for lost property was calculated according to the 
estimated replacement value at the time the compensation was granted.808 While it 
would be naïve to assume that compensation has been paid in each case where physical 
restitution was unavailable, the findings of Chapter 1.§1.V /§4 nevertheless suggest the 
aspect of financial compensations already received will be a factor in current dicucssions 
of what constitutes just and fair solutions. The analysis of the instruments will be 
structured according to chronological order.809 
1.  TH E  1998  WA S H I N G T O N  PR I N C I PL E S  O N  NA Z I -CO N F I S C A T E D  AR T  
 As stipulated already above the “Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art” (hereinafter: the 1998 Washington Principles) were adopted by the 
delegates to the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (hereafter: “the 
1998 Washington Conference”).810 The eleven-point statement was based on draft 
principles that had been prepared by the American delegation, which on their part were 
based on a report and guidelines on the spoliation of art during the Nazi / World War II 
Era (1933-45) of a task force of the American Association of Art Museum Directors 
(AAMD).811 The principal aim of the 1998 Washington Conference for the American 
Delegation was to internationalize these principles.812  
A reading of the principles shows, that the 1998 Washington Principles 
quintessentially boil down to two principles: works of art that had been confiscated by 
the Nazis and have not yet been restituted should be identified (Principle I) and 
secondly, claims should be solved in a “just and fair” manner (Principles VIII and IX). 
While the call for the “identification of works of art that had been confiscated by the 
Nazis and that have not yet been restituted” might seem clear at first sight, it contains a 
number of ambiguities. As far as the designation “works of art” is concerned, the 1998 
Washington Principles do not define the term, nor did the drafters choose to describe 
what qualifies as works of art by adding an enumeration of examples.813 This omission 
                                                     
808 According to the BRüG, which was in particular relevant for those claims dealing with property that no 
longer existed or which had disappeared from either within or outside the German territory compensation 
for lost property was calculated according to the estimated replacement value as of April 1, 1956. See 
further on the BRüG above in chp. 1§4.IV.   
809 Any attempt to bring developments within various fora in a chronological order is to some extend forced. 
Instruments have been ordered according to their date of adoption. 
810 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, 1998.  
811 The task force had been convened in response to the seizure of the Schiele paintings from the Moma 
exhibition in 1998. See: Eizenstat, S.E., 2003, p. 193. See further: Rascher, A.F.G., 1999, p. 338. See also: 
Garner, B., A., 2004, p. 319. 
812 Eizenstat, S.E., 2003, p. 193. 
813 Legislators have found different ways to deal with the challenge of defining a “work of art”. There is 
general agreement that “art” cannot be defined. A technique frequently employed is to combine a general 
but not conclusive definition with an enumeration of works that fall under that definition. This double 
approach, with both parts qualifying one another foresees both in the philosophical impossibility to define 
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is, however, of little relevance as there are hardly any cases in which the question as to 
whether or not an object qualifies as a work of art proved problematic.814 With regard to 
the explicit reference to “Nazi-confiscated art”, rather than “spoliated art” it might be 
interesting to learn that it was an accommodation to the Russian Federal Republic in the 
light of the discussions on the “Soviet Trophy Art”. While a number of countries 
favoured a broader application of the principles to all spoliated artworks, their 
application was limited to “Nazi-confiscated art” to allow for the unanimous adoption 
of the principles.815  
The principle of identification is elaborated by practical guidelines in Principles II – 
IV: principle II stresses the necessity to make the relevant records and archives 
accessible to the public, while principle III acknowledges that the identification of Nazi-
confiscated works of art on the envisaged scale can only be achieved through the 
assignment of man-power and resources to this work. Principle IV takes account of the 
unavoidable gaps or ambiguities in the provenance of an object in light of the lapse of 
time and the circumstances of the 1933-1945 period. It stipulates that in case of doubt 
one should give credit to the original owner. Once a work of art has been identified as 
having been confiscated by the Nazis, Principles V and VI become relevant: principle V 
states that the original owners or their heirs should be identified. This task would profit 
from the introduction of central registry of the works having been identified as Nazi-
confiscated, as stipulated by Principle VI.  
Principles VII-IX deal with claims that will result from the localisation of the original 
owners. While the 1998 Washington Principles aim primarily at the identification of the 
works that have not been restituted, they imply, prepare, and facilitate the subsequent 
stage of restitution, as the identification of works of art with a problematic provenance 
necessarily leads to the question of what to do with them.816 Principle VII encourages 
claims by former owners.  
Principles VIII and IX stipulate that claims should be solved in a “just and fair” 
manner. The principles do not, however, further reflect on what just and fair solutions 
mean but the drafting history suggests that just and fair solutions were understood as a 
                                                                                                                                          
art, and the practical necessity to differ between those goods that qualify as art and those that do not, i.e. 
which goods will generate a royalty levy, e.g. droit de suite, which object will grant the owner a tax reduction 
or which objects should not be exported. The fact that no definition is included in the 1998 Washington 
Principles is but another indicator for the fact that it is not a binding instrument.  
814 Where there exists legal disputes as to the artistic character of a work these generally concern 
contemporary art works (See e.g. case Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928). Given the 
lapse of half a decade since World War II this problem does no longer apply to Nazi spoliated art.  
815 Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and France with an interest of recovering cultural objects 
from the territory of the Russian Federation had favoured a broad application of the 1998 Washington 
Principles to all spoliated objects. 
816 Rascher, A.F.G., 1999, p. 339. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   176 12-10-2009   12:09:07
R E C E N T  D E B A T E S  O N  N A Z I  S P O L I A T E D  A R T  A N D  H U M A N  R E M A I N S  |  177   
 
  
broad, multi-faceted category, with physical restitution being only one option amongst 
several others.817  
Principles X and XI make suggestions as to how “just and fair” solutions can be 
achieved: through the establishment of commissions or other bodies with a balanced 
membership that will help in the identification of the confiscated works of art, and, 
more important here, resolve the dispute on ownership (Principle X). As far as this last 
aspect is concerned, i.e. the resolving of ownership issues, Principle XI puts specific 
emphasis on the introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. It also 
appeals to the countries that attended the conference to take the necessary measures to 
implement the set of principles on the national scale. The Washington Principles do not 
address the possibility (and the relevance of) financial compensation payments that 
might have been received for a work of art. Given its aim to find “just and fair” 
solutions which were understood as a broad, multi-faceted category, with physical 
restitution being only one option amongst several others818 it can be assumed that the 
question of any compensation payments received would be addressed in the 
determination of the “just and fair” solution in a specific case.  
The circle of addressees profiting respectively having to take action is not further 
defined by the 1998 Washington Principles. With regard to the former owners of art 
works, the wording of the 1998 Washington Principles clarifies that it applies to any 
Nazi confiscated works of art. Consequently, any former owner (or heir) regardless of 
his or her racial background profits from the Washington Principles. With regard to the 
party that is demanded to act, these are first and foremost the countries that supported 
the 1998 Washington Principles. The participating countries were wary to create any 
binding obligations. The plan of the American Delegation to “draft binding obligations 
under international law” was abandoned at an early stage of the preparatory phase”819 
and consensus was reached only after including an explicit statement in the preamble 
reiterating the principles’ non-bindingness and recognizing the differences in legal 
systems and that the individual states can only act within the context of its own laws.820  
2.  CO U N C IL  OF  EU R O P E  RE S O L U T I O N  1205  (1999)  O N  SP O L I A T E D  JEW IS H  
C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y   
 After the 1998 Washington Principles had been adopted by an ad-hoc group of 
attendees to the 1998 Washington Conference, including national representatives and 
                                                     
817 As will be shown below in chp. 4.§1, “just and fair” solutions would be interpreted more and more in the 
sense of physical restitution at the conferences and symposia following the 1998 Washington Conference. 
818 As will be shown below, “just and fair” solutions would be interpreted more and more in the sense of 
physical restitution at the conferences and symposia following the 1998 Washington Conference. 
819 Rascher, A.F.G., 1999, p. 341. 
820 The compromise was suggested by the Swiss delegation. See: Zingeris, E.R., 1999. The preamble reads as 
follows: “In developing a consensus on non-binding principles to assist resolving issues relating to Nazi-
confiscated art, the Conference recognizes that among participating nations there are differing legal systems 
and that countries act within the context of their own laws”. 
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interest groups, the momentum reached institutionalised fora dealing more in general 
with culture and the protection of cultural objects. One of these fora is the Council of 
Europe.821 
On 5th November 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1205 on Spoliated Jewish Cultural Property 
(hereinafter: “Resolution 1205”).822 As far as the general aim of Resolution 1205 is 
concerned, it aims at changing the national legal frameworks applicable to the 
identification and restitution of cultural property. According to Resolution 1205, 
provisions that are obstructing and / or preventing the identification and restitution 
must be abolished or amended.  
With regards to the claimant group, Resolution 1205 explicitly limits itself to “Jewish 
property”, in the sense of cultural objects that have been spoliated from Jews or Jewish 
organisations.823 While the Committee on Culture and Education of the Parliamentary 
Assembly acknowledged that there is “reason to attempt to locate and return all cultural 
property seized by the Nazis” and that “[i]f the Jews were deliberately targeted so too 
were the Gypsies-Roma and homosexuals”824 it nevertheless chose to limit the scope of 
application to Jewish cultural property for two reasons: first, the limitation to Jewish 
cultural property would allow for a clearer focus”.825 Secondly, the restitution of Jewish 
cultural heritage would contribute to the restoration of Jewish culture in Europe826, 
which is an aim that was pursued by the Council of Europe already prior to the (re-) 
emergence of the restitution debate.827  
While Resolution 1205 is more limited in application than the 1998 Washington 
Principles by dealing only with cultural property formerly in Jewish possession, it is 
broader with regard to the circumstances of loss. Rather than being limited to Nazi-
confiscated objects, Resolution 1205 applies to all “spoliated” cultural objects, including 
forced sales.828 Different from the 1998 Washington Principles that called for the 
                                                     
821 The Council had been called upon by the attendees of a the international symposium on "Legal Aspects 
of Restitution of Cultural Values: Theory and Practice" organised by the National Commission of the 
Restitution of Cultural Treasures to Ukraine organized in Kiev in December 1996 to keep on taking efforts 
for further updating international legal norms in the sphere of protection, repatriation, restitution of cultural 
treasures. Cf.: Lust, J., 1996.  
822 Resolution 1205 had been prepared by the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the 
Parliamentary Assembly. On 19 April 1999, hearings were held in Paris. On 24 September 1999, the 
Committee adopted a draft version, which was sent to the full Assembly. See further on the process of 
adoption: O'Keefe, P., 1999a. 
823 Zingeris, E.R., 1999, p. 10 at para. 47.  
824 Ibid., p. 10 at para. 48. 
825 See: Ibid., p. 10 at para. 49. 
826 See: O'Keefe, P., 1999a, p. 314.  
827 See for earlier instruments adopted by the Council of Europe: Resolution 885 (1987) and 
Recommendation 1291 (1996). 
828 See: O'Keefe, P., 1999a, p. 314. One noteworthy aspect about Resolution 1205 is the fact that it declares 
the expropriation and nationalisation of cultural property by communist regimes and in countries occupied 
by the Soviet Union illegal (§ 3). Squared with the effort of the Russian delegates to the Washington 
Conference to get rid of the reference to “spoliated” works of art, which was feared to invoke the illegality 
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identification of confiscated artworks and for just and fair solutions, Resolution 1205 
explicitly calls for physical restitution of spoliated cultural property (§ 8).829 If restitution 
to the (heirs of) former owners is not possible for reason of death, restitution is to be 
made towards the country where the item was located before the war. Paragraph 8 
proved to be controversial as some Jewish organisations would have preferred the 
objects to be given to Israel rather than being returned to the countries of origin.830 The 
emphasis on restitution stricto sensu must be understood in the light of the resolution’s 
general aim to enable “the reconstitution of the place of Jewish culture in Europe itself”. 
This is a motive both wider and narrower at the same time than to “right the wrongs 
which were done many years ago”.831 What paragraph 8 does not take into consideration 
is the fact that restitution to original owners or their heirs would not necessarily lead to 
the reconstitution of Jewish culture in Europe. After all, many Jewish families have 
emigrated to the United States or Israel.832  
Where physical restitution is not possible – in the case that a work has been 
destroyed, damaged or is untraceable, Resolution 1205 calls for financial compensation 
at full market value (§ 12). While Resolution 1205 itself takes to financial compensations 
and recognises the restitution efforts during the post war era (§ 4) it does not explicate 
whether it applies also to cultural property whose original owners or their heirs did 
receive (full) financial compensation during the post-war years.833  
The emphasis on physical restitution as introduced in paragraph 8 is further 
elaborated upon by paragraphs 10, 13 and 15. Together, these paragraphs form the core 
of Resolution 1205. They seek for legislative changes within the Member States to 
facilitate the return of Nazi spoliated art. Paragraph 10 appeals to the national 
                                                                                                                                          
of the Soviet Trophy Art, this aspect deserves to be mentioned here, regardless of the fact that the Soviet 
Trophy Art discussion is not further dealt with. The inclusion of such a reference is astounding given that 
Russia had become a Member of the Council of Europe in 1996. The report prepared by the Committee on 
Culture and Education in the process of the adoption of Resolution 1205 states: “An enormous amount has 
been written on the Holocaust and on the looting of Jewish cultural property by the Nazis. Less has been 
written on the confiscation of Jewish cultural property by the communists”. Zingeris, E.R., 1999, p. 5 at 
para. 11. Also, it is stated: “A special chapter is needed to shed light on the looting and expropriation of 
Jewish cultural heritage by communist regimes and in particular in the Baltic countries under Soviet 
occupation”. O'Keefe, P., 1999a, p. 314. 
829 Para 8 of Resolution 1205 reads: “The Assembly believes that restitution to original owners or their heirs 
(individuals, institutions or communities) or countries is a significant way of enabling the reconstitution of 
the place of Jewish culture in Europe”.  
830 Zingeris, E.R., 1999, para. 38. See for the ensuing discussion of whether Jewish religious object should be 
returned to Europe: Lipman, R., 2006. See in this respect Art. 10 of Military Government Regulation No. 
59 on the Restitution of Identifiable Property discussed in chp. 1§5. According to the provision unclaimed 
estate of persecuted persons were to be granted to Jewish successor organisations rather than falling to the 
German State. 
831 O'Keefe, P., 2001, p. 128. 
832 This has been acknowledged in the report prepared Reporter Zingeris. See: Zingeris, E.R., 1999, p. 9 at 
para. 43.  
833 Para. 4 of Resolution 1205 reads: “Though early moves were made following the end of the second 
world war to find and return this spoliated property, a very considerable amount has not been recovered 
and has remained in private and public hands”.  
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parliaments to “give immediate consideration to ways in which they may be able to 
facilitate the return of spoliated Jewish cultural property”. Given the fact that the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe cannot adopt any legally binding 
instruments, the legal impetus of its recommendations and resolutions depend on 
further action taken by either the Committee of Ministers or the Member States 
themselves.834 Given the fact that the Committee of Ministers did not act upon the 
views of the Parliamentary Assembly as laid down in the nineteen paragraphs of 
Resolution 1205 the national reactions that will be addressed in Chapter 4 (§ 1) are even 
more important.  
The legislative changes to be considered by the national parliaments are listed in 
paragraph 13: the extension or removal of statutory limitation periods, the removal of 
restrictions on alienability, the provision of immunity from action for breach of duty on 
the part of those responsible for collections, the waiving of export controls. By 
suggesting legislative changes of statutory limitation periods, paragraph 13 touches upon 
one of the main problems encountered by (heirs of) former owner claiming their 
cultural objects. Sixty years after the end of the Second World War any post-war 
national legislation has long-since lapsed.835 Often, objects have passed through a 
number of hands, and in many cases these transactions involved different legal 
systems.836 A related problem experienced by (the heirs of) former owners are bona fide 
acquisitions. Resolution 1205 not only seeks for the extension or removal of limitation 
periods, it also indirectly recommends the cancellation of a good faith owner's title: 
Paragraph 15 (sub c) stipulates that consideration should be given to "annulling later 
acquired titles, that is, subsequent to the divestment".837 While the Resolution 1205 puts 
strong emphasis on the suggested changes in national law, it also follows the 
Washington Principles in recommending the “exploration and evolution of out of court 
forms of dispute resolution such as mediation and expert determination” (§16). The call 
for further research was completed by a plea “for the organisation of a European 
conference, further to that held in Washington on the Holocaust-era assets, with special 
referents to the return of cultural property and the relevant legislative reform” (§ 19).  
                                                     
834 See further on the role of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers: Robertson, A.H., 
1961, Benoît-Rohmer, F. / Klebes, H., 2005, p. 48. See on the influence of the Parliamentary Assembly on 
the adoption of treaties: König, H., 2006, p. 378. 
835 An exception under certain conditions is the French decree of 21st April 1945. See: Redmond-Cooper, 
R., 1999. 
836 See for general overview on time limits in art and antiquity claims under English law: Redmond-Cooper, 
R., 2000, and Giovannini, T., 2002, p. 271.  
837 See: Choi, S., 2005, fn 221, O'Keefe, P., 2002, p. 264. See for an international treaty that does introduce 
an absolute obligation to return cultural property that is neither subject to any prescription, nor recedes 
from any rights that might have been acquired by a bona fide purchaser: (First) Protocol for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954. The relevant provision is Art. I 3. The protocol 
is discussed in chp. 1.§1.VI.2.  
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3.  TH E  V I L N IU S  IN T E R N A T I O N A L  FO R U M  ON  HO L O C A U S T-ERA  SP O L I A T E D  
CU L T U R A L  AS S E T S ,  2000  
 The International Forum on Holocaust Era Spoliated Cultural Assets, held in 
Vilnius in 2000, took place under the auspices of the Council of Europe as a follow-up 
to the 1998 Washington Conference, and in response to Resolution 1205 of the Council 
of Europe.  
Paragraph 19 of Resolution 1205 called for the “organisation of a European 
conference, further to that held in Washington on the Holocaust-era assets, with special 
reference to the return of cultural property and the relevant legislative reform”. While 
the proposed legislative reform loomed large in the draft declaration that formed the 
basis for discussion838 the explicit call for legal changes had been dropped in the final 
Vilnius Forum Declaration (hereinafter: “the Vilnius Declaration”). 
Paragraph 1 of the Vilnius Declaration asks Governments to “undertake every 
reasonable effort to achieve the restitution of cultural assets spoliated during the 
Holocaust era to the original owners or their heirs (…) and encourages all participating 
states to take all reasonable measures to implement the Washington Principles (…) as 
well as Resolution 1205 (…)”. The scope ratione materiae of the Vilnius Declaration is 
broad by applying to all “spoliated cultural assets”.839 With regard to the application 
ratione temporis, the Vilnius Declaration remains vague by referring to the “Holocaust 
era”. In particular, the reference does not clearly state whether it also applies to Jewish 
property taken prior to 1939, i.e. from Jewish citizens within the borders of Germany.840 
While the Vilnius Declaration clearly emphasizes Jewish losses, its preamble suggests 
that it also applies to “art and objects owned by others”, where the reference to “others” 
only makes sense when read as referring to non-Jewish owners.  
 If one compares the mandate of the Vilnius Conference – the seeking of legal 
reforms - with the declaration as finally adopted, the conference must be considered a 
failure841: the final declaration does not appeal to countries to change their national legal 
systems but instead “welcomes the process being made by countries to take the 
                                                     
838 The draft resolution appealed to countries to “move towards changes in their legal systems that may be 
necessary to assist in the commitment to restitution and to work towards the creation of a future 
Convention”. See further: O'Keefe, P., 2002, p. 265. 
839 It is, however, unclear why preference has been given to the term “cultural assets” – which has been 
criticised as “ill-named” O'Keefe, P., 2001, p. 128. A reason could be the original name of the 1998 
Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets and the Principles of Nazi-Confiscated Art. 
840 Since the 1950s, when speaking of “the Holocaust”, historians generally refer to the mass murder of the 
Jews by the Nazis during the war-years 1939-1945. Simpson, J.A. / Weiner, E.S.C., 1989, p. 315. Without 
the determiner “the”, the term “Holocaust” denotes the destruction or slaughter on a mass scale. See: The 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2004. See further on the history of the word ‘holocaust’ and the phrase 
‘the Holocaust’: Herman, D., 2008. As to whether “the Holocaust” refers to Jewish victims only, or to all 
groups targeted by the Nazis, or to some subset of those groups is debated. While there exists general 
agreement that other groups, such as homosexuals or Gypsies were targeted by the National Socialist Party 
not all scholars consider them as victims of the Holocaust. Niewyk, D.L., 2000, p. 45. 
841 See, e.g.: O'Keefe, P., 2001, p. 129. 
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measures necessary, within the context of their own laws, to assist in the identification 
and restitution” (§ 6).842 The appeal to make legal changes was abandoned during the 
negotiations as countries attending the forum were not prepared to make any 
commitments to change their national legal systems, nor were they prepared to discuss 
suggestions on legal amendments.843 Furthermore, the final Vilnius Declaration had 
dropped the proposal to prepare an international convention on the legal aspects of the 
return.844 Neither did the delegates want to agree on the foundation of the proposed 
“institutionalised watchdog” that would monitor the implementation of the 1998 
Washington Principles, Resolution 1205, and the Vilnius Declaration throughout 
Europe.845 Instead of the introduction of such a ‘Task Force on Holocaust Era 
Spoliated Assets’ paragraph 5 of the final Vilnius Declaration suggests the organisation 
of periodical international expert meetings to “exchange views and experiences on the 
implementation (…) and to serve to address outstanding issues and problems”.846 The 
last sentence of paragraph 5, which stresses that solutions should be found within the 
existing legal systems rather than changing them is yet another indication of the 
unwillingness to make legal changes within national systems.847  
In sum, the Vilnius Declaration did not introduce new principles to the restitution 
debate nor did it advance the legal reform introduced by Resolution 1205. Rather, as 
expressed by its first paragraph, the relevance of the Vilnius Declaration comes down to 
an encouragement of national Governments to “take all reasonable measures to 
implement the Washington Principles (…) as well as Resolution 1205 (…)” without 
even ironing out any ambiguities of the two earlier instruments. Like the Washington 
Principles and Resolution 1205 the Vilnius Declaration does not explicate whether it 
applies to all objects that had been spoliated or whether it excludes those objects whose 
loss was financially compensated during the post war era. 
4.  RE S O L U T I O N S  A D O P T E D  B Y  TH E  EU R O P E A N  PA RL IA M E N T 
 At European Community level, a total of three resolutions have been adopted by 
the European Parliament that are relevant for the issue of Nazi spoliated cultural 
goods.848 
                                                     
842 O'Keefe, P., 2002, p. 265.  
843 O'Keefe, P., 2001, p. 131. 
844 Ibid., p. 130. 
845 Ibid. 
846 See: Ibid. 
847 The last sentence of para. 5 reads: “[t]hese [periodical international expert, K.L.] meetings should also 
serve to address outstanding issues and problems and develop, for governments to consider, possible 
remedies within the framework of existing national and international structures and instruments” (Emphasis added). 
848 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed 
from the territory of a Member State does not apply with regard to Nazi spoliated art but for very 
exceptional cases where a cultural object in the sense of the Directive that has been unlawfully removed 
after 1 January 1993 happens to be Nazi spoliated art. See further on the Directive in chp. 1.§2.VI.  
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The first resolution was adopted in 1995 and dealt with the return of plundered 
property to Jewish communities.849 The resolution did not deal with spoliated cultural 
objects but with property in general and must be placed in the context of the transition 
of former communist states after the fall of the Iron Curtain. By its self-initiated 
resolution the European Parliament lauded the willingness of a number of Central and 
Eastern European states – which at that point in time had not yet become Member 
States - to return property of Jewish Communities.850 The Parliament furthermore called 
upon Central and Eastern European Countries to adopt appropriate legislation 
regarding the return of plundered property from Jewish communities, as well as for the 
return of other property plundered by the Communists or the Nazis.851  
The second resolution was adopted in 1998 and dealt with the restitution of property 
belonging to Holocaust victims.852 It calls on the Council and Commission 
 
“out of respect for the memory of millions of victims and the most elementary human rights, to bring every 
pressure to bear on the Governments concerned to ensure that these assets are disclosed and returned to 
their original owners or those now entitled to them”. 
 
While the first two resolutions were essentially steps to recognise the historical fact 
of art-looting the third resolution was more future-oriented in suggesting certain action 
to be taken. 
The third resolution was adopted in 2003 endorsing a report drawn up by a Member 
of Parliament and published by the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market 
of the European Parliament.853 It calls upon the European Commission to undertake an 
extensive study by the end of 2004 on matters such as the establishing of a common 
cataloguing system, the developing of common principles regarding access to public or 
private archives, and the identification of common principles on how ownership or title 
is established (para. 4).854 Furthermore, it called for assigning the matter to a working 
                                                     
849 OJ C17, 22.01.1996. Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, 2003. 
850 Paras. 1 and 2 of the Resolution. 
851 Paras. 3 and 4 of the Resolution. 
852 OJ C292, 21.09.1998.  
853 European Parliament Resolution on a legal framework for free movement within the internal market of 
goods whose ownership is likely to be contested (2002.2114(INI)), Official Journal of the European Union 
C 91 E/500, 15/4/2004. Report on a Legal Framework for Free Movement Within the Internal Market of 
Goods Whose Ownership is Likely to be Contested, Commission on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market 
(Rapporteur Willy C.E.H. De Clercq), A5-A408/2003 (Nov. 26, 2003).  
854 Para. 4 reads in full: “The European Parliament calls on the European Commission, with due regard for 
Art. 295 of the EC Treaty, to undertake a study by the end of 2004 on: establishing a common cataloguing 
system, to be used by both public entities and private collections of art to gather together data on the 
situation of spoliated cultural goods and the exact status of existing claims; developing common principles 
regarding access to public or private archives containing information on property identification and location 
and tying together existing databases of information about title to disputed properties; identifying common 
principles on how ownership or title is established, prescription, standards of proof, rights to export or 
import property which has been recovered; exploring possible dispute resolution mechanisms that avoid 
lengthy and uncertain judicial procedures and take into account principles of fairness and equity; the value 
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group of the Council. Member States and applicant States are asked to make all 
necessary efforts to adopt measures to ensure the creation of mechanisms which favour 
the return of the property referred to in this resolution and to be mindful that the return 
of art objects spoliated as part of crime against humanity855 to rightful claimants is a 
matter of general interest for the purposes of Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (para. 5).  
Further to these resolutions, no action was taken within the forum of the European 
Community.856 The European Commission did not comply with the request of the 
Parliament to undertake an extensive study by the end of 2004, nor was a working group 
of the Council assigned to deal with the matter. 
IV .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  O N  T H E  CA S E  O F  NA ZI  S P O L I A T E D  A R T 
 In the previous section an array of declarations, principles and resolutions have 
been discussed that have been adopted by various fora in reaction to the re-emergence of 
the debate on Nazi-spoliated art. While a number of representatives had understood the 
1998 Washington Principles as final act of the renewed interest for Nazi spoliated art, 
they proved to be only the first in a series of instruments adopted at the end of the 
1990s and during the first decade of the new millennium.857 
The chronological analysis of the various instruments revealed that none of the 
instruments introduces new legal rights for the original owners or their heirs for 
thereturn of works of art that have been spoliated by the Nazis. The principles, 
resolutions and declarations discussed above do not qualify as international treaties.858 
While both treaties and the instruments at hand are codified in writing and came into 
existence due to the corresponding wills of the parties involved, it is the intention of the 
authors of the specific document that determines whether or not a document 
constitutes binding law.859 The crucial difference lies in the will to be bound by the 
agreement (pacta sunt servanda) that is absent with regard to the instruments at hand.860 
                                                                                                                                          
of creating a cross-border coordination administrative authority to deal with disputes on title of cultural 
goods”. 
855 Cf.: fn. 404 for a comment on the question whether the looting of art works qualifies as crime against 
humanity.  
856 Cf.: O'Keefe, P., 2002, p. 265. 
857 Cf.: Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 139. In fact, the process has not yet been concluded. Within 
UNESCO, an initiative was taken in 1996 to adopt a ‘Declaration of Principles relating to Cultural Objects 
displaced in connection with the Second World War’. When this study was concluded in summer 2009 the 
draft principles had not yet been adopted. See further on the praparatory steps and instruments: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=32665&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 24 June 2009). At the 
earliest, the declaration may be adopted by General Conference at its 35th session, which is scheduled for 
Tuesday 6 to Friday 23 October 2009. 
858 Selle, C.v. / Szchunke, U., 2006. See Art. 2 of the Vienna Convention for a definition of treaty. 
859 See: Ibid., p. 386. 
860 Aust, A., 2005, p. 12. 
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The will to be bound is absent with regard to the instruments discussed above. 
Consequently, none of the instruments create rights that exist directly under 
international law, nor do they oblige states to grant municipal rights. This does not 
mean, however, that the instruments discussed constitute merely “legal surrealism”.861 
At the end of this chapter, after having addressed the case of human remains, we will 
reflect upon the relevance of these instruments as soft law (2.§3.I). Furthermore, we will 
discuss the solutions to be implemented at the national level as proposed by the 
instruments (2.§3.II).  
Before turning to the case of human remains we need to summarise our findings 
with regard to the second focus of the present analysis, i.e. the question of how the 
instruments dealt with possible financial compensation payments received by the 
original owners or their heirs during the direct post-war era. According to our analysis 
the instruments put great emphasis on physical restitution. While physical restitution 
was considered as one alternative next to other “just and fair” solutions by the drafters 
of the Washington Principles subsequent instruments explicitly request physical 
restitution. None of the instruments address or explicitly factor in the possibility that the 
claimants of a specific work might have received financial compensation during the post 
war years. In fact, only Resolution 1205 makes explicit mentioning of financial 
compensations (§ 12) as an alternative where the return of an object is impossible. It 
does not, however, explicate whether it applies also to cultural property whose original 
owners or their heirs did receive (full) financial compensation during the post-war 
years.862 Whether this absence in reflection upon the relevance of past financial 
compensation payments must be accorded to unawareness of the post-war restitution 
regime or whether it must be interpreted as signifying the absolute irrelevance of 
financial compensation received in the past cannot be established. However, the absence 
of any discussion on this point must be noted as lamentable and not contributing to the 
transparency of the debate. While the outcome of such discussion might still be that 
physical restitution is the only just and fair solution given the atrocities of the Nazi-era, 
in spite of any financial compensations received, the discussion is nevertheless worth 
having. It will be interesting to see how this is dealt with at the national level as will be 
scrutinised in Chapter 4.§1.  
§2. THE CAS E  OF  HUM AN  REMAIN S   
 Compared with the case of Nazi spoliated art the developments that led to the 
emergence of international claims for the return of human remains from Western public 
collections are more diffuse in time and location. As a consequence, the outlining of the 
                                                     
861 Frigo, M., 2004, p. 70; Alda, K., 2006; Selle, C.v. / Szchunke, U., 2006, p. 383. 
862 Para 4. of Resolution 1205 reads: “Though early moves were made following the end of the second 
world war to find and return this spoliated property, a very considerable amount has not been recovered 
and has remained in private and public hands”.  
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developments is more extended and simplified at the same time. Before looking at the 
developments as they started at intra-national level in the United States and other 
formerly colonised countries from the 1960s onward and their spill-over to Western 
Collections in the 1990s we will reflect upon how human remains have become 
collection items in the first place. Such a background on the history of collecting of 
human remains is necessary to understand the complexities underlying claims for the 
return or repatriation of human remains.  
I .  TH E  H I S TO R Y  O F  C O L L E C T I N G  H U M A N  R E MA I N S   
 The earliest context in which human remains have been collected in Western 
countries was a religious one and dates back to the 4th century AD.863 Within the Roman 
Catholic Church, (parts) of a saint’s body or other personal objects of someone of 
religious significance were preserved and collected. The devotion of these relics was 
based on the belief that the holy person is present in the relics, as is “God’s grace and 
heavenly virtue”.864 From the early Medieval Ages onwards bishops and rulers dedicated 
themselves to the collection of relics.865 The veneration of relics flourished until the end 
of the Middle Ages despite criticism by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)866.867 
During the Renaissance (14th-16th centuries), a secular practice of collecting human 
remains emerged.868 Princes and noblemen started to collect rare and exotic objects both 
of natural origin (naturalia) and products that were the result of human labour 
(artificialia).869 The collected objects were kept in so called cabinets of curiosities (or 
“Wunderkammern” or “Kunstkammern”).870 With the discovery of the “New World” 
and the opening up of contacts with Africa, South-East Asia and the Far East at the end 
of the 15th century, the geographical diversity of the collections significantly increased as 
the objects were often collected during exploring expeditions and trading voyages.871 
                                                     
863 Walker, P.L., 2000, p. 9.The earliest sources cited to support the efficacy of relics date back to the second 
century. See e.g.: the Book of the two Kings 13:20-21, and the records on the veneration of Polycarp's relics 
in the Martyrdom of Polycarp that was written 150-160 AD. 
864 Angenendt, A., 1994, pp. 155-156.  
865 Ibid., p. 159.  
866 See: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica III Suppl., qu.78,3, p. 268-272. Aquinas denied any kind of 
force (aliqua vis) to remain in the elements that remain of the dead body.  
867 Angenendt, A., 1994, p. 158. Whether the religious display of bodies as relics might help to explain 
Western practise of displaying human remains cannot be verified. Cf.: Bennett, B., 2002, p. 11. 
868 Pearce, S.M., 1995, p. 109; Lustig, A.J., 2003, p. 117.  
869 See: Boström, H.-O., 2001, pp. 125-128; Olmi, G., 2001, pp. 14-15; Raby, J., 2001, p. 347; Scheicher, E., 
2001, pp. 41-43.  
870 Pomian, K., 1990, p. 48; Pearce, S.M., 1995, p. 109; Impey, O. / MacGregor, A., 2001, p. XVI & XIX; 
Mauriès, P., 2002, p. 23.  
871 Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003, p. 2. 
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Amongst these objects were human remains, such as Toi Moko’s (tattooed and 
preserved heads of Māori or Moriori origin).872  
In the beginning, no clear differentiation between the objects exhibited was made. 
Rather, the arrangement reflected personal preferences of the collector. The 
administration of the collections became more and more standardized since the early 
18th century.873 From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, achievements 
of the Scientific Revolution were reflected in new methodologies of collecting: 
collections were ordered along scientific lines and the labelling was according to the 
newly emerging scientific disciplines.874  
From the dawn of the field of anthropology in the mid-19th century human remains 
have been the subject of anthropological studies and it was commonplace for bones and 
skeletons of indigenous people to be collected for scientific purposes.875 One of 
scientific disciplines that significantly contributed to the creation of (museum) 
collections of human remains was physical anthropology.876 Physical anthropology, 
which was based on the assumption that race was a major determinant of human 
behaviour, flourished in the climate of colonial interaction despite having its roots in the 
anatomical dissecting rooms rather than in the encounter with foreign peoples.877 While 
physical anthropologists worked mainly in situ during expeditions, the link of cultural 
anthropology with evolutionist anthropology resulted in the creation of (museum) 
collections.878 Consequently, there exists a coincidence between the zenith of European 
dominion over the rest of the world and the era in which the fundaments of current 
public collections have been laid.879 Museum collections of artefacts and human remains 
are, at least to some extent, enmeshed in the history of imperialism.880 
After World War II, physical anthropology was no longer practised as a scientific 
discipline in its own right. To the contrary, it came to be regarded as bogus science for 
                                                     
872 Cf.: Qureshi, S., 2004, p. 234. The volume of this “vivid trade in dead body parts” is reflected by the fact 
that the trade in preserved heads was banned in 1831 by the Governor of New South Wales. Cf.: 
Awekotuku, N.T., 2004, p. 84. See further below the case studies on a Toi Moko in the collection of the 
Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde in Leiden (chp. 4.§2.I.2), respectively in the collection of the municipal 
museum in Rouen (chp. 4.§2.III.2).  
873 Lustig, A.J., 2003, p. 117. 
874 Ibid., p. 118. 
875 Davies, P., 2004, p. 82. Davies reports the existence of official instructions on the best way to get 
skeletons, e.g. by the Australian Museum. Cf.: Turnbull, P., 1991. Similar instructions had been issued to the 
U.S. Army by a Surgeon-General in 1862 to acquire Native remains for study by collecting bones and crania 
form graves and following military suppression. Cf.: Zimmerman, L., 1997, p. 94; Simpson, M.G., 2001, p. 
175; Thornton, R., 2002, pp. 17-18. See in particular on the situation in South Africa: Legassick, M. / 
Rassool, C., 2000. 
876 Duuren, D.v., et al., 2007, pp. 15-16.  
877 Ibid., pp. 13 & 15-16. 
878 See on the discussion whether anthropologists implicitly advanced the interests of colonial production 
and hegemony: Burton, J.W., 1992. 
879 Peers, L. / Brown, A.K., 2003, p. 1. 
880 See for a lucid reflection upon the differences between “colonialism” and “imperialism”: Kohn, M., 
2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/colonialism/, last visited 25 November 2007. 
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its core concept of race had been discredited.881 Furthermore, scientists were no longer 
interested in physical characteristics in search of the key to understanding the origin of 
mankind but took to molecular biology.882 As a result, the original motivation for the 
inclusion of a great number of human remains in public collection was lost. The remains 
did not, however, loose their relevance for science. With the emergence of 
anthropobiology, which is concerned with human evolution, variation and growth, the 
earlier orientation of physical anthropology was redirected at “a complex of disciplines 
dealing with the origins of man and his physical and biosocial evolution; in other words, 
a synthetic approach to the study of man as a zoological species”.883 Genetics (DNA), 
biochemistry, ecology and ethnology moved into the centre of attention and changed 
the research on and therewith the purpose of human remains in public collections. 
Other scientific disciplines that resulted in the collecting of human remains were and 
still are archaeology and medicine. Archaeologists study the material remains of past 
human life and activities, which consists both of everything made by human beings as 
well as the human remains themselves.884 Skeletal remains offer insight into human 
morphological variation in time and between groups.885 The data generated from the 
studying of human remains can provide information over population movement, 
migration, as well as specific genetic compositions of individual populations.886 Research 
of dentition and skeletal remains have contributed to the identification of prehistoric 
diets and health patterns.887  
With regard to medical science, the examination of skeletons can provide insight into 
pathological conditions therewith contributing to the interpretation of human responses 
to various diseases.888 The research findings are not limited to insights into the health 
and conduct of life of ancient peoples but also provide knowledge on trends affecting 
modern cultures.889 The identification of medical cures for diseases profits from the 
growing possibilities of DNA analyses of human remains.890 With regard to research and 
the relevance and (im-) possibilities of DNA analysis carried out on human remains 
biomedics stress the progress that was made in the last twenty years in the feasibility and 
use of DNA research and their hopes in future developments of the techniques and its 
                                                     
881 Duuren, D.v., et al., 2007, p. 16. See for a discussion whether anthropologists implicitly advanced the 
interests of colonial production and hegemony: Burton, J.W., 1992. 
882 Lubina, K.R.M., 2007, p. 84.  
883 Roede, M.J., 2002, p. 1037; Duuren, D.v., et al., 2007, p. 17. 
884 Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 550. 
885 Afrasiabi, P.R., 1997, p. 808; Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 550; Turner, C.G.I., 1986. 
886 Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 551 with further references in fn. 26; Steckel, R., et al., 2006.  
887 Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 551 with further references in fn. 28. 
888 Ibid. 
889 Afrasiabi, P.R., 1997, p. 808; Simpson, M.G., 2001, pp. 178-179; Bekvalac, J., et al., 2006. 
890 Cf.: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 552. See for the concrete application with regard to like, e.g. thalassemia: 
Afrasiabi, P.R., 1997, p. 821. Thalassemia is described as a “group of anemias caused by a variety of genetic 
mutations at different sites of the gene coding for the structure of the globulin chains of hemoglobin”. See 
further: Aufderheide, A.C. / Rodriguez-Martin, C., 1998, p. 347. 
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application.891 Currently, the problem of the contamination of body samples of any age 
still significantly limits scientific research. Further to (bio-) medical application human 
remains find forensic application in contributing to the developments of techniques 
used or the identification of war dead, victims of mass disasters and of crimes.892 
Nowadays, the conservation of human organs and other tissues for medical purposes 
is subject to the principle of informed consent.893 Informed consent refers to legal rules 
that amongst others promote patients rights of self-determination regarding their 
treatment.894 In former days, however, human organs and tissue were taken without 
such informed consent. This was not only the case in the obtaining of human material 
but is true for most cases in which human remains have been acquired in the past. While 
cultural objects more in general were obtained by a wide range of methods of 
acquisition such as gift, genuine trade, deception, conquest, confiscations895 it can be 
assumed that human remains except for some worked remains (e.g. a flute made of a 
human femur) were not freely given away. In particular with regard to the remains 
collected during the era of the European dominion over the rest of the world it can be 
concluded that not only was consent to collect human remains absent – but was the 
collecting in clear contravention of local laws, customs and belief systems.896 A case that 
illustrates this point is the case of “El Negro”.897  
                                                     
891 Lubina, K.R.M., 2007, pp. 87-88. Discussion recorded under MZ000027.WAV. 
892 Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 552 with further references in fn. 32-39.  
893 Cf.: Gevers, J.K.M., 1990, p. 14; Bostyn, S., J.R., 1998, p. 291; Price, D., 2005. See for Dutch legislation: 
Wet op de orgaandonatie (Organ Donation Act, 24/05/1996, Stb. 370) but see e.g. Art. 7:467 Dutch Civil 
Code (BW) on the Dutch Medical Treatment Contract that allows for anonymous bodily material separated 
from the human body to be used for medical statistical or other medical research provided the patient did 
not expressly withhold his/her consent for such use. See for UK legislation: The Human Tissue Act 2004. 
See further on the Act in chp. 4.§2.II.2. The principle of informed consent also applies to Gunther van 
Hagens travelling exhibition ‘Body Worlds’, which has been a topic of heated discussion for years (Hagens, 
G.v., 1999a, pp. 74-75). See further for the views of supportive and dissenting lawyers, theologians, 
philosophers, medics e.g.: Hagens, G.v., 1999b; Wetz, F.J. / Tag, B., 2001.  
894 See further on informed consent, e.g.: Berg, J.W., et al., 2001. 
895 Davies, P., 2004, p. 81. 
896 While there exists great diversity amongst societies with regard to moral ideas such as whose duty it is to 
support children, the aged, or the poor, the forms of sexual relationship permitted, the status of women, the 
right to property and what constitutes theft, the respect for the dead is shared to a great extend. See, e.g.: 
Westermarck, E., 1926, pp. 513-552. See also the work of Sir James G. Frazer who, after a lifetime of 
investigation of the origin of religious structure concluded that awe toward the dead was probably the most 
powerful force in forming primitive systems for grappling with the supernatural: Frazer, J.G., 1890. Cf.: 
Trope, J., F. / Echo-Hawk, W., R., 2000, pp. 124-125. 
897 The case of “El Negro” concerned the remains of a Bechuana person that had been on display in the 
Natural History Museum of Banyoles in Catalonia, Spain since 1916. The initiative to take the remains that 
were displayed under the cognomen of “El Negro” off display and to return them to their home land 
started in 1991 by a Spanish citizen of Haitian origin who pressed the case in the months preceding the 
Spanish hosting of the Olympic Games. The controversy about El Negro lasted for almost ten years and in 
fact did not end with the return of the remains in October 2000 to the Republic of Botswana, which had 
been requested by the Organisation of African Unity to receive and lay to rest the body of El Negro. 
According to the literature, the final chapter of the repatriation of El Negro was disturbed by discussions on 
the true home grounds of the remains (at last moment it appeared that not nowadays Botwsana but South 
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The remains which became known in the 1990s as “El Negro” had been removed 
from their grave near the Vaal River in what is now South Africa between 1829 and 
1831 within days from their burial by the French brothers Verreaux. The brothers 
subsequently performed taxidermic work on the body, exhibited and sold it.898 Other 
evidence of the acquisition of material that was unethical not only by current standards 
is available from the records of those who removed the remains in the first place. E.g. 
the notes of Ales Hrdlicka (1869-1943), a physical anthropologist whose research 
focused on reconstructing the origins and population histories of Native American 
populations make mention of a conflict he had with a woman whose husband’s bones 
had had just removed from his grave and of the collecting of bones from sites he had to 
leave by a difficult route “to avoid notice”.899 
The practice of removing indigenous remains from their graves was not confined to 
the colonial era but continued until recently. One commentator remarked in 1990 that 
“[d]esecrate a white grave and you get jail. Desecrate an Indian grave and you get a 
PhD”.900 
I I .  HU M A N  R E MA IN S :  G EN E S I S  O F  T H E  D E B A T E  O N  T H E  R E T U R N  O F  H U M A N  R E M A I N S  
 Against the circumstances of acquisition outlined above it might not surprise that 
the debate on the repatriation of human remains emerged in the greater context of the 
struggle for indigenous rights in the post-colonial era following World War II. In the 
following we will outline the unfolding of the debate, which started with intra-national 
claims concerning newly disinterred human remains, shifted to intra-national claims 
human remains from public collections in former colonies before becoming truly 
international in character in the sense of affecting human remains in public collections 
worldwide, especially in Western public collections 
                                                                                                                                          
Africa comprised El Negro’s geographical roots) and the manner in which the remains had been returned 
by Spain, which was felt to be appropriate for a museum asset being donated to Botswana but not for the 
remains of a human being. Finally, there was discussion on the location of the grave in a public park rather 
than in proper burial grounds. See on the details of the case: Parsons, N., 2000; Bennett, B., 2002, p. 9; 
Parsons, N. / Sebobye, A., Kelo, 2002; Segobye, A., 2002, p. 14.  
898 Bennett, B., 2002, p. 9; Parsons, N. / Sebobye, A., Kelo, 2002, p. 245; Segobye, A., 2002, p. 14. 
899 Cf.: Pullar, G.L., 1994, pp. 22-23; Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, para. 66. See for 
bibliographical information:  
http://www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/information/biography/fghij/hrdlicka_ales.html (Last visited 4.11.2008). 
See also: Paczensky, G.v. / Ganslmayr, H., 1984, chp. 8 ‘Leichen fürs Museum’. 
900 Remark by Echo-Hawk, Senior Staff Attorney for the Native American Rights Fund cited in: Arnold, 
D., 2 April 1990, p. 28.  
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1.  IN T RA-N A T IO N A L  CL A I M S  R E G A R D IN G  N EW L Y  D I S I N T E RR E D  H U M A N  R E M A IN S  
 The challenging of the treatment of indigenous human remains started in former 
(settler) colonies901 from the 1970s /1980s onwards in the context of civil rights 
movements and the struggle of indigenous peoples for self-determination.902 In the 
beginning, the focus lay on the treatment of recently disinterred remains, which received 
little respect and were treated different from non-indigenous remains.903 Given the 
relevance of the principle of sovereignty in international law, which is understood as the 
complete and undisturbed dominion over a territorial space904, it must not surprise that 
the disinterment of human remains came to play a significant role in the quest of 
indigenous peoples for self-determination.  
In response to the campaigns of indigenous peoples various jurisdictions, especially 
in the United States, adopted legislation dealing with (the reburial of) recently excavated 
indigenous human remains.905 A number of laws may be mentioned here as 
representative examples: In 1980 the U.S. State Maine introduced laws that required all 
Indian skeletons disinterred after 1973 to be returned to the appropriate Indian tribes 
for reburial.906 In the Canadian province Saskatchewan the Heritage Property Act 
requires he return of Amerindian skeletal material, excavated or naturally exposed, to the 
Indian Band Council.907 In Australia, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act (hereinafter: ATSIHPA) was adopted in 1984 and provide for the 
protection from injury or desecration of areas and objects, including human remains in 
accordance with Aboriginal tradition.908 In South Africa, the only legislation dealing 
directly with human remains until 1999 was the 1969 National Monuments Act 
                                                     
901 Different types of colonies can be distinguished, reflecting different colonial policies. Settler colonies 
arose from the emigration of peoples from a metropolis, or mother country, and involved displacement of 
the indigenous peoples to their permanent detriment. Examples of settler states that are relevant in the 
context of this study are the United States of America and New Zealand. Settler colonies may be contrasted 
with dependencies, where the colonizers did not arrive as part of a mass emigration, but rather as 
administrators over existing sizeable native populations, exercising control by use or threat of force. 
Examples in this category are the Dutch East Indies. Cf.: Ashcroft, B., et al., 2003. 
902 Cf.: Brown, M.F., 2003, p. IX; Seidemann, R.M., 2003, p. 151; Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 547; Bristow, 
M., 2008, p. 211. 
903 The following situations can be mentioned as examples of contexts in which human remains may be 
disinterred: the building of roads, bridges, railways, housing and commercial complexes, in the development 
of oil or mineral mining or in archaeological excavations. Cf.: Hubert, J., 1992, p. 106. See further below 
with regard to archaeological excavations the Vermillion Accord in chp.2.§2.IV.1 
904 Cf.: Francioni, F., 2004, p. 1220. 
905 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, para. 389. 
906 Indians and Tribes, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.tit.22 s.4720 (1980). Cf.: Ibid. See further on state legislation 
passed in the United States on the protection for unmarked graves and statutes foreseeing in the reburial of 
disinterred human remains: Price III, H.M., 1988; Price III, H.M., 1991; Trope, J., F. / Echo-Hawk, W., R., 
2000, pp. 134-136. 
907 Heritage Property Act Ch. H.-2.2 (1984). Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, para. 389. 
908 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (ATSIHPA), No. 79, 1984, s 4. See further 
on ATSIHPA: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, pp. 570-573. 
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(NMA).909 The protection provided for in the NMA applied to graves of individuals of 
lived before 1652; the date at which European settlers arrived. On top of that, 
protection was granted to graves of people who died in wars until 1914, and to 
gravestones older than fifty years.910 In 1999, the National Heritage Resources Act 
(NHRA) was passed.911 Under NHRA, all graves that are older than 60 years and are not 
in a formal cemetery (such as ancestral graves in rural areas) will be protected. Any 
action disturbing the graves requires a permit which is depending on consultation and 
agreement with communities with a vested interest in the graves.912 For New Zealand, 
the relevant law protecting human remains of Māori affiliation is the 1993 Historic 
Places Act.913 The main aim of the act is to ‘promote the identification, protection, 
preservation, and conservation of the historical and cultural heritage of New Zealand’.914 
In addition to archaeological sites, historic places and historic areas the 1993 Historic 
Places Act protects wāhi tapu (‘sites sacred to Māori’) and wāhi tapu areas, which include 
burial places.915 
Further to activities by state and federal legislators, the indigenous movement also 
resulted in the adoption of ethical standards by professional bodies. With archaeology 
being one of the main disciplines actively seeking the disinterment of human remains 
the World Archaeological Congress felt the need to take a stand about archaeological 
ethics and the treatment of the dead.916 In 1989, the World Archaeological Congress 
adopted the ‘Vermillion Accord on Human Remains’917 as the first international 
expression of ethical standards with regard to the excavation of human remains.918 The 
Vermillion Accord emphasizes the need to respect mortal remains and the wishes of the 
local communities during and after archaeological excavations (paras. 1-3 and 5). At the 
same time, the Vermillion Accord recognises the need for mutual respect and 
cooperation between indigenous peoples and archaeologists and stresses the need to 
respect scientific research (para. 4).919 
                                                     
909 Act 28 of 1969. Cf.: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, pp. 562-562. 
910 These provisions lead to the bizarre situation that post-1952 graves of persons that had not died in wars, 
were left without any protection but for the gravestone (once older than fifty years).  
911 Act 25 of 1999, available at http://www.sahra.org.za.-intor.htm. 
912 The National Monuments Council, . See further: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, pp. 562-567. 
913 Historic Places Act 1993 No 38. 
914 See the Preamble (a) of the act.  
915 Cf.: Tupara, N., 2000.  
916 Cf.: Doumas, C., 1990. 
917 The Vermillion Accord on Human Remains, adopted by the South Dakota WAC Inter-Congress in 
1989. 
918 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 176.  
919 See further on the Vermillion Accord: Hubert, J., 1992, pp. 110-113 and below in chp. 2.§2.IV.1. 
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2.  IN T RA-N A T I O N A L  CL A I M S  C O N C E R N IN G  H UM A N  R E MA I N S  I N  P U BL I C  CO L L E C T I O N S  
I N  T H E  F O R M ER  C O L O N I E S  
 In the wake of campaigns focusing on recently disinterred remains and the 
introduction of burial protection laws, awareness shifted to the existence and exhibition 
of human remains such as skulls, mummified bodies and skeletons in public (museum) 
collections. At first, the campaigns sought to make an end to the displaying of human 
remains.920 After a “growing trend to remove human remains form museum displays”921, 
attention shifted to the reburial of the remains and therewith to the disposal of human 
remains from public collections.922 This question was by far more crucial for institutions 
and researchers than the removal of the remains from display.923  
The responses by different Governments to the campaigns of local indigenous 
peoples varied from the adoption of laws compelling return to official policies 
suggesting the return of human remains to the granting of mandates to specific 
institutions pursuing repatriation. In the following we will shortly review the laws and 
policies introduced in the United States, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia.924 
Whereas the legislation adopted in the United States will be discussed for constituting 
the most concise and clearest stand with regard to the treatment of curated human 
remains925 and was important in stimulating the debate well beyond the US borders; the 
analysis of the latter three jurisdictions is interesting in that most of the international 
requests dealt with in next Chapter 4 (§2) seek the return of human remains to Australia, 
South Africa and New Zealand.926  
                                                     
920 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 224, para. 388. 
921 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P., 1984, p. 141, para. 454; Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 224, para. 388. 
Prott and O’Keefe, e.g. report of a law adopted in the U.S. State Oregon according to which it was an 
offence to “[p]ublicly display or exhibit any native Indian human remains” (Protection of Indian Graves, 
Or. Rev. Stat. s.97.745(2)(b)(1981)).  
922 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P., 1984, paras. 448-545. See for an account of the situation in New Zealand: 
Watt, R., J., 1989; Watt, R., J., 1995. The emphasis of the claims is also mirrored by the evolution of the 
Code of Ethics for Museums developed by the International Council of Museums (ICOM). In its original 
version as adopted in 1986, the ICOM Code did not touch upon the return of human remains. It did 
however provide some guidance on the acquisition, researching and display of human remains. In the 
amended 2001 version of the Code greater emphasis is put on the interests and beliefs of source 
communities with regard to the treatment of human remains. The 2004 version introduced a paragraph 
dealing explicitly with request for removal of human remains from public display, respectively their return. 
See further on the ICOM Code below in chp. 2.§2.IV.3. 
923 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 224, para. 388.  
924 While the laws or policies dealing with the return of human remains are more broad than focusing solely 
on this aspect we will only discuss the relevant portions of the instruments.  
925 Cf.: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 562. 
926 Another country that witnessed intra-national claims for the return of human remains is Canada. We will 
not further discuss Canada as there is no national law governing human remains in Canada. Cf.: McAleese, 
K., 1998, p. 46. It would exceed the scope of this chapter to undertake a province-by-province analysis of 
the legislation in place. See further on the return of human remains within Canada: Bell, C., 1992/1993; 
Baikie, G., 1993; Ferris, N. / Leclair, L., 1998. 
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a) United States and its landmark legislation NAGPRA 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (hereinafter: 
“NAGPRA”)927 was passed by the United States Congress in 1990.928 The federal act, 
which has repeatedly been characterised as “landmark legislation”929 serves three 
purposes. First, it introduces legally enforceable procedures that allow Indian tribes to 
recover human remains and funerary objects from federally funded museums.930 
Secondly, NAGPRA criminalises the trafficking of Indian human remains and cultural 
items.931 Thirdly, it provides for notification and consultation procedures for excavation 
of Native American human remains and cultural objects on federal and tribal lands.932 It 
is the first portion of the Act on the repatriation of human remains from federal 
agencies and museums that is relevant in the present context.933  
In order to facilitate the emergence of claims NAGPRA requires federal agencies934 
and museums935 to adopt a proactive attitude towards repatriation. Not only does it 
require federal agencies and museums to compile and publish inventories of their 
collections; they also have to provide information to potential claimants who might be 
interested in making a claim.936  
For the situation that a claim is made for the return of human remains, as well as 
funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of relevance to the cultural patrimony, 
                                                     
927 The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 25 U.S.C.3001 - 13 (1994).  
928 See for an engaging overview of the history that made NAGPRA necessary: Thomas, D.H., 2000. 
NAGRPA was, however, not the first legislative statement in the US on the return of human remains from 
museum collections. Prior to the enactment of NAGPRA the National Museum of the American Indian 
Act (NMAIA), 20 U.S.C. 80(q) provided for the repatriation of the Smithsonian Institution’s collection. Cf.: 
Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 546, fn. 542. See further on NMAIA: Trope, J., F. / Echo-Hawk, W., R., 2000, 
pp. 137-138. 
929 E.g. Trope, J., F. / Echo-Hawk, W., R., 2000, p. 123; Brown, M.F. / Bruchac, M.M., 2006, p. 194. 
930 25 U.S.C. 3005 (2004).  
931 25 U.S.C. 1170 (2004). 
932 25 U.S.C. 3002(d) 2004. 
933 See further on the third portion, the notification and consultation procedures for intentional and 
inadvertent excavations, e.g.: Lannan, R., W., 1998, pp. 397-400; Riley, A.R., 2002, part III.  
934 See 25 U.S.C. 3001(4) for the definition of federal agency as “any department, agency, or instrumentality 
of the United States. Such term does not include the Smithsonian Institute”.  
935 See 25 U.S.C. 3001(8) for the definition of museum as “any institution or State or local government 
agency (including any institution of higher learning) that receives Federal funds and has possession of, or 
control over, Native American cultural items. Such term does not include the Smithsonian Institution or 
any other Federal agency”. 
936 See 25 U.S.C. 3003 on the compilation of inventories for human remains and associated funerary 
objects. To the extent possible, the inventory must include information of the geographical and cultural 
affiliation. Section 5, which is dedicated to the compilation of inventories of human remains and associated 
funerary objects, is far more stringent in its requirements than section 6 which provides for written 
summaries of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony. The main difference is 
the quality of information demanded (itemized inventory vs summary of the scope of the collections). The 
difference is mirrored in the time-period available to fulfill the tasks; five years for the inventories 
concerning human remains an associated funerary objects, whereas the unassociated and sacred objects and 
the cultural patrimony as part of a museum or Federal agency collection must be summarized within only 
three years.  
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NAGPRA prescribes the process for the assessment of the claim.937 Where human 
remains or associated objects are requested by a lineal descendant, the federal agencies 
and museum are legally required to repatriate the requested object. Where the claimant 
is not a lineal descendant, the Native American group must be able to show a cultural 
affiliation with the human remains claimed. Cultural affiliation is defined in section 2(1) 
as “a relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonable traced historically or 
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and 
an identifiable earlier group”.938 The existence of a cultural affiliation can either be 
asserted on the grounds of the inventories of the collections or where the inventories do 
not allow for such proof “by a preponderance of the evidence based on geographical, 
kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral tradition, 
historical, or other relevant information or expert opinion”.939 Where cultural affiliation 
with human remains has been established the remains must be repatriated expeditiously. 
That the concept of cultural affiliation can give rise to significant discussion is well-
illustrated by the case Bonnichsen v. U.S.940, better known as the “Kennewick Man” 
case. While the case is strictly speaking not a case about the return of human remains 
from a public collection as it concerned newly discovered remains and therewith was 
judged against the provisions of NAGPRA dealing with notification and consultation 
procedures for excavation of Native American human remains and cultural objects on 
federal and tribal lands, the case is nevertheless relevant in the present context for 
highlighting the difficulties and stakes involved in repatriation cases of human remains: 
first, it pinpoints the difficulties in establishing the degree of relationship required 
between human remains and a claiming party. Secondly, the case illustrates that scientific 
research is not a universally shared value and can clash with beliefs and knowledge 
systems. 
Bonnichsen v. U.S 
In 1996 a human skull and scattered bones were discovered near Kennewick in the 
U.S. State Washington. The area where the remains were found was Federal lands. 
While initial research by local anthropologists concluded that the remains were of an 
early European settler or trapper further examination of the remains revealed 
characteristics inconsistent with those of a European settler, yet also inconsistent with 
any Native American Indian remains previously documented in the region. Subsequent 
radiocarbon analysis indicated that the remains were between 8340 and 9200 years old 
making them “one of the most complete early Holocene human skeletons ever 
                                                     
937 See 25 U.S.C. 3001(3) which subsumes all terms (human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects and 
objects of relevance to the cultural patrimony) under the definition of “cultural item”. Note that NAGPRA 
does not provide for a separate definition of human remains.  
938 25 U.S.C.3001 (2) (2004).  
939 25 U.S.C.3005 (a)(4) (2004). 
940 Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997). 
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recovered in the Western Hemisphere”.941 Due to the age and feature of the remains 
many scientists believed that the remains could shed considerable light on questions 
such as the origins of humanity in the Americas.942  
In the course of arrangements made to transport the remains to the Smithsonian 
Institute for scientific research local Indian tribes came forward and objected to the 
removal and scientific study on religious grounds. According to the Indian tribes, the 
spirits of the remains remain at unrest until returned to the ground. The argument of the 
scientists pointing to relevance of the remains for the early history of the people in the 
Americas was rejected with reference to the oral histories of the tribes according to 
which their ancestors have populated the American continent since the beginning of 
time. Five Indian groups joined forces and claimed on the basis of NAGPRA for the 
immediate burial of the remains without further testing at a secret location.943 
In response to the Indian groups’ claim, the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(the Corps), which is responsible for the management of the land, prevented the 
transport of the remains to the Smithsonian, ordered the halt to DNA testing and 
published a “Notice of Intent to Repatriate Human Remains” in the local newspaper. A 
number of scientists objected to the Corps’ decision to return the remains.944 When the 
Corps did not respond to the objections and requests to allow for scientific study of the 
remains, and evidenced its intent to repatriate the remains, the group of scientists 
commenced litigation in the District Court of Oregon. Plaintiffs sought to prevent the 
transfer of the remains to the Indian Tribes for burial and to secure permission to study 
the remains.945  
In court the case centred on the question of the cultural affiliation between the 
remains and the Indian tribes. The Oregon District Court held that the age and lack of 
information as to the era from which the remains originated made it impossible to say 
whether the remains were related to any identifiable indigenous group or culture in the 
United States or whether there was a shared group identity between his group and the 
living indigenous peoples on the basis of oral histories passed down through 
generations. Consequently, the Oregon District Court barred the transfer of the skeleton 
                                                     
941 Taylor, R.E., 2001. 
942 The summary of the facts is based on: Jelderks, J., 2002, I. Background, A Pre-Litigation Events. See 
further on the theories that exist on the origins of people in North America: Lannan, R., W., 1998, pp. 383-
388. For an overview of the issues surrounding the fate of Kennewick Man, see Kelly, M., 1999; Tsosie, R., 
1999. 
943 See, e.g.: Fisher, D., 2000.  
944 Plaintiff scientists included Robson Bonnichsen (Texas A&M), C. Loring Brace (University of 
Michigan), George W. Gill (University of Wyoming), C. Vance Haynes, Jr. (University of Arizona), Richard 
L. Jantz (University of Tennessee), Douglas Owlsley and Dennis J. Stanford (Smithsonian Institution), and 
D. Gentry Steele (Texas A&M).  
945 The summary of the facts is based on: Jelderks, J., 2002, I. Background, A Pre-Litigation Events. See 
further for descriptions of the facts of the case e.g.: Flood, M., A., 2002, pp. 39-53; Lannan, R., W., 1998, 
pp. 371-386. For a description from an archaeological point of view see e.g.: Johansen, B.E., 2004; Stapp, 
D.C. / Longenecker, J.G., 2005. 
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for immediate burial and permitted its scientific study instead.946 This decision was 
confirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, which stressed 
that the statute required some relationship between the remains and a presently existing 
tribe or culture to be considered Native American which was lacking in the present 
case.947 
b) Australia 
Different from the US American situation, no federal legislation exists in Australia 
that deals with the return of human remains from curated museums, let alone prescribes 
it. Except for Tasmanian state legislation, there exists no legislative regulation for public 
collections.948 In 1993, in the absence of federal legislation the Council of Australian 
Museum Associations, the precursor body to Museums Australia, introduced a policy 
document titled ‘Previous Possessions, New Obligations: policies for museums in 
Australian and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’.949 In 2000, it was decided 
to undertake a formal review of the policies.950 In 2005, the revised guidelines were 
approved by the National Council of Museums Australia and published as ‘Continuous 
Cultures, Ongoing Responsibilities - Principles and guidelines for Australian museums 
working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural heritage’.951 These non-
binding guidelines emphasise the need for Australian museums to enter into 
“meaningful consultations” with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in 
relation to existing collections of their ancestral remains.952 According to the guidelines 
museums should adopt a pro-active attitude with regard to repatriation. Rather than 
waiting for a claim to be made, museums should actively identify claimants and 
approach them with the question whether they want to have human remains from the 
museum’s collection to be repatriated (para. 1.4.4). While the guidelines recommend 
museums to return ancestral remains where a rightful custodian asks them to do so, they 
                                                     
946 Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 628 (1997); Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 
1116 (2002). 
947 Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F. 3d 864 (2004). See for a dissenting opinion according to which the 
remains are Native American within the meaning of NAGPRA and that the claimant tribes have established 
a “cultural affiliation”: Flood, M., A., 2002. In reaction to the Kennewick Case a number of proposals were 
issued to amend NAGPRA to clarify the meaning of cultural affiliation. As of today, there have been no 
amendments to NAGPRA in this respect. 
948 ATSIHPA, the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 does not 
compel the return of human remains from museums or other institutions. Its main aim is to grant 
protection to objects of particular significance to Aborigines, according to Aboriginal tradition, from any 
threat of injury or destruction. Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 78, para. 231; Seidemann, 
R.M., 2004, pp. 570-573. 
949 See for a description of the guidelines, e.g.: Watson, N., 2003; Working Group on Human Remains, 
2003, pp. 80-81, paras. 239-241. See on the return of Australian public collections prior to the publication of 
the guidelines e.g.: Mulvaney, D.J., 1990 with regard to the Museum of Victoria; Mulvaney, D.J., 1989 with 
regard to the Murray Black collection. 
950 Museums Australia Inc, 2005, p. 3. 
951 Ibid. 
952 Ibid., p. 18, para. 11.14. 
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do not explicitly demand it (para. 1.4.5). Instead, the guidelines stress the need to act 
with sensitivity and recommend the decision-making process to be a joint undertaking 
between the museum and the indigenous community rather than a unilateral activity by 
the former. Consequently, where museums want to repatriate human remains, they 
should do so in consultation with the community of origin (1.4.3). The joint decision-
making process also implies that museums do not make the repatriations subject to 
conditions (1.4.6).953  
Tasmanian Museums (Aboriginal Remains) Act 1984  
Different from the general situation in Australia, the state of Tasmania introduced 
legislation explicitly dealing with the return of indigenous human remains in 1984.954 
According to the Museums (Aboriginal Remains) Act 1984, all Tasmanian Aboriginal 
remains held in the Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery and in the Queen Victoria 
Museum and Art Gallery became the property of the Crown with the entry into force of 
the act.955 The minister in charge has the task to provide for the delivery of the remains 
to the Tasmanian Aboriginal community. By 1986, most Aboriginal skeletal remains 
from the collections of the two museums had been handed over to the Tasmanian 
Aboriginal Centre Inc. (“TAC”) on the Aboriginal’s community's behalf.956  
c) New Zealand  
New Zealand did not adopt national legislation on the treatment of curated human 
remains. Instead, the New Zealand Government mandated the Museum of New 
Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa) to undertake a repatriation programme for 
Māori and Moriori ancestral remains. The programme, titled ‘Karanga Aotearoa 
Repatriation Programme’, was formally adopted in July 2003.957 The policy pursued by 
Te Papa in repatriating Māori and Moriori ancestral remains, especially Toi Moko 
(preserved tattooed human heads), is set out in a briefing note that was especially 
drafted for overseas institutions on the role and status of the Te Papa in the repatriation 
of kōiwi tāngata.958 The repatriation policy is guided by six principles:  
 
The government role is mainly one of facilitation – it does not claim ownership of 
kōiwi; 
Repatriation from overseas institutions and individuals is by mutual agreement only; 
The repatriation policy does not cover Māori remains in war graves maintained by the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, or other similar institution; 
No payment for kōiwi will be made to overseas institutions;  
                                                     
953 See further on the situation of human remains in Australian Museum Collections: Pickering, M., 2006.  
954 Museums (Aboriginal Remains) Act 1984 (Tas.) (No. 75 of 1984). 
955 Ibid., ss. 4(1) & 6(1). 
956 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 79-80, paras. 235-237. 
957 Matthews, M., 2004; Te Herekiekie, H., 2008, p. 405. 
958 The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   198 12-10-2009   12:09:09
R E C E N T  D E B A T E S  O N  N A Z I  S P O L I A T E D  A R T  A N D  H U M A N  R E M A I N S  |  199   
 
  
Kōiwi must be identified as originating from New Zealand;  
Māori are to be involved in the repatriation of kōiwi, and to determine the final resting 
place, where possible.959 
d) South Africa 
The South African National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA) was passed in 1999.960 
While NHRA explicitly provides for protection of in situ remains it is less clear with 
regard to human remains curated in public collections. However, by subsuming human 
remains under the meaning of “other objects referred to in section 3” it does require 
institutions holding public collections to “enter into a process of negotiation with the 
claimants regarding the future of the resource” where a bona fide claim for repatriation 
has been made.961  
3.  SP I L L  O V E R  TO  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  R E A L M   
 After a number of formerly colonised countries had adopted legislation962 
dictating the return of human remains respectively general policies stressing meaningful 
relationships and consultation between indigenous communities and institutions 
housing public collections the debate on the repatriation spilled-over from the local to 
the international, cross-border stage.963 
In particular, the role of NAGPRA as a rights-based approached must not 
underestimated in making the debate truly international. It seems that NAGPRA added 
authority to the developments of claiming the repatriation of human remains. On top of 
that, cases like the case of the “Kennewick Man” contributed to raising international 
awareness of the question of human remains in public collections. The Kennewick Case 
was extensively discussed by scientists, academics and the general public both within the 
United States and abroad and therewith contributed to raising the question of human 
remains at the international level.964 The spill-over from the intra-national level within 
former colonies to challenging public collections abroad, in particular in Western 
Europe furthermore profited from the fact that we live in a global village965: news about 
the return of human remains from one country to another is no longer refined to these 
countries but travels and challenges long held beliefs about the composition of 
                                                     
959 Cf.: Matthews, M., 2004; Te Herekiekie, H., 2008. 
960 Act 25 of 1999, available at http://www.sahra.org.za.-intor.htm. 
961 See NHRA § 41(1) juncto NHRA § 2 (xxix)(d) juncto NHRA § 3(s)(g). Cf.: Deacon, H.J. / Deacon, J., 
1999, pp. 196-197; Seidemann, R.M., 2004, pp. 566-567. 
962 The United States of America and Tasmania.  
963 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000b, p. 345. 
964 Zimmerman, L.J. / Clinton, R.N., 1999, p. 219. See more in general on the employment of the mass 
media and the raising of dramatic cases at law (even when the case is expected to be lost) as consciousness-
raising techniques to awaken dormant values: Price III, H.M., 1991, p. 19. 
965 The reference to global village is not meant to evoke Marshall McLuhan’s understanding of the phrase in 
his book the Gutenberg Galaxy but is used in it current general understanding as a metaphor to describe the 
Internet and the World Wide Web.  
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   199 12-10-2009   12:09:09
200  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
collections. In the following we will first address the relationship between international, 
cross-border claims for the repatriation of human remains with the existing legal 
framework on the restitution of cultural objects under public international law as 
outlined in Chapter 1 above. Such demarcation contributes to a better understanding of 
the present claims and the reactions and initiatives by the international community in 
the form of principles, resolutions and declarations that will be addressed subsequently.  
I I I .  TH E  C A S E  O F  H U M A N  R E M A I N S  F R O M  T H E  L E G A L  P E R S P EC T I V E  
1 .  PU B L I C  I N T E R N A TI O N A L  L A W  T O U C H I N G  EX P L I C I T L Y  ON  HU M A N  R E M A IN S  
 In Chapter 1 we have analysed in how far public international law is relevant for 
the return and restitution of cultural objects. The analysis distinguished between the 
following categories: the protection of cultural objects in times of war (§ 1), the 
protection of cultural objects in time of peace (§ 2 & § 3); the restitution of cultural 
objects to private individuals (§ 4), as well as to a people (§ 5). Different from Nazi 
spoliated art, these categories are of indirect relevance only for current claims for the 
return of human remains from public collections. This must not surprise as the 
constellations analysed aim at the restitution of cultural property. However, despite the 
fact that the frameworks do not seek to provide for the restitution of human remains as 
human remains, i.e. as the remains of once sentient human remains, the analysis 
nevertheless revealed instances in which the restitution of human remains was explicitly 
addressed in two instances. Before reflecting upon the relevance of this finding, let us 
recall and further elaborate upon these instances. 
The first international binding provision to explicitly touch upon human remains is 
Art. 246 of the Treaty of Versailles:  
 
“Within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Germany will restore to His Majesty 
the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the 
Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William II.  
 
Within the same period Germany will hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the 
Sultan Mkwawa which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany. 
The delivery of the articles above referred to will be effected in such place and in such conditions as may be 
laid down by the Governments to which they are to be restored”. 
 
The above analysis of the article, especially its second provision, revealed that the 
obligations of Art. 246 had been included in the treaty in response to British lobbying 
and strictly speaking did not constitute a form of reparations. Instead of constituting 
part of the German reparations to the British for the losses and damage sustained in the 
First World War the inclusion of the provision on the skull’s return clearly served the 
British in their political aspirations in Tanganyika. In the following, we will further 
analyse the second provision of Art. 246 of the Treaty of Versailles against its historical 
and political context, as well as its perception in the literature. 
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Sultan Mkwawa of Uhehe was a tribal chief who had fought against the Germans 
during their occupation of East Africa.966 In 1898, after a seven-year fight, his rebellion 
failed when he died of exhaustion or committed suicide.967 His body was found by a 
German soldier called Merkl. Most likely, Merkl had ordered for the cutting of the head 
as proof to claim the reward that had been promised on the capture of Mkwawa.968 
Different accounts exist on what happened with the head after Merkl had delivered it to 
the German Governor Tom von Prince. Whether the head / skull had indeed been 
taken to Germany as assumed in Art. 246 of the Versailles Treaty has never been 
established.969 Germany held that the head had never been taken to Germany.970 In any 
                                                     
966 The (German) East African territory, which corresponds to present-day Rwanda and Burundi, the 
continental portion of Tanzania, and a small section of Mozambique, was first penetrated by German 
commercial agents in 1884. German claims to the territory were recognized by the other European powers 
in the period 1885–94. In 1891 the German imperial government took over administration of the area from 
the German East Africa Company. German East Africa (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved May 
15, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9036569. See 
further on the German imperialism, the Bushiri’s rebellion and the rule of Mkwawa: Winans, E.V., 1994, pp. 
224-233. 
967 Winans, E.V., 1994, p. 225.  
968 Ibid., pp. 228-229. The report written after the Second World War by the then British Governor of 
Tanganyika in his search for the skull contains the following quotation from a report filed by Sergeant-
Major Merkl on the death of Mkwawa: “On July 14, 1898, a native brought news that Mkwawa had been 
here during the past few days. I received orders to proceed by forced marches with 15 askaris (Arabic word 
for soldier K.L.) and a few Hehe and, if possible, to capture him… I had halted in the bush to await the 
remaining askaris who had been sent out to scour the country, when I saw a boy coming down the hillside. 
The boy fled as soon as he had seen us. We caught him and found that he was Maw’s boy. He stated that 
Mkwawa lay sick in the bush three hours away, at a place where, on the evening before he had shot his last 
companion for fear of betrayal. He, the boy, had run away that morning. Without waiting for my caravan I 
immediately started with one corporal, two soldiers and one Hehe, guided by the boy. After half an hour we 
heard a distant shot in a south-westerly direction. The boy thought that that was Mkwawa shooting game 
for him. At last he said we were near the camp. We took off our boots and kit and crawled on our stomachs 
to a baobab which I climbed, but I could see nothing. We crawled on over the stony ground to a dry 
watercourse, where we saw the camp at a hundred yards distance, and from there we crawled on to within 
30 yards of the camp. We now saw two figures apparently asleep, one of whom the boy said was Mkwawa 
himself. As we could not proceed over the stoned unnoticed, we aimed, fired, and ran on. Both figures were 
dead, and we judged that the one identified by the boy as Mkwawa had been dead for about an hour or so. 
Mkwawa had clearly killed himself with the shot which we had heard and the muzzle of his carbine was 
burst and the rifle was charred by the fire beside him… The caravan soon caught us up; the Hehe 
immediately recognized Mkwawa and remained for long in silence” (Merkl report quoted by: Twining, E., 
1954. The Twining report is quoted by: Winans, E.V., 1994, p. 228. Research into the availability of the 
Twining report conducted by the Royal Library of the Netherlands revealed that none of the German, 
English, American or Australian catalogues contained a reference to the report. According to Winans’ 
interpretation the cutting off of the head was done for mere practical reasons – to serve as proof to claim 
the reward (p. 230).  
969 That Merkl did deliver the head to Prince and received the reward is accounted in the published diary of 
Prince’s wife: Prince, M.v., 1908, p. 179 where she reports of Merkl bringing the head of the dead Mkwawa 
(Quawa) to her husband, the governor. She also gives a precise description of the head. See on various 
explanations of what had happened with the head subsequently: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 127; Winans, E.V., 
1994, p. 230 referring to: Department of State Publication 2724, Conference Series 92, The Treaty of 
Versailles and After, Annotations of the text of the Treaty, Washington 1947, p. 524); Hollander, B., 1959, 
p. 32; Baer, M., 2001, pp. 195-197. 
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negotiate about the return of the skull to the people of Uhehe.972 He also reports that 
the wish of the Uhehe to have the skull returned had been voiced “almost [as] the very 
first request (…) when the British assumed administrative charge at Iringa”.973  
Winans, a scholar investigating the question as to why a British high-ranked 
administrator placed such priority on the Uhehe’s request suggests that the British 
“merely engaged in a political charade intended to establish good relations with the 
[U]Hehe”.974 Winans comes to the conclusion that “the British did see the skull as an 
object but (…) the [U]Hehe were more concerned about their dead chief as a 
person”.975 Put differently, the skull was not requested by the British as the remains of a 
once sentient human being but as a convenient object to enforce their political powers. 
What might be even more interesting than the British motivation for including the 
provision in the Treaty of Versailles is the perception of the provision in academic 
literature. While the above analysis revealed that Art. 246 received only little academic 
attention it is nevertheless interesting to reflect upon the way the literature treated the 
request for the return of the skull of Mkwawa. Where Art. 246 is mentioned in the 
literature, it is in the context of Art. 245 and Art. 247 as articles “providing for the 
restitution of works of art”976 or “cultural property”977 respectively as articles holding 
“specific obligation for Germany concerning cultural property”.978 The literature does 
not hesitate to qualify Art. 246 as an article dealing with cultural objects. In fact, the 
literature review did not identify any publication reflecting upon the human quality of 
the skull. This is true both for older publications and publications written subsequent to 
the present rise in claims for the restitution of human remains as ancestral remains.  
The second instance in which the above analysis touched upon the restitution of 
human remains concerns the case of the “Broken Hill” Skull. Strictly speaking the 
Broken Hill Skull does not qualify as “human remains” as it has been placed under the 
species name Homo Heidelbergensis which thus constitutes the last step before 
contemporary man in the imaginary evolutionary scheme.979 The fossilized skull was 
                                                     
972 Moffett, J.P., 1958, pp. 61-62.  
973 Ibid., p. 61. The British had attempted to invade German East Africa in 1914 but were repulsed. The 
change in power between Germany and Great Britain over the territory was confirmed in Art. 119 of the 
Versailles Treaty in which “Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all 
her rights and titles over her oversea possessions”. The name of the territory was changed to Tanganyika. 
Cf.: German East Africa (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved May 15, 2008, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9036569.  
974 Winans, E.V., 1994, p. 235. See more in general on the motivation underlying returns of cultural objects: 
Savoy, B., 2009, p. 93.  
975 Winans, E.V., 1994, p. 235. Cf.: McGuire, T., 1990, pp. 41-42 who characterises the skull as “a trophy 
signifying Britain’s new dominion over the former German colony”. 
976 See, e.g.: Hollander, B., 1959, p. 32. 
977 See, e.g.: Gattini, A., 1996, p. 5; Birov, V.A., 1998, p. 209; Keane, D., 2004, pp. 7-8. 
978 Engstler, L., 1964, p. 126; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 139; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 164. An exception is Siehr 
who discusses only Artt. 245 and 247 but does not mention Art. 246: Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 116-117.  
979 Many researchers believe that the Homo heidelbergensis is the common ancestor of both Neanderthals and 
modern man, with the transition from H. heidelbergensis to H. sapiens having occurred in Africa between 
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found in 1921 near the town of Kabwe, Zambia (formerly Broken Hill, Northern 
Rhodesia) in 1921. At that point Zambia was still a colony of the United Kingdom.980 
The skull was donated to the British Museum of Natural History where it remains until 
today.981  
In 1972, the Zambian Government requested the British Government to have the 
skull returned. The request was turned downed with reference to the British Museum 
Act, which would not allow the disposal of the skull from the museum’s collection.982 
The British Government suggested providing Zambia with a replica.983 The Town 
Council of Kabwe, the city where the skull had been discovered and the Zambian 
Government insisted that the original skull was to be returned to Zambia. In 1974, the 
British Government reiterated its stand that the British Museum Act debarred the return 
of the skull.984 
In 1991, Zambia requested the help from UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Committee 
for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its 
Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation to have the skull returned from the United 
Kingdom.985 While the case was never officially filed with the Intergovernmental 
Committee this was not due to the fact that the claim concerned a fossilised skull rather 
than cultural property in the classical sense. Instead, the Intergovernmental Committee 
requested Zambia to first (re-) enter into bilateral negotiations with the United 
Kingdom.986 While the documentation available does not clarify the result of these 
negotiations or why the request was never officially filed with the Intergovernmental 
Committee, the reaction of the Intergovernmental Committee is nevertheless instructive 
as to the perception of the claim. By requiring Zambia to explore the bilateral 
                                                                                                                                          
300,000 and 200,000 years ago. See further: Homo heidelbergensis (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Retrieved April 1, 2009, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-
9040898; Kabwe cranium. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 9, 2008, from 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online,  
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9044260; 
http://piclib.nhm.ac.uk/piclib/www/image.php?search=cat_1&getprev=51522 (last visited 9.12.2008).  
980 Zambia became an independent republic in 1964.  
981 Mulongo, A.H., 1992, p. 103. See for the catalogue entry and image of the skull:  
http://piclib.nhm.ac.uk/piclib/www/image.php?search=cat_1&getprev=51522 (last visited 9.12.2008). The 
literature does not report on when and how the skull entered the collection.  
982 Ibid. The British Museum Act applies also to the British Museum of Natural History (See s. 8(3) of the 
British Museum Act 1963 according to which “Sections 2 to 7 of this Act and the First Schedule thereto 
shall apply in relation to the Natural History Museum and the Trustees thereof as they apply in relation to 
the British Museum and the Trustees thereof (…)”) See for an extensive analysis of the restrictions on the 
disposal of objects in public collections in the United Kingdom in chp. 3.§2.II.   
983 Greenfield, J., 1989, p. 159; Mulongo, A.H., 1992, p. 103. 
984 Mulongo, A.H., 1992, p. 103. 
985 Cf.: Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return of Cultural Property to its 
Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation on its Activities (1991-1993), 27 C/102, 
para. 5; Greenfield, J., 1989, p. 159. 
986 Cf.: Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return of Cultural Property to its 
Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation on its Activities (1991-1993), 27 C/102, 
para. 5. 
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negotiations first, UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Committee indirectly acknowledged 
that the disputed skull qualified as cultural property as defined in Art. 3 of its Statute.987 
Whether the fact that the fossilised skull was in fact the skull of a pre-modern Homo, 
and not from a modern Homo sapiens did play a role in the Intergovernmental 
Committee’s considerations cannot be established. Its official report does not make 
mention of the age or attribution of the skull but speaks of skull without any further 
qualifications.988 Secondary literature discussing the request for the return of the Broken 
Hill Skull also discusses the case as a case dealing with the return of cultural property.989 
Further to these two cases the general framework on the protection of cultural 
property is also relevant for human remains with regard to preventive protection against 
destruction and damage, as well as removals in the future. In the analysis above, we have 
seen that the definitions of cultural property employed by the 1954 Hague Convention 
and its protocols, as well as by the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention are extremely broad and subjective in that importance is to be 
defined by a State Party. Consequently, human remains may enjoy protection under 
these conventions. This point becomes clearer by reflecting upon the definitions of 
cultural property employed by the conventions.  
2.  RE L E V A N C E  O F  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  L A W  F O R  H U MA N  R EM A I N S :  H U M A N  
R E M A IN S  = C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y?   
 In order to reflect upon the question whether human remains qualify as cultural 
property we first need to recall the characterisation of cultural property this study relies 
on. As stated in the introduction, this study relies on Odendahl’s characterisation (rather 
than definition) of cultural property.990 Based on her study on the multi-level system of 
the protection of cultural property, Odendahl arrived at the following characterisation of 
cultural property:  
 
“[o]bjects qualifying as cultural property are corporeal objects, movable or immovable, either unique or 
consisting of collections / ensembles, which have been either created, changed or formed by human effort 
or which represent human cultural development, and which are accorded historical, artistic, scientific, 
architectural, archaeological or any other cultural value of different dimensions”.991  
 
                                                     
987 Goy, R., 1979, p. 969; Schulze, D., 1983, p. 26; Walter, B., 1988, p. 15 & 96. 
988 Cf.: Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for promoting the return of Cultural Property to its 
Countries of Origin or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation on its Activities (1991-1993), 27 C/102, 
para. 5. 
989 See, e.g.: Walter, B., 1988, p. 14 who states that the “skull of the Broken Hill Man thus qualifies as 
cultural property”. Greenfield, J., 1989, p. 159 speaks of a “paleontological claim”. An exception is Engstler, 
L., 1964, p. 216 who states that human remains do not fall under “other archaeological objects” but does 
not motivate his statement.  
990 See above in the Introduction (§2.III.2). Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 386. 
991 Ibid., p. 387.  
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Essentially, the characterisation consists of two elements: an anthropocentric 
element and a subjective element expressing an appreciation of the object concerned. 
With the designation “created, changed or coined by human effort or which represent 
human cultural development”, the characterisation makes clear that cultural property 
cannot exist without an anthropocentric element. In other words, the object must have a 
link with human kind. In most cases, the relationship consists in the fact that the object 
has been created by a human being. This is, however, not a necessary condition.992 It is 
sufficient that an object has been changed by a human being (e.g. Palaeolithic Cave 
paintings) or has been formed by a human being (e.g. a natural science collection). Even 
an object that has not been created, changed or formed by a human being may represent 
human cultural development. This is in particular true for archaeological finds of 
organic origin, provided they allow the drawing of conclusions on the cultural 
development of human history.993 
While any object that fulfils the requested anthropocentric element has the potential 
of qualifying as cultural property, the item must also be accorded “historical, artistic, 
scientific, architectural, archaeological or any other cultural value of different 
dimensions”.994 According to Odendahl, the accordance of value to an object by a 
society (rather than a single human being) constitutes the most important element in the 
definition of cultural property.995 Consequently, the crucial criterion as to whether or 
not an object qualifies as cultural property is not an inherent characteristic of the object 
as such but is externally imposed.996  
As an external subjective process, the accordance of cultural value to an object may 
be subject to change: an object can at one point in time be a simple tool and at a later 
stage qualify as cultural property of eminent value.997 Likewise, the cultural value 
accorded to an object can diminish over time. By referring to “culture value of different 
dimensions”, Odendahl clarifies that it is irrelevant for the qualification as cultural 
property whether an object is of value (only) for a certain group of the population, a 
people, a continent or humanity as a whole. Neither is it crucial for the qualification of 
an object as cultural property that it is of outstanding cultural relevance: cultural 
property may be of outstanding, special, extraordinary or any other cultural value.998 
                                                     
992 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 49. 
993 Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 387-388. 
994 The same approach has been adopted by UNESCO in its Recommendation for the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Property as adopted by the UNESCO’s General Conference on 28 November 1978. 
According to its first paragraph, “'movable cultural property' shall be taken to mean all movable objects 
which are the expression and testimony of human creation or of the evolution of nature and which are of 
archaeological, historical, artistic, scientific or technical value and interest (…)”.  
995 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388.  
996 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 48-51. Schönenberger discusses a number of elements, such as age, 
origin, uniqueness, authenticity, aesthetic or financial value and comes to the conclusion that none of these 
elements can serve as defining element singling out cultural property from other goods.  
997 Cf.: Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 31 gives the example of an antique goblet.  
998 Cf.: Müller-Katzenburg, A., 1996, p. 140 This interpretation is also supported by the analysis of O’Keefe 
on the definition of cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
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Consequently, territorial and qualitative dimensions are irrelevant to the qualification of 
an object as cultural property. They become relevant when it comes to the question of 
whether an object falls under the scope of application of a specific legal norm.999  
Comparing the characterisation of cultural property as formulated by Odendahl with 
the characteristics of human remains in public collections, it becomes clear that human 
remains satisfy the two main criteria of cultural property: the presence of an 
anthropocentric element and the subjective element of possessing “historical, artistic, 
scientific, architectural, archaeological or any other cultural value of different 
dimensions”. The anthropocentric element of human remains in public collections does 
not lie in the fact that the remains themselves are of human origin. Rather, the 
anthropocentric element is given by the changing of the remains by another human 
being; its inclusion in a collection is a reflection of the cultural development of 
humanity.1000 With regard to worked human remains such as a Tibetan skull cup 
(kapala), an Egyptian mummy or a preserved, tattooed head of Maori origin (Toi Moko), 
the identification of the anthropocentric element is evident: not only have these remains 
been changed by the skilful work of other human beings, they have also been included 
in collections where they give evidence of human beliefs and developments.1001 While 
most human remains in public collections have to some extent been “worked” in the 
sense of having been preserved against decay, it is less obvious to qualify non-worked 
human remains, e.g. skeletal remains, as cultural property. However, also non-worked 
human remains reflect the cultural developments of humankind and possess a cultural 
value ranging from historical to scientific or archaeological value.1002 In contrast to 
worked human remains, such as a mummy, which reflects the cultural values and 
mythology of the ancient Egyptians, unworked human remains mainly reflect the 
cultural values of those who acquired them. They bear witness to historical 
                                                                                                                                          
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. While its first Article seems to introduce a rather high standard by 
requiring an object to be of “great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”998, O’Keefe came 
to the conclusion “that the Convention applies to all movable (…) property considered by each respective 
state to form part of its national cultural heritage”. O'Keefe, P., 1999b, p. 36. 
999 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388.  
1000 Cf.: Ibid. 
1001 Mummies are the most frequently cited example of human remains qualifying as cultural property. See, 
e.g.: Hipp, A., 2000, pp. 10-11; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388. See also the Recommendation for the 
Protection of Movable Cultural Property as adopted by the UNESCO’s General Conference on 28 
November 1978, para. 1 (a) (iii) where mummies are explicitly listed as ‘movable cultural property'. 
Disagreeing: Engstler, L., 1964, p. 216 who states that human remains such as Egyptian Mummies and 
remains from Pompeii constitute very important witnesses of the past but do not fall under “other 
archaeological objects” with regard to the 1954 Hague Convention. While he expresses his regret from the 
point of protection, he does not provide reasoning to support his conclusion. In theory, Engstler’s 
understanding of a cultural object as an “individual creative activity by a human being, as well as any object 
from the hand of humans that are historically relevant” (p. 13) does not preclude human remains, at least 
those remains that have been modified by human skill and effort.  
1002 Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 387-388. Consenting: Fraoua, R., 1985, p. 10; Greenfield, J., 1989, p. 159; Prott, 
L.V., 1989, p. 225; Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1992, pp. 307-308; Schorlemer, S.v., 1992, pp. 51 & 82; 
Fechner, F.G., 1998, p. 380.  
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developments such as colonialism and scientific theories, such as physical anthropology. 
Moreover, their (continued) presence in public collections bears witness to Western 
perceptions of death and the human body or what remains of it many years after a 
person’s death.1003  
The finding that human remains fall under the notion of cultural property is 
confirmed in secondary literature. This is not only the case with regard to the literature 
discussing (other) specific cases of requests for the return of human remains1004; is also 
true for more general discussions of the concept of cultural property.1005 The perception 
of human remains in public collections as cultural property does, however, not exclude 
other perceptions. Just like the accordance of cultural value to an object is subject to 
changes in time1006 it does not exclude multiple perceptions of an object at any point in 
time: while human remains qualify as cultural property from a Western perception; they 
may at the same time qualify as ancestral remains or simply the remains of a once 
sentient person.  
The finding that human remains can represent various values while at the same time 
constituting cultural property brings us to the following conclusive remarks and 
questions: first, rather than giving rise to obligations to repatriate human remains, the 
various constellations of public international law are relevant for human remains in 
public collections in that they protect them against destruction and damage in times of 
war as well as against removal from the collections. Consequently, claimants seeking the 
repatriation of human remains cannot rely on rights to restitution under the traditional 
framework but rather have to face the fact that the framework(s) are reinforcing the 
status quo. It is, however, possible that one of the instruments adopted more or less 
recently at the international level has introduced a new legal basis for the return of 
human remains. Whether this is indeed the case will be scrutinised in the following 
section.  
                                                     
1003 “How to treat dead bodies may appear to be a trivial moral question compared with al the seemingly 
vital problems that confront the living. But, from a theoretical point of view, few are as illuminating of our 
self-conception and self-understanding”, Kass, L.R., 1985, p. 24. 
1004 See, e.g. the return by the museum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Cambridge, of the embalmed penis 
and testicles of Kabaka Mutesa I of Buganda to Uganda when that country became independent. See 
further: Daniel, G., 1982, p. 4; Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 885. Daniel speaks of the “rather special 
objects relating to the Kabaka of Buganda”. 
1005 See, e.g.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P., 1984, para. 454; Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, chp. 16; 
Greenfield, J., 1996, pp. 132-135; Jenschke, C., 2005, p. 32. Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 47. Implicitly 
agreeing: Müller-Katzenburg, A., 1996, pp. 139-140. See further, by means of examples, the following 
articles published in journals dedicated to the subject of cultural property law and to the subject of arts 
antiquities and the law: O'Keefe, P., 1992; Zimmerman, L.J. / Clinton, R.N., 1999; Woodhead, C., C., 2004; 
Shelbourn, C., 2006; Bristow, M., 2008; Frigo, M., 2008. Cf.: also Marc-André Renold during his lecture at 
the Seminar for advanced Studies in Public and Private International law at the Hague Academy on the 
International Protection of Cultural Property on 12 February 2008, in which he discussed the return of 
human remains as “cultural property but not in classical form”.  
1006 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 388.  
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IV .  RE C E N T  D E V E L O P M E N T S :  P R IN C I PL E S ,  R E S OL U T I ON S  A N D  D E C L A RA T ION S  
A D O P T E D  B Y  TH E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O M M U N I T Y  I N  R E A C T I O N  TO  T H E  R E-
E M E R G E N C E  O F  T H E  D E B A T E  O N  H U M A N  R EM A I N S  
 In this section we will address the developments at the international level since 
the beginning of the 1990s in response to the emergence of claims for the repatriation 
of human remains. In the light of the result of the analysis of public international law 
according to which claimants cannot rely on rights to restitution or return as they 
presently exist under the frameworks, the accords, codes and declarations that have 
been agreed upon at the international level in response to the emergence of claims are 
even more important when compared to the principles that have been adopted with 
regard to Nazi spoliated art. After all, one of the main problems for claimants of Nazi 
spoliated art is the passage of time as a consequence of which they can no longer rely 
upon the restitution rights once granted to them under public international law. With 
regard to human remains no such rights have been recognised in the past. Consquently, 
the main focus of the following analysis is whether the instruments introduced at the 
international level introduce legally enforceable rights for the return of human remains.  
1.  TH E  VER M I LL IO N  AC C O R D  O N  HU M A N  RE M A I N S   
 The first instrument dealing with human remains at the international level was the 
Vermillion Accord on Human Remains.1007 The Vermillion Accord, which has been 
shortly introduced above, was adopted in 1989 by the World Archaeological 
Congress.1008 As an instrument dealing with the treatment of human remains by 
archaeologists, the Vermillion Accord is not directly relevant for claims for the return of 
human remains from public collections. However, as the first instrument adopted with 
regard to the treatment of human remains and given its relevance in tilting the debate on 
the treatment of human remains from the intra-national to the international level, it is 
nevertheless included in this overview.  
The Vermillion Accord consists of six paragraphs asking for respect for different 
interests with regard to the treatment of human remains. According to the first 
principle, respect for human remains shall be granted to all, irrespective of origin, race, 
religion, nationality, custom and tradition. The following three principles seek respect 
for the wishes of the dead with regard to disposition, for the wishes of the local 
community and of relatives and for scientific research. Consequently, the Vermillion 
Accord not only stresses the need to respect mortal remains and the wishes of the local 
communities during and after archaeological excavations; it also recognises the value of 
scientific research. The fifth principle then brings the previous four together in stating 
that agreement on the disposition of human remains must be the result of mutual 
                                                     
1007 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 176.  
1008 See above chp. 2.§2.II.2.  
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respect for the interests of the communities, as well as the interests of science and 
education. The last paragraph, rather than introducing a new principle, expresses the 
hope that agreements found on mutual and express recognition of the different interests 
will lead to acceptable agreements for all parties that will be honoured in the future.1009  
The fact that the Vermillion Accord not only stresses the need to respect the dead 
and the interest of local communities but instead balances these interests with scientific 
ones stems from the fact that it was adopted by the World Archaeological Congress as a 
non-governmental organisation. While membership of the World Archaeological 
Congress is open to the general public it is first and foremost an organisation 
representing the interests of archaeologists. The appeal of the Vermillion Accord to 
respect certain interest groups with regard to human remains is hence in first instance 
directed at archaeologists. However, by stressing also the need for respect for scientific 
research the Vermillion Record also seeks to appeal to local communities.  
With regard to the present analysis of principles applicable to the repatriation of 
human remains from public collections we should recall the fifth principle according to 
which agreement on the disposition of human remains must be based on respect for the 
interests of local communities, as well as for the interests of science and education. 
While the fifth principle deals with the disposition of human remains its relevance with 
regard to the disposal or repatriation from public collections is more indirect than might 
appear at first sight. After all, the decision upon disposition of human remains in the 
archaeological context of the Vermillion Record is relevant for the inclusion of human 
remains in public collections rather than their disposal: in the past, the inclusion of 
excavated human remains, especially indigenous ones, in public collections occurred 
rather automatically. It is at this point that the fifth principle becomes relevant in that it 
requires mutual agreement on the treatment of human remains subsequent to 
excavation and (possibly) research. Only where local communities and archaeologists 
agree that the disposition of the remains should consist of housing them in a public 
collection will the remains be included in a collection, at least in as far as the Vermillion 
Accord is observed. Consequently, the Vermillion Accord allows local communities to 
veto the inclusion of human remains in a public collection. While one could argue that 
the disposition of human remains already included in public collections, i.e. their 
disposal, should also be based upon mutual agreement between scientists and local 
communities, such a proposal would not take into account that the remains were in 
most cases included in the collections without consent in the first place. Also, the power 
to veto a decision would not lie with local communities but would shift to scientists.  
                                                     
1009 See further on the Vermillion Accord: Bulmer, S., 1991; Hubert, J., 1992, pp. 110-113; Watkins, J., et al., 
1995. 
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2.  MA TA A T UA  DE C L A R A T I O N   
 The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter: “the Mataatua Declaration”) was adopted as the result 
of the First International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous peoples. The conference was hosted in June 1993 by nine iwi of the 
Mataatua (Bay of plenty Region of Aotearoa New Zealand).  
The Mataatua Declaration deals with various issues, including cultural property, but 
essentially asks members of the United Nations to recognize the rights of indigenous 
peoples to control in all respects their cultural intellectual property and to be the 
inherent beneficiaries of such property.1010 It is founded on the understanding that 
national laws failed to protect their property. Instead, national laws should recognise 
that property rights are multigenerational, that there is a need for retroactive action to be 
taken to protect “historical as well as contemporary works” and that biological and 
botanical knowledge requires specialized treatment.1011 
In the section holding recommendations to states, national and international 
agencies, the Mataatua Declaration contains two provisions that are relevant with regard 
to the repatriation of objects from public collections. Recommendation 2.12 states that: 
“[a]ll human remains and burial objects of indigenous peoples held by museums and 
other institutions must be returned to their traditional areas in a culturally appropriate 
manner”. If one compares the recommendation on human remains to Recommendation 
2.14 dealing with indigenous cultural objects it becomes evident that the return of 
human remains is accorded greater importance: whereas the recommendation with 
regard to the return of human remains is formulated uncompromisingly 
Recommendation 2.14 dealing with cultural objects only states that they must be offered 
back to their traditional owners.1012 The appeal to return all human remains from 
museums and other institutions and to offer other cultural objects is complemented 
with Recommendation 2.13 according to which: “[m]useums and other institutions must 
provide, to the country and indigenous peoples concerned, an inventory of any 
indigenous cultural objects still held in their possession”. 
In recommending the return of all human remains of indigenous peoples held by 
museums and other institutions to their traditional areas, the Mataatua Declaration 
adopted a very comprehensive and uncompromising approach that starts from the mere 
existence of human remains in public collections rather than from requests made for the 
return of specific remains. The Mataatua Declaration has been presented to the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (11th session).  
                                                     
1010 Cf.: Ziff, B.H. / Pratima, V.R., 1997, p. 247. 
1011 Cf.: Ibid. 
1012 Recommendation 2.14 reads: “Indigenous cultural objects held in museums and other institutions must 
be offered back to their traditional owners”. 
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3.  TH E  ICOM CO D E 
 The ICOM Code of Professional Ethics (hereinafter: the ICOM Code) was 
adopted unanimously by the 15th General Assembly of ICOM (The International 
Council of Museums) in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 4 November 1986. It was amended 
by the 20th General Assembly in Barcelona, Spain on 6 July 2001, retitled ICOM Code 
of Ethics for Museums, and revised by the 21st General Assembly in Seoul, Republic of 
Korea on 8 October 2004. As an instrument adopted by a non-governmental 
organisation, the ICOM Code cannot bind national Governments. In can, however, 
serve as guideline for museums in as far as the behaviour recommended is in line with 
the national laws applicable to public collections.  
With regard to the recommended treatment of human remains, the original 1986 
version of the ICOM Code touched upon their acquisition, housing, research and 
display. According to para. 6.7:  
 
“[w]here a museum maintains and /or is developing collections of human remains and sacred objects, these 
should be securely housed and carefully maintained as archival collections in scholarly institutions, and 
should always be available to qualified researchers and educators, but not to the morbidly curious. Research 
on such objects and their housing and care must be accomplished in a manner acceptable not only to fellow 
professionals but also to those of various beliefs, including particular members of the community, ethnic or 
religious groups concerned. Although it is occasionally necessary to use human remains and other sensitive 
material in interpretative exhibits, this must be done with tact and with respect for the feelings for human 
dignity held by all peoples”.  
 
What is striking about the 1986 ICOM Code, compared with the later amendments is 
that it does not contain any reference to the return of human remains. Also, it does not 
emphasize the beliefs and feelings of the members of the community, ethnic or religious 
groups concerned but mentions them secondary to the beliefs of museum professionals 
/ researcher and as part of various beliefs only.  
When the ICOM Code was amended in 2001, the paragraph on human remains was 
complemented with an additional sentence explicitly dealing with the removal of human 
remains from display and requests for the return of human remains. According to the 
renumbered paragraph 6.6, last sentence:  
 
“[r]equests for removal from public display of human remains or material of sacred significance from the 
originating communities must be addressed expeditiously with respect and sensitivity. Requests for the 
return of such material should be addressed similarly. Museum policies should clearly define the process for 
responding to such requests”. 
 
While paragraph 6.6 explicitly addresses claims of the return of human remains it 
does not take a stand on whether or not the remains must be returned. All it asks 
museums to do is to address such claims with respect and sensitivity and to define their 
policy as to how they will react to such claims. In the present version of the ICOM 
Code, as amended in 2004, references with regard to the acquisition, housing, research, 
display and return of human remains are split over four paragraphs: Para. 2.5; para. 3.7; 
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para. 4.3 and para. 4.4. Furthermore, a section has been introduced dealing with respect 
for source communities (paras. 6.5-6.8). Paragraph 2.5 deals with the acquisition of 
human remains and makes acquisition subject to appropriate housing of the remains:  
 
“[c]ollections of human remains and material of sacred significance should be acquired only if they can be 
housed securely and cared for respectfully. This must be accomplished in a manner consistent with 
professional standards and the interests and beliefs of members of the community, ethnic or religious 
groups from which the objects originated, where these are known”.  
 
While paragraph 2.5 still mentions professional standards first, it does single out the 
interests and beliefs of members of the community, ethnic or religious groups from 
which the objects originated rather than subsuming them under “various beliefs” as it 
was done in the 1986 and the 2001 versions. However, the consideration of the beliefs 
of the source community are not absolute in that they have to be taken into account 
only “where known”. The same principle applies to researching human remains (para. 
3.7):  
 
“[r]esearch on human remains and materials of sacred significance must be accomplished in a manner 
consistent with professional standards and take into account the interests and beliefs of the community, 
ethnic or religious groups from whom the objects originated, where these are known”. 
 
With regard to the displaying of human remains paragraph 4.3 again reiterates that 
professional standards and the interests and beliefs of the source community must be 
taken into account. Furthermore, the provision alludes to “feelings of human dignity 
held by all peoples”: 
 
“[h]uman remains and materials of sacred significance must be displayed in a manner consistent with 
professional standards and, where known, taking into account the interests and beliefs of members of the 
community, ethnic or religious groups from whom the objects originated. They must be presented with 
great tact and respect for the feelings of human dignity held by all peoples”. 
 
Interestingly, paragraph 4.4 dealing with requests to remove human remains from 
public display or to have them returned does not emphasise the interests and beliefs of 
the source community but speaks more vaguely of respect and sensitivity:  
 
“[r]equests for removal from public display of human remains or material of sacred significance from the 
originating communities must be addressed expeditiously with respect and sensitivity. Requests for the 
return of such material should be addressed similarly. Museum policies should clearly define the process for 
responding to such requests”. 
 
Consequently, if one compares the provisions on human remains of the 2004 version 
of the ICOM Code with the 2001 version one realises that greater attention is paid to 
the interests of source communities. This tendency is furthermore confirmed if one 
compares the provision with the general provision on the return of cultural property as 
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contained in para. 6.21013 and by the inclusion of a new section titled ‘Respect for 
Communities served’. According to its paragraph 6.7 the interests of contemporary 
communities should be taken into account in the use of collections: 
 
“[m]useum usage of collections from contemporary communities requires respect for human dignity and 
the traditions and cultures that use such material. Such collections should be used to promote human well-
being, social development, tolerance, and respect by advocating multisocial, multicultural and multilingual 
expression”.  
 
In conclusion, since its introduction in 1986 and over its course of amendments, the 
ICOM Code has developed towards greater emphasis of the interests and beliefs of 
source communities. However, with regard to the treatment of human remains these 
interests are not the only ones that inform the decision making process. The ICOM 
Code also takes into account professional standards of the museum world. With regard 
to the actual return of human remains paragraph 4.4 of the ICOM Code is less explicit 
in recognising the interest of source communities but speaks more vaguely of 
responding with respect and sensitivity.  
4.  CO N V EN T IO N  FO R  T H E  SA F EGU A R D IN G  O F  TH E  IN TA N G I B L E  CU L T U R A L  HE R I T A G E   
 In 2003 UNESCO adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage.1014 The convention entered into force on 20 April 2006.1015 
While the convention does not deal with the return of human remains as such, it is 
nevertheless relevant in the present context as will be set out in the following.  
The notion of intangible cultural heritage (ICH) emerged in the 1990s to 
counterbalance the normative efforts that had so far mainly focused on the protection 
tangible aspects of culture, both movable and immovable. According to Art. 2 of the 
convention the “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural 
spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted 
from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in 
response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and 
provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for 
cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, 
consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible 
                                                     
1013 Para. 6.2 on the return of Cultural Property reads: “Museums should be prepared to initiate dialogues 
for the return of cultural property to a country or people of origin. This should be undertaken in an 
impartial manner, based on scientific, professional and humanitarian principles as well as applicable local, 
national and international legislation, in preference to action at a governmental or political level”. 
1014 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, 17 November 2003, 
UNESCO Doc.MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14. 
1015 Ibid., Art. 34. As of 2 November 2008, the Convention had 104 State Parties.  
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with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of 
mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable 
development.  
One of the domains in which the intangible cultural heritage manifests itself 
concerns social practices, rituals and festive events (Art. 2 (2) (c)). Amongst these social 
practices and rituals are burial ceremonies and funeral rituals.1016 The recognition of 
certain burial ceremonies and funeral rituals as ICH and their safeguarding under the 
convention does not result in the repatriation of all human remains belonging to the 
source community. It does, however, add authority to the relevance of protecting social 
practices, including burial ceremonies by ensuring greater viability of ICH by 
documenting and promoting it, in particular by means of a listing system.1017  
5.   UN I T E D  NA TIO N S  DE C L A R A TI O N  O N  T H E  RI G H T S  O F  IN D IG E N O U S  PE O P L E S 
 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the 
General Assembly on 13 September 2007.1018 It had taken more than a decade to reach 
the required consens.1019 The adoption of the declaration, which consists of 46 Articles 
including one article dealing with the repatriation of human remains, took so long due to 
the polarization between indigenous and state positions, particularly with regard to the 
question for self-determination, collective rights and territorial rights.1020 With regard to 
the provision dealing with the repatriation of human remains consensus was not so 
difficult to reach.1021 According to Art. 12: 
 
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their spiritual and religious 
traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their 
religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the 
repatriation of their human remains. 
 
                                                     
1016 See: http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=55 (last visited 15.12.2008).  
1017 See: Art. 2(3). 
1018 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, 
(A/RES/61/295). The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General 
Assembly by a a majority of 144 states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). 
1019 The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations had agreed on the final text of the draft UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Approved on 26 August 1994, UN 
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1994/56. Cf.: Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008, p. 73. 
1020 Cf.: Chernela, J., M., 2006, p. 487; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008, pp. 73-74. 
1021 See: Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its eleventh session (E/CN.4/2006/79 - 22 March 2006), 2006, pp. 
6-7. Cf.: Vrdoljak, A.P., 2008, p. 76. 
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2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in 
their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned.”1022 
 
Art. 12 explicitly mentions the ‘right to the repatriation of their human remains’. The 
fact that this is remarkable becomes evident if one compares the wording of the article 
with that of Art. 11 dealing with cultural traditions and customs. According to the final 
version of the article as adopted:  
 
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This 
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their 
cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual 
and performing arts and literature. 
 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual 
property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and 
customs”. 
 
While Art. 11 mentions the right to “past manifestations of indigenous cultures, such 
as artefacts” as well as the introduction by States of “effective mechanisms, which may 
include restitution” the article does not speak of a right to restitution. While the 
reference to such a right had been included in the 1993 Draft UN Declaration1023 it was 
removed from the provision due to resistance of former metropolitan powers and 
market states.1024 
In a similar fashion, Art. 12 does not provide for a right to the restitution of the right 
to the use and control of their ceremonial objects but makes mention only of the “right 
to the use and control of their ceremonial objects”.1025 With regard to human remains, 
however, the attempts of some States to compromise the “right to the repatriation of their 
human remains” with protection of third-party rights of scientists or public collections 
were unsuccessful.1026 Art. 12 clearly speaks of a right to the repatriation of human 
remains.  
The finding that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly 
speaks of a right for the repatriation of human remains must of course be squared with 
the fact that the declaration is not legally binding. However, the long drafting period of 
                                                     
1022 (Emphasis added). 
1023 Ex-Art. 12, 1993 Draft UN Declaration reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the 
past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, 
designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to the 
restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free and informed consent or in 
violation of their laws, traditions and customs” (Emphasis added). 
1024 Cf.: Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 268. 
1025 Cf.: Ibid. 
1026 See: UN Doc. E/CN.4.2002/98, para. 51; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/81, para. 54. Cf.: Ibid. 
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the declaration and the tug-of-war with regard to the formulation of the provisions, in 
the present context with regard to rights to repatriation and restitution are good 
indications that the declaration nevertheless influences legal and political reality as will 
be further addressed below.  
V .  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  O N  T H E  CA S E  O F  H U MA N  R EM A I N S   
 In the previous section four instruments have been discussed that touch upon the 
question of the repatriation of human remains from public collections. None of the five 
instruments introduces new legal rights for the return of human remains. The first three 
instruments were all adopted by actors that do not have the capacity to agree binding 
legal treaties under international law. Despite the fact that public international law has 
come to recognise a broader concept of international legal personality than equating it 
with state actors only, the privilege of concluding treaties is still reserved to states and to 
a lesser extent to international organisations in the sense of inter-state organisations. 
Non-governmental organisations as the World Archaeological Congress and the 
International Council of Museums (ICOM) or indigenous peoples in case of the 
Mataatua Declaration cannot conclude treaties under public international law.  
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage do not create rights that exist 
directly under international law either. While the United Nations is an international 
organisation rather than an NGO and possesses, in the form of the Security Council, an 
organ that can create binding legal rules, declarations adopted by the General Assembly 
are not legally binding.1027 Consequently, different from the intra-national solutions 
adopted in the United States and the state of Tasmania the instruments adopted at the 
international level do not introduce legally enforceable rights for the repatriation of 
curated human remains.1028 As for the Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, it requires its State Parties to undertake necessary measures 
to ensure the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage present in its territory. It 
does not create legally enforceable rights, let alone provide for rights pertaining to the 
return of human remains.  
Further to this finding with regard to the legal status of the instruments, the 
chronological analysis of these instruments also revealed the following two trends: first, 
the analysis revealed that the instruments accord greater weight and legitimacy to the 
                                                     
1027 Cf.: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 107. 
1028 An interesting question exceeding the scope of the present thesis but meriting further research is 
whether a right to the repatriation of human remains might be construed as part of the right to self-
determination. For a long time cultural (human) rights have attracted much less attention and conceptual 
elaboration compared with other human rights. See further on human rights, minorities’ rights, and most 
importantly with regard to the repatriation of human remains, self-determination, e.g.: Wyss, M.P., 1992, p. 
192; Sjouke, P.S., 1999; Pritchard, S., 2001; Chamberlain, K., 2003; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 204-208; 
Francioni, F., 2008, p. 1. 
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return of human remains in comparison to the restitution of cultural objects. Whereas 
the instruments remain somewhat reserved with regard to the restitution of cultural 
property, both the Mataatua and the UN Declaration on indigenous Rights state the 
right to the return of human remains in an uncompromised manner. From this follows 
the treatment of human remains and cultural property in separate provisions.1029  
Secondly, the analysis revealed a polarisation with regard to the question whether the 
repatriation of human remains should be subject to the recognition rights of third 
parties such as scientists or curators. The Mataatua Declaration and the UN Declaration 
of indigenous Rights chose for an uncompromising approach not taking third party 
interests into account. While this is not surprising with regard to the Mataatua 
Declaration as a declaration by indigenous peoples this is to some extent remarkable 
with regard to the UN Declaration on indigenous Rights as product of an 
intergovernmental forum. The Vermillion Accord and the ICOM Code, on the other 
hand, do acknowledge third party rights, i.e. the interests of their drafters being 
archaeologists respectively museum professionals. 
§3. CONCLUS IONS  FOR  CHAPTER 2 
I .  TH E  S T A T U S  A N D  R EL E V A N C E  O F  S O F T  L A W   
 In the previous two sections dealing with Nazi spoliated art and human remains 
respectively we have seen that an array of declarations, principles, resolutions, accords 
etc. have been adopted that deal with the return of these objects to former owners, 
heirs, indigenous peoples or other groups of claimants. All of the instruments discussed 
share that they are not legally binding and as such do not introduce new legal rights and 
obligations to claim / return cultural objects. 
The fact that the instruments do not create legally binding rules does not mean that 
they constitute merely “legal surrealism”.1030 In order to understand the impact non-
binding instruments can have, it is instructive to first consider the reasons for countries 
to opt for non-binding insturments rather than binding legal agreements.1031 First, non-
binding agreements allow countries to gradually become familiar with the proposed 
                                                     
1029 Cf.: Thornberry, P., 2002, pp. 25-26 & 370-376; Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p 267. 
1030 Frigo, M., 2004, p. 70. Also: Alda, K., 2006: “Although none of the above acts and declarations formally 
goes beyond the borders of what is commonly defined as “soft law”, it would not be wise to underestimate 
their value and effects on both diplomatic and judicial practice in many respects”. Another indication of the 
relevance of non-legally binding instruments is the impact of the 1943 London Declaration as discussed in 
chp. 1.§1.V. In fact, the London Declaration was not only referred to in the context of the restitution 
following WWII but was used as authority also in the debate on the return of cultural objects to their 
territories of origin. Cf.: below in chp. 1.§3.I where the UNESCO Resolution 3.428 is discussed. 
1031 It should be pointed out that the following statements apply first and foremost to instruments that have 
been adopted at the intergovernmental level. While non-binding instruments adopted by non-governmental 
organisations or interest groups can also affect the legal and political realm, their impact is even more 
indirect. 
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standards before being confronted with the adoption of enforceable rules. 
Consequently, non-binding agreements allow for a greater basis for negotiation and 
achieving consensus on issues that are particularly complex or sensitive.1032 Secondly, 
these instruments do not require formal ratification, therewith having a more direct and 
rapid influence on the practice of states than treaties.1033 Thirdly, non-binding 
agreements can have legitimising effects for government action and can prepare the 
grounds for national legislative action. This is particularly true in the globalised society 
we live in and where documents are easily spread by media, especially the Internet. At 
the same time, these aspirational non-commitments often capture the imagination of 
citizens, NGOs, organisations treat these instruments as if they were legally binding 
instruments. In turn, this reception again impacts Governments who need to observe 
the wishes of citizens.1034 Where a Government wishes to deviate from the principles it 
must justify its choice.1035 This last aspect is in fact already an explanation for the 
effectiveness of instruments like declarations, principles, and resolutions. In spite of not 
being legally binding and having a more indirect effect these instruments nevertheless 
require signatory states to show a certain level of moral and political commitment.  
Non-binding principles, resolutions, and declarations are often characterised as “soft 
law”.1036 From a legal perspective the term “soft law”, as distinct from binding “hard 
law” is not very helpful.1037 As of today there exists controversy on the existence of 
“soft law” and on how to define it. Legal scholars have tried to grasp the concept of soft 
law as the “linkage of a subject of international law to a norm, which it has created or 
supported. This linkage resembles a legally binding effect, but does not posses any 
binding effect itself”,1038 or as an “emerging patterns of behaviour”.1039 Another attempt 
seeks to distinguish soft law from gentlemen’s agreements, inter-agency agreements, and 
rules within treaties that are too vague to impose a legally binding effect and therefore 
only serve as explanatory of the binding rules.1040  
                                                     
1032 Cf.: Andorno, R., 2007. 
1033 Bothe, M., 1980, pp. 91-92; Guzman, A.T., 2005, p. 592. 
1034 Cf.: Bothe, M., 1980, p. 91. From my working experience in the art market, especially in the segment 
dealing with restitution claims I can confirm the effect that non-binding principles give rise to expectations 
and trigger a certain pressure for compliance especially with regard to the Washington Principles. The 
Washington Principles are frequently cited as argument that a work of art must be restituted. Interesting to 
see was also that the practice developed its own understanding and scope of application of the principles: 
rather than restricting their referencing to cases of Nazi-confiscated works of art the principles were cited in 
any case dealing with spoliated art and as an argument for full physical restitution.  
1035 Jayme, E., 2002, p. 248. See further: Dunné, J.M.v., 1996, pp. 263-264. 
1036 Cf., with regard to the Washington Principles,: Rascher, A.F.G., 1999, p. 341; Frigo, M., 2004, p. 70. Cf., 
with regard to Resolution 1205, the Vilnius Declaration as well as the resolution of the European 
Parliament dated 17 December 2003,: Hartung, H., 2005, pp. 102-124; Selle, C.v. / Szchunke, U., 2006, p. 
384.  
1037 Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 54; Meyer, T., 2008, p. 6.  
1038 Ipsen, K., 2004, p. 251. 
1039 Hillgenberg, H., 2004, p. 499. 
1040 Cassese, A., 2005, p. 196. 
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This digest of definitions and concepts of soft law clearly shows that there exist 
different understandings of the characteristics and roles of soft law. In particular one 
can distinguish two different concepts of soft law within the various definitions: first, 
soft law as a term referring to rules of international law that are normative rules of law, 
but whose content is flexible and vague. Instead of establishing clear-cut norms the rules 
that fall under this first concept of soft law introduce incremental obligations to 
undertake certain extertions or relative obligations. Areas of law where this concept of 
soft law can be frequently denoted are non-traditional areas of international law, such as 
the protection of the environment and human rights.1041 
Under the second concept, soft law is understood as a description of “values, 
guidelines, ideas and proposals that may develop into rules of international law but have 
not yet done so”.1042 The crucial difference between the two concepts is that the former 
are normative rules whereas the latter are only principles de lege ferenda.1043 Rather than 
stating where the law currently stands, instruments that fall under the second concept of 
soft law suggest what the law may or should be in the future. The qualification of the 
prinicples as being de lege ferenda does not exclude the possibility that they can harden 
into legal rules. This “hardening” of soft law into hard law may happen via two different 
mechanisms: first, the non-binding rule can constitute the first step towards a treaty-
making process in which reference will be made to the principles already stated in the 
declaration. Secondly, non-binding rules may lead to the creation of customary law.1044 
The instruments we analysed in the present chapter with regard to the return of Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains respectively, fall under the second concept of soft law: 
they denote “values, guidelines, ideas and proposals that may develop into rules of 
international law but have not yet done so”.1045 Consequently, while they require 
signatory states to show a certain level of moral and political commitment, they do not 
impose any legal obligations on states to act in a particular way or even to provide for 
the return of the objects. Put differently, these instruments do not limit the states’ 
capacity to act in any way but serve as guidance on how states can react to the 
developments at the international level more in general and in specific cases of requests. 
In the following we will categorise the solutions proposed to facilitate the subsequent 
analysis of the national regimes.  
                                                     
1041 Dixon, M., 2007, p. 50. Dixon quotes Art. 2 of the Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 as an example of such a normative rule with vague content. The provision obliges the state parties to 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance (…) with a view to achieving progressively” 
the rights recognised in the treaty.  
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid. Cf.: Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., 1997, p. 54. 
1044 Cf.: Szasz, P., 1992, p. 68; Cassese, A., 2005, p. 491; Andorno, R., 2007. 
1045 Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, p. 50. 
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I I .  SO L U T I O N S  P R O P O S E D  B Y  THE  I N S T R U M E N TS  T O  F A C I L I TA T E  T H E  R E T U R N  O F  
NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T  A N D  HU M A N  R E M A IN S  
 The solutions proposed by the instruments discussed in the present chapter may 
be devided in two categories: solutions that seek to provide for or facilitate the return of 
the objects concerned by legal reforms and solutions that accept the present state of the 
law and seek to facilitate the return of cultural objects by different means.1046  
1.  LE G A L  SO L U T I O N S 
 Solutions pertaining to changing the law can be subdivided into the creation of a 
new basis for a claim on the one hand and the revival or strengthening of already 
existing legal norms on the other hand. The creation of a new basis for a claim has been 
realised and proposed with regard to the return of human remains. The ultimate 
example of a solution introducing new legally enforceable rights for the return of human 
remains is the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(“NAGPRA”).1047 The federal act introduced legally enforceable procedures that allow 
Indian tribes to recover human remains and funerary objects from federally funded 
museums.1048 Where human remains or associated objects are requested by a lineal 
descendant or a culturally affiliated tribe, federally funded museums are legally required 
to repatriate. At the international level, no comparable instruments exist. While Art. 246 
of the Treaty of Versailles also created a legal obligation for Germany to return human 
remains, it is a provision dealing with one specific case, i.e. the skull of Sultan Mkwawa 
only. As for the instruments adopted in reaction to the rise in claims for the return of 
human remains we have already seen that due to their legal nature none of the 
instruments can create legally enforceable rights on their own. The suggestion to 
recognise / create such rights at the national level is, however, made by theMataatua 
Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the 
Mataatua Declaration”) and by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.1049 As for the UN Declaration it must be pointed out that it is somewhat 
ambiguous. While Art. 12 recognises on the one hand the right of indigenous peoples to 
the repatriation of their human remains, its second paragraph limits the absolute 
formulation by asking states to enable the repatriation of ceremonial objects and human 
remains “through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction 
with indigenous peoples concerned”. Consequently, while the first paragraph of Art. 12 
suggests the creation of legally enforceable basis for a claim, the second paragraph limits 
this approach by referring to mechanisms that do not necessarily require the 
introduction of legal rights.  
                                                     
1046 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 240-284.  
1047 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act; Public Law 101-601; 25 U.S.C.3001 et seq.  
1048 25 U.S.C. 3005 (2004).  
1049 See Recommendation 2.12 of the Mataatua Declaration. 
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With regard to Nazi spoliated art, the analysis did not reveal any instruments 
providing for or seeking the creation of a legal basis for a claim. Instead, more emphasis 
is put on the “revival” of already existing norms and the facilitation of returns by legal 
means. “Reviving” existing norms is necessary where the passage of time has the effect 
that an original title or claims right can no longer be relied upon due to good faith 
acquisition, prescriptive acquisition or extinctive prescription. The facilitation of returns 
consists in getting rid of any legal obstacles preventing or complicating the return of an 
object, such as rules preventing disposal and export regulations. The technique to 
support the return of spoliated objects by not recognising a later acquired title and by 
excluding extinctive prescription has already been applied by instruments discussed in 
Chapter 1 (§4.II). Law No. 59 on the ‘Restitution of Identifiable Property’ in the U.S. 
occupied zone explicitly stated that a right to restitution could not be invalidated by the 
interests of a good faith purchaser.1050 The (First) Protocol of the 1954 Hague 
Convention goes even a step further.1051 According to Art. I 3, the obligation to return 
cultural property at the close of hostilities to the competent authorities of the formerly 
occupied territory is neither subject to any prescription, nor does it recede from any 
rights that might have been acquired after the export by a bona fide purchaser. 
Of the instruments discussed in the present chapter, the only insturment explicitly 
advocating the revival of existing norms and of facilitating return by legal means is 
Resolution 1205 of the Council of Europe. According to paragraph 13, national 
parliaments should consider to extend or remove statutory limitation periods, 
restrictions on alienability, as well as the waiving of export controls. Furthermore, in 
paragraph 15 (sub c), Resolution 1205 recommends to annul later acquired titles. While 
the Vilnius International Forum was supposed to further elaborate upon the call for 
legal reform from Resolution 1205, the final Vilnius Forum Declaration had abondoned 
the call for a legislative reform.  
2.  AL T E R N A T I V E  S O L U T I O N S   
 Further to solutions that seek to provide for or facilitate the return of the objects 
concerned by legal reforms, our analysis revealed that a number of instruments accept 
the current state of the law and propose solutions alternative to legal reform. The 
following proposals have been identified. 
First, a number of instruments made suggestions pertaining to facilitating the 
production of evidence. With regard to Nazi spoliated artworks, and in view of the 
difficulties of claimants to provide sufficient evidence of their original title and the 
circumstances of loss, the suggestions range from facilitating public access to historical 
                                                     
1050 Military Government for Germany, U.S. Are of Control, Law No. 59: ‘Restitution of Identifiable 
Property’, Military Government Gazette (Germany. U.S. Zone. Issue G) No. 10, November 1947, Art. 2. 
See for a discussion of the act more in detail above in chp. 1.§4.II.  
1051 Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed May 1954, 249 
U.N.T.S. 358. See for a discussion of the protocol more in detail above in chp. 1.§1.VI.2.  
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records and archives (Principle II 1998 Washington Principles, paragraph 4 of 2003 
European Parliament Resolution), to supporting the research with technical and human 
resources (Principles III, X, XI 1998 Washington Principles, paragraph 4 of 2003 
European Parliament Resolution), to adopting a lenient stand with regard to the 
evidence that must be produced. According to Principle IV of the 1998 Washington 
Principles “[i]n establishing that a work of art had been confiscated by the Nazis and not 
subsequently restituted, consideration should be given to unavoidable gaps or 
ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the circumstances of 
the Holocaust era”. The leniency pertaining to the evidence to be provided is not a res 
nova. It has already been relied upon in the post WWII restitution laws. Art. 3 of Law 
No. 59 on the ‘Restitution of Identifiable Property’ in the U.S. occupied zone provided 
for the presumption that all transactions made in the period 1933-1945 by a person 
belonging to a persecuted group qualify as an act of confiscation.1052 Another 
international legal instrument employing an assumption of illegal loss is the First 
Protocol of the 1954 Hague Convention. According to its Art. I 3 any cultural property 
exported during a period of occupation must be returned. 
With regard to facilitating the return of human remains only one of the instruments 
discussed explicitly stipulated the difficulties of claimants of making a claim. According 
to Recommendation 2.13 of the Mataatua Declaration “[m]useums and other 
institutions must provide, to the country and indigenous peoples concerned, an 
inventory of any indigenous cultural objects still held in their possession”. While the call 
for inventories is slightly different in nature than the proposals made in the context of 
Nazi spoliated art it nevertheless belongs to the categories of suggestions seeking to 
facilitate the production of evidence. 
A second solution proposed as alternative means to legal reform is the creation of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This solution has been proposed only with 
regard to Nazi spoliated art (principle XI of the 1998 Washington Principles; paragraph 
16 of Resolution 1205). More specifically, emphasis is put on the establishment of 
committees or other bodies with a balanced membership that can hear and decide cases 
without being limited to positive law applicable (principle X of the 1998 Washington 
Principles).  
Before we can scrutinise the solutions adopted at the national level we will first 
discuss the national legal frameworks applicable to cultural objects in public collections 
in view of their disposal and export. Such an analysis serves a better understanding and 
assessment of the solutions adopted at national level in cases of requests for the return 
of cultural objects. Furthermore, from a more practical point of view, a clear 
understanding of what is achievable within the present confines of the law is important 
                                                     
1052 See, e.g.: Military Government for Germany, U.S. Are of Control, Law No. 59: ‘Restitution of 
Identifiable Property’, Military Government Gazette (Germany. U.S. Zone. Issue G) No. 10, November 
1947. See further above in chp. 1§4.II. 
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as it takes away insecurities both at the side of the holding collections and the claimants 
and therewith contributing to informed communication and understanding.1053 
                                                     
1053 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, para. 280 where the effects of legal uncertainty are 
addressed. The legalistic approach which has been witnessed in the United Kingdom with regard to 
questions of return is in part accorded to the confusion and insecurities about the legal position of the 
museums. See also: Seidemann, R.M., 2004, p. 562.  
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C H A P T E R  3  
Comparative Overview of National Legal Frameworks 
applicable to Cultural Objects in Public Collections in view 
of their Disposal and Export 
 The present chapter explores the legal regimes applicable to public collections in 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (especially England) and France.1054 The finding 
from the two previous chapters that public international law does not provide for legally 
enforceable claims does not mean that the law is irrelevant for the return of cultural 
objects from public collections. In fact, the legal rules applicable to objects in public 
collections may hamper or even prevent a return. Obstacles could consist in the law 
applicable to the disposal of objects from public collections as well as the law applicable 
to the export of cultural objects.1055 Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to 
extrapolate the general law applicable to disposal and export of objects from public 
collection in the various jurisdictions and to identify potential obstacles. 
The law applicable to the de-accessioning of objects from public collections is strictly 
national in nature. In scrutinising the national law attention must be paid to various 
fields of law: specific statutes under public law, administrative law, civil law, and trust 
law. Given the great variety in the national approaches on the regulation of public 
collections and the national idiosyncrasies, the structures of the country reports naturally 
vary. 
With regard to export regulation, the analysis also needs to address European law. 
With all countries discussed in this chapter being Member States of the European 
Community their respective export regulations of cultural objects are to some extent 
shaped by European Community Law. A centralized discussion of the applicable EC 
                                                     
1054 See further on the choice of jurisdictions above in the Introduction (§2.I). 
1055 Cf.: § 13 d) of the Council of Europe Resolution 1205 (1999) on Looted Jewish cultural property that 
also mentions export controls as obstacle to restitutions. Resolution 1205 has been discussed in detail in 
chp. 2.§1.III.2. 
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law provides for a better fundament and therewith understanding of the national export 
controls. Consequently, before turning to the national jurisdictions, the relevant EC law 
with regard to export restrictions on objects of cultural relevance will be introduced. 
The subsequent country reports are represented in order of the extent of restrictions put 
on the disposal and export of objects from public collections starting with the country 
with the least stringent restrictions: first, the Netherlands, as a country with a very liberal 
approach towards the protection of cultural property, including export control will be 
analysed before turning to the law applicable in the United Kingdom, in particular 
England. The French legal framework is brought up to the rear. 
§1. EUROP EAN  COMMUNITY  LAW ON  THE  EXPORT  OF  NAT ION AL  TREASURES 
 From the outset of the European integration the creation of a common or 
internal market was one of the main aims pursued.1056 In accordance with Art. 14 of the 
EC Treaty, the internal market is an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. With regard to the present 
subject, the movement of art works across national borders, the relevant fundamental 
freedom to be addressed is the free movement of goods. The applicability of this 
principle to works of artistic or cultural value has been confirmed by the European 
Court of Justice (hereinafter: “the ECJ”) as early as 1968. In the case, which has become 
known as the “Italian Art Treasure Case”1057, the ECJ held that the principle of free 
movement of goods applies to any “products which can be valued in money and which 
are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions".1058 In other 
                                                     
1056 Cf.: Art. 2 EU Treaty, Art. 2 and Art. 14 EC Treaty. Cf.: Craig, P. / De Búrca, G., 2008, p. 604. While 
the articles speak of ‘common market’ respectively ‘internal market’ the literature generally agrees that there 
exists no fundamental difference between the two concepts. See, e.g.: Borries, R.v. / Zacker, C., 2002, p. 
124.  
1057 Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 423. The case dealt with the admissibility of an Italian law 
(Law no. 1089 of 1 June 1939, in particular Art. 37) according to which a special export tax was charged on 
works of art and other cultural objects. The Commission brought an action under Art. 226 EC Treaty (ex- 
Art. 169) alleging that the tax was in breach Art. 25 EC Treaty (ex- Art. 16, which has been repealed but 
whose substance is now covered under Art. 25). Art. 25 prohibits duties and charges of equivalent effects 
on exports. Italy argued that the cultural objects did not qualify as goods for the purpose of the rules on the 
customs union and that furthermore the tax was levied to protect the national heritage. The Court rejected 
these arguments and held that the cultural objects covered by the export tax can be valued in money and are 
cable of forming the subject of commercial transactions and therewith qualify as goods for the purposes of 
EC Law. The argument of the Italian State that the tax was levied to protect its national heritage as a 
justification of the measure could not bite: where a tax is caught by Art. 25 EC Treaty, it is per se unlawful. 
The attempted justification with reference to Art. 30 EC Treaty (ex- Art. 36) by Italy is only available as 
defence in relation to quantitative restrictions as caught by Art. 28 EC Treaty (ex- Art. 30). Cf.: Craig, P. / 
De Búrca, G., 2008, pp. 639-640.  
1058 Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 423; Psychogiopoulou, E., 2008, p. 19.  
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words, it is the economic character of an object that is determinative for the application 
of Community law.1059 
With the principle of free movement of goods applying to the trade in cultural 
objects, the trade has to act in conformity with the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports and all measures having equivalent effect (Artt. 28 
and 29 EC). Measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions have been 
defined by the ECJ in Dassonville as:  
 
“[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually 
or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect quivalent to 
quantitative restrictions”.1060  
 
While the Dassonville case dealt with the question whether a Belgian law was in 
violation of Art. 28 EC (ex-Art. 30), it has since been recognised that quantitative 
restrictions have the same meaning for Art. 29 as for Art. 28.1061 While in general Art. 28 
EC prohibiting restrictions on imports is the more important provision, it is of little 
relevance with regard to cultural objects as none of the EC Member States introduced 
any import restrictions for these objects. In principle, no state opposes to the import of 
cultural objects.1062 By subjecting the export of cultural objects to the requirement of 
obtaining an export licence, States can exercise control over which objects are exported 
and which are not. The subjection of exports to the requirement of an export licence 
qualifies as a measure having equivalent effect in the sense of Art. 29 EC.1063 
However, measures having equivalent effect are not per se unlawful. Instead, the 
broad interpretation of measures having equivalent effect is to some extent balanced by 
the justifications available under Art. 30 EC. According to the article:  
 
                                                     
1059 See for a discussion of EC case law in respect of the cultural field and grounds accepted by the court as 
justifications for restrictions to the free movement rules: Psychogiopoulou, E., 2006, p. 580 and especially: 
Craufurd Smith, R., 2004, pp. 28-40. 
1060 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5.  
1061 European Commission, I.M.D., 2001, p. 18,  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/art2830/guideart2830_en.pdf. 
1062 Cf.: Berndt, J., 1998, pp. 140-141; Peya, A., 2002, pp. 57-58; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 211. There do, 
however, exist jurisdictions that impose import restrictions on certain cultural objects: US Statute on the 
Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Murals, 19 USCA § 2091-2095 
(1976). See further: Nafziger, J.A.R., 1982, p. 191; Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 172-176. Cf.: above chp. 1.§2.IX.1. 
The reference in some publications (Fraoua, R., 1985, p. 89, fn. 57; Uhl, A.-K., 1993, p. 94, fn. 340; Bila, J., 
1997, p. 54) to a Dutch act prohibiting the import of cultural objects worth more than fl. 1000 without the 
presentation of an important license declaring that the object had been legally exported is incorrect. Such an 
act never existed in the Netherlands. Cf.: Email from Marja van Heese, State Inspectorate for Cultural 
Heritage, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science dated 9.10.2008 on file with the author.  
1063 Cf.: Case 68/76, Commission v. French Republic [1977] ECR 515.; Cases 51-54/71, International Fruit 
Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (No 2) [1971] ECR 1107; Schwarze, J., 1994, pp. 112-113; 
Müller-Graff, 1997a, para. 25. See further on the application of Art. 29 EC to the export of cultural goods: 
Peya, A., 2002, pp. 58-64.  
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“[t]he provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or 
goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States” (emphasis added).  
 
The ratio of Art. 30 EC is to provide Member States with a certain discretion under 
national law to compensate for the absence in protection at the community level.1064 
Justifing trade rules for certain policy aims, including the protection of national cultural 
treasures that would otherwise breach Artt. 28 and 29 EC, Art. 30 must be interpreted 
restrictively.1065 For a national rule to be saved by Art. 30 EC it must be justified by one 
of the listed categories and must pass a test of proportionality: only where the Court is 
satisfied that the discriminatory measure is the least restrictive possible to attain the aim 
in view can the rule be justified by Art. 30 EC.1066 
The literature has noted a number of questions on the interpretation of the article 
and its application.1067 In particular, discussion exists on the community concept of 
‘national treasures’ and the criteria of “artistic, historic or archaeological value”.1068 
Despite the lack of clarity with regard to the interpretation of Art. 30 EC, it is generally 
accepted that the article allows for the persistence of national legislation foreseeing in 
the control of the export of cultural objects.1069  
The protection of national treasures by national legislation could, however, function 
only for as long as the export of cultural objects was controlled at the national borders. 
                                                     
1064 Cf.: Müller-Graff, 1997b, para. 1. 
1065 The ECJ already held in the Italian Art Treasure Case that Member States must observe the limitations 
imposed by Art. 30 EC Treaty (ex-36 EEC Treaty) with regard to the objective to be attained and the nature 
of the means employed in order to profit from the exception to the principle of the free movement of 
goods ( Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 423). The finding was confirmed in: 46/67 Bauhuis v. 
Netherlands [1977] ECR 5. Cf.: Maurer, C.H.M., 1997, p. 49; Müller-Graff, 1997b, para. 14; Peya, A., 2002, p. 
79. 
1066 Cf.: Craig, P. / De Búrca, G., 2008, p. 696. 
1067 See, e.g.: Uhl, A.-K., 1993, p. 115-137; Schmahl, S., 1996, p. 43 ff; Bila, J., 1997, p. 120- 132; Berndt, J., 
1998, p. 142 ff.. 
1068 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 211. As of today, no case has been brought to the ECJ requiring for the 
interpretation of the provision. Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 486, para. 942 reports of an incident 
where the consistency of the Waverley Criteria with Art. 30 EC was raised: the case concerned a silver 
plaque by Paul van Vianen, which had been purchased in 1979 the Dutch Rijksmuseum. When the export 
of the plaque from the UK was prevented for reason of qualifying as a national treasure in the sense of Art. 
30 EC (ex-36 EEC), the Rijksmuseum argued that, although the article allows for restrictions on ground of 
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, the protection of 
cultural objects on grounds of their aesthetic significance or importance to scholarship, i.e. the second and 
third Waverley criterion, did not fall within that exemption. The Reviewing Committee rejected this view 
and concluded that the plaque could properly be considered as part of the United Kingdom’s national 
heritage and therefore within the scope of Art. 30 EC, given that it met two of the Waverley criteria. The 
matter was apparently not taken any further. Cf.: The Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art 
& Objects of Cultural Interest (RCEWA), 1979-1980.  
1069 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 211. 
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With the progressing integration consisting of the completion of the internal market in 
December 1992 as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”, and the gradual abolition of systematic 
border controls under the Schengen Agreement1070 the national export restrictions could 
no longer bite: without the existence of internal border controls, national treasures could 
be freely moved within the European Community in spite of national rules banning 
their export. Once removed from the territory where the object was protected under 
national legislation the object could be easily exported to a third country as the national 
legislation or the state of origin would not apply after the object’s removal from its 
jurisdiction (“cultural drain”1071).1072  
Against this background and in order to reconcile the fundamental principle of 
European Community Law of the free movement of goods with the protection of 
objects classified as "national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological 
value" in the sense of Art. 30 EC, the European Community adopted two measures: 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural 
goods (hereinafter: “the Regulation”) and Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 
1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a 
Member State (hereinafter: “the Directive”).1073 The two measures are complementary 
to one another in that the Regulation provides for EC wide uniform export controls at 
the external borders in order to prevent the unregulated export of cultural objects, 
whereas the Directive introduced domestic obligations in all Member States to return 
cultural objects unlawfully removed from another Member State.1074 In the context of 
the present chapter looking into restrictions on disposal of objects from public 
collections and their export, we will concentrate on the Regulation.1075  
                                                     
1070 The Schengen Agreement consists of two treaties: the 1985 Agreement between the Governments of 
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (Official Journal L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0013 – 
0018) also known as Schengen I, and the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (Official 
Journal L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 - 0062), also known as Schengen II or CIS.  
1071 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 226.  
1072 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 212.  
1073 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods, OJ No L 
395, 31.12.1992, p. 1, as amended by information of 27 March 1993, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 80; Council 
Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the 
territory of a Member State, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74. 
1074 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 232. 
1075 See further on the Directive above in chp. 1.§2.VI.  
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I .  CO U N C IL  RE G U L A TI O N  NO.  3911/92  O N  TH E  EX P O R T  O F  CU L T U R A L  GO O D S  
 The Regulation, which entered into force in 1993, introduced a uniform system 
of controls of cultural objects at the external Community borders.1076 Where a cultural 
object is exported within the Community, the export is not affected by the 
Regulation.1077  
Any object that falls under the scope of application of the Regulation may only be 
exported to a third country subject to the presentation of a valid Community export 
license (Art. 2(1)).1078 Rather than providing for a definition of cultural good1079, the 
Regulation’s scope of application is set out in an annex. The annex employs a system of 
categories of objects that are squared with financial thresholds. In total, there exist 
fourteen categories of objects and five ranges of financial values:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1076 Cf.: COM Doc. (91)447, SYN 382, 10 Feb. 1992, 2 according to which the Regulation aims at: 
“supplementing the protection afforded by (divergent) national rules with a common system of protection 
at Community level (…) Member States will have to play their part in protecting the national treasures of 
the other Member States, through harmonized export control at the external frontiers and machinery for 
returning cultural objects unlawfully removed”. In order to facilitate uniform controls, the Regulation 
introduces an EU wide system of export licenses for the export of cultural goods outside the customs 
territory of the Community. The system of export licenses is further outlined in Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 752/93 of 30 March 1993. See also: Siehr, K., 1993, pp. 225-240; Vitrano, V.J., 1994; Polonsky, 
M. / Canat, J.-F., 1996, p. 558; Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 213-214.  
1077 The fact that intra-community export is not governed by the Regulation does not mean that it is 
irrelevant for intra- Community trade. The national export controls, as measures having equivalent effect, 
must fulfil the requirements of Art. 30 EC. Furthermore, the regulation is indirectly relevant for intra-
community exports. According to Art. 1(2) of Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the 
return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State unlawful removal in the 
sense of the Directive includes removal in breach of EEC Regulation No 3911/92. See further on the 
Directive and its interaction with the Regulation above in chp. 1.§2.VI.  
1078 The provisions necessary for the implementation of the Regulation, in particular with regard to the 
forms to be used, are outlined in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 752/93 of 30 March 1993 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 on the export of cultural 
goods. 
1079 Note that the Regulation speaks of “cultural goods” while the Directive speaks of cultural objects. The 
difference in terminology has been criticised but it is generally assumed that there exists no material 
difference between the objects covered by the two instruments. See, e.g.: Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 215.  
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Table representing the categories of the Annex with the threshold applicable 
 
 
Category of cultural good 
 
Threshold value (in €1080) 
1. Archaeological objects more than 100 years old which are the products of: 
excavations and finds on land or under water 
archaeological sites 
archaeological collections1081
Regardless of the value 
2. Elements forming an integral part of artistic, historical or religious 
monuments which have been dismembered, of an age exceeding 100 years
Regardless of the value 
3. Pictures and paintings executed entirely by hand, on any medium and in 
any material (and which are not included in category 3A or 4)1082
≥ 150,000 
3A. Water-colours, gouaches and pastels 1082 ≥ 30,000
4. Mosaics other than those in categories 1 or 2 and drawings executed 
entirely by hand, on any medium and in any material 1082
≥ 15,000  
5. Original engravings, prints, serigraphs and lithographs with their respective 
plates and original posters 1082
≥ 15,000  
6. Original sculptures or statuary and copies produced by the same process as 
the original1082, other than those in category 1
≥ 50,000 
7. Photographs, films and negatives thereof 1082 ≥ 15,000 
8. Incunabula and manuscripts, including maps and musical scores, singly or 
in collections1081 
Regardless of the value 
9. Books more than 100 years old, singly or in collections1081 ≥ 50,000
10. Printed maps more than 200 years old ≥ 15,000 
11. Archives, and any elements thereof, of any kind or any medium which are 
more than 50 years old
Regardless of the value 
13. Means of transport more than 75 years old ≥ 50,000
14. Any other antique items not included in categories A.1 to A.13 
(a) between 50 and 100 years old:  
toys, games, glassware, articles of goldsmiths' or silversmiths' wares, furniture, 
optical, photographic or cinematographic apparatus, musical instruments, 
clocks and watches and parts thereof, articles of wood, pottery, tapestries, 
carpets, wallpaper, arms 
(b) more than 100 years old
≥ 50,000 
 
Where an object falls within one of the fourteen categories and the applicable 
financial thresholds it may not be exported to a third country without a valid 
                                                     
1080 The Regulation originally referred to ECU but was amended to incorporate the introduction of the 
Euro: Council Regulation (EC) No 974/2001 of 14 May 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 on 
the export of cultural goods. 
1081 Collections were defined by the Court of Justice in its judgment C- 252/84 Collector Guns v Hauptzollamt 
Koblenz [1985] ECR 3387 as: “Collectors` pieces within the meaning of heading N° 97.05 of the Common 
Customs Tariff are articles which possess the requisite characteristics for inclusion in a collection, that is to 
say, articles which are relatively rare, are not normally used for their original purpose, are the subject of 
special transactions outside the normal trade in similar utility articles and are of high value”. 
1082 The cultural goods must furthermore be older than 50 years and may not belong to their originators. 
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Community export license (Art. 2(1)).1083 The decision whether or not to grant an export 
license depends on national legislation. With different national regimes of protection, 
ranging from very liberal regimes to very restrictive ones, the crucial question is which 
national legislation is applied to decide whether or not to grant an export license. 
According to Art. 2(2), it is the national legislation of the Member State in whose 
territory the cultural object in question was lawfully and definitively located on 1 January 
1993 that is decisive for the granting of the export license. In those cases where an 
object is no longer located in the same jurisdiction where it was located as of 1 January 
1993, the law of the new jurisdiction will only be applied if the export from the 1993 
jurisdiction was lawful and definitive. 
In 1996, an exception was introduced to the general rule that any object falling under 
the Regulation’s annex may only be exported subject to a licence. Member States were 
granted the possibility to waive the need for export licences for archaeological objects of 
limited archaeological and scientific interest1084. Art. 2(2) second subparagraph, provides 
that no export licenses may be required for the following objects: archaeological objects 
where the objects are more than 100 years old and are the products of excavations and 
finds on land or under water and of archaeological sites outside of the territory of the 
Member State. Furthermore, the objects must be of limited archaeological or scientific 
interest and their presence on the market must be lawful.1085  
The aim of this provision, which has been called a “de minimis clause”1086, is to 
exclude less important objects from the obligation of an export license.1087 The clause 
has been criticized for being difficult to enforce as its application requires expertise that 
is generally not present with the custom authorities.1088  
The Regulation hence does not supersede national export regimes but complements 
them (or: rather allows for their effectuation) in order to allow for an effective 
protection regime in spite of absent border controls within the European Community. 
Given the broad scope of the Regulation’s annex the theoretical possibility that an 
object that is protected under national legislation is not covered by the annex and 
                                                     
1083 The provisions necessary for the implementation of the Regulation, in particular with regard to the 
forms to be used, are outlined in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 752/93 of 30 March 1993 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 on the export of cultural 
goods. 
1084 Cf.: Peya, A., 2002, p. 147.  
1085 The relevant passage of Art. 2(2) reads: “However, without prejudice to paragraph 4, the Member State 
which is competent in accordance with the two indents in the first subparagraph may not require export 
licences for the cultural goods specified in the first and second indents of category A.1 of the annex where 
they are of limited archaeological or scientific interest, and provided that they are not the direct product of 
excavations, finds and archaeological sites within a Member State, and that their presence on the market is 
lawful”. 
1086 Cf.: Peya, A., 2002, p. 147; Weber, M., 2002, p. 247 (with further references).  
1087 Peya, A., 2002, p. 147. 
1088 See, e.g.: Hipp, A., 2000, p. 270; Peya, A., 2002, pp. 147-148. 
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therewith will slip through the export controls and into the “cultural drain” can be 
neglected.1089 
I I .  RE L E V A N C E  O F  T H E  RE G U L A TI O N  I N  L I G H T  O F  R E Q U E S T S  F O R  T H E  R E T UR N  O F  
C U L T U R A L  O B JE C T S   
 While the Regulation aims first and foremost at the art market and privately 
owned cultural objects, rather than objects held in (permanent) public collections, it 
applies indiscriminately to any cultural object which falls under the annex’ categories. 
Consequently, the Regulation and its requirement for the presentation of an export 
license for the export of a cultural object to a third country apply also to object 
originating from a public collection, where the object concerned falls under the scope of 
the annex. 
The following steps must be taken to establish whether or not a return of a cultural 
object to a country not being an EC Member State must be supported by an export 
license in the sense of Art. 2 of the Regulation:1090 first, it must be established whether 
the object concerned belongs to one of the categories outlined in the Regulation’s 
annex. Given the broad scope of the annex, this is rather likely to be case. Where the 
object to be returned falls in one of the categories and meets the respective threshold in 
value, the object can only be exported subject to a valid export license.  
It can be concluded here that EC law as such does in no way prevent any returns but 
does under certain circumstances require the return to an entity outside the EC territory 
to be accompanied by a Community export license. As to whether or not a Community 
export license is granted depends on national law, which will be addressed in the 
following sections. The country reports will first discuss potential restrictions to disposal 
before turning discussing the rules on export control.  
§2. NATIONAL  LAW 
I .  TH E  NE T H E R L A N D S 
 The Dutch legal system for the protection of cultural heritage is of rather recent 
date compared with other European countries.1091 At the end of the 19th century, the 
absence of any government intervention on cultural matters was challenged when Victor 
de Stuers, a high ranking official and politician published his article ‘Holland op zijn 
smalst’ which one might translate as ‘Dutch frugality’.1092 In the article, which caused a 
                                                     
1089 Cf.: Odendahl, K., 2005, pp. 213-214.  
1090 Where the export is to another EC Member State it is governed by national export controls (which 
must comply with Art. 30 EC Treaty). 
1091 See on the history of the emergence of national regimes on the protection of tangible cultural heritage: 
Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 41. 
1092 Stuers, V.E.L.d., 1873.  
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stir, de Stuers criticised the neglect of the Dutch cultural heritage by the Government 
and pleaded for more governmental intervention. In response to de Stuers’ accuse a 
Government Department for the Arts and Sciences was set up. In 1918, it was turned 
into a full-fledged Ministry for Education, the Arts and Sciences (Ministerie Onderwijs, 
Kunsten en Wetenschappen).1093 It took several decades until the adoption of the first 
legal instruments on the protection of cultural objects it would take several more 
decades. The first act on the protection of cultural heritage adopted was the Monuments 
Acts (Monumentenwet) in 1961.1094 The first act to apply to the protection of movable 
cultural heritage, the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (Wet tot behoud van 
cultuurbezit) followed in 1984.1095 In the following we will introduce the main 
characteristics of the act and will discuss whether and in how far the act is relevant for 
the de-accessioning of objects in public collections. This question is important in that 
the act is generally considered to apply only to objects in private collections.1096 Once we 
have clarified whether there exist general restrictions to disposal we will turn to the 
more specific case where the object concerned has been acquired by donation or 
testamentary disposition. While there exists no general ban on disposal of objects 
acquired by donation or testamentary disposition1097, such a ban may arise from the 
obligations as stipulated by the donor or the testator. Subsequently, we will shortly 
elaborate on the question who is the competent actor to decide upon the de-
accessioning of objects in public collections, before rounding off the Dutch country 
report with an analysis of potential export restrictions.  
                                                     
1093 Please note that for reasons of simplification we only refer to the Minister of Culture in the main text 
and do not distinguish between the Minister and the State Secretary. In some government terms there exist 
an additional State Secretary for Culture to support the Minister of Education, Culture and Science. Given 
that the final responsibility lies with the Minister we do not think it necessary to make the distinction. 
However, in the footnote references, we distinguish between them. Also, it should be noted that the name 
changed from Ministry for Education, the Arts and Sciences (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en 
Wetenschappen) to Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Welfare (Ministerie voor Cultuur, Recreatie en 
Maatschappelijk Werk) to Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur 
en Wetenschappen) to Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en 
Wetenschap). Again for reasons of simplification we only refer to the Ministry of Culture.  
1094 Wet van 22 juni 1961 houdende voorzieningen in het belang van het behoud van monumenten van 
geschiedenis en kunst, Stb. 200 replaced by Wet van 23 december 1988 tot vervanging van de 
Monumentenwet, Stb. 638 and recently amended by Wet van 21 december 2006 tot wijziging van de 
Monumentenwet 1988 en enkele andere wetten ten behoeve van de archeologische monumentenzorg mede 
in verband met de implementatie van het Verdrag van Valletta (Wet op de archeologische 
monumentenzorg), Stb. 2007, 42.  
1095 Wet van 1 februari 1984 houdende vaststelling van de Wet tot behoud van cultuurbezit, Stb. 1984, 49.  
1096 See, e.g.: http://www.erfgoedinspectie.nl/page/collecties/de_wet_tot_behoud_van_cultuurbezit (last 
visited 21.6.2009).  
1097 Cf.: Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991b, p. 124.  
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1.  CU L T U R A L  HER I T AG E  PR E S ER V A T ION  AC T  (WE T  T O T  B E H O U D  V A N  
C U L T U U R B E Z IT)  
 The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (Wet tot behoud cultuurbezit) 
(hereinafter: “the CHP Act”) was adopted and entered into force in 1984.1098 Since then, 
it has undergone several revisions. The most notable amendments were made in 1995, 
for the purpose of harmonizing the CHP Act with European Community Law.1099 The 
main goal of the CHP Act is the prevention of the loss of objects that are significant to 
Dutch cultural history, and it is specifically concerned with the loss of access to the 
objects through export.1100 To achieve this end, the CHP Act makes any transfer or 
relocation of protected objects subject to notification of the State Inspectorate for 
Cultural and permission of the Minister of Culture.1101  
To receive protection under the CHP Act, an object must be deemed both 
irreplaceable and indispensable for Dutch cultural heritage.1102 An object is deemed 
irreplaceable when there are no similar objects present in the Netherlands.1103 An object 
is deemed indispensable if it fulfils a symbolic function, a “linking function”, or a 
“reference function.”1104 An object has a symbolic function if it serves as memory of 
historically important persons or events.1105 An example is the “Portrait of Jan Six” by 
Rembrandt.1106 The other two alternative criteria for judging indispensability are 
formulated rather cryptically and are party overlapping: a “linking function” (in Dutch: 
schakelfunktie) is explained as the “functioning of an object or collection as an essential 
element in a development that is of great importance for the exercise of scholarly work, 
including cultural science studies”.1107 An object is considered to have a “reference 
function” (in Dutch: ijkfunctie) if it “served as a starting point for the development for 
other scientific or artistic objects.”1108 
                                                     
1098 Wet van 1 februari 1984 houdende vaststelling van de Wet tot behoud van cultuurbezit, Stb. 1984, 49. 
1099 See further below in chp. 3.§2.I.4 on the changes to the CHP Act in the context of the implementation 
of Council Directive 93/7/EEC where we discuss potential export restrictions applicable to objects in 
public collections. 
1100 Art. 7 CHP Act.  
1101 Art. 7 juncto Art. 1(f). Transfers that do not affect the presence of the object in the Netherlands only 
need to be notified but do not require permission. 
1102 Art. 2.  
1103 Art. 2(2). 
1104 Art. 2(3). 
1105 Art. 2(3)(a).  
1106 See further on this particular painting, e.g.: Mak, G.L., 2005. 
1107 Art. 2(3)(b). See also: Memorie van Toelichting, 27812, nr. 3, p. 8 para. 7. An example of an object listed 
for its “linking function” is a stone sculpture of a standing triumphing Jesus Christ. The sculpture dates 
from the Roman period and is one of very few similar sculptures that are present in the Netherlands. The 
sculpture is thus important for the studying of stone sculptures in the Maas area. Cf.: Raad voor Cultuur, 
2001. 
1108 Art. 2(3)(c). See also: Memorie van Toelichting, 27812, nr. 3, p. 8 para. 7. An example of an objects 
listed for its ‘reference function’ is the ‘Portret van Jan Govertsen’ by Hendrick Goltzius. The oeuvre of 
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The exact scope of these functions is nowhere elaborated upon – neither in the 
legislative history nor in case law. While the criteria were discussed during an evaluation 
of the CHP Act in 1998 and 1999, no further light was shed on the meaning of the 
“linking function” or the “reference function.” Instead the discussion centered on the 
merits of including additional cumulative or supportive criteria in the CHP Act. In the 
end, the Council for Culture, as the main advisory body for the Dutch Government on 
cultural policy matters, confirmed the existing criteria of the CHP Act and held that 
there was no need to introduce further criteria such as “artistic value” or “presenting 
value”.1109 
Where an object fulfils the criterion of irreplaceability, and one of the three criteria 
stipulating its indispensability, it can be designated as a protected object under the CHP 
Act.1110 While any citizen can suggest the granting of protection to an object by writing a 
letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, it is the Minister of Culture, 
advised by the Netherlands’ Council for Culture, who ultimately decides whether 
protection is granted or not.1111 Currently, 270 individual objects and 31 collections are 
listed in the specific inventory to be maintained by the Minister under the CHP Act (the 
so-called Cultural Heritage Protection list).1112 The Dutch State Inspectorate for Cultural 
Heritage estimates that the total number of single objects, plus objects from the 
designated collections, ranges from 60,000 to 70,000 objects1113 At present, all objects 
registered under the CHP Act are objects from private collections. In the following, we 
will discuss the relevance and application of the CHP Act to objects in public 
collections.  
a) Cultural Heritage Preservation Act and objects in public collections: applicable to objects in 
public collections? 
When the CHP Act was adopted in 1984, the Dutch Government did not think it 
necessary to bring cultural objects in public collections under the scope of the act.1114 
With regard to the protection of objects held in public collections, the Dutch 
Government stated that public authorities and government-controlled museums were 
expected to “possess sufficient sense of responsibility to counter the disappearance of 
                                                                                                                                          
paintings by Goltzius is limited. The painting is the only signed and dated portrait by Goltzius and thus 
forms an important starting point for studying the oeuvre. Cf.: Ibid. 
1109 See also: Memorie van Toelichting, 27812, nr. 3, pp. 8-9, para. 7. “Artistic value” and “presenting value” 
as additional criteria were rejected for they were too difficult to define and their evaluation would depend 
too much on subjective factors and the zeitgeist.  
1110 Art. 1.  
1111 Art. 2(1) for single objects & Art. 3 in respect of collections junto Art. 3c specifying the registration of 
the objects in the list.  
1112 Art. 3c. See for the discussion in Parliament: Memorie van Toelichting, 27 812, no. 3, pp. 19-20.  
1113 Source: Email from Margot Llompart, Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap dated 
11.9.2008 on file with the author.  
1114 See on the relevance of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act with regard to the export of objects 
owned by the state or lower authorities, in particular its Art.14a, further below (chp. 3.§2.I.4).  
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really important works of art they themselves hold”. The argument continued that “one 
may reasonably expect that the government bodies will not act irresponsibly with regard 
to cultural objects in their care”.1115  
The State Council in its reading of the act adopted a more pessimistic attitude with 
regard to the protection of cultural objects in public property. According to the State 
Council, the argument that public authorities possess sufficient sense of responsibility is 
not persuasive. Furthermore, the State Council referred to the existence of statutes 
dealing with immovable cultural objects in public ownership, such as the Monuments 
Act as an argument to provide for protection of movable cultural objects in public 
ownership.1116 Despite the criticism of the State Council, the CHP Act was passed 
without any changes providing explicitly for the protection of objects of cultural 
relevance in public collections.1117 Within three years from the adoption of the CHP 
Act, the disposal of objects from a collection owned by a public authority became 
subject to extensive discussion when the city of Hilversum wanted to sell a Mondriaan 
painting from its collection.  
                                                     
1115 Memorie van Toelichting, Kamerstukken II 1980/1981, 16 749, p. 10. The relevant passage reads: “Van 
de overheid en de daaronder ressorterende musea zal men in het algemeen mogen vertrouwen, dat zij 
voldoende verantwoordelijkheidsbesef hebben om het verdwijnen van een eigen werkelijk belangrijk 
kunstbezit tegen te gaan”. Cf.: Boll, J., M., 1989, p. 130; Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991a, p. 49. See for a critical 
discussion of the exclusion of publicly owned cultural objects: Advies van de Raad van State, 1980-1981, 16 
749, B, p. 14.  
1116 Advies van de Raad van State, 1980-1981, 16 749, B, p. 14. 
1117 In response to the State Council the Minister of Culture stated: "the acquisition of cultural objects by 
the Government is generally driven by the aim to introduce the acquired objects into public collections. The 
motives for including the objects in public collections are generally of cultural-historical, scientific, artistic 
and educational character. The pending proposal is of no relevance for the realisation of these motives with 
regard to objects in public collections. The further argumentation in favour of including objects from public 
collections on the list, i.e. the early warning system of a potential loss is not valid with regard to cultural 
objects owned by public authorities. Consequently, I do not see the necessity to reconsider this passage in 
the memory of explanation". While the Minister of Culture refers to the motivation of public authorities to 
acquire and include cultural objects in their collections, he does not elaborate as to how this acquisition 
policy relates to the question of disposal of such objects from the public collections or even prevents it 
(Nader Rapport, 1980-1981, 16 749, C). In Dutch: “Ten aanzien van de plaatsing van overheidsbezit op de 
lijst zegt de Raad niet overtuigd te zijn door het in de memorie van toelichting geleverde betoog, dat onder 
meer het voornemen kenbaar maakt om overheidsbezit bij voorkeur niet op de lijst te plaatsen. De 
motivering, dat van de overheid in het algemeen voldoende verantwoordelijkheidsbesef mag worden 
verwacht om het verdwijnen van werkelijk belangrijk kunstbezit tegen te gaan (met eventuele vormen van 
preventief en repressief toezicht als mogelijk correctiemiddel), spreekt de Raad kennelijk niet aan. Ik mag in 
dit opzicht in de eerste plaats op wijzen, dat de aankoop van cultuurbezit door de overheid in het overgrote 
deel van de gevallen de opneming in een museumverzameling ten doel heeft. De overwegingen, die aan 
deze opneming ten grondslag liggen zijn meestal van cultuurhistorische, wetenschappelijke, artistieke en 
educatieve aard. Het wetsvoorstel heeft voor de verwezenlijking van deze overwegingen ten aanzien van 
overheidsbezit geen betekenis. Het argument voorts voor plaatsing op de lijst, namelijk het vroegtijdig 
signaleren van het gevaar voor verlies voor het nationale cultuurbezit, komt voor cultuurbezit in 
overheidshand te vervallen. Ik acht daarom een heroverweging van de desbetreffende passage van de 
toelichting op dit punt niet noodzakelijk”. 
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suspended the resolution of the City Council.1121 The royal decree stated that “the 
painting was of such great relevance for the Dutch cultural heritage that it satisfies the 
criteria employed by the CHP Act for the listing of cultural objects” and that “public 
authorities can be generally expected to preserve objects belonging to the Dutch cultural 
heritage satisfying these criteria”.1122  
The city of Hilversum initiated summary proceedings at the District Court in The 
Hague for the invalidation of the royal decree providing for the suspension of the City 
Council’s resolution.1123 The District Court sided with the State and confirmed the city’s 
responsibility to protect the national cultural heritage. The appeal of the city of 
Hilversum was dismissed by the Appeal Court The Hague.1124 According to the Appeal 
court, the decision of the city of Hilversum to dispose of the painting ignored the 
“special character of the right of ownership of government bodies with regard to works 
of art”.1125  
With the confirmation of the suspension of the City Council’s decision to sell the 
painting, any disposal of the painting was barred until further research would show 
whether the decision could be rescinded.1126 While the painting was in the end preserved 
for the Dutch cultural heritage by purchase of the city of Amsterdam, the case was 
reason for the Minister of Culture to consider the introduction of clearer guidelines or 
legislation on the disposal of objects from state-owned collections.1127 To this day, no 
such guidelines or legislation have been adopted.1128 This leaves us with the question as 
                                                     
1121 KB 17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344 houdende schorsing van het besluit van de gemeenteraad van Hilversum 
tot verkoop van een schilderij (KB 17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344). See further on the case: Boll, J., M., 1989; 
Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991b, p. 51. It would be interesting to see where a similar case arose today whether the 
Minister of Culture would make use of the emergency procedure granted to him since 1 June 2002 (Wet van 
7 maart 2002 tot wijziging van de Wet tot behoud van cultuurbezit in verband met een evaluatie van die 
wet, Stb. 2002, 145). According to Art. 3a and 3b the Minister can place objects under the protection of the 
Cultural Heritage Preservation Act without first having heard the owner and the Council for Cultural 
Matters (Raad voor het Cultuurbeheer). 
1122 KB 17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344 houdende schorsing van het besluit van de gemeenteraad van Hilversum 
tot verkoop van een schilderij. 
1123 President District Court The Hague, 14 July 1987, KG 1987-315. 
1124 Appeal Court The Hague, 26 November 1987, KG 1988, 72.  
1125 Ibid. In Dutch: “Hilversum miskent het eigen-aardige karakter van het eigendomsrecht van 
overheidslichamen op kunstvoorwerpen (...)”.  
1126 Cf.: KB 17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344 houdende schorsing van het besluit van de gemeenteraad van 
Hilversum tot verkoop van een schilderij. See further on the possibility to annul or suspend decisions by 
Royal Decree: Art. 132(4) of the Dutch Basic Law, Art. 10:35 General Administrative Code, Art. 268 of the 
Act on Municipalities. Cf.: Boll, J., M., 1989; Versteden, C.J.N., et al., 2008. 
1127 Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991a, pp. 46 & 51. 
1128 While the Minister of Culture asked the State Commission for the Museums (Rijkscommissie voor de 
Musea) to advice on the matter, the latter’s recommendation was not brought into effect in the form of a 
statute or guidelines. Advies of the State Commission for the Museums, 21 November 1989, ref. MR/III-
89-482. Reproduced in: Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, 1990, Annex 3. According to 
the Commission any plan to sell or trade objects from the State-owned collections was acceptable only in 
very exceptional cases and should be brought before the Council for Cultural Matters (Raad voor het 
Cultuurbeheer). Cf.: Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991a, p. 51. In 1995 the Council for Cultural Matters (Raad voor het 
 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   239 12-10-2009   12:09:13
240  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
to the relationship between the CHP Act and objects in public collections. That the 
CHP Act is relevant for objects in public collections became evident from the 
Mondriaan case. However, the case did not clarify whether the CHP Act was directly 
applicable to the painting or of indirect relevance only.  
c) The CHP Act and objects in public collections: extensive interpretation? 
From the legislative history of the CHP Act it appears that the Dutch Government 
and the State Council did not consider the act to apply to objects in public 
collections.1129 This understanding is reflected in the wording and structure of the act: 
while the CHP Act does not explicitly rule out the registration of objects in public 
collections,1130 its wording and the procedures that are relied on for the registration of 
an object clearly show that the act does not apply to objects in public collections.1131 
Consequently, an extensive interpretation of the CHP Act to include also objects in 
pubic collections would conflict with a literal and historical interpretation. It is only a 
teleologic interpretation, which differs from the historical one in that it may take into 
account new facts and situations that were not taken into account at the drafting stage, 
that pleads for an extensive interpretation of the CHP Act. However, the fact that the 
legislator did discuss and refuse the application of the act to objects in public collections 
prevents such an interpretation. Consequently, we must conclude that the CHP Act is 
not directly relevant for the de-accessioning of objects from public collections.1132 
d) Analogous application of the criteria of the CHP Act  
Regardless of the fact that the CHP Act does not directly apply to cultural objects in 
public collections it is nevertheless relevant in the context of the discussion of disposal 
from public collections: where Dutch law limits private property rights for the 
safeguarding of cultural objects of outstanding cultural-historical or scientific value for 
the Dutch public interest, the underlying ratio and logic of the CHP Act analogously 
                                                                                                                                          
Cultuurbeheer) became the Dutch Council for Culture (Raad voor Cultuur). The Commission for the 
Museums has been integrated in the Council of Culture (Raad voor Cultuur), department museums.  
1129 See above. 
1130 See Artt. 1-2 of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. Cf.: MvT, Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23657, nr. 
3, pp. 4-5. The Flemish Topstukkendecreet on the other hand explicitly includes both objects and 
collections in private collections as well as objects and collections owned by public authorities (Art. 5. § 1). 
Cf.: Draye, A.M., 2007, p. 390. 
1131 Cf.: Art. 3 of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. According to this provision it is the Minister of 
Culture who decides upon the granting of protection of a cultural object under the Cultural Heritage 
Preservation Act. The article stipulates that the Minister has to hear both the owner and the Council for 
Cultural Matters (Raad voor het Cultuurbeheer) before taking the final decision. The fact that the provision 
stipulates that the Minister has to hear the owner is an indication that state-owned property was not 
intended to fall under the protection of the act. After all it is the Minister of Culture who has been accorded 
responsibility for the management of the public collections and the cultural objects in state ownership. See 
further below on the relevant provision of the Government Accounts Act (Comptabiliteitswet 2001) below 
in chp. 3.§2.I.3.  
1132 See for a different opinion: Vlies, I.C.v.d., et al., 2009, p. 85. 
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demands the same from Dutch public authorities.1133 Consequently, although the 
deaccession of objects is generally not prohibited, public authorities may not part from 
an object that satisfies the criteria of irreplaceability and of indispensability of the CHP 
Act as outlined above.  
This view on the management and disposal of objects from public collections was 
also adopted by the Minister of Culture in 1990-1991 in the policy note ‘Opting for 
Quality’.1134 In the policy note, the Minister of Culture sketches the principles that 
should guide the management of public collections. Starting point of the policy note is 
that the quality of the Dutch collections and the access of the public are the 
predominant aims to be pursued. With regard to the disposal of collection items, these 
aims are translated into a literally conservative attitude.1135 While disposal is to be 
approached in a reserved manner, it is not subjected to a general ban. The question 
whether or not disposal of a specific object is allowed should be measured against the 
parameters of the CHP Act.1136 Put differently, where an object satisfies the criteria of 
irreplaceability and of indispensability, it shall not be disposed of.  
In order to allow for a better assessment of an object’s irreplaceability, the policy 
note introduced the notion of the ‘Collectie Nederland’.1137 The ‘Collectie Nederland’, 
which in English would translate as ‘the Netherlands Collection’ may be defined as the 
aggregate of all publicly accessible collections in the Netherlands for which society is 
prepared to take responsibility.1138 Comparing a specific object against all objects 
comprised in the ‘Collectie Nederland’ allows for a more substantiated decision on an 
object’s irreplaceability for the Dutch cultural heritage. The ‘Collectie Nederland’ 
therewith functions as an added framework for policy decisions, including decisions to 
dispose of objects.1139  
As stipulated in the introduction to the Dutch country report there may exist further 
restrictions to the de-accessioning of objects from public collections that have been 
acquired by donation or testamentary disposition. In the following, we will further 
                                                     
1133 Cf.: Boll, J., M., 1989, p. 131; Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, 1990, p. 24. See also 
the royal decree suspending the sale of the Mondriaan painting. The royal decree stated that “the painting 
was of such great relevance for the Dutch cultural heritage that it satisfies the criteria employed by the 
Cultural Heritage Preservation Act for the listing of cultural objects” and that “public authorities can be 
generally expected to preserve objects belonging to the Dutch cultural heritage satisfying these criteria”. KB 
17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344 houdende schorsing van het besluit van de gemeenteraad van Hilversum tot 
verkoop van een schilderij. See on a comparable situation where provisions on the protection of privately 
owned nature reserves were held applicable also to public nature reserves by their “external effect” 
respectively analogy: ARRS 8 juni 1994, AB 1995/25, m.nt. Chris Backes. 
1134 Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, 1990, p. 24.  
1135 The note considers disposal only in the sense of the selling of collection items. It does not mention 
disposal in the context of a case where the return /restitution of an object has been requested. 
1136 Act of 1 February 1984, Stb. 1984, 49. 
1137 Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, 1990, p. 10. 
1138 Cf.: Kuyvenhoven, F., 2001, p. 6.  
1139 Cf.: the non-binding guidelines on de-accession prepared by the Netherlands Institute for Cultural 
Heritage: Instituut Collectie Nederland, 2006.  
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reflect upon this specific category as claims for the return of an object may very well 
affect an object that has been acquired in this way. 
2.  RE S T R I C T I O N S  F R O M  D O N A T I O N S  A N D  T E S T A M E N TA R Y  DI S P O S I T I O N S 
 While the above analysis of the regulation of public collections showed that there 
exist no formal rules restricting the de-accession of objects from public collections 
except where the public destination of the collection calls for the analogue application 
of the CHC Act, restrictions may nevertheless exist where an object has been acquired 
by donation or testamentary disposition.1140 While there exists no general ban on 
disposal of objects acquired by donation or testamentary disposition1141, such a ban may 
arise from the obligations as stipulated by the donor or the testator. E.g. the donor or 
the testator might have stipulated that the objects concerned must remain exhibited in a 
particular museum1142, that the objects donated must always remain together1143, or that 
the collection donated may never be given in loan or exhibited outside of a certain 
institution1144. In the following we will address the question how Dutch law treats such 
conditions that might stand in the way of disposal, i.e. whether they constitute absolute 
bans or whether and if so how they can be amended. Both the inheritance law and the 
law applicable to donations changed recently: on 1 January 2003 the new rules on 
donations and inheritance law were introduced. Given the relevance of donations in 
acquisitions of public collections we will first address donations before turning to 
testamentary dispositions.1145  
a) Donations  
The specific legal regime applicable to donations is outlined in Title 3 of Book 7 of 
the Dutch Civil Code (DCC).1146 Furthermore, with donations qualifying as 
agreements1147, the general law of obligations as codified in Book 6 DCC is applicable. 
While Title 3 of Book 7 DCC dealing specifically with donations does not contain any 
rule or procedure with regard to amending restrictive conditions, there exists a provision 
in the general rules on obligations that allows for the amendment of conditions under 
certain circumstances. Art. 6:258 DCC contains the so-called ‘imprévision-rule’ according 
to which Dutch courts may, at the request of one of the parties, modify the effects of an 
agreement, or may wholly or partially set aside an agreement if due to unforeseen 
                                                     
1140 Cf.: Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, 1990, p. 24. 
1141 Cf.: Quaedvlieg, A.A., 1991b, p. 124.  
1142 Cf.: the condition by Dr. A. Bredius in the so-called Bredius case: Hoge Raad 16 maart 1990, NJ 1991, 
575. See for wording of the condition: Forder, C., 1993, p. 117. 
1143 Cf.: Hoge Raad 30 januari 1976, NJ 1976, 564 on the collection of Adriaan van der Hoop.  
1144 Cf.: Hoge Raad, 4 oktober 1996, NJ 1998, 397 on the collection Waller.  
1145 According to a survey dating from 1988 donations constitute the most important source of acquisitions 
for 67% of museums of cultural-historical character. Cf.: Bevers, A.M. / Halbertsma, M.E., 1991. 
1146 Artt. 7:175- 7:188 DCC.  
1147 See Art. 7:175(1) DCC. 
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circumstances the co-contracting party may, according to criteria of reasonableness and 
equity, not expect that the contract be maintained in an unmodified form.1148 
Consequently, where “unforeseen circumstances” occurred after the conclusion of a 
donation, which the parties have not taken into account when concluding the contract, 
modification or annulment of the agreement is possible. “Unforeseen circumstances” 
are circumstances that have not been factored in by the parties, rather than 
circumstances that could not have been foreseen.1149 However, a court will order the 
alteration or annulment of contractual terms only in exceptional circumstances. It will 
not give such an order when the change of circumstances is considered to fall within the 
risk of the party requesting it, taking into account the nature of the contract and 
common opinion. 
Applying the foregoing to a case in which an institution wishes to return / restitute 
an object that has been donated subject to conditions that restrict its disposal it seems 
likely that the court will alter or annul the terms prohibiting the disposal:1150 where not 
factored in by the parties a request for the return / restitution may qualify as unforeseen 
circumstances. In case of a pending request for the return or restitution of a cultural 
object the criteria of reasonableness and equity would command the alteration or 
annulment of the terms thus allowing for the disposal. Different from testamentary 
dispositions discussed in the following section, no case law exists on the alteration of 
conditions of donations to public collections.1151  
b) Testamentary dispositions  
Until 2002, there existed specific regulation on the alteration of obligations arising 
from testamentary dispositions in the form of the Museum Act (Museumwet).1152 The 
Museum Act provided for a very stringent regime under which stipulations in 
testamentary dispositions could be changed.1153 An application to the Supreme Court 
could only be made after more than 40 years had lapsed since the death of the testator. 
                                                     
1148 Art. 6:258 DCC reads in Dutch: “1. De rechter kan op verlangen van een der partijen de gevolgen van 
een overeenkomst wijzigen of deze geheel of gedeeltelijk ontbinden op grond van onvoorziene 
omstandigheden welke van dien aard zijn dat de wederpartij naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billijkheid 
ongewijzigde instandhouding van de overeenkomst niet mag verwachten. Aan de wijziging of ontbinding 
kan terugwerkende kracht worden verleend. 2. Een wijziging of ontbinding wordt niet uitgesproken, voor 
zover de omstandigheden krachtens de aard van de overeenkomst of de in het verkeer geldende opvattingen 
voor rekening komen van degene die zich erop beroept. 3. Voor de toepassing van dit artikel staat degene 
op wie een recht of een verplichting uit een overeenkomst is overgegaan, met een partij bij die 
overeenkomst gelijk”. 
1149 Cf.: Baan, E. / Valk, W.L., 2008, para. 19.11.  
1150 In the absence of case law on the alteration of conditions of donations to public collections (Schiphof, 
T., 2000, p. 214) it is difficult to draw generally applicable conclusions. In the end each case has to be 
analysed in its own right with due regard for the specific nature of the agreement and its terms.  
1151 Cf.: Ibid.  
1152 Wet van 1 mei 1925 tot herziening in het algemeen belang van bij erfstelling of legaat gemaakte 
bedingen, Stb. 174.  
1153 Kolkman, W.D., 2006, p. 151.  
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Furthermore, the possibility to amend conditions was not unlimited. Instead only the 
following conditions could be amended: 
 
a. the place where, and the manner in which, artefacts or objects of historical or scientific value 
(including documents), must be kept in a collection which is accessible to the public; or  
b. the extent to which, and under which conditions, the public must be afforded access to view or use 
the objects;  
c. the object to which money bequeathed for artistic or research purposes should be applied.1154 
 
In weighing the application, the Supreme Court had to decide in accordance with 
public interests and the wishes of the testator. 
With the introduction of new inheritance legislation in 20031155, the Museum Act 
became redundant.1156 The new inheritance legislation introduced two provisions that 
are relevant for the changing of conditions that might be applicable to objects 
bequeathed to public collections. Before further scrutinising the relevant Artt. 4:123 and 
4:134 DCC a few words must be said on the types of testamentary disposition according 
to which public collections may receive objects from the estate of a deceased. The most 
relevant scenario is that where a museum or public body receives a bequest.1157 A 
bequest is a “testamentary disposition by which a deceased grants one or more persons a 
right of claim”.1158 A bequest concerns one ore more specific objects.1159 The second 
possibility is that an institution or public body is appointed as heir and therewith shares 
in the entire estate of a deceased.1160  
Both types of testamentary dispositions - bequest and the appointment of heirs – can 
be subject to certain conditions as mentioned already above. Such conditions may take 
                                                     
1154 Art. 1. The translation of the conditions is based on: Forder, C., 1993, p. 120. For more information on 
this act see: Luijten, E.A.A., 1994a; Luijten, E.A.A., 1994b; Pitlo, A., et al., 1997, p. 248 ff; Hartkamp, A.S., 
1999; Schiphof, T., 2000. See for relevant case law e.g.: the ‘Bredius Case’ (Hoge Raad 16 maart 1990, NJ 
1991, 575) which has been discussed in the literature especially by private international law scholars for the 
interesting question it raised on the choice of law rules given the Monegasque nationality of the testator. Cf.: 
Forder, C., 1993; Boele-Woelki, K., et al., 2004, pp. 208-209. 
1155 Wet van 18 April 2002 tot vaststelling van de Invoeringswet Boek 4 en Titel 3 van Boek 7 van het 
nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, vierde gedeelte (aanpassing van de wetgeving aan het nieuwe erfrecht en 
schenkingsrecht), Stb. 230. 
1156 Cf.: MvT, Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 245, nr. 3 p. 25-26.  
1157 See for examples of objects acquired by legacy the cases listed in fn. 1154. 
1158 Art. 4:117 DCC. Translation based on: Sumner, I. / Warendorf, H.C.S., 2005, p. 49. In Dutch Art. 
4:117 (1) DCC reads: “Een legaat is een uiterste wilsbeschikking waarin de erflater aan een of meer 
personen een vorderingsrecht toekent”. 
1159 Cf.: Schiphof, T., 2000, p. 207.  
1160 See Art. 4:115 DCC on the appointment of heirs according to which “[a]n appointment of an heir is a 
testamentary disposition pursuant to which a deceased leaves his or her entire estate or a share therein to 
one or more persons who are thereby designated”. Translation based on: Sumner, I. / Warendorf, H.C.S., 
2005. In Dutch Art. 4:115 DCC reads: “Een erfstelling is een uiterste wilsbeschikking, krachtens welke de 
erflater aan een of meer daarbij aangewezen personen zijn gehele nalatenschap of een aandeel daarin 
nalaat”. 
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the form of a testamentary obligation.1161 In the following two paragraphs we will 
scrutinise Art. 4:123 DCC, which provides for the possibility to alter obligations arising 
from a bequest, as well as Art. 4:123 DCC on the alteration of testamentary obligations. 
Both articles bear resemblance to Art. 6:258 DCC discussed above concerning the 
amending of conditions of donations. While testamentary dispositions differ from 
donations in that they are unilateral in character1162, the travaux preparatoires of the new 
inheritance law nevertheless considered the Artt. 4:123 DCC and 4:123 DCC as lex 
specialis to the ‘imprévision-rule’ codified in Art. 6:258 DCC.1163  
Art. 4:123 DCC introduces a general procedure under which the legatee or the 
person burdened with the bequest may request the court to alter or terminate the 
obligations. Such alteration is only possible on the ground of circumstances that 
occurred after the death of the deceased and which are of such a nature that the other 
party, according to standards of reasonableness and equity, may not expect these 
obligations to remain in effect without alteration. In deciding upon the request, the 
court will take the intentions of the deceased into account as much as possible.1164 
Whether this excludes the possibility to dispose of objects from public collections will 
be discussed after Art. 4:134 DCC has been introduced. 
Art. 4:134 DCC introduces a procedure to alter or discharge testamentary obligations 
resting upon the heirs or legatees. Different from Art. 4:123 DCC concerning 
obligations arising from bequests, the possibility to seek for the alteration of 
testamentary obligations is not only granted to the person charged with the testamentary 
obligation but is also accorded to the Public Prosecutor. The underlying ratio for 
including the Public Prosecutor lies in the fact that the testamentary obligations may be 
in the interest of the general public.1165 Furthermore, Art. 4:134 DCC provides for a 
greater variety of situations in which testamentary obligations may be changed. The first 
                                                     
1161 Art. 4:130 (1) DCC states that “A testamentary obligation is a disposition by last will whereby the 
deceased imposes an obligation on the joint heirs or on one or more determinate heirs or legatees not 
consisting in the execution of a bequest”. Translation based on: Ibid. In Dutch Art. 4:130(1) reads: “[e]en 
testamentaire last is een uiterste wilsbeschikking waarin de erflater aan de gezamenlijke erfgenamen of aan 
een of meer bepaalde erfgenamen of legatarissen een verplichting oplegt, die niet bestaat in de uitvoering 
van een legaat”.  
1162 Cf.: Art. 4:42(1) DCC. 
1163 MvA I, Parl Gesch. (Inv. Boek 4), p. 2018. 
1164 Translation based on: Sumner, I. / Warendorf, H.C.S., 2005. In Dutch Art. 4:123 DCC reads: “1. De 
rechter kan op verzoek van de legataris of van hem die met het legaat belast is, de verbintenissen uit een 
legaat wijzigen of geheel of gedeeltelijk opheffen op grond van na het overlijden van de erflater ingetreden 
omstandigheden welke van dien aard zijn, dat de andere partij naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billijkheid 
ongewijzigde instandhouding van die verbintenissen niet mag verwachten. 2. Bij een wijziging of opheffing 
neemt de rechter zoveel mogelijk de bedoeling van de erflater in acht. 3. De artikelen 258 leden 1, tweede 
zin, 2 en 3 van Boek 6 en 260 leden 1 en 2 van Boek 6 zijn van overeenkomstige toepassing”. This third 
paragraph of the article declares the application mutatis mutandis of Art.s 258(1), second sentence, (2) and 
(3) of Book 6 and 260(1) and (2) of Book 6. These provisions concern the possibility to grant retrospective 
effect to alterations, that the alterations are applicable also to legal successors and that the court will not 
change the conditions where the changes in circumstances are caused or attributed to the requesting party. 
1165 Cf.: Luijten, E.A.A. / Meijer, W.R., 2003, p. 178. 
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situation is similar to the situation covered by Art. 4:123 DCC: the occurrence of 
circumstances after the death of the testator, which are of such a nature that the 
unaltered maintenance of the obligation would be unjustified having regard to the 
personal and societal interests involved.1166 The court may, upon request, also alter 
testamentary obligations where an obligation has become cumbersome or impossible to 
execute as a result of the abatement or reduction of the obligation or of the 
testamentary disposition to which it is connected1167 and in the case the obligation 
became incumbent pursuant to Art. 4:123 on a person other than the persons on whom 
the obligation was imposed by the testamentary disposition.1168 In all three situations, 
the court will bear in mind the intentions of the deceased as much as possible.1169  
The literature discussing the introduction of the new inheritance legislation 
emphasises that the possibility to alter conditions and testamentary obligations is much 
broader compared with the old regime applicable under the Museum Act.1170 While this 
finding is certainly true for conditions or obligations concerning objects that did not fall 
under the scope of the Museum Act, which was limited to objects of the “arts, history 
or science”1171, the finding is also true with regard to situations that were previously 
governed by the Museum Act.  
Under the current regime as introduced by Art. 4:123 DCC and Art. 4:134 DCC, 
there exists no minimum period of time that must have lapsed before conditions or 
obligations can be altered.1172 The current regime is also broader in that it does not list 
and thereby limit the conditions / obligations that may be altered or terminated. 
Different from the Museum Act, which exclusively listed three categories of conditions, 
                                                     
1166 Art. 4:134(1)a) DCC.  
1167 Art. 4:134(1)b) DCC. 
1168 Art. 4:134(1)b) DCC. 
1169 Art. 4:134(2) DCC. The third paragraph of the article declares the application mutatis mutandis of Artt. 
258(1), second sentence, (2) and (3) of Book 6 and 260(1) and (2) of Book 6. These provisions concern the 
possibility to grant retrospective effect to alterations, that the alterations are applicable also to legal 
successors and that the court will not change the conditions where the changes in circumstances are caused 
or attributed to the requesting party. Translation based on: Sumner, I. / Warendorf, H.C.S., 2005. In Dutch 
Art. 4:134 DCC reads: “1. De rechter kan op verzoek van degene op wie de last rust of van het openbaar 
ministerie de last wijzigen of geheel of gedeeltelijk opheffen: a. op grond van na het overlijden van de 
erflater ingetreden omstandigheden welke van dien aard zijn dat de ongewijzigde instandhouding van de last 
uit een oogpunt van de daarbij betrokken persoonlijke en maatschappelijke belangen ongerechtvaardigd zou 
zijn; b. op grond dat de last door inkorting of vermindering van de last, of van de making waaraan hij is 
verbonden, bezwaarlijk of onmogelijk uitvoerbaar is geworden; c. in geval de last ingevolge artikel 132 op 
een ander is komen te rusten dan degenen aan wie hij bij de uiterste wilsbeschikking is opgelegd. 
2. Bij een wijziging of opheffing neemt de rechter zoveel mogelijk de bedoeling van de erflater in acht. 
3. De artikelen 258 leden 1, tweede zin, 2 en 3 van Boek 6 en 260 leden 1 en 2 van Boek 6 zijn van 
overeenkomstige toepassing”. 
1170 Cf.: Luijten, E.A.A., 1994b, p. 138; Asser, C. / Perrick, S., 2002, para. 148; Luijten, E.A.A. / Meijer, 
W.R., 2003, pp. 175-176; Huijgen, W.G., 2005; Kolkman, W.D., 2006, p. 151.  
1171 Cf.: Art. 1 of the Museum Act.  
1172 The only reference to time under the current regime lays in the requirement that alteration or 
termination of obligations can only be requested where unforeseen circumstances occurred after the death 
of the testator. This requirement is, however, logic as the parties could otherwise renegotiate the conditions. 
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the current regime starts with a general approach under which the conditions / 
obligations in a specific case must be weighed against the standards of reasonableness 
and equity. According to Art. 3:12 DCC “[i]n determining what reasonableness and 
equity require, reference must be made to generally accepted principles of law, to 
current juridical views in the Netherlands, and to the particular societal and private 
interests involved”.1173 In a case where the disposal of an object from a public collection 
is required in the context of returning / restituting the object to a third party the 
derogating effect of the standards reasonableness and equity could allow for the altering 
or termination of the conditions otherwise preventing the disposal.1174 
In conclusion to this section scrutinising the possibilities to alter or terminate 
conditions or obligations originating from a donation or testamentary disposition 
preventing the disposal of an object it should first be repeated that there exists no 
general ban on disposal of objects acquired by donation or testamentary disposition. It 
is only where the donor or the testator stated explicit conditions or obligations 
stipulating e.g. that the object may never be removed or lent or that a collection must 
remain intact that the articles discussed in this section - Art. 6:258 DCC with regard to 
donations, Art. 4:123 DCC with regard to bequests and Art. 4:134 DCC with regard to 
testamentary obligations – become relevant. While it is one thing to amend conditions / 
obligations to allow an object to be moved from one museum to another it is a different 
matter to fully erase the obligation to preserve and object and therewith allow for its 
disposal. Only few cases have been tried since the introduction of the new legislation 
with regard to inheritance law and donations and none provide insight into whether 
disposal be allowed in a case where it is motivated by the wish to return / restitute the 
object concerned.1175 The derogatory effect of the standards of reasonableness and 
equity suggests that in cases of return / restitution disposal would be possible. It is also 
likely that the donor or the testator would have (had) sympathy for this cause.  
After having discussed potential obstacles and restrictions to the de-accessioning of 
objects from public collections, we will now address the question who is competent to 
act on behalf of a public authority under private law.  
3.  CO M P E T E N C Y  T O  D E C I D E  O N  D I S P O SA L  
 The question as to which organ of the legal personalities concerned has 
competences under private law is regulated in public law. While the State, the provinces, 
and the municipalities all possess legal personality (cf.: Art. 2:1, first paragraph General 
Administrative Code (Awb)), they are abstract constructs that cannot take concrete 
decisions but must be represented. 
                                                     
1173 Translation based on: Haanappel, P.P.C. / MacKaay, E., 1990.  
1174 See further on the derogating effect of the standards of reasonableness and equity, e.g.: HR, 20 mei 
1994, NJ 1995, 691, noot Brunner; Hesselink, M.W., 1999, pp. 166-172. 
1175 None of the cases touch upon objects in public collections.  
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At the national level, the relevant provision is provided for under the Government 
Accounts Act (Comptabiliteitswet 2001).1176 As a general rule, it is the Minister of 
Finances who is responsible for the management of movable and immovable things in 
state property (Art. 32(2) Government Accounts Act).1177 With regard to the 
management under private law of the public collections and the cultural objects in state 
ownership, however, the responsibility has been accorded to the Minister of Culture.1178 
Consequently, it is the Minister of Culture who represents the State as owner of the 
public collections in decisions involving the management of public collections, including 
the disposal of collection items. It is foreseeable that the Minister of Culture will 
introduce more specific regulation on the management of the state’s public collections 
in the near future: According to a proposal currently pending in the First Chamber, the 
Government Accounts Act should be amended to grant the Minister of Culture greater 
powers to adopt regulations on the management of cultural objects in state property.1179  
At decentralised level, the competences to act on behalf of a municipality 
respectively province rest with the municipal executive, consisting of the Mayor and 
Aldermen, respectively with the provincial executive (gedeputeerde staten).1180 Decisions 
by provinces and municipalities are subject to control by the Dutch Government.1181 
                                                     
1176 Comptabiliteitswet 2001 (Government Accounts Act): Wet van 13 juli 2002 tot vaststelling van de Wet 
inzake het beheer van de financiën van het Rijk, Stb. 2002, 414. 
1177 See: Ibid., Art. 32(2).  
1178 See Wet van 24 juni 1993, houdende de verzelfstandiging van de rijksmuseale diensten, Stb. 1993, 398, 
Art. 4 juncto Art. 1. Art. 4 of this Act providing for the privatisation of the national museums reads: "Onze 
Minister is belast met het privaatrechtelijk beheer van de museale verzamelingen of museale voorwerpen die 
eigendom zijn van de Staat dan wel aan de zorg van de Staat zijn toevertrouwd”.  
1179 Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 29 833, nr. 6, Wijziging van de Comptabiliteitswet 2001 houdende 
bepalingen inzake een nadere splitsing van de Rijskbegroting (Tweede wijziging van de Comptabiliteitswet 
2001). According to the proposal a new paragraph 3 shall be added to Art. 38 of the Comptabiliteitswet that 
allows the Minister of Culture to introduce specific regulation on the management of the state’s public 
collections. See also: Letter from the State Secretary to the Second Chamber from 1 July 2005 with the 
subject “rijkscollectiebeheer”, ref. no.: DCE/05/25372. The delegation of powers to adopt further 
regulation will not, however, affect the general rules with regard to the management of the collections under 
private law. 
1180 See Art. 160 (e) of the Act on Municipalities according to which the municipal executive, consisting of 
the Mayor and Aldermen are “in any event competent to decide upon legal acts under private law of the 
municipality” (In Dutch: “Het college is in ieder geval bevoegd tot privaatrechtelijke rechtshandelingen van 
de gemeente te besluiten”). Where a decision has far-reaching implications for the municipality the 
executive is required by Art. 169 (4) to hear the city council. There exists great insecurity about the 
interpretation of this provision but it is generally accepted that the decision must have significant financial 
consequences for the municipality concerned. Prior to the entry into force of the Act on Dualism, decisions 
under private law were taken by the city council. Cf.: Kortmann, S.C.J.J., et al., 1999, p. 532. See the 
Mondriaan case above for an example of a decision of the city council to dispose of an object. See for 
another example the case study on the West Frisian Eskimo in chp. 4.§2.I.1. See Art. 158 (e) of the 
Provinces Act according to which the provincial executive (gedeputeerde staten) are “in any event 
competent to decide upon legal acts under private law of the province” (In Dutch: “Gedeputeerde staten 
zijn in ieder geval bevoegd tot privaatrechtelijke rechtshandelingen van de provincie te besluiten”). Where a 
decision has far-reaching implications for the province the provincial executive is required by Art. 167 (4) to 
hear the provincial council. The competences to act on behalf of a municipality resepectively province have 
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4.  EX PO R T  R E S T RI C T I ON S   
 The first legal restrictions on the export of cultural objects from the Netherlands 
were based upon the 1945 Exchange control regulation (Deviezenorder 1945).1182 
According to the rules, which had been adopted with the aim to improve the Dutch 
currency market, any painting whose value exceeded f 20.000 and any other cultural 
object whose value exceeded f 80.000 could only be exported with a licence issued by 
the Minister of Culture. The 1945 Exchange control regulation proved to be a meagre 
legal basis and in the late 1950s, a ministerial committee was established to make 
recommendations on how to regulate the export of cultural objects. The report of the 
Committee Röell, named after its chairman, the director of the Rijksmuseum D.C. Röell, 
to subject any export of an object of a certain value to a ministerial license was, 
however, not put into practice.1183  
In 1969, a new committee of experts was installed, this time under the chairmanship 
of D.F.W. Langelaan, then chairman of the Rembrandt Foundation. While the 
recommendations of the committee Langelaan to ban only the export of certain listed 
objects, respectively to subject their export to a license form the basis of the current 
system on export control, it would take several more years before the CHP Act would 
be adopted. According to the explanatory report of the act, the reason for the delay was 
the need to further study the effects of the increasing liberalisation of the international 
trade and the dwindling possibilities to control the export.1184 
As a consequence of the delay, there was a gap in export protection between 1981 
when the 1945 Exchange control regulation expired and 1984, when the CHP Act 
entered into force.1185 During its first decade the export restrictions of the CHP Act 
applied only to certain designated cultural objects in private ownership. It was only in 
                                                                                                                                          
recently been changed in the context of an operation seeking to enhance the transparency of lower public 
authorities and in particular to strengthen the balance of power by re-organising (“dualising”) the tasks and 
competencies of the administration and the representatives of the people. Cf.: Stuurgroep Evaluatie 
Dualisering Gemeentebestuur, 2004, para. 2.2.. At municipal level, the changes were introduced by the Act 
on Dualism (Dualiseringswet) that entered into force in March 2002: Wet van 28 februari 2002 tot wijziging 
van de Gemeentewet en enige andere wetten tot dualisering van de inrichting, de bevoegdheden en de 
werkwijze van het gemeentebestuur" (Wet Dualisering Gemeentebestuur). At provincial level, the operation 
of dualising the tasks and competences between the administration and the representation of the people was 
introduced by the Act on Dualising Provincial Administration. Wet van 16 januari 2003 tot wijziging van de 
Provinciewet en enige andere wetten tot dualisering van de inrichting, de bevoegdheden en de werkwijze 
van het provinciebestuur (Wet dualisering provinciebestuur). 
1181 See further on the possibility to annul or suspend decisions by Royal Decree: Art. 132(4) of the Dutch 
Basic Law, Art. 10:35 General Administrative Code, Art. 268 of the Act on Municipalities. See above for an 
example the Mondriaan Case.  
1182 Deviezenorder 1945, Stb. F 222.  
1183 Cf.: Sjouke, P.S., 2007, p. 13.  
1184 MvT, Kamerstukken II 1980/1981, 16 749, p. 7.  
1185 The exchange control regulation expired with the entry into force of the Act on financial relations of 
foreign character: Wet van 28 mei 1980, Stb. 321 (Wet inzake de financiële betrekkingen met het 
buitenland). 
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1995, in the context of the implementation of Council Directive 93/7/EEC 
(hereinafter: the Directive)1186, that the Netherlands introduced export restrictions for 
objects from public collections by amending the CHP Act accordingly.1187  
Above we have already introduced the CHP Act, its parameters with regard to the 
listing of cultural objects from private collections as Dutch national treasures and its 
analogous application to the de-accessioning of objects in public collections. In the 
following we will not further touch upon the aspect of de-acessioning, but will focus on 
export restrictions applicable to objects from public collections as introduced in the 
context of the implementation of the Directive.1188 In the light of the aim of the present 
chapter we will also not discuss export restrictions of cultural objects in private 
collections. 
As discussed above in Chapter 1 (§2.VI) the Directive introduced domestic 
obligations in all Member States to return cultural objects unlawfully removed from 
another Member State.1189 One of the constellations that constitute unlawful removal in 
the sense of the Directive is removal in breach of national laws.1190 For an object to 
qualify as ‘cultural object’ in the sense of the Directive it must fulfil two requirements. 
First it must be “classified (…) among the 'national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value' under national legislation or administrative procedures within 
the meaning of Art. 36 of the Treaty” (Art. 1(1) Directive). Secondly, it must either 
belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex or must form an integral part of 
“public collections listed in the inventories of museums, archives or libraries' 
conservation collection” (Art. 1(2) Directive). 1191  
In order to profit from the protection granted by the Directive for the return of 
objects removed from the Dutch territory, the Dutch legislator had to provide for 
national legislation foreseeing in “administrative procedures within the meaning of Art. 
36 of the Treaty”. This was achieved by introducing Art. 14a to the CHP Act, which 
bans the export of an object from a Dutch public collection without prior written 
declaration by the object’s owner, or where not available by the Minister of Culture.1192 
                                                     
1186 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed 
from the territory of a Member State. See further on the implementation and the effects on Dutch private 
law: Salomons, A.F., 2007. 
1187 MvT, Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23657, nr. 3, pp. 1-3. Cf.: Sjouke, P.S., 2007, p. 23.  
1188 See for a critical assessment of the implementation of the Directive into Dutch law more in general: 
Bollen, C.J.M. / de Groot, G.R., 1995.  
1189 Siehr, K., 1993, p. 232. 
1190 Art.1(2) Directive. 
1191 See further on the Directive above in chp. 1.§2.VI.  
1192 Art. 14a Cultural Heritage Preservation Act: 1. Het is verboden een roerende zaak die integrerend deel 
uitmaakt van een openbare collectie die vermeld staat in de inventarislijst van een museum, een archief of 
een vaste collectie van een bibliotheek, en waarvan de Staat of een ander openbaar lichaam eigenaar is, 
buiten Nederland te brengen zonder dat de eigenaar daartoe schriftelijk toestemming heeft gegeven. Indien 
de eigenaar zich te dier zake niet verklaart, kan zijn toestemming op verzoek van een belanghebbende 
worden vervangen door een vergunning van Onze Minister. 2. Het verbod, bedoeld in het eerste lid, geldt 
eveneens ten aanzien van een roerende zaak die integrerend deel uitmaakt van:  
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The ban of Art. 14a CHP Act is not limited to cultural objects in public collections that 
are owned by the Dutch State and lower public authorities (Art. 14a(1) CHP Act). It also 
applies to those objects that are owned by the Dutch State but which are not part of any 
museum collection (Art. 14a(2)(c) CHP Act).1193 Furthermore, the ban may also apply to 
objects from the collections of a museum, archive or library, which owned by a legal 
person under private law but whose financing depends significantly on subsidies of the 
Dutch State or other public authorities. For the ban to apply the Minister of Culture 
must have designated the collection as falling under the ban and the object concerned 
must be listed in the institute’s inventory (Art. 14a(2)(b) CHP Act). Finally, the ban 
applies to objects that belong to collections of cultural-historical or scientific relevance 
that are owned by a religious institution (Art. 14a(2)(a) CHP Act); 
The administrative procedure introduced by the Dutch legislator concerning the 
export of public collections has correctly been characterised as very light regime that 
corresponds to the general attitude towards the protection of cultural objects in public 
collections.1194 In coherence with the disposal of objects from public collections 
emphasis is put on the discretion of the owner. Consequently, where an object from a 
Dutch public collection is to be exported from the Netherlands, also in a case of return 
or restitution, permission by the owner respectively the Minister of Culture is required.  
Where the export is to a third country outside of the territory of the European 
Community, the obtaining of permission from the owner is not sufficient. Further to 
the permission of the owner an export license in the sense of Council Regulation (EEC) 
N° 3911/92 is required (Art. 14b CHP Act). Art. 14b(2) CHP Act grants the Minister 
the power to introduce the exception provided for under Art. 2(2) second subparagraph 
of the Regulation for archaeological objects of limited archaeological and scientific 
interest. The Minister has so far not used this power.1195 
The competent Dutch authority to oversee the granting of export licences for 
exports outside of the territory of the European Union is the State Inspectorate, in 
                                                                                                                                          
a. een inventarislijst van roerende zaken van cultuurhistorische of wetenschappelijke betekenis waarvan een 
kerkgenootschap, een zelfstandig onderdeel daarvan, of een ander genootschap op religieuze grondslag 
eigenaar is; b. een openbare collectie die vermeld staat in de inventarislijst van een museum, een archief of 
een vaste collectie van een bibliotheek, en waarvan de eigendom berust bij een privaatrechtelijke 
rechtspersoon die in overwegende mate wordt gefinancierd door subsidie, die door de Staat of een ander 
overheidslichaam wordt verstrekt en die door Onze Minister voor de toepassing van dit verbod is 
aangewezen; c. de inventarislijst die door Onze Minister wordt bijgehouden van roerende zaken van 
cultuurhistorische of of wetenschappelijke betekenis. (…). 
1193 These more than 100.000 objects are managed by the Netherlands Institute for Cultural Heritage 
((Instituut Collectie Nederland (ICN)) and can be assessed via a database available at: http://www.icn-
collectie.nl/ (last visited: 7 April 2009). The Institute, which falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Culture has three more tasks further to managing this collection: consulting on management and 
preservation of collections, performing research, and disseminating and sharing knowledge. See further: 
http://www.icn.nl/en (last visited: 7 April 2009).  
1194 Sjouke, P.S., 2007, pp. 25-26.  
1195 Email from Marja van Heese, State Inspectorate for Cultural Heritage, Ministry of Education, Culture 
and Science dated 8.4.2009 on file with the author.  
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cooperation with the Tax Authorities and Customs. Given the light regime of 
protection, such a licence will be granted in the great majority of the cases. 
I I .  UN I T E D  K IN G DO M 
 In this section an overview will be given of the restrictions on the disposal of 
objects in public collections in the United Kingdom with an emphasis on England, as 
well as of potential export restrictions from the United Kingdom. It is difficult to 
categorise the many different museums in the United Kingdom but one can broadly 
distinguish between the following categories: local authority museum, university 
museums, national collections, charities, and collections vested in trustees pursuant to 
the terms of a trust obligation. Public collections can in be a number of these categories 
at the same time. As a consequence, various layers of law may apply simultaneously to a 
certain public collection.  
The following analysis will focus on the interplay between the various layers of law 
with regard to disposal from national museums. While local authority museums and 
university museums will not be further discussed, the elaborations of restrictions arising 
from trust and charity law are also true for these two categories of museums. As for 
local authority museums, these layers may be the only layers of law restricting disposal as 
they are generally not subject to statutory restraints on disposal.1196 With regard to 
university museums, they may be subject to rules against disposal depending on their 
governing instruments (royal charters and foundation deeds). 
Given the relevance accorded under Common law to the institute of the “trust”, 
which is unique to Common Law, restrictions on disposal arising from trust law must 
first be considered. Subsequently, the existing statutory restrictions on disposal of 
                                                     
1196 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000b, p. 348. The Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964 (c.75), London: The 
Stationery Office, which governs most local authority museums, gives local authorities the power to provide 
and maintain museums and art galleries (s. 12) but does not restrict local authorities’ powers of disposal of 
items in their collections (ss. 12-26). There exists, however, the possibility that local authority museums are 
subject to statutory restrictions on disposal of objects from their collections under Local Acts (Public 
Libraries and Museums Act 1964 (c.75), London: The Stationery Office, s. 23 on Local Acts). To illustrate 
this point, reference can be made to the Greater Manchester Act 1981, London: The Stationery Office and 
the County of Lancashire Act 1984, London: The Stationery Office. According to section 149 of 
Manchester Act, the Manchester Council has to hold “all works or other objects of art” on trust for the 
benefit of the citizens of Manchester. While the Council may dispose of any object from the collection, this 
may only be done for a consideration, i.e. in the form of a sale or exchange. The power to dispose of 
objects for district councils subject to the Lancashire Act is more restrained: disposal in the sense of parting 
not only with possession but also ownership is limited to those cases where an object is given to another 
institution in Lancashire (museum, art gallery or library) which is more suitable for the object’s suitable for 
exhibition or use. The disposal may be without consideration (County of Lancashire Act 1984, s. 58). Cf.: 
Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, para. 2.13. What the examples of the Greater Manchester 
Act 1981 and the County of Lancashire Act 1984 indicate is that while the Public Libraries and Museums 
Act 1964 as such does not provide for a statutory restriction on disposal, this does not mean the absence of 
any statutory restrictions. Instead, one has to take into account of the respective Local Act. See further on 
local authorities: Palmer, N., 2000a, pp. 30-35. 
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objects from the National collections, respectively the powers available for disposal will 
be scrutinised. In doing so, attention must also be given to the question how the law 
treats the disposal of objects acquired by gift or testamentary dispositions.  
After the regime with regard to the disposal of objects from public collections have 
been scrutinised, the analysis will turn to the question in how far restitutions might be 
affected or restricted by the existence of export restrictions. These restrictions focus on 
the individual object and hence apply irrespective of the public collection the object 
belongs to. Put differently, the layer of export control applies to all categories of public 
collections.  
1.  TR U S T  A N D  C HA R I T Y  L A W 
 Trusts are a creation of equity consisting of a relationship based on fiduciary 
confidence between one person (or persons), known as a trustee and another person (or 
persons), known as a cestui que trust (or, more commonly, a “beneficiary”).1197 A trust 
may apply to any sort of property. Created by legal instrument, a trust vests legal title to 
the property in the trustee(s) who is/are bound to administer the property for the 
benefit of cestui que trust, that is to say an identifiable beneficiary, in accordance with the 
terms of the trust and usually without personal benefit to the trustee.1198 Trustees can be 
individuals or a body corporate.  
For a trust to be enforceable at law there must be certainty about the beneficiary of 
the trust. In other words there must be someone capable to demonstrating to a court his 
or her right to benefit under the trust. Where there is no certainty as to the beneficiary 
the trust will fail.1199 Charity law provides an exception to this rule. Following the 
passing of the Statute of Charitable Uses, also known as the Statute of Elizabeth there 
gradually emerged a set of public interest purposes for which a trust could be said to 
exist as a matter of charity law, even though an individual could not be identified as its 
beneficiary.1200 As the law developed, the Sovereign’s Attorney-General became the 
guardian of the beneficial interests in charitable trusts, and during the twentieth century 
his role has been largely subsumed into that of the Charity Commissioners.  
In the eighteenth century, trust corporations were being created by Act of Parliament 
or Royal Charter for the foundation of institutions whose purpose was the public good 
(in the charitable sense) rather than personal gain for their members. Early examples 
included Sir Thomas Coram’s Foundling Children’s Hospital and of course the British 
Museum.   
Trusts have been called “the guardian angel of the Anglo-Saxon, accompanying him 
everywhere, impassively, from the cradle to the grave”.1201 They sure follow him into the 
                                                     
1197 Cf.: Rutherford, L. / Bone, S., 1993, p. 332.  
1198 Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, para. 403. 
1199 E.g.: Ramjohn, M., 2008, p. 54. 
1200 Stat. 43 Eliz. 1, c4 (1601).  
1201 Lepaulle, P., 1932, p. 113.  
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museum premises with the national museums and galleries being established by statute 
and whose Trustees hold the collections in trust for the (education of the) public.1202 
While the national museums and galleries are exempt from the mandatory provisions of 
the 1993 Charities Act under which charities are required to register with an account to 
the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales1203, there are nevertheless certain 
requirements of charity law that these institutions must conform to.1204 
As starting point, any museum which is a charity cannot dispose of its charitable 
assets other than in its interest pursuant to its own charitable trusts and pursuant to the 
powers and duties set out in the Charities Acts 1993-2006.1205 This does not mean, 
however, that trustees may only dispose of charitable assets where they have been 
granted explicit powers to do so. Therefore, before we will scrutinise the powers 
explicitly granted to the trustees of the national collections under statutory law, we will 
shortly reflect upon the situation where the Trustees wish to make an application of 
property of the charity where they have not been provided with such a power. This 
question was addressed in Re Snowdon.1206 In his judgment Cross J held that the 
Attorney-General had the power to authorise “a payment (…) out of charity funds 
                                                     
1202 Cf.: Forder, C., 1994, p. 146. The statutory powers of a local authority are not confined to charitable 
purposes, and accordingly, items in the collection of a local authority museum are not necessarily subject to 
charitable trusts. Where the collection originally passed to a local authority from a learned society or other 
charity, for example, the items comprised in the collection at that date may well be subject to special 
charitable trusts, but subsequent acquisitions by the authority for the purposes of its museum may not be, 
depending on the terms on which the item was acquired. So, for example, Glasgow City Council was able to 
transfer title in a Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt in the collection of the Art Gallery and Museum in Kelvingrove 
to the Wounded Knee Survivors Association in 1999. The shirt had been donated to the Glasgow museum 
at the end of the 19th century together with a number of other items. As no legal conditions were attached 
to the donation, there existed no legal obstacles to returning the Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt. See 
Memorandum from Glasgow City Council to the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, April 
2000, published with the minutes of evidence to that Committee in volume 2 of the Report of Cultural 
Property Return and Illicit Trade (HC 371-II).  
1203 See Schedule 2 of the Charities Act 1993 (c. 10). 
1204 Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 138. 
1205 It is fair to say that any public museum in the UK that operates for public benefit is either exempt, 
registered or entitled to register as a charity today. But for a number of local authority museums most public 
museums have done so. 
1206 Snowden, decd, In re [1970] Ch 700. The circumstances of In re Snowden were as follows: there were 
two summonses before Cross J, one relating to the will of Norman Snowden, the other concerning the will 
of Florence Henderson. In the case of the will of Norman Snowden, due to sales made in his lifetime, 
bequests of his shareholdings in specific companies had been adeemed but, in consequence, pecuniary 
legacies and bequests of shares of residue were much greater than the testator could have contemplated. 
The pecuniary and residuary legatees were six charities. They agreed, if the Attorney General had no 
objection, that various sums should be paid to the specific legatees. In the case of the will of Florence 
Henderson a manuscript but unattested addition to the will was omitted from probate. Under the will, as 
proved, the residue after payment of various pecuniary legacies was left to charity generally. The 
administrators sought the approval of the court, if the Attorney General consented, to give effect to the 
manuscript alteration. Thus, in each case, approval was sought for a transaction in which charity would 
forego money to which it was entitled. Cf.: The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 
1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the British Museum), para. 17. 
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which is motivated simply and solely by the belief of the trustees or other persons 
administering the funds that the charity is under a moral obligation to make the 
payment”.1207 The judgment of Cross J has since been enshrined in statute. Section 27 of 
the Charities Act 1993 gives the designated authority power to authorise the trustees of 
the charity to “make any application of property of the charity (...) in a case where the 
charity trustees (…) have no power to do so, but in all the circumstances regard 
themselves as being under a moral obligation to do so”. Hence, further to any explicit 
disposal powers granted to the trustees, they may make an application to the designated 
authority (the Charity Commission, the Attorney-General or the courts) to seek 
approval to part with property.1208  
While In Re Snowdon and Section 27 of the Charities Act provide for the situation 
that there exists no statutory powers for disposal, they do not address the question 
whether an application the designated authorities can also be made in those cases where 
the trustees regard themselves as being under a moral obligation to dispose of objects 
but are prohibited by statute from doing so. Put differently, could Section 27 of the 
Charities Act be relied upon – not in the absence of any statutory provisions providing 
for a power of disposal – where such a disposal was explicitly prohibited by statute? 
This question was addressed in the Attorney-General v. Trustees of the British Museum 
(The Feldmann case).  
a) Attorney-General v. Trustees of the British Museum (the Feldmann case)1209  
The Feldmann Case concerned a claim advanced in 2002 by the Commission for 
Looted Art in Europe on behalf of the heirs of the late Dr Feldmann for restitution of 
four old master drawings held by the British Museum. The drawings1210 had been seized 
in March 1939 by the Gestapo from Dr Feldmann’s house in Brno when the Nazis 
invaded Czechoslovakia. Three of the drawings later entered the museum's collection 
through a sale at Sotheby's in 1946, while the fourth was part of a bequest to the 
museum in 1949. The British Museum’s trustees agreed that the four drawings ought to 
be returned to the heirs of Arthur Feldmann as they felt they had a moral obligation to 
do so given the “exceptional atrocities committed during the 1933-1945 era”.1211 In the 
light of the statutory restrictions on disposal of the British Museum Act 1963, according 
to which the Trustees may not dispose of objects vested in them otherwise than in a 
                                                     
1207 Snowden, decd, In re [1970] Ch 700, p. 710.  
1208 Cf.: Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 138.  
1209 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum).  
1210 The Holy Family, by Niccolo dell'Abbate; An Allegory on Poetic Inspiration with Mercury and Apollo, 
by Nicholas Blakey; Virgin and Infant Christ adored by St Elizabeth and the Infant St John, by Martin 
Johann Schmidt; St Dorothy with the Christ Child, by a follower of Martin Schongauer. 
1211 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum), para. 5.  
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number of very limited circumstances1212, the Attorney-General instituted proceedings 
to resolve the question whether the express restrictions prevented a disposal of the 
drawings under the Snowden principle.1213 According to the Trustees of the British 
Museum, who argued analogue to Re Snowden, the Attorney-General had the power to 
authorise the Trustees, notwithstanding the express terms of the statute restricting the 
British Museum’s powers of disposal, to transfer the drawings to the claimants on the 
grounds that they were under a moral obligation to do so. The Attorney-General was 
unsure about the extent of his powers and had brought the matter before the Vice-
Chancellor of the High Court to resolve the question. 
The Vice-Chancellor held that “no moral obligation can justify a disposition by the 
Trustees of an object forming part of the collections of the museum in breach of section 
3(4) of the 1963 Act”.1214 Different from the Re Snowden1215, which confirmed the power 
to authorise trustees to make payments out of charity funds on moral grounds1216, the 
disposition of an object cannot be based on moral obligations contrary to statutory 
restrictions.1217 Consequently, the paintings could not be returned to the Feldmann heirs 
on moral grounds but remained in the collection of the British Museum. 
The case Attorney-General v. Trustees of the British Museum therewith clearly stated the 
hierarchy between the possibility to apply to the designated authorities under section 27 
of the Charities Act in favour of a disposal and statutory prohibitions on such disposal: 
where there exist statutory prohibitions on disposal of an object they can not 
superseded by the reliance on section 27 of the Charities Act.1218 For this reason, the 
subsequent paragraphs will analyse the powers and restrictions with regard to disposal as 
provided for in the individual constitutions of the national museums and galleries.1219  
2.  TH E  EN G L I SH  NA T I ON A L  CO L L E C T I ON S:  S T A T U T O R Y  PO W ER S  A N D  R E S T R IC T I O N S  
O N  DI S P O SA L  
 All national collections in England are subject to statutory restrictions on the 
disposal of items within their collection but vary in the degree of restrictedness in their 
                                                     
1212 See further below for an analysis of the exceptions available to the ban on disposal of s. 3(4) of the 
British Museum Act 1963, London: The Stationery Office (chp. 3.§2.II.2).  
1213 Snowden, decd, In re [1970] Ch 700.  
1214 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum), para. 45.  
1215 Snowden, decd, In re [1970] Ch 700.  
1216 “(...) a payment (…) out of charity funds which is motivated simply and solely by the belief of the 
trustees or other persons administering the funds that the charity is under a moral obligation to make the 
payment” (para. 4). 
1217 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum), para. 45. 
1218 See chp. 4.§1.II.1 discussing the work of the Spoliation Advisory Panel as to the final settlement of the 
case. 
1219 Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 138. 
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disposal powers.1220 Most but not all collections have also been granted powers to 
dispose of objects in their collections. In the following, the applicable statutory regimes 
of the national collections will be scrutinised with regard to the restrictions and powers 
provided for in the governing statutes.  
At first, the restrictions and powers to disposal applicable to the British Museum, as 
primus inter pares, will be analysed before turning to the restrictions on and powers of 
disposal as they apply to the other national collections.  
a) British Museum and Natural History Museum 
The British Museum is governed by the British Museum Act 1963.1221 According to 
section 8(3) of the British Museum Act, the Natural History Museum is subject to the 
same restrictions as the British Museum with regard to questions of disposal.1222 
Consequently, the following elaborations on the British Museum (Act) are true also for 
the Natural History Museum.  
According to section 3(1) of the British Museum Act 1963, “it shall be the duty of 
the Trustees of the British Museum to keep the objects comprised in the collections of 
the Museum within the authorised repositories of the Museum (…)”. Temporary 
removals of objects from the collection are only allowed for administrative reasons or 
the management of the collection, or in the form of loans for public exhibition (whether 
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).1223 Section 3 (4) of the British Museum Act 
complements the positive duty of the Trustees to keep the objects from the collection 
within the authorised repositories of the museum with the explicit prohibition of 
disposing of any objects vested in them otherwise than in accordance with section 5 and 
9 of that Act, or section 6 of the Museums and Galleries Act 1992.  
Under section 5(1), the British Museum may dispose of items vested in the Trustees 
if: 
 
“ 
a. the object is a duplicate of another object, or  
b. the object appears to the Trustees to have been made not earlier than the year 1850, and substantially 
consists of printed matter of which a copy made by photography or a process akin to photography is 
held by the Trustees, or  
                                                     
1220 As far as Scotland is concerned, there are no statutory restrictions on disposals from collections in the 
governance arrangements for Scottish museums. Similarly there are no statutory restrictions on disposals 
from the collections of the National Museums and Galleries of Wales. The National Museums and Galleries 
of Wales are governed by Royal Charter, and are not therefore subject to statutory restrictions on disposal. 
Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, paras. 1.12 & 12.11. 
1221 British Museum Act 1963, London: The Stationery Office. British Museum Act 1963, London: The 
Stationery Office 
1222 See s. 8(3) of the British Museum Act 1963 according to which “Sections 2 to 7 of this Act and the First 
Schedule thereto shall apply in relation to the Natural History Museum and the Trustees thereof as they 
apply in relation to the British Museum and the Trustees thereof (…)”.  
1223 Sec. 3(1) and sec. 4 of the British Museum Act 1963. See also further below (chp. 3.§2.II.4) discussing 
export restrictions on Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs). 
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c. in the opinion of the Trustees the object is unfit to be retained in the collections of the Museum and 
can be disposed of without detriment to the interests of students:  
 
Provided that where an object has become vested in the Trustees by virtue of a gift or bequest the powers 
conferred by this subsection shall not be exercisable as respects that object in a manner inconsistent with 
any condition attached to the gift or bequest.” 
 
The powers conferred sub a) and b) apply to specific, well-defined situations: 
duplicates and objects that have been printed after 1850. The scope of the third power 
granted, according to which an object that is considered "unfit" and whose disposal is 
without detriment to the interests of students" may be disposed (sub c) is less clear. The 
general interpretation of this clause is that an object qualifies as unfit “if no reasonable 
person would want the Museum to keep it because, for example, it is a forgery or was 
wrongly identified and is for that reason, in the Trustees' reasonable opinion, without 
merit or value".1224 
However, even if the object concerned fits any of these three categories (i.e. it is a 
duplicate, printed matter dating from 1850 onwards or is unfit to be retained), it may 
only be disposed of if it is not subject to any non-statutory restrictions. The British 
Museum Act does not lift the Trustees’ obligation to observe non-statutory restrictions 
in the situations set out in section 5(1). To the contrary, non-statutory restrictions are 
explicitly entrenched by the proviso that  
 
“where an object has become vested in the Trustees by virtue of a gift or bequest the powers conferred by 
this subsection shall not be exercisable as respects that object in a manner inconsistent with any condition 
attached to the gift or bequest”. 
  
Consequently, all three powers to disposal can be effected only where they do not 
contravene with any conditions attached to an object that has been received as a gift or 
bequest. This is different for the power granted in section 5(2). According to this 
section, Trustees are granted the power to dispose of any object vested in them if they 
are satisfied that it has become “useless for the purposes of the Museum by reason of 
damage, physical deterioration, or infestation by destructive organisms”. In this case, 
disposal can be affected regardless of the question whether the objects had been 
acquired in form of a gift or bequest. Consequently, section 5(2) provides trustees with 
the power to override trust and other non-statutory conditions.  
                                                     
1224 Cf.: Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 139. It has been suggested that “unfitness” of an object might 
“extend to moral unfitness or the shame of continued retention”. Such moral unfitness has never been 
argued or accepted as of today. Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, pp. 24-25; Palmer, N., 2000b, p. 349. However, even 
if one accepted that unfitness could be construed on moral grounds, the test in s 5(1)(c) is two fold: further 
to unfitness, disposal is subject to the requirement that it is without detriment to the interests of students. 
In the Feldmann Case discussed above the Trustees did not suggest that they were "unfit" by virtue of their 
provenance in the sense of s 5(1)(c) of the British Museum Act 1963. Cf.: The High Court judgement of 
24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the British Museum), para. 22.  
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Further to the disposal powers granted in section 5 of the British Museum Act, the 
Trustees might also be allowed to transfer an object from their collection to another 
public collection. Under section 9 of the British Museum Act1225 and section 6 of the 
Museums and Galleries Act 1992 Trustees are granted the power to transfer an object 
other approved museums as specified in Part I of Schedule 5 to the Museums and 
Galleries Act 1992.1226 For objects that have been acquired subject to a trust or 
condition, transferors are required to hold the object subject to the same trust or 
condition (s. 6(4)). Where a transfer of an object subject would be inconsistent with a 
trust or condition, the transfer is only possible after the person who first imposed the 
trust or condition or his personal representatives have consented (s. 6(3)).  
b) Other National Museums  
In the following, the restrictions on and powers to disposal of objects from the other 
national museums will be discussed. Against the analysis of the restrictions applicable to 
the British Museum (and the Natural History Museum), the respective regimes can be 
classified in three categories: first, museums that are subject to similar statutory 
restrictions as the British Museum. Secondly, museums that are subject to stricter 
restrictions on disposal than the British Museum and thirdly, museums that are subject 
to less stringent restrictions. In the following we will first discuss the collections that are 
subject to similar restrictions as the British Museum before turning to the category that 
is subject to greater restrictions and the category of more liberally regulated museums.  
National museums with statutory restrictions on disposal similar to the British Museum 
A number of national collections are subject to similar statutory restrictions as 
applicable to the British Museum. First, there are the collections of the Victoria & 
Albert Museum, the Science Museum, the Armouries and the Royal Botanic Gardens, 
Kew. All four collections are governed by the National Heritage Act 1983. According to 
section 6(3) of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the Victoria and Albert Museum may 
not dispose of an item which is vested in them and comprised in their collections unless:  
 
a. the disposal is by way of sale, exchange or gift of an object which is a duplicate of another object the 
property in which is so vested and which is so comprised, or 
                                                     
1225 S 9 reads “[a]ny movable property vested in the Trustees of either Museum [the British Museum and 
the Natural History Museum, K.L.] may be transferred by them to the Trustees of the other Museum”. 
1226 The following collections can be both transferors and transferees: The Board of Trustees of the 
Armouries, The British Library Board, The Trustees of the British Museum, The Trustees of the Imperial 
War Museum, The Board of Governors of the Museum of London, The Board of Trustees of the National 
Gallery, The Board of Trustees of the National Galleries of Scotland, The Board of Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland, The Trustees of the National Maritime Museum, The Board of Trustees of 
the National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, The Board of Trustees of the National Museums of 
Scotland, The Board of Trustees of the National Portrait Gallery, The Trustees of the Natural History 
Museum, The Board of Trustees of the Science Museum, The Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery, The 
Board of Trustees of the Victoria and Albert Museum, The Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission 
for England. 
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b. the disposal is by way of sale, exchange or gift of an object which in the Board’s opinion is unsuitable 
for retention in their collections and can be disposed of without detriment to the interests of students 
or other members of the public, or 
c. the disposal is an exercise of the power conferred by section 6 of the Museums and Galleries Act 
1992 (i.e. to an approved museum), or 
d. the disposal (by whatever means, including destruction) is of an object which the Board are satisfied 
has become useless for the purposes of their collections by reason of damage, physical deterioration, 
or infestation by destructive organisms. 
 
With regard to the question in how far the power of disposal granted to the Trustees 
may be exercised contrary to non-statutory restrictions, section 6(5) explicitly foresees in 
this possibility with regard to disposal of an object that has become useless (s. 6(3)(d)). 
In case an object has become useless in the sense of section 6(3)(d) it may be disposed 
notwithstanding a trust or condition.1227  
The same options of disposal are available to the Science Museum, the Armouries 
and the Royal Botanic Gardens.1228 With regard to the National Museums and Galleries 
on Merseyside1229, Art. 6 of the Merseyside Museums and Galleries Order 1986 also 
provides for the same restrictions.1230  
National museums with more stringent statutory restrictions on disposal  
In the following, four national museums subject to stricter restrictions on disposal 
will be discussed in ascending order according to the degree of restrictedness. While all 
four museums, the National Portrait Gallery, the Tate, the National Gallery, and the 
Wallace Collection, are governed by the Museums and Galleries Act 19921231, the 
applicable statutory restrictions and power to disposal vary.  
The Trustees of the National Portrait Gallery may dispose of works from their 
collection by transfer to another approved museum, of duplicates, and of objects that 
have become useless for the collections by reason of damage, physical deterioration or 
infestation by destructive organisms. In the latter case, disposal may be affected despite 
any trusts or conditions prohibiting the disposal of the object. Compared with the 
British Museum and the other national museums discussed above, the National Portrait 
Gallery misses the option to dispose of an object that is considered “unfit to be 
retained”. The Trustees of the National Portrait Gallery have, however, been granted a 
                                                     
1227 S 6(5) reads: “An object may be disposed of as mentioned I subsection (3)(d) notwithstanding a trust or 
condition (express or implied) prohibiting or restricting the disposal of the object”.  
1228 Ss 14(3), 20(3) and 27(2) of the 1983 Act respectively. As for the Board of Trustees of the Royal 
Botanic Gardens, it does not have the power under s 6 of the Museums and Galleries Act 1992 (c. 44), 
London: The Stationery Office to transfer items in their museums to approved museums.  
1229 The Liverpool Museum, the Museum of Liverpool Life, the Merseyside Maritime Museum, the Walker 
Art Gallery, the Lady Lever Art Gallery, Sudley House, the National Conservation Centre and the World 
Museum Liverpool. 
1230 Merseyside Museums and Galleries Order 1986, (as amended by the Museums and Galleries Act 1992), 
London: The Stationery Office.  
1231 See for an in-depth discussion of the Act and the legal situation of the galleries prior to the Act: Forder, 
C., 1994.  
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“sui-generis” disposal power, which mirrors the mission of the museum as National 
Portrait Gallery: in cases where the identification of the sitter of a portrait has been 
discredited, the Board of Trustees may dispose of the portrait by whatever means (!).1232 
The Trustees of the Tate may transfer an object to an approved museum, may 
dispose of an object considered unsuitable for retention, which can be disposed of 
without detriment to the interests of students or other members of the public and may 
dispose of an object which has become useless for the purposes of their collections by 
reason of damage, physical deterioration, or infestation by destructive organisms.1233 
Squared with the possibilities of disposal granted to the Trustees of the British Museum, 
the Trustees of the Tate miss the option to dispose of a duplicate. Furthermore, they are 
not granted the power to override any trust or other non-statutory restriction. In 
contrast with the power granted to a number of other national collections1234 according 
to which they may dispose of an object notwithstanding any trust or condition 
restricting such disposal where the object has become “useless”, section 4(4)(c) of the 
Museums and Galleries Act explicitly provides with regard to the collection of the Tate 
that “this subsection is without prejudice to any trust or condition (express or implied) 
prohibiting or restricting disposal of the relevant object”. 
The National Gallery is barred from disposing any item in its collection unless by 
way of transfer (by sale, gift or exchange) to an approved museum.1235 The Board of 
Trustees of the Wallace Collection, finally, has no power at all to dispose of objects in 
the collection.1236  
National museums subject to less stringent restrictions than the British Museum 
The group of national museums that are subject to a less stringent regime with 
regard to disposal is formed by the Imperial War Museum, the National Maritime 
Museum and the Museum of London, each of which are governed by their own 
museum act.  
According to the Imperial War Museum Act 1920, the trustees of the Imperial War 
Museum may dispose of any duplicate. Non-duplicate objects, which are considered 
unfit to be preserved or no longer required for the museum’s purposes may be disposed 
with the consent of the Secretary of State.1237 Furthermore, the museum may transfer 
objects to other approved museums. The Imperial War Museum Act contains no 
provision exempting the Trustees from observing non-statutory obligations.  
                                                     
1232 Museums and Galleries Act 1992 (c. 44), London: The Stationery Office, s 4(5). The terminology by 
“whatever means” suggests that this includes destruction. Cf.: Forder, C., 1994, p. 144.  
1233 Museums and Galleries Act 1992 (c. 44), London: The Stationery Office, s 4(4). 
1234 British Museum under s 5(2) of the British Museum Act 1963, the Victoria & Albert Museum, the 
Science Museum, and the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew under s 6(3), respectively s 14(3) and s 27(3) of the 
National Heritage Act 1983, London: The Stationery Office.  
1235 Museums and Galleries Act 1992 (c. 44), London: The Stationery Office, s 4(3). Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, 
p. 26.  
1236 Museums and Galleries Act 1992 (c. 44), London: The Stationery Office, s 4(6). 
1237 Imperial War Museum Act 1920 (c.16), London: The Stationery Office, s 2(1)(c). 
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The powers granted to the Trustees of the National Maritime Museum under the 
National Maritime Museum Act 1934 are similar.1238 On top of these powers, the Board 
may also transfer objects to any institution which receives monies provided by 
Parliament and which would be designated to hold the object. Similar to the Trustees of 
the Imperial War Museum, the powers of the Trustees of the National Maritime 
Museum are subject to any condition attached to a gift or bequest vesting the object in 
the Board for the purposes of the Museum. Different to the Imperial War Museum Act, 
the National Maritime Museum Act 1934 entrenches this general obligation in an 
explicit provision.1239 
The Governors of the Museum of London, may dispose of duplicates and of objects 
which “for any other reason are not required for retention in those collections”.1240 This 
power does not, however, supersede any restrictions originating from a trust or 
condition attached to the object.1241 
c) Restrictions applicable to public collections in Scotland, Wales and Nothern-Ireland 
As far as Scotland is concerned, section 8 of the National Heritage (Scotland) Act 
1985 restricts the disposal of objects from the national museums of Scotland.1242 The 
National Museums and Galleries of Wales, to the contrary, are governed by Royal 
Charter, and are not subject to statutory restrictions on disposal. As belonging to the 
charitable assests of a registered charity, however, objects from the collection of the 
National Museums and Galleries of Wales may not be disposed of other that in the 
interests of the charity having regard to the charitable powers and duties of its 
trustees.1243 As for Northern-Ireland, the Museums and Galleries (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1998 restricts the disposal of objects under section 5. According to section 
5(2)(b)&(e), however, the national museums in Northern Ireland are grantd to the 
authority to de-accession from its collections, subject to the consent of the Department 
of Culture, Arts and Leisure.1244  
                                                     
1238 National Maritime Museum Act 1934 (c.43), London: The Stationery Office, s 2(3)(b). 
1239 Ibid., s 2 reads: “(3) The Board shall have the general management and control of the Museum and for 
that purpose may - (b) exchange, sell or otherwise dispose of any duplicate objects vested in them for the 
purposes of the Museum, and with the consent of the Lord President of the Council exchange, sell or 
otherwise dispose of any objects so vested which the Board consider to be not required for the purposes of 
the Museum (…). Provided that the powers conferred by this section of selling or otherwise disposing of, 
or lending or transferring, any object, shall not be exercised in any manner inconsistent with any condition attached to 
any gift or bequest by virtue or in consequence of which that object was vested in the Board for the purposes of the Museum 
(Emphasis added). Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, para. 2.11. 
1240 Museum of London Act 1965 (c. 17), London: The Stationery Office, s 5(2). 
1241 Ibid., s 5(4).  
1242 See for the text of s 8:  
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Primary&PageNumber=39&NavFrom=2&par
entActiveTextDocId=1298640&ActiveTextDocId=1298651&filesize=6098 (last visited: 6 July 2009). 
1243 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, paras. 1.12 & 12.11. 
1244 See for the text of s 5:  
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Legislation&title=Museums+and+Galleries+(
Northern+Ireland)+Order+1998&searchEnacted=0&extentMatchOnly=0&confersPower=0&blanketAme
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3.  RE S T R I C T I O N S  O N  D I SP O SA L  F R O M  D O N A T I O N S  A N D  T E S T A M E N TA R Y  
D I S P O S I T I ON S 
 Further to the statutory restrictions on disposal discussed above, disposal may be 
barred on the grounds of non-statutory restrictions. The most relevant non-statutory 
restrictions arise from the situation where an object has been acquired in the form of a 
gift or testamentary dispositions subject to explicit or implied terms preventing 
disposal.1245 By means of example, the reader may referred to Attorney-General v Trustees of 
the British Museum1246 discussed above, which concerns four drawings from the collection 
of the British Museum, one of which had been acquired by bequest in 1949. While the 
fact that the drawing had been given to the museum by bequest was of no further 
relevance in the present case as disposal was barred already by statute, it might have 
been crucial in the absence of statutory limitations.  
In those cases where a museum is not prevented from disposal by statutory 
provisions, it may nevertheless not be able to part from an object or collection vested in 
the trustees pursuant to the terms of a trust obligation, usually contained in a will of a 
deed of gift.1247 Where the donee museum accepted a gift or bequest subject to a private 
restriction, the limitation is recognized by the law.1248 However, the mere fact that an 
object has been received as a gift or testamentary disposition does not necessarily mean 
that it is subject to restrictive conditions.1249 Instead, a case-by-case analysis must 
establish the exact conditions attached to a bequest or gift and whether these bar 
disposal and transfer of the object.  
In a limited number of cases disposal will be possible even if the conditions attached 
to the bequest or gift provide against disposal. This is, however, only the case where the 
governing statutes of the national collections explicitly provide for this option. The 
analysis of statutory powers above revealed that a number of national collections have 
been granted the power to override trust and other non-statutory conditions under 
certain circumstances.1250 Disposal in the context of a restitution case is, however, not 
amongst these circumstances. Rather, this power to dispose of an object in 
contravention of non-statutory restrictions is first and foremost granted where an object 
has become useless for the purpose of the collection by reason of damage, physical 
                                                                                                                                          
ndment=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber=1&NavFrom=0&parentActiveTextDocId=1012840
&ActiveTextDocId=1012849&filesize=2946 (last visited: 6 July 2009).  
1245 Above, the limitations on disposal under charity law have already been discussed. 
1246 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum). 
1247 Examples are the Wallace Collection or the Burrel Collection. See on the latter: Spoliation Advisory 
Panel, 2004 below in chp. 4.§1.II.1).  
1248 Jessup, P.C.J., 1991, p. 71. 
1249 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 25. 
1250 The National Portrait Gallery, the British Museum, the Royal Botanic Gardens, the Science Museum 
and the Victoria and Albert Museum. The British Library, the Museum of London, the National Maritime 
Museum, the Tate Gallery and the Merseyside Museums and Galleries have no power to override trusts and 
other conditions prohibiting disposal in any circumstances.  
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deterioration or infestation by destructive organisms. In all other cases, i.e. where an 
object has not become useless, it may not be disposed of in contravention of non-
statutory restrictions. This situation can of course be changed by changing the governing 
statute. Inspiration could, e.g. be drawn from existing legislation at lower administrative 
level. The Greater Manchester Act 1981 and the County of Lancashire Act 1984, e.g. 
ensure that the extent to which the powers of disposal conferred on local authorities 
may be restricted by obligations to respect any condition attached to a gift or bequest is 
limited to a period of 21 years (in the case of Manchester) and 35 years (for Lancashire) 
from the date in which the object became vested in the local authority concerned.1251 
There exists, however, resistance amongst the Trustees of the national museums to 
extent the possibilities to dispose of gifts and bequest for fear of sending wrong signals 
to potential future donors and testators.1252  
The wish not to disencourage donations and gifts might also be an explanation for 
the fact that some statutes entrench1253 non-statutory restrictions by explicitly stating 
that any power of disposal granted to the institution is subject to any trust or other 
condition which might restrict the disposal of a particular item.1254  
In the following section, the UK export control will be discussed and scrutinised 
with regard to the question in how far it applies to restitution cases. 
4.  EX PO R T  R E S T RI C T I ON S  
 Until 1939, no legal controls on the export of cultural objects existed in the 
United Kingdom. In reaction to the outbreak of World War II and in order to conserve 
national resources in general, the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 
1939 was enacted by Parliament, as well as the Defence (Finance) Regulations. Both 
legal instruments sought to ensure that the export of any good outside of the Sterling 
Area occurred only where the goods had earned their proper quota of foreign exchange. 
In 1940, antiquities and works of art were brought under the licensing system.1255  
After the revival of the art trade in the post-war years, the export licensing regime 
became subject to controversy when a number of owners had been refused export 
                                                     
1251 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, para. 2.20. 
1252 Cf.: Forder, C., 1994, pp. 150-151 who reports of the wish of the National Gallery of Scotland to have 
its disposal powers restricted as it felt that the absence of such limitations put them in a comparative 
disadvantage to other national collections with regard to gifts and bequests. See also: National Museum 
Directors' Conference, 2003, p. 12.  
1253 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006b, para. 3.39. 
1254 See, for example, the British Library Act 1972 (c.54), London: The Stationery Office, Schedule, 
paragraph 11(15); Museum of London Act 1965 (c. 17), London: The Stationery Office, s 5(4); National 
Maritime Museum Act 1934 (c.43), London: The Stationery Office, s 2(3)(e); Museums and Galleries Act 
1992 (c. 44), London: The Stationery Office, ss 4(4) & 4(5); British Museum Act 1963, London: The 
Stationery Office, s 5(1). 
1255 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2007, p. 80. See further on the history of export controls 
in the UK: Maurice, C. / Turnor, R., 1992. 
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licences without any corresponding purchase offer.1256 In reaction to this controversy a 
committee was appointed in 1950 to review the functioning of the export control 
system and to make recommendations for changes of the administrative 
arrangements.1257 The recommendations of the committee, named after its chairman 
Viscount Waverley, have shaped the UK export rules ever since1258 and are observed 
under the current export regime, which is derived from the Export Control Act 2002 
and the Export of Objects of Cultural Interest (Control) Order 2003.1259  
The Export Control Act 2002 as primary legislation replacing the 1939 Act, was 
adopted after the Scott Inquiry1260, which had identified a number of limitations in the 
1939 Act, including the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation made 
under the Act and the absence of any indication of the purposes for which export 
controls may be imposed.1261 In accordance with Section 1(1) of the Export (Control) 
Act 2003, the Secretary of State is provided with order-making powers to introduce 
controls on the export of any goods (…). The Export of Objects of Cultural Interest 
(Control) Order 2003, which entered into force in May 2004, is based on this provision.  
As a general rule under the Export (Control) Order 2003, all objects of cultural 
interest, which were manufactured or produced more than 50 years before the date of 
exportation may only be exported under the authority of a licence granted by the 
Secretary of State (S. 2 juncto Schedule 1, Art. 1). By requiring objects to be 
“manufactured or produced”, the UK export control does apply exclusively to man 
made items and does not affect natural items.1262 Applications for an export licence 
must be addressed to the Export Licensing Unit of the Museums, Libraries and 
Archives Council.1263 In order to reduce the administrative burden of the Licensing 
Unit, as well as of exporters, a number of exceptions and blanket permissions have been 
introduced.  
Excepted from the requirement to obtain an export licence are postage stamps and 
other articles of philatelic interest, as well as personal papers and goods exported by 
                                                     
1256 Cf.: Maurice, C. / Turnor, R., 1992, p. 275. Cf.: Waverley Committee, 1952, para. 22. 
1257 Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 457, para. 906.  
1258 Maurice, C. / Turnor, R., 1992, p. 275; Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2007, p. 80. See 
further below in chp. 3.§2.II.4 on the so-called Waverley criteria. 
1259 Export Control Act 2002 (c. 28), London: The Stationery Office;  The Export of Objects of Cultural 
Interest (Control) Order 2003, London: The Stationery Office; Department for Culture Media and Sport, 
2007, p. 80. Until recently, the UK export regime relied upon  
1260 Sir Richard Scott’s Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods 
to Iraq and Related Prosecutions in February 1996. See further: United Kingdom Parliament, 2002.  
1261 Ibid. 
1262 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2003, p. 31 where it is recommended to bring individual 
fossils of material value within the UK export control. In its response to the recommendation published on 
16 December 2004, the Department for Culture Media and Sport agreed to further consider this. 
Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004b, p. 5. As of today the wording of the Export (Control) 
Order 2003 has not been amended to include (a definition of) fossils.  
1263 Museums Libraries and Archives Council Notice, 2008, p. 4.  
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their maker or his or her spouse, widow or widower (Schedule 1, Art. 1 Export 
(Control) Order 2003).  
Further to the exceptions stated in law, the Secretary of State introduced blanket 
permissions in the form of an ‘Open General Export Licence’ (OGEL) as well as Open 
Individual Export Licences (OIELs) which permit the export of certain specified 
objects, even if over 50 years, without the need to obtain a licence.1264 The OGEL 
covers temporary exports of certain objects and largely includes those exported under 
an EU licence or objects that do require an EU export licence.1265 Examples of items 
that fall under the OGEL are musical instruments or motor vehicles, as well as 
permanent exports of objects below a certain monetary threshold, e.g. any painting in oil 
or tempera of a value below £180,000 (about € 227.234).1266 
OIELs are available to specific authorised individuals and institutions for the 
following categories: licences for goods imported less than 50 years ago; licences for 
regular exporters of manuscripts, documents, archives and photographs; licences for 
temporary (1-2 year) export of objects owned or under the care of museums; licences 
for certain other art objects approved specifically approved by the Secretary of State, 
exported on a regular bases and if imported less than 50 years ago.1267 The existence of 
OIELS stresses that the UK export control aims at private owners but generally applies 
to any person or institution wishing to export an objects of cultural interest in the sense 
of the Export (Control) Order 2003.1268 
Where objects are neither excluded from the export controls, nor fall under the 
OGEL or an OIELs, an export licence must be obtained. Straightforward cases are 
decided by the Staff of the Export Licensing Unit of the Museums, Libraries and 
Archives Council. More complex cases are referred to an expert adviser.1269 Where the 
expert adviser finds that the object to be exported is of national importance, he or she 
may object to the granting of the export licence. The assessment of an object’s 
(national) importance is based on three criteria promulgated by the Waverley 
Committee: 
 
1. Is the object so closely connected with our history and national life that its departure would be a 
misfortune?  
2. Is it of outstanding aesthetic importance?  
                                                     
1264 The current OGEL is the Open General Export Licence dated 1st May 2004, which was granted by the 
Secretary of State in exercise of powers conferred by Art. 2 of the Export of Objects of Cultural Interest 
(Control Order 2993). The OGEL does not apply to embargoed destinations.  
1265 Cf.: McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., 2000, p. 4.  
1266 See for a list of objects, manufactured more than 50 years before the date of exportation, which may be 
exported from the UK under the Open General Export Licence dated 1st May 2004:  
http://www.mla.gov.uk/what/cultural/export/~/media/Files/pdf/2004/elu_open_general_exp_lic_2004
0501.ashx. 
1267 Cf.: McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., 2000, p. 4.  
1268 Cf.: Barr-Smith, A., 1991, pp. 147 & 150-151; Museums Libraries and Archives Council Notice, 2008, p. 
7.  
1269 See for a list of the export advisers: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2003, p. 41, Appendix D.  
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3. Is it of outstanding significance for the study of some particular branch of art, learning or history? 
 
Since the “Waverley criteria” have been introduced in 1952, their wording has been 
unchanged. Their interpretation, however, has been broadened to some extent.1270 
Currently, the Waverley criteria are interpreted and applied as follows: 1271  
The first criterion, asking whether an object is so closely connected with the history 
of the UK and national life that its departure would be a misfortune, refers to national 
treasures whose export would constitute a loss for the country for the object’s 
outstanding artistic, historical, or archaeological value. For an object to qualify under the 
first criterion it is not required that is has been created in the UK. What is crucial is the 
object acquired national importance by association with an important person, location 
or event. Under the original interpretation, this criterion referred to objects of truly 
national relevance only, such as the “Alfred jewel” and the manuscript of Gray’s Elegy. 
Under the revised interpretation, however, also items that are of major importance for 
local history, items that have been part of collections which are of great historical 
significance, or objects which are associated with significant historical events, people or 
places can qualify under the first Waverley criterion.1272 
The second criterion, investigating whether an object is of outstanding aesthetic 
importance, is a subjective one. It is not restricted to great works of art only but is 
applied also to other objects, e.g. an exquisite snuff box. The assessment whether an 
object is of outstanding aesthetic importance is judged on a case by case basis even 
where it concerns work by great artists. It is not the case that any work by a great artist 
is outstanding in the sense of the second Waverley criterion. Instead, the assessment 
includes also the condition as well as the quality of the work in question, as well as the 
extent of damages and restorations.1273 
The third Waverley criterion, looking at an object’s significance for the study of 
some particular branch of art, learning or history, assesses whether the object is 
                                                     
1270 The broadening of the interpretation of the Waverley criteria was discussed in the 2003 Quinquennial 
Review of the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest. The 
role of the Reviewing Committee in the UK export control will be discussed further below (Ibid., pp. 44-
45). The recommendation to broaden the interpretation of the Waverley criteria was published on 8 
December 2003 and was subsequently accepted by the Department for Culture Media and Sport: 
Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004b, p. 5.  
1271 Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2003, pp. 44-45.  
1272 Examples of the first Waverley Criterion under the broadened interpretation cited by the Reviewing 
Committee are: the deposit from the ‘royal’ ship burial from Sutton Hoo, the Middleham jewel, the Lutterell 
psalter, the Dog of Alcibiades, a portrait miniature of Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley, the archive of 
manuscripts relating to the editing of Newton’s Principia Mathematica, decorations awarded to Sir William 
Carnegie in connection with the battle of Trafalgar, Lewis Carroll’s photographs of Alice Liddell, the Royal 
Standard belonging to Sir Ernest Shackleton and Captain Scott’s sledging flag. Ibid., p. 44.  
1273 Examples of the second Waverley Criterion are: Titian’s ‘Venus and Adonis’; Fra Bartholomew’s ‘the 
Holy Family with the Infant St John’, a pair of George II open armchairs by William and John Linnell, 
Henry Moore’s sculpture ‘Bird Basket’, a George III mahogany commode attributed to Tomas Chippendale, 
the drawing ‘A Peasant Family going to market’ by Gainsborough, as well as a watercolour by Van Gogh: 
‘Harvest in Provence’. Ibid. 
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outstanding in significance either on its own account or in connection with a person, 
place, event, archive, collection or assemblage. The value of retaining such an object 
within the UK lies in its service as benchmark for the assessment of other items. Under 
the revised interpretation of the Waverley criteria “learning” in relation to culture covers 
a wide number of disciplines, such as art history, archaeology, ethnography, 
anthropology, palaeontology, science, engineering, architecture or literature.1274  
There exists no hierarchy between the Waverley criteria.1275 If the export adviser 
comes to the conclusion that any one or more of the “Waverley criteria” is met and for 
this reason objects to the granting of a license, the application is referred to the 
Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest 
(hereinafter: “the Reviewing Committee”). 
The Reviewing Committee is a non-statutory independent body whose role is to 
advise the Secretary of State on all cases where refusal of an export licence for an object 
of cultural interest is suggested on grounds of national importance.1276 The Committee 
consists of a chairman and seven experts in the relevant fields (paintings, furniture, etc.) 
who are appointed by the Secretary of State.1277 After a case has been referred to the 
Reviewing Committee from the expert adviser, the Reviewing Committee will institute a 
hearing.1278 If the Reviewing Committee concludes that an item meets one or more of 
the Waverley criteria, its recommendation is passed on to the Secretary of State. The 
Reviewing Committee also advises the Secretary of State about the object’s condition 
and quality.  
Where the Secretary of State upholds the decision that the object qualifies as national 
treasure, the export licence is not refused outright. Instead, a period of delay is given to 
allow the state or a public institution to raise sufficient funds to make an offer to the 
                                                     
1274 The Reviewing Committee stressed that this list is illustrative and not comprehensive. Cf.: Ibid. With 
regard to concrete examples of the third Waverley criterion, the Reviewing Committee referred to: a lady’s 
secretaire by Thomas Chippendale, mathematical instruments associated with Charles, Earl Stanhope, 
ledgers and account books of Messrs Fribroug and Treyer, three albums comprising photographs of Indian 
architecture and scenery by Samuel Bourne, Shepherd and Roberson c. 1870, a 13th century gold and 
sapphire clasp, a Hutton Racing car, and the Swan Roll manuscript. Department for Culture Media and 
Sport, 2003, p. 44. 
1275 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2007, p. 22. Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 486, 
para. 942 reports of an incident where the Dutch Rijksmuseum challenged the validity of the second and 
third Waverley criteria: in 1979 the Dutch Rijksmuseum had purchased a silver plaque by Paul van Vianen. 
When the plaque’s export was prevented for reason that it satisfied the second and third Waverley criteria, 
the Rijksmuseum argued that the second and third Waverley criteria did not describe objects qualifying as a 
national treasure in the sense of Art. 30 EC (ex-36 EEC). The Reviewing Committee rejected this view and 
concluded that the plaque could properly be considered as part of the United Kingdom’s national heritage 
and therefore within the scope of Art. 30 EC given that it met two of the Waverley criteria. The matter was 
apparently not taken any further. Cf.: The Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art & Objects 
of Cultural Interest (RCEWA), 1979-1980.  
1276 See Terms of references of the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of 
Cultural Interest: Museums Libraries and Archives Council Notice, 2008, p. 30, Appendix D.  
1277 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2007, p. 81.  
1278 See further on the hearing: Maurice, C. / Turnor, R., 1992, p. 285.  
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owner to buy the work at the price which the Reviewing Committee recommends as the 
“fair market price”.1279 In case an offer is made and accepted by the owner, the 
application for the export licence lapses.   
In those cases where the state or the public institutions do not succeed in raising the 
necessary funds by the end of the deferral period, which is generally between 2-6 
months an export license will be granted, despite the fact that the object is considered as 
national treasure.1280 It is only where the owner refuses an offer at fair market value that 
an export licence will be refused.1281  
Overall, the UK export control, with the Waverley system functioning as a tripwire 
rather than a mandatory right of pre-emption1282 qualifies as a very liberal regulation of 
exports of cultural objects from the UK.1283 The interpretation of the Waverley criteria 
and their application in practice result in regime in which government approval is only 
required for the export of very valuable and important man-made objects of cultural 
relevance and in which export prohibitions are very rare.1284  
I I I .  FR A N C E   
 France has a long history of protecting objects of cultural relevance. The idea of 
museums as comprehensive collections of valuable cultural objects took flight during 
the French Revolution (1789-1799).1285 It would take, however, some time before the 
idea found expression in law. At the beginning of the 20th century, after the first 
protection measures on cultural heritage had focused solely on immovable objects1286 
and cultural objects in state ownership1287, the Act on Historical Monuments from 31 
December 1913 introduced a broader realm for the protection of immovable and 
                                                     
1279 Cf.: Ibid., p. 286; McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., 2000, p. 3. See further on the calculation of the fair 
market value: Polonsky, M. / Canat, J.-F., 1996, p. 567; Weber, M., 2002, p. 340; Museums Libraries and 
Archives Council Notice, 2008, pp. 13-14. See the latter at pp. 12-13 on the decision on the length of the 
deferral period. 
1280 Cf.: McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., 2000, p. 3; Cohan, A., 2004, p. 54. 
1281 Cf.: Polonsky, M. / Canat, J.-F., 1996, p. 567.  
1282 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2007, p. 19. 
1283 Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 355.  
1284 McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., 2000, p. 18; Weber, M., 2002, p. 355. 
1285 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 19 (with further references). See also: Jenschke, C., 2005, pp. 123-124. 
1286 Odendahl, K., 2005, p. 26 (with further references). 
1287 Loi du 30 mars 1887 relative à la conservation des monuments et object d'art ayant un intérêt historique 
et artistique, JO, 31 mars 1887, Bull. n° 17739. The act was adopted in reaction to a case in which the 
French State failed to revindicate the sarcophagus of the French politician Philippe Pot, which had been 
acquired by a private person in good faith. Richard de Vesvrotte v. l'État Dijon, Decision of 3.3.1886, D.P. 
1887, II, 253. Cf.: Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 238, para. 405; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 30. Had the 
object belonged to the domaine public, such acquisition had not been possible. The notion of domaine public is 
discussed in the following section.  
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movable cultural objects both in public and private ownership.1288 The Act is considered 
as the fundament of the current French system of protecting cultural property.1289   
Since the adoption of the Act on Historical Monuments, a whole range of laws and 
regulations have been adopted for the protection of cultural property.1290 As a result, a 
complex and compartmentalised system, involving different national services 
responsible for the protection of cultural property had emerged.1291 In 2004, in the 
context of a greater operation of the French Government to simplify the law1292, the 
Cultural Heritage Code (Code du Patrimoine) was adopted.1293 The Cultural Heritage Code 
(hereinafter: “the CHC”) unifies and regroups the previously scattered laws dealing with 
tangible cultural heritage. Before discussing the CHC in view of restrictions to disposal 
and export of cultural objects, we will first introduce the notion of the domaine public as 
another relevant aspect of the French legal system of the protection of cultural objects.  
1.  DO MA IN E  P U BL I C   
 The notion of the domaine public constitutes a specific regime of protection under 
French law for part of the public property, which is not limited to objects of cultural 
relevance.1294 It differs between two categories of state property (domaine de l’Etat): the 
domaine public and the domaine privé. The domaine public consists of those objects that are 
considered as indispensable for the fulfilment of public tasks.1295 Objects that are merely 
useful but not crucial for the functioning of the state and the public authorities fall in 
the domaine privé.1296 This dichotomy with regard to objects in state ownership and the 
criteria that determine as to whether an object falls in the domaine public have been 
developed in case law1297 and doctrine1298 from the 19th century onwards.1299 The exact 
                                                     
1288 Loi du 31 décembre 1913 sur les monuments historiques, JO 1 janvier 1914, p. 129. Cf.: Prott, L.V. / 
O'Keefe, P.J., 1989, p. 455, para. 904; Weber, M., 2002, p. 76-77. 
1289 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 30; Cornu, M., 2008. 
1290 See, e.g.: Loi du 1 mai 1920 prohibant l'exportation des objets d'art et ameublement anciens et 
soumettant à des droit de sortie ceux des ces objets dont l'exportation aura été autorisé; Loi du 23 juin 1941 
relative à l'exportation des oeuvres d'art, JO 19 juin 1941;Loi n° 92-1477 du 31 décembre 1992 relative aux 
produits soumis à certaines restrictions de circulation et à la complémentarité entre les services de police, de 
gendarmerie et de douane, disposition relatives aux biens culturels, JO 5 janvier 1993, p. 198; Loi n° 95-877 
du 3 août 1995 portant transposition de la directive 93/7 du 15 mars 1993 du Conseil des Communautés 
européennes relative à la restitution des biens culturels ayant quitté illicitement le territoire d'un État 
membre de la Communauté européenne, JO 4 août 1995, p. 11664.  
1291 Cf.: Cornu, M., 2008. Traditionally, the Ministry of Culture consisted of sub-sections dedicated to books 
and libraries, the museums, the fine arts, the national heritage and historical monuments and archives.  
1292 Loi n°2003-591 du 2 juillet 2003 habilitant le Gouvernement à simplifier le droit du 2 juillet 2003, JO 3 
juillet 2003, p. 11192, p. 11192.  
1293 Code du Patrimoine. Available online at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ (last visited: 15.09.08). 
1294 Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 64.  
1295 Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 47. 
1296 Cf.: Ibid. See further on the distinction between the domaine public and the domaine privé: Boulet-Sautel, 
M., 1995, pp. 100-102.  
1297 The notion of the domaine public referred initially only to immovable objects. Since the first half of the 
19th century, however, it has been accepted that the notion also comprises movable objects of cultural 
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scope of the domaine public remains unclear. The Code of State-owned property (Code du 
domaine de l’Etat)1300 does not define its boundaries. For some objects, their belonging to 
the domaine public is inherent to their nature.1301 Other objects require a dedication to the 
public cause. This dedication can take the form of an explicit order or can be implied.1302 
With regard to public collections of cultural objects, which serve the public cause of 
preserving and exhibiting cultural objects on behalf of the public1303, their belonging to 
the domaine public is generally accepted.1304 However, not all cultural objects in state 
ownership fall in the domaine public: those objects, which do not strictly serve the public 
cause, e.g. cultural objects decorating or antique objects furnishing the buildings of the 
public authorities, fall in the domaine privé.1305  
Further to (cultural) objects from the domaine privé of the state, privately owned 
objects do not qualify as domaine public either.1306 The domaine public is, however, not 
limited to state property (not falling in the domaine privé) but extends also to objects 
owned by the departments, cities, as well as other corporations and corporations under 
public law or public bodies.1307  
Once an object has become part of the domaine public it keeps its status even when no 
longer relevant to the public cause. The status can only be revised by means of an 
                                                                                                                                          
relevance: Cour de Cassation, 10.8.1841 (Cousin c. la liste civile et les héritiers de Mallié), p. 1841, I, 742, 
Bull.civ. 1841, no. 104. See further on the development of the domaine public in case law e.g.: Hervé, B., 1993; 
Weber, M., 2002, pp. 69-75. 
1298 The publication of the treaties by Victor Proudhon is generally considered as the hour of birth of the 
modern theory on the domaine public: Proudhon, V., 1833. 
1299 Cf.: Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 1990, p. 18; Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 109. While Art. 538 of the French 
Civil Code of 1804 refers to the “domaine public”, it must not be confused with the notion of the domaine 
public as it would develop from the 19th century onwards. The “domaine public” as referred to in Art. 538 
does not distinguishes between different modalities in which the State can own property, which is the 
decisive criterion for the decision as to whether an object is held in the domaine public or domaine privé. Art. 
538 reads: “Les chemins, routes et rues à la charge de l’Etat, les fleuves et rivières navigables ou flottables, 
les rivages, lais et relais de la mer, les port, les havres, les rades, et généralement tous les portions du 
territoire français qui ne sont pas susceptibles d’une propriété privée, sont considérés comme des 
dépendances du domaine public”.  
1300 The Code du domaine de l’État is based on décret n°57-1336 du 28 décembre 1957 porte réforme des 
règles de gestion et d’alienation des biens du domaine national et codification sous le nom de code du 
domaine de l’État des textes legislatifs applicables à ce domaine and décret n° 62-298 du 14 mars 1962.  
1301 E.g.: streets and rivers. Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 48. 
1302 Aubry, C.M.B.A., et al., 1961, § 169, no.  141; Ferid, M. / Sonnenberger, H.J., 1986, p. 525, para. 523 A 
541.  
1303 Cf.: Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 1990, p. 18. 
1304 Cf.: Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 109; Cornu, M., 1996, pp. 476-477; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 49; Cornu, M., 
2008. Cf.: Cour de Cassation, decision of 2.4.1963, AJDA 1963, p. 486: “Les biens des établissements 
publics sont partie du domaine public dès lors que (…) leur conservation et présentation au public sont l’objet 
même du service public”. Cf.: Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 1990, p. 18.  
1305 Cf.: Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 1990, p. 19 with examples.  
1306 Weber, M., 2002, p. 80.  
1307 See for the relevant case law: Trib. de Montlucon, Decision of 29.9.1965, D.S. 1965, p. 774 ff; Conseil 
d’Etat, Decision of 21.3.1984, D.S. 1984, p. 510 (Guy Mansuy). See further: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 49; 
Weber, M., 2002, pp. 65-66, with further references in fn. 366.  
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explicit legal act of de-classification.1308 While de-classification from the domaine public is 
regularly effected for consumer goods and other mass-produced goods of utilitarian 
character, which loose their value over time, e.g. military equipment, it is “very 
exceptional and in practise inexistent” with regard to objects in public museum 
collections.1309 The understanding of cultural objects belonging to the domaine public as 
“inalienable in perpetuity”1310 might explain the absence of a specific legal procedure for 
the de-classification of cultural objects from the domaine public. Different from de-
classification of ecclesiastical objects, which is outlined in a special law1311 the de-
classification of cultural objects from the domaine public is not regulated in a specific 
law.1312 However, as will be discussed further below, a specific procedure for de-
classification of objects from the Musées de France, has recently been introduced. This de-
classification procedure is relevant only to a certain portion of the domaine public. For 
cultural objects that belong to the domaine public but are not owned by a public collection 
designated as Musées de France, the general rules on de-classification from the domaine 
public apply.  
According to the general rules on de-classification (or desaffection) from the domaine 
public, which have been developed in case law and legal doctrine, the de-classification 
must be an explicit administrative act1313 and may not coincide with the sale of the 
object concerned.1314 The form of the de-classification (act, executive order, or a 
decision) must correspond with the form of the classification.1315 As a result of the de-
classification, the object concerned no longer belongs to the domaine public but instead 
belongs to the domaine privé.1316 The domaine privé is not subject to restrictions on 
disposal.  
In 2006, with the introduction of the General Code Regarding the Property of Public 
Entities1317 (hereinafter: “GCPPP”), certain aspects of the notion of the domaine public 
have been codified. The GCPPP entered into force on 1 July 2006.1318 Of relevance with 
                                                     
1308 Cf.: Dufau, J., 1993, p. 265; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 48; Weber, M., 2002, pp. 87 & 92. See Conseil d’ État 
9.5.1958 (Delort), AJDA 1958, II, 331; Conseil d’État 17.2.1932 (Commune de Barran), D. 1933, III, 49 for 
relevant case law. Whereas the de-classification of ecclesial objects is outlined in a special law (Loi du 9 
décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État, JO 11 décembre 1905) the de-classification 
of cultural objects is not regulated by law. This has recently been changed to some extend for a specific 
category of public collections. See further below on the details with regard to the procedure for 
declassifying objects belonging to the so-called Musées de France. Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 110.  
1309 Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 110. 
1310 Ibid. 
1311 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État, JO 11 décembre 1905. 
1312 Weber, M., 2002, p. 92. 
1313 Conseil d’État 9.5.1958 (Delort), AJDA 1958, II, 331. See also Art. L. 2141-1 GCPPP. 
1314 Conseil d’État 17.2.1932 (Commune de Barran), D. 1933, III, 49. Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 92. 
1315 Cf.: Ibid. See further on this principle of the analogy of forms: Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., 2006, p. 
275. 
1316 Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 110 ; Weber, M., 2002, p. 92.  
1317 Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques. The Code was established by Ordonnance 2006-
460 of 21 April 2006.  
1318 See further: Sorbara, J.-G., 2007. 
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regard to cultural objects is Art. L. 2112-1 GCPPP. The Article confirms the status of 
several (collections of) movable cultural objects as belonging to the domaine public by 
stating that they are “part of the movable public domain of the public entity owning 
property with a public interest from the perspective of history, art, archaeology, science 
or technology”.1319 
Having outlined the notion of the domaine public, we can now discuss the Cultural 
Heritage Code in view of the disposal and export of cultural objects. 
2.  TH E  CU L T UR A L  HE R I T A G E  CO D E  (CHC) 
 The Cultural Heritage Code (CHC) was established by Order 2004-1781320 and 
entered into force on 20 February 2004. The main aim of the CHC is to simplify the law 
applicable to the French cultural heritage by integrating previously dispersed acts and 
regulations.1321 But for minor changes, which were required for the coherence and 
legibility of the new code, the substance of the protection applicable to the different 
categories of cultural objects was not affected and will be outlined in the following. 
a) The structure and protection of the Cultural Heritage Code (CHC) 
The framework of the CHC consists of one introductory article that sets out the 
code’s scope of application and seven books that integrate the previously existing laws 
and regulations. According to the introductory Art. L. 1 CHC, French cultural heritage 
in the sense of the CHC consists of the totality of immovable and movable goods, both 
in public or private property that are of historical, artistic, archaeological, esthetical, 
scientific or technical interest.1322 The notion of cultural heritage is naturally very broad 
to comprise the respective realms of protection outlined in the books of the CHC for 
                                                     
1319 Art. L. 2112-1 GCPPP reads: “Sans préjudice des dispositions applicables en matière de protection des 
biens culturels, font partie du domaine public mobilier de la personne publique propriétaire les biens 
présentant un intérêt public du point de vue de l'histoire, de l'art, de l'archéologie, de la science ou de la 
technique, notamment: (…) 6° Les objets mobiliers classés ou inscrits au titre du chapitre 2 du titre II du 
livre VI du code du patrimoine ou situés dans un immeuble classé ou inscrit et concourant à la présentation 
au public de parties classées ou inscrites dudit immeuble; (…) ; 8° Les collections des musées; 9° Les 
œuvres et objets d'art contemporain acquis par le Centre national des arts plastiques ainsi que les collections 
d’œuvres et objets d'art inscrites sur les inventaires du Fonds national d'art contemporain dont le centre 
reçoit la garde; (…)”. The wording of the article follows the wording of the Code du Patrimoine. The Code 
du Partrimoine defines the French patrimony as the “ensemble des biens, immobiliers ou mobiliers, relevant 
de la propriété publique ou privée, qui présentent un intérêt historique, artistique, archéologique, esthétique, 
scientifique ou technique” (Emphasis added). Cf.: Cornu, M., 2008. 
1320 Ordonnance n° 2004-178 du 20 février 2004 relative à la partie législative du code du patrimoine, JO 
24.2.2004. 
1321 E.g.: Loi du 31 décembre 1913 sur les monuments historiques, JO 1 janvier 1914, p. 129 and Loi 
n°2002-5 du 4 janvier 2002 relative aux musées de France, JO 5 janvier 2002, p. 305. Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, 
p. 30; Cornu, M., 2008. 
1322 Le patrimoine s’entend, au sens du présent code, de l’ensemble des biens, immobiliers, ou mobiliers, 
relevant de la propriété publique ou privée, qui présentent un intérêt historique, artistique, archéologique, 
esthétique, scientifique ou technique.  
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the different categories of cultural objects.1323 Quintessentially, the CHC distinguishes 
between cultural objects that qualify as national treasures (trésors nationaux) and cultural 
objects that do not. National treasures are objects that belong to the collections of the 
specifically designated Musées de France or other public collections owned by the State or 
lower public authorities, objects classified as historical monument and classified 
archives. Furthermore, objects that are not comprised in any of the former sub-
categories but which are of significant relevance for the national heritage from the 
perspective of history, art or archaeology can be qualified as national treasure.1324 Before 
turning to these realms of protection, it must be pointed out that so far, only the so-
called “partie legislative” of the Code has been adopted. These legal norms, which 
originate from the previously existing acts and regulations, need subsequent 
implementation in the form of regulations. Until this has been achieved, a number of 
regulatory rules predating the CHC remain in force. All other earlier laws, whose 
provisions on the protection of cultural property have been incorporated into the CHC, 
have been repealed.1325  
The first book (Book I) holds provisions that apply to the totality of the cultural 
heritage, in particular with regard to the export of cultural objects.1326 The following five 
books are dedicated to different categories of cultural property: Book II deals with 
archives, Book III deals with libraries, Book IV deals with collections designated as 
Musées de France, Book V is dedicated to archaeology and Book VI deals with historical 
monuments and protected sites.1327  
                                                     
1323 It has been pointed out that the definition does not refer to intangible cultural heritage despite the 
French ratification of the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage. Cf.: Cornu, M., 2008. This is, however, of no further relevance in the context of the present study.  
1324 Art. L. 111-1 CHC: “Les biens appartenant aux collections publiques et aux collections des musées de 
France, les biens classés en application des dispositions relatives aux monuments historiques et aux archives, 
ainsi que les autres biens qui présentent un intérêt majeur pour le patrimoine national au point de vue de 
l'histoire, de l'art ou de l'archéologie sont considérés comme trésors nationaux”. 
1325 See: Ordonnance n° 2004-178 du 20 février 2004 relative à la partie législative du code du patrimoine, 
JO 24.2.2004, Art. 7 The following laws were repealed: Loi du 31 décembre 1913 sur les monuments 
historiques, JO 1 janvier 1914, p. 129; Loi n°79-18 du 3 janvier 1979 sur les archives, JO 5 janvier 1979, p. 
43; Loi n°2002-5 du 4 janvier 2002 relative aux musées de France, JO 5 janvier 2002, p. 305 ; Loi n° 92-
1477 du 31 décembre 1992 relative aux produits soumis à certaines restrictions de circulation et à la 
complémentarité entre les services de police, de gendarmerie et de douane, disposition relatives aux biens 
culturels, JO 5 janvier 1993, p. 198; Loi n° 95-877 du 3 août 1995 portant transposition de la directive 93/7 
du 15 mars 1993 du Conseil des Communautés européennes relative à la restitution des biens culturels ayant 
quitté illicitement le territoire d'un État membre de la Communauté européenne, JO 4 août 1995, p. 11664.  
1326 Book I integrates the previous Loi n° 92-1477 du 31 décembre 1992 relative aux produits soumis à 
certaines restrictions de circulation et à la complémentarité entre les services de police, de gendarmerie et de 
douane, disposition relatives aux biens culturels, JO 5 janvier 1993, p. 198; Loi n° 95-877 du 3 août 1995 
portant transposition de la directive 93/7 du 15 mars 1993 du Conseil des Communautés européennes 
relative à la restitution des biens culturels ayant quitté illicitement le territoire d'un État membre de la 
Communauté européenne, JO 4 août 1995, p. 11664 ; Loi n°92-546 du 20 juin 1992 relative au dépôt légal, 
JO 23 juin 1992, p. 8167 ; Loi du 31 décembre 1921 portant fixation du budget général de l'exercice. 
1327 Book VII deals with the application of the CHC in the French departments overseas.  
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In the following, Book IV dealing with the Musées de France and Book VI dealing with 
historical monuments will be further outlined as the two most relevant sources for the 
protection of public collections, next to the application of the concept of the domaine 
public. In the final part of this section, Book I of the CHC will be scrutinised and 
discussed with regard to the applicable law for export restrictions. 
b)  Book IV of the Cultural Heritage Code (CHC) on the Musées de France 
Book IV of the CHC outlines the protection available to museum collections, in 
particular those museums that have been designated as Musées de France. The protection 
corresponds with the protection previously granted by Law No. 2002-05 relating to 
French Museums.1328 The Law relating to French Museums had for the first time 
codified the protection of public collections whose protection previously depended on 
the notion of domaine public. Furthermore, it extended the protection available to certain 
collections in private ownership. With the integration of its provision into the CHC, the 
Law relating to French Museums as separate law has been repealed.1329 Only a few 
provisions of the Law remain in force until they will have been replaced by further 
regulations as provided for under the CHC.  
In the following, the CHC’s provision with regard to the designation of museums as 
Musées de France will be introduced, as well as the scope of protection granted to the 
collections of the museums with this label and the possibility of revocating the label.  
c) The designation as “Musée de France”  
According to Art. L. 441-1 CHC, the label “Musée de France” can be granted to 
national museums, as well as to museums belonging to other legal entities under public 
law or legal entities under private law with a charitable cause.1330 Different from the 
domaine public outlined above which consists only of objects in public ownership (not-
including objects in the domaine privé), the label “Musée de France” can also be granted to 
entities under private law with charitable cause. Any collection that is put forward for 
designation must, however, be of permanent character and must be comprised of 
objects whose conservation is in the public interest and which is managed for the 
knowledge, education and entertainment of the general public (Art. L. 410-1 CHC).  
                                                     
1328 Loi n°2002-5 du 4 janvier 2002 relative aux musées de France, JO 5 janvier 2002, p. 305. The Law 
relating to French Museums was adopted to replace an earlier order whose application to museums of fine 
arts was considered too limited: Ordonnance n°45-1546 du 13 juillet 1945 modifiée portant organisation 
provisoire des musées des Beaux-Arts. Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 43; Recours, Rapport N°3036 from 3 May 
2001 of the Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales of the Assemblée Nationale, p. 5.  
1329 Ordonnance n° 2004-178 du 20 février 2004 relative à la partie législative du code du patrimoine, JO 
24.2.2004, Art. 7.  
1330 Art. L. 441-1 CHC reads: “L'appellation "musée de France" peut être accordée aux musées appartenant 
à l'Etat, à une autre personne morale de droit public ou à une personne morale de droit privé à but non 
lucratif”. 
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A number of museums have automatically been designated as “Musée de France” by 
Art. L. 442-2 CHC. According to this provision, the national museums1331, classified 
museums (musées classés)1332, as well as state museums whose status has been 
determined by executive order, qualify as “Musée de France” as of 5 January 2002.1333  
Other museums have to follow the designation procedure as outlined by Art. L. 422-
1 CHC: as first step, the legal entity owning the collections has to make a formal 
application. The requirements that must be fulfilled are more stringent for collections 
owned by legal entities under private law with charitable cause in order to compensate 
for the lesser influence on the collection management by public authorities.1334 The 
subsequent step consists of hearing the High Council (Haut Conseil) of the French 
Museums1335. The hearing of the High Council is mandatory.1336 The ultimate decision 
power lies with the Minister of Culture.  
The designation of a museum as “Musée de France” is permanent but can be revoked. 
There exist two grounds on which the label can be withdrawn: first, in those cases 
where the conservation of the collection and its presentation to the public is no longer 
of public interest. If the absence of such public interest has been confirmed by the High 
Council, the Minister of Culture can revoke the designation.1337 The second situation in 
which the designation can be revoked is where the legal entity, which had applied for 
the designation in the first place, seeks for reversal of the designation. For the entity to 
be able to revise the designation, a number of conditions must be fulfilled. First, the 
revocation is possible only after a period of four years since the designation. 
Furthermore, should the museum have received financial aid from public funds, the 
decision to revoke the designation requires prior approval by the High Council and can 
only be affected after the objects, which had been acquired by means of public funds or 
                                                     
1331 National Museums are defined by Décret n°45-2075 du 31 août 1945 portant application de 
l'ordonnance relative à l'organisation provisoire des musées des beaux-arts, JO 14 juin 1945, p. 4343, Art. 3 
and have been listed in: Décret n°86-1370 du 30 décembre 1986 fixant les dispositions statutaires 
applicables à certains emplois de la direction des musées de France, JO 1 janvier 1987, p. 65. There are in 
total 32 National Museums including the Musée du Louvre, the Musée d’Orsay, the Picasso Museum. 
1332 The so-called musées classées are listed in Executive Order n˚ 46-1702 from 26.7.1946. 
1333 State Museums (Musée de l’Etat) are those museums that have been founded by ministerial order and 
reside under one of the ministerial departments.  
1334 Art. L. 442-1 second paragraph CHC reads: Lorsque la demande émane d'une personne morale de droit 
privé à but non lucratif, l'attribution de cette appellation est subordonnée à la présentation d'un inventaire 
des biens composant les collections, à la justification de l'absence de sûretés réelles grevant ces biens et à la 
présence, dans les statuts de la personne en cause, d'une clause prévoyant l'affectation irrévocable des biens 
acquis par dons et legs ou avec le concours de l'État ou d'une collectivité territoriale à la présentation au 
public, conformément à l'article L. 451-10. La décision attribuant l'appellation ainsi que l'inventaire joint à la 
demande font l'objet de mesures de publicité définies par décret en Conseil d'Etat.  
1335 Art. L. 430-1 CHC outlines the general composition of the High Council. Further details on the 
composition, as well as on the election of its members must be determined by executive Order (Art. L. 430-
2 CHC).  
1336 The High Council must not be confused with the National Scientific Commission of Museum 
Collections of France further introduced below. 
1337 Or where applicable another minister. 
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as result of the exercise of the right of pre-emption, have been transferred to another 
public collections in accordance with Art. L. 451-8 CHC.1338 
d) Legal Consequences of the designation of a collection as “Musée de France” 
With regard to the applicable legal rules on the protection of objects in collections 
designated as Musées de France and their impact on the possibility to dispose of an object 
from such a collection, one must distinguish between collections in public ownership 
and collections owned by legal entities under private law with charitable cause. While the 
provisions of Book IV of the CHC as originally introduced by the Act relating to 
French Museums did extent the regime of protection to collections owned by legal 
entities under private law with charitable cause, the protection of these collections in the 
form of restrictions of the owner’s bundle of rights cannot correspond to those 
applicable to collections in public property for it would constitute too great an 
infringement of private property.1339 Consequently, while the principle of 
imprescriptability applies both to objects in pubic and private collections, the principle 
of inalienability applies only to objects in collections owned by the French State and 
other legal entities under public law.  
Imprescriptability refers to the owner’s right of revindication. If an object qualifies as 
imprescriptable, its owner can at all times seek revindication of the object. According to 
Art. L. 451-3 of the CHC, the collections of the Musées de France are imprescriptable.1340 
Consequently, legal title to an object from the collection cannot be acquired by a good 
faith purchaser by means of legal transaction nor as a result of adverse possession.1341 
On top of that, the action to revindication is not subject to any extinctive prescription 
period.1342 The owner of the collection designated with the label “Musée de France”, 
regardless of whether it is held in public or private property, can at all times recover the 
object. Therewith, imprescriptability prevents involuntary loss of title, even against a 
purchaser in good faith.1343 
                                                     
1338 Art. L. 451-8 CHC reads: “Une personne publique peut transférer, à titre gratuit, la propriété de tout ou 
partie de ses collections à une autre personne publique si cette dernière s'engage à en maintenir l'affectation 
à un musée de France. Le transfert de propriété est approuvé par décision de l'autorité administrative, après 
avis du Haut Conseil des musées de France. Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables aux 
biens remis à l'État en application des articles 1131 et 1716 bis du code général des impôts”. 
1339 Weidner, A., 2001, p. 36.  
1340 Art. L. 451-3 CHC reads: “Les collections des musées de France sont imprescriptibles”. 
1341 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 35. 
1342 Cf.: Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., 2001, p. 148 See, e.g. the case where the export licence for a 
fragments of the column Vendôme was denied for the reason that the object belonged to the domaine public. 
The column had disappeared in the 19th century but nevertheless the then possessor of the column could 
not have acquired legal title to the fragment due to the object’s imprescriptability. Tribunal administratif de 
Paris, 9 avril 2004.The decision of the Administrative Tribunal of Paris was confirmed in appeal by CAA 
Paris, 4 avril 2006. Cf.: Schmitt, J.-M., 2004; Cornu, M., 2008. 
1343 Cf.: Debbasch, C., et al., 1994, p. 121; El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 35. See for a critical discussion of the weak 
position of a good faith purchaser: Carducci, G., 1997, p. 64; Chatelain, F., et al., 1997, p. 34; Weber, M., 
2002, pp. 91-92.  
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Another possibility of granting protection to collection items is by rendering the 
objects inalienable. Inalienability means that an object cannot be sold or otherwise be 
transferred by any legal transaction.1344 Any transfer of an inalienable object is void.1345 
Given the fact that the rendering of an object as inalienable constitutes a significant 
interference with property rights, it applies only to objects from collections owned by 
the state or other legal entities under public law but does not apply to objects in 
privately owned collections.1346 
With regard to objects from collections owned by legal entities under private law 
with charitable cause, the restrictions on disposal are less far-reaching: as a general rule 
objects from privately owned collections can be disposed. It is only with regard to 
objects that have been acquired by donations, legacies or by public monies, that disposal 
is limited with regard to the transferee: objects thus acquired may only be transferred to 
another Musée de France provided that the High Council of French Museums agrees with 
such transfer. 
With regard to objects held in publicly owned collections, the interference with 
property rights does not constitute a hindrance for the full application of the rule on 
inalienability. According to the first sentence of Art. L. 451-5 CHC “objects constituting 
collections of the museums of France, and belonging to a legal personality under public 
law, are in the domaine public and are hence inalienable (…)”.1347 The provision 
contributes to legal security by clearly stating that objects from the collections of 
publicly owned Musées de France cannot be sold or otherwise transferred by any legal 
transaction.1348 It does not, however, change or extend the protection that had already 
been granted to the objects under the notion of the domaine public.1349 Together, the traits 
of inalienability and imprescriptability render an object that belong to the domaine public 
(res) extra commercium.1350 It is only after its de-classification from the domaine public that an 
object is no longer inalienable and imprescriptable and can be legally transferred.1351  
                                                     
1344 Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 10. See for relevant case law: Cour de cassation 2.4.1963 (Sieur Montagne c. 
Réunion des Musées de France et autres), AJDA 1963, II, 486 which concerned the sale of a sketch by 
Georges Seurat that had been donated to the Louvre. Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 85.  
1345 Cf.: Conseil d’ État 30.10.1936 (Cotteraux), D.H., 1937, 55; Conseil d’ État 25.1.1984 (Ville de Grasse c. 
Montlaur et autres), R.D.S. 1985, 466. Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 84 ; Debbasch, C., et al., 1994, p. 122.  
1346 Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 36. See above fn. 13396. 
1347 Art. L 451-5 CHC first sentence reads in French: “Les biens constituant les collections des musées de 
France appartenant à une personne publique font partie de leur domaine public et sont, à ce titre, 
inaliénables”. See also Art. L. 451-4 of the CHC according to which “every cession of all or part of a 
collection of a museum of France contrary to the provisions of this section is null. Actions or claims to 
nullify can be exercised at any time by the State or by any legal personality that is the proprietor of the 
collection”. Cf.: Art. L. 3111-1 GCPPP confirms the general rule with regard to objects in the domaine 
public, i.e. that these objects are “inalienable and imprescriptable”.  
1348 See above on the meaning of inalienability. 
1349 Cf.: also with Art. L. 2112-1 (sub 8) GCPPP that also certifies museums owned by public persons to 
belong to the domaine public.  
1350 Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 9. 
1351 Cf.: Debbasch, C., et al., 1994, p. 101. 
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The circumstances under which objects from public collections that carry the title 
Musée de France can be declassified (and hence disposed of) are set out in Art. L. 451-5 
CHC. This provision constitutes a novelty from the previous regime by explicitly setting 
out the procedure to be followed for de-classification of an object. According to the 
provision, the decision to declassify an object from public collections qualifying as Musée 
de France can only be taken in accordance with the assent of a scientific body, the 
composition and functionality of which are to be fixed by executive order.1352  
Strictly speaking, the novelty of the explicit de-classification procedure was not 
introduced under the CHC but under the Law relating to French Museums of January 4, 
2002.1353 Prior to the adoption of the Law relating to French Museums of January 4, 
2002, which is now incorporated into Book IV CHC, no specific rules with regard to 
cultural objects (not being ecclesiastical objects) did exist.1354 Rather, the general 
procedure of de-classification by means of an explicit legal act had to be followed and 
has to observe the rule of parallism of forms.1355 With the introduction of Art. 11(II) of 
the Law relating to French Museums (now: Art. L. 451-5 CHC ), the de-classification of 
objects from public collections of the Musée de France has been explicitly recognised and 
framed in legal provisions and in procedure. This formal recognition of the possibility to 
declassify objects from the collections of the Musée de France is the more important given 
the unique feature of cultural objects of (often) increasing in value over time.1356  
The details of the de-classification procedure, in particular the establishment and 
consultation of a “National Scientific Commission of Museum Collections of France” 
(hereinafter: “the National Scientific Commission”), were further outlined in an 
executive order from 25 April 2002 and will be outlined in the following.1357 
e) De-classification via the National Scientific Commission of Museum Collections of France  
The National Scientific Commission of Museum Collections of France has been 
established by Art. 16 of the executive order of 25 April, 2002 as provided for under the 
Law relating to French Museums.1358 According to Art. 22 of the executive order, the 
National Scientific Commission consists of twenty members, the majority of which are 
                                                     
1352 “Toute décision de déclassement d'un de ces biens ne peut être prise qu'après avis conforme d'une 
commission scientifique dont la composition et les modalités de fonctionnement sont fixées par décret”. 
1353 See Art. 11(II) of the Law relating to French Museums of January 4, 2002. 
1354 See further with regard to the de-classification of ecclesial objects: Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant 
la séparation des Églises et de l'État, JO 11 décembre 1905. Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 92. 
1355 See further on the rule of analogy of forms: Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., 2006, p. 275. Cf.: Dufau, J., 
1993, p. 265; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 48; Weber, M., 2002, pp. 87 & 92. See Conseil d’ État 9.5.1958 (Delort), 
AJDA 1958, II, 331; Conseil d’État 17.2.1932 (Commune de Barran), D. 1933, III, 49 for relevant case law.  
1356 Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 110. With regard to the situation as it existed prior to the explicit legal 
recognition to declassify cultural objects, Chatelain stated that “the museum collections are in fact 
unalienable for eternity or at least for as long as the concept of the museum as it exists for more than two 
centuries does not change”. 
1357 Décret n°2002-628 du 25 avril 2002 modifié pris pour l'application de la loi 2002-5 du 4 Janvier 2002 
relative aux musées de France, JO 28 avril 2002, p. 7742. 
1358 Ibid. 
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representatives from the national or public museums or of the French Government.1359 
Decisions on de-classification must be taken by the full National Scientific Commission 
(Art. 22(II)) and require a three quarter majority (Art. 23).  
The provisions outlining the composition and modalities of the National Scientific 
Commission are essentially procedural in character. They do not provide for the criteria 
on the basis of which a decision on de-classification has to be assessed. Until today, the 
National Scientific Commission has never met and thus did not elaborate upon the 
criteria.1360 This leaves question whether the Commission will decide solely from the 
interest of preserving the collections or whether it will include other interests in the 
decision making-process presently unanswered. In the former case, which seems the 
more likely scenario given the name and the composition of the National Scientific 
Commission, the situations in which de-classification is possible will be very limited 
given the fact that different from most other objects, cultural objects do not loose but 
instead increase their value over time.1361 However, even if the National Scientific 
Commission is able to declassify objects for reasons not purely related to the 
preservation of public collections (e.g. interests of claimants seeking the return of an 
object), the involvement of the commission in the first place, the fact that it has never 
convened so far, its composition and modalities of its decision-making makes that de-
classification remains an absolute exception and in practice inexistent.1362 
While the possibility to dispose of an object is thus very limited in general some 
objects may not be declassified at all. According to Art. L. 451-7 CHC, objects that have 
been acquired by donation or legacy, or - where it concerns public collections not in 
State property - objects that have been acquired with financial public support cannot be 
                                                     
1359 Ibid., Art. 22 – I reads as follows: La Commission scientifique nationale des collections des musées de 
France est présidée par le directeur des musées de France. Elle comprend en outre: 
1° Des membres de droit: a) Le chef de l’inspection générale des musées, vice-président; b) Le chef de 
l’inspection générale de l’architecture et du patrimoine; c) Le chef de la mission permanente d’inspection, de 
conseil et d’évaluation de la création artistique; d) Le président du musée du Louvre; e) Les chefs des grands 
départements mentionnés à l’article 2 du décret du 31 août 1945 susvisé; f) Le directeur du Musée national 
d’art moderne; g) Le directeur des collections au Muséum national d’histoire naturelle; h) Le directeur du 
musée national des techniques du Conservatoire national des arts et métiers; i) Le directeur des collections à 
la Bibliothèque nationale de France; j) Le chef du centre de recherche et de restauration des musées de 
France;  
2° Cinq membres désignés par le directeur des musées de France parmi les professionnels siégeant dans les 
commissions régionales ou interrégionales; 
3° Un membre désigné par le directeur des musées de France parmi les spécialistes siégeant dans les 
commissions régionales ou interrégionales; 
4° Quatre personnalités qualifiées désignées en raison de leurs compétences scientifiques par arrêté du 
ministre chargé de la culture: a) Un conservateur du patrimoine, conseiller pour les musées dans une 
direction régionale des affaires culturelles; b) Une personnalité désignée sur proposition du ministre chargé 
de la recherche; c) Une personnalité désignée sur proposition du ministre de la défense; d) Une personnalité 
désignée sur proposition du ministre chargé de la jeunesse et des sports. 
1360 Cf.: Email by Marie Cornu with the subject 'Re: question en concernant la Commission scientifique 
national e des collections des musées de France’ dated 1.4.2009 (on file with the author). 
1361 Cf.: Poli, J.-F., 1996, p. 283. 
1362 Cf.: Chatelain, F., 1991, p. 110; Cornu, M., 2008. 
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declassified.1363 The inability to declassify these objects is motivated by the wish not to 
disencourage future donations and legacies.1364 This inability of declassifying an object 
from the domaine public constitutes a full ban on the object’s disposal from the collection.  
The protection of gifts goes so far that they may not even be transferred to other 
Musées de France under the procedure outlined in Art. L 451-8 CHC. According to this 
article, cultural objects from collections designated as Musée de France1365 may be 
transferred between these collections provided that the future conservation of the 
objects transferred is guaranteed. The reason that objects that have been acquired by gift 
or legacy or in accordance with the provisions of the French Tax Code (Code Général des 
Impôts)1366 may not be transferred between the collections of the Musées de France lies 
again in the inclination not to disencourage future gifts and legacies. 
The above analysis of the CHC, the notion of the domaine public as recently codified 
in the GCPPP as to their relevance for the disposal of cultural objects from public 
collections revealed that disposal from a collection would only be possible after the 
object has been declassified from the domaine public. As long as the object belongs to the 
domaine public, it cannot be disposed of due to its inalienability. With regard to privately 
owned collections designated with the label Musée de France there exists no such 
limitation to disposal. In the following section on Book VI CHC, a different source of 
protection for certain cultural objects will be discussed that has the effect of restricting 
the alienability of the objects concerned. 
f) Book VI of the Cultural Heritage Code (“Act on Historical Monuments”) 
Book VI of the Cultural Heritage Code (CHC) hosts the provisions that originate 
from the Act on Historical Monuments (Loi sur les monument historiques) from 31 
December 1913.1367 The Act on Historical Monuments has been crucial in laying the 
fundament of the current regime of protection of cultural objects in France.1368 While its 
provisions (as codified in the CHC) are first and foremost relevance for the protection 
of immovable cultural heritage1369, the scope of the Act also comprises movable objects. 
The provisions that are relevant for the protection of movable cultural objects are 
comprised in the second Chapter of Book VI (Artt. L. 622-1 - L. 622-21 CHC). The 
                                                     
1363 Art. L. 451-7 CHC reads: “Les biens incorporés dans les collections publiques par dons et legs ou, pour 
les collections ne relevant pas de l'Etat, ceux qui ont été acquis avec l'aide de l'État ne peuvent être 
déclassés”. 
1364 Cornu, M., 2008. 
1365 Art. L. 451-8 CHC reads: “Une personne publique peut transférer, à titre gratuit, la propriété de tout ou 
partie de ses collections à une autre personne publique si cette dernière s'engage à en maintenir l'affectation 
à un musée de France. Le transfert de propriété est approuvé par décision de l'autorité administrative, après 
avis du Haut Conseil des musées de France. Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables aux 
biens remis à l'État en application des articles 1131 et 1716 bis du code général des impôts”.  
1366 See in particular Artt.1131 and 1716 bis du code général des impôts. 
1367 Loi du 31 décembre 1913 sur les monuments historiques, JO 1 janvier 1914, p. 129.  
1368 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 30; Cornu, M., 2008. 
1369 Cf.: Cornu, M., 2008. 
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chapter is subdivided in two sections each representing a separate regime of protection. 
Section 1 on the classification of movable objects (Artt. L. 622-1 – L. 622-19 CHC) 
contains the more important and elaborate regime of protection. Section 2 allows for 
the inscription of objects that do not qualify for classification under section 1 in a 
special inventory (Artt. L. 622-20 - L. 622-21 CHC). 
Classification as historical monument 
According to Art. L. 622-1 CHC, movable objects whose preservation is of public 
interest with regard to history or the arts, the sciences, or technical developments, can 
be classified as historical monument.1370 The classification as historical monument is 
available to cultural objects both in public and private ownership.1371 Against the scope 
of the present study, the following elaboration will focus on cultural objects from public 
collections, both belonging to the State (Art. L. 622-2 CHC) and lower public authorities 
(Art. L. 622-3 CHC).1372  
The classification of cultural objects as historical monuments is done by the 
respective administrative authority.1373 From the moment the administrative authority 
notified the owner of the object concerned about its classification as historical 
monument, the objects can no longer be freely transferred or disposed of.  
With regard to historical monuments that are in State ownership, Art. L. 622-14 
CHC declares them to be inalienable.1374 Historical monuments that are owned by a 
lower public authority or public corporation are not subjected to a full ban on their 
alienability. However, they can only be transferred to a limited circle of recipients 
                                                     
1370 Art. L. 622-1 CHC reads: “Les objets mobiliers, soit meubles proprement dits, soit immeubles par 
destination, dont la conservation présente, au point de vue de l'histoire, de l'art, de la science ou de la 
technique, un intérêt public peuvent être classés au titre des monuments historiques par décision de 
l'autorité administrative. Les effets du classement subsistent à l'égard des immeubles par destination classés 
au titre des monuments historiques qui redeviennent des meubles proprement dits”. The expression 
“immovible par destination” refers to the legal fiction of Art. 524 CC according to which “[a]nimals and 
things that the owner of a tenement placed thereon for the use and working of the tenement are immovable 
by destination". Thus, (…) all movables which the owner has attached to the tenement perpetually are also 
immovables by destination”. See further for examples of cultural objects falling under the fiction of 
“immovable by destination”: Frier, P.-L., 1997, pp. 430-431.  
1371 See Artt. L. 622-2 – L.662-4 CHC. 
1372 See further on the classification of privately owned objects e.g.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, pp. 32-33. 
1373 See Art. L. 622-1 CHC in combination with the Artt. L. 622-2 – L.662-3 CHC. In case of classification 
of objects owned by lower public authorities, Art. L.611-1 CHC on the involvement of the ‘Superior 
Commission of Historical Monuments’ applies. See further on the classification procedure and the different 
regimes that apply depending on whether the owner agrees or disagrees with the classification: El-Bitar, J., 
2007, pp. 31-33. 
1374 Art. L. 622-14 CHC reads: “Les objets classés au titre des monuments historiques appartenant à l'État 
sont inaliénables. Les objets classés au titre des monuments historiques appartenant à une collectivité 
territoriale ou à un établissement public ou d'utilité publique ne peuvent être aliénés qu'avec l'accord de 
l'autorité administrative et dans les formes prévues par les lois et règlements. La propriété ne peut en être 
transférée qu'à l'Etat, à une personne publique ou à un établissement d'utilité publique”. See further on the 
meaning of inalienability above. 
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consisting of the state, public corporations or an institution for the public benefit. 
Furthermore, their transfer is subject to assent by the public authority. 
The rule on the historical monuments’ inalienability is complemented by their 
imprescriptability, which, according to Art. L. 622-13 applies indiscriminately to all 
movable historical monuments whether they are owned by the State or a lower public 
authority.1375 
For as long as an object is classified as historical monument, it cannot be disposed 
of. Objects in State ownership cannot be disposed of at all, whereas objects owned by 
lower public authorities can only be transferred to certain recipients, mainly other public 
collections. The classification as historical monument, is, however, not irreversible. 
According to Art. L.622-6 CHC, de-classification is possible where the administrative 
authority explicitly provides for the de-classification of a classified object either ex-
officio or on demand by the object’s owner.1376 As a result of the de-classification, the 
object is no longer classified as historical monument. Consequently, the provisions of 
Book VI will no longer prevent the object’s disposal. 
 The de-classification as historical monument does, however, not automatically mean 
that the object can be disposed. While the provisions of Book VI may no longer prevent 
the object’s disposal, it may still be prohibited under the rules applicable to the domaine 
public.1377 Where the two regimes with regard to historical monuments and the domaine 
public collide, rules with regard to domaine public are granted priority.1378 
Registration of non-classified movable heritage in a special inventory 
Section 2 of the second Chapter of Book VI introduces the possibility for the 
registration of movable objects in a special register (Art. L. 622-20 CHC).1379 The 
                                                     
1375 Art. L. 622-13 CHC reads: “Tous les objets mobiliers classés au titre des monuments historiques sont 
imprescriptibles”. See further on the meaning of imprescriptability above. 
1376 Art. L. 622-6 CHC reads: “Le déclassement d'un objet mobilier classé au titre des monuments 
historiques peut être prononcé par l'autorité administrative soit d'office, soit à la demande du propriétaire. Il 
est notifié aux intéressés”. 
1377 See in this regard Art. L. 2112-1 GCPPP. While the article lists (only) “les objets mobiliers classés ou 
inscrits au titre du chapitre 2 du titre II du livre VI du code du patrimoine ou situés dans un immeuble 
classé ou inscrit et concourant à la présentation au public de parties classées ou inscrites dudit immeuble”, it 
is nevertheless feasible that also objects not or no longer classified as historical monuments or registered in 
an inventory referred to in Art. L. 622-20 belong to the domaine public. See above on the rules on the domaine 
public. See further Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 1990, p. 49, note 13 who laments the impreciseness of the 
legal terminology with regard to the de-classification of historical monuments and from the public domain. 
Chatelain proposes to speak of “desaffectation” with regard to the domaine public Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., 
1990, p. 49, note 13. Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, p. 51, fn. 50. See above on the rules on the domaine public. 
1378 Weidner, A., 2001, pp. 50-52. 
1379 Art. L. 622-20 CHC: “Les objets mobiliers, soit meubles proprement dits, soit immeubles par 
destination, appartenant à l'Etat, aux collectivités territoriales et aux établissements publics ou aux 
associations cultuelles et qui, sans justifier une demande de classement immédiat, présentent, au point de 
vue de l'histoire, de l'art, de la science ou de la technique, un intérêt suffisant pour en rendre désirable la 
préservation, peuvent, à toute époque, être inscrits sur un inventaire supplémentaire à la liste des objets 
mobiliers classés au titre des monuments historiques”. 
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decision to register an object can be taken by the administrative authority (Art. L. 622-
21CHC).1380 This registration is available to those movable objects that do not qualify 
for classification as historical monument under section 1 discussed above. The legal 
consequences of registration are less far-reaching than that of classification under 
section 1: registered objects are neither inalienable nor imprescriptable.1381 Instead, the 
protection granted to the registered objects consists of their owners’ obligation to 
inform the administrative authorities in advance about any change in location (one 
month prior to envisaged change) and any plans to dispose of the object or to modify it 
in any sense (two month notification). This obligation of prior notice allows the 
administrative authorities to take further protective measures, such as the classification 
of the object under section 1 if deemed necessary under the applicable circumstances. 
In the previous sections, various regimes applicable to French cultural heritage from 
public collections have been discussed with regard to the question in how far they allow 
for the disposal of an object. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter the 
restitution of an object abroad not only requires the object’s disposal but also 
presupposes its export. The export of cultural objects is often subject to conditions or 
restrictions. Export restrictions seek to prevent the removal of an object outside of a 
country’s territory and therewith have the potential of further hampering envisaged 
restitution. For this reason, the French export rules with regard to cultural objects will 
be scrutinised in the following.  
3.  EX PO R T  R E S T RI C T I ON S :  BOOK  I  CHC 
 The French regime with regard to export restrictions was significantly revised in 
reaction to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export 
of cultural goods (hereinafter: “the Regulation”). The French regime as it existed prior 
to the Regulation since 1941 had relied to a great extent on tariff regulation.1382 With the 
                                                     
1380 Art. L. 622-21 CHC: “Cette inscription est prononcée par décision de l'autorité administrative. Elle est 
notifiée aux propriétaires, aux gestionnaires, aux détenteurs, aux affectataires et aux dépositaires et entraîne 
pour eux l'obligation, sauf en cas de péril, de ne procéder à aucun transfert de l'objet d'un lieu dans un autre 
sans avoir informé, un mois à l'avance, l'administration de leur intention et l'obligation de ne procéder à 
aucune cession à titre gratuit ou onéreux, modification, réparation ou restauration de l'objet, sans avoir 
informé, deux mois à l'avance, l'administration de leur intention. Un décret en Conseil d'État détermine les 
conditions d'application du présent article”. 
1381 Unless of course the registered object is State property. Cf.: Art. L. 2112-1 GCPPP: “Sans préjudice des 
dispositions applicables en matière de protection des biens culturels, font partie du domaine public mobilier de 
la personne publique propriétaire les biens présentant un intérêt public du point de vue de l'histoire, de l'art, 
de l'archéologie, de la science ou de la technique, notamment: (…)  
 6° Les objets mobiliers classés ou inscrits au titre du chapitre 2 du titre II du livre VI du code du patrimoine ou 
situés dans un immeuble classé ou inscrit et concourant à la présentation au public de parties classées ou 
inscrites dudit immeuble”. 
1382 Cf.: Frier, P.-L., 1997, pp. 464 ff. & 470-471; El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 56. See, e.g. on the old system: 
Mercillon, H., 1990. 
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abolition of systematic border controls, the revision of the French export regime had 
become indispensable.1383  
The new export regime is based upon Act No. 92-1477 of 31.12.19921384 and 
Executive Order No. 93-124.1385 With the adoption of the CHC in 2004, the newly 
introduced export regime was incorporated in Book I CHC. Book I holds provisions 
that apply to the totality of the cultural heritage, in particular with regard to the export 
of cultural objects.1386 
The current export regime distinguishes between three categories of cultural objects: 
national treasures, cultural objects of historical, artistic or archaeological interest and 
finally those cultural objects that do not fall in any of the two previous categories.  
National treasures as the first category are defined in Art. L. 111-1 CHC as those 
object that either belong to public collections owned by the State or lower public 
authorities, the collections of the Musées de France, objects classified as historical 
monument (as well as classified archives), as well as other objects of significant 
relevance for the national heritage from the perspective of history, art or 
archaeology.1387  The reference to objects from public collections and collections of the 
Musées de France is rather straight forward. All cultural objects that belong to the domaine 
public qualify as national treasures. With regard to classified objects, these are also clearly 
delineated by Book II CHC with regard to archives and by Book VI with regard to 
historical monuments. Less clear is the reference to “other objects of significant 
relevance for the national heritage from the perspective of history, art or 
archaeology”.1388 It is a category that is not defined a-priori to the application for an 
export licence. Instead, whether an objects falls in this category is determined only in the 
procedure following the application for an export licence and depends on the 
                                                     
1383 Cf.: Poli, J.-F., 1996, pp. 75. 
1384 Loi n° 92-1477 du 31 décembre 1992 relative aux produits soumis à certaines restrictions de circulation 
et à la complémentarité entre les services de police, de gendarmerie et de douane, disposition relatives aux 
biens culturels, JO 5 janvier 1993, p. 198. 
1385 Décret de 29.1.1993 relatif aux biens culturels soumis à certaines restrictions, JO 30 janvier 1993, p. 
1600. The executive order was revised by two further executive orders: Décret no 95-24 du 9 janvier 1995 
modifiant le décret no 93-124 du 29 janvier 1993 relatif aux biens culturels soumis à certaines restrictions de 
circulation, JO 11 janvier 1995 and Décret n°2001-894 du 26 septembre 2001, JO 29 septembre 2001, p. 
15393.  
1386 Book I also contains the provisions of the Act No 95-877 of 3.8.1995 implementing Council Directive 
93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a 
Member State which is not further discussed here (Loi n° 95-877 du 3 août 1995 portant transposition de la 
directive 93/7 du 15 mars 1993 du Conseil des Communautés européennes relative à la restitution des biens 
culturels ayant quitté illicitement le territoire d'un État membre de la Communauté européenne, JO 4 août 
1995, p. 11664).  
1387 Art. L. 111-1 CHC: “Les biens appartenant aux collections publiques et aux collections des musées de 
France, les biens classés en application des dispositions relatives aux monuments historiques et aux archives, 
ainsi que les autres biens qui présentent un intérêt majeur pour le patrimoine national au point de vue de 
l'histoire, de l'art ou de l'archéologie sont considérés comme trésors nationaux”. 
1388 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 58 ; Weber, M., 2002, p. 295. 
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appreciation of the administration.1389 The necessity of allowing for such a vague ad-hoc 
“promotion” of objects to national treasures has been explained with reference to the 
undesirability of an exhaustive definition of what constitutes national treasures given the 
evolving character of the notion of cultural heritage and the little awareness of the 
French administration of the cultural heritage in private hands.1390 
While the category of national treasures remains an open ended category given the 
administrative’s discretionary power to declare objects of significant relevance national 
treasures, the legal consequence of the qualification is clear: cultural objects that qualify 
as national treasures may not be exported.1391 While the wording of Art. L. 111-4 CHC 
suggests that the license that is required for export “may” be refused for national 
treasures1392, there exists general agreement in the literature that the provision is badly 
drafted and that, in accordance with its legal history, must be understood as prohibiting 
the granting of an export licence to national treasures rather than only providing the 
possibility for doing so.1393 
The prohibitive interpretation of Art. L.111-4 is furthermore supported by the scope 
of Art. L. 111-7 CHC which explicitly provides for four situations in which a national 
treasure may be temporarily exported. The existence of this provision, which allows for 
temporary export of a national treasure for reasons of restoration, the obtaining of 
expertise, for exhibition purposes and as loan to a public collection1394 can only be 
explained against the general ban on national treasures’ export. Consequently, cultural 
objects that qualify as national treasures cannot be exported unless it concerns a 
temporary removal for one of the specified aims. 
                                                     
1389 Art. L. 111-2 CHC: “L'exportation temporaire ou définitive hors du territoire douanier des biens 
culturels, autres que les trésors nationaux, qui présentent un intérêt historique, artistique ou archéologique et 
entrent dans l'une des catégories définies par décret en Conseil d'État est subordonnée à l'obtention d'un 
certificat délivré par l'autorité administrative. (…)”. Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, p. 59 ; Poli, J.-F., 1996, p. 78. 
1390 Marché, J.-P., pp. 19ff. quoted by: Poli, J.-F., 1996, pp. 78-79. 
1391 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, pp. 30 & 34.  
1392 Art. L. 111-4 CHC: “Le certificat ne peut être refusé qu'aux biens culturels présentant le caractère de trésor national. 
Aucune indemnité n'est due du fait du refus de délivrance du certificat. Il est accordé aux biens culturels 
licitement importés dans le territoire douanier depuis moins de cinquante ans. S'il existe des présomptions 
graves et concordantes d'importation illicite, l'autorité administrative peut exiger la preuve de la licéité de 
l'importation du bien et, en l'absence de preuve, refuser la délivrance du certificat. Le refus de délivrance du 
certificat ne peut intervenir qu'après avis motivé d'une commission composée à parité de représentants de 
l'État et de personnalités qualifiées et présidée par un membre du Conseil d'Etat. Un décret en Conseil 
d'État fixe les modalités de désignation de ses membres et les conditions de publication de ses avis” 
(emphasis added). 
1393 Cf.: Poli, J.-F., 1996, p. 78 ;Weber, M., 2002, p. 295. According to Poli it would have been preferable 
had the provision stated that the certificate “devait être refusé aux bien culturels qui sont des trésors 
nationaux” rather than stating that the certificate “pouvait être refusé”.  
1394 Art. L. 111-7 CHC: “L'exportation des trésors nationaux hors du territoire douanier peut être autorisée, 
à titre temporaire, par l'autorité administrative, aux fins de restauration, d'expertise, de participation à une 
manifestation culturelle ou de dépôt dans une collection publique. Cette autorisation est délivrée pour une 
durée proportionnée à l'objet de la demande. A l'occasion de la sortie du territoire douanier d'un trésor 
national mentionné à l'article L. 111-1, l'autorisation de sortie temporaire doit être présentée à toute 
réquisition des agents des douanes. 
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As for those cultural objects that do not (or after de-classification no longer) qualify 
as national treasures, the current export regime differs between objects that are of 
historical, artistic or archaeological interest and which also fall in one of the categories as 
defined by executive order and those objects that do not.  
As for cultural objects of historical, artistic or archaeological interest Art. L. 111-2 
CHC provides that their export is subject to the requirement of a certificate granted by 
the administrative authority.1395 The details with regard to the application to obtain a 
certificate and the procedure followed by the administrative authority to decide upon 
the application are outlined in Executive Order 93-124.1396 While the procedure will not 
be further elaborated1397, it should be pointed out that it is during this procedure that 
the administrative authority will determine whether the object concerned qualifies as an 
“object of significant relevance for the national heritage from the perspective of history, 
art or archaeology” and therewith constitutes a national treasure in the sense of Art. L. 
111-1 CHC. Where the administrative authority finds that the object is indeed of 
significant relevance for the national heritage, the object – as national treasure – may not 
be exported. This possibility to prevent an export aims at the safeguarding of objects 
from private collections and is therefore of little relevance in the present study.  
Where the administrative authority comes to the conclusion that the object does not 
represent an object of significant relevance it can be exported without an export license. 
Only where such an object is exported to a non-EC Member State is the export subject 
to an export license, provided that the objects falls in one of the categories of the EEC 
Regulation’s annex. 
§3. CONCLUS IONS  FOR  CHAPTER 3 
 This chapter scrutinised national jurisdictions for the existence of legal barriers to 
the restitution of cultural objects from public collections. The analysis split in two parts: 
the analysis of the national regimes first addressed the law applicable to the disposal of 
objects from public collections before turning to export controls, therewith following 
the chronological sequential of a restitution case. It revealed that while all national 
regimes know restrictions, there exist great variety in the degree of restrictions as well as 
in the form of the technique employed that prevents disposal. While a minimalist 
                                                     
1395 Art. L. 111-2 CHC: “L'exportation temporaire ou définitive hors du territoire douanier des biens 
culturels, autres que les trésors nationaux, qui présentent un intérêt historique, artistique ou archéologique et 
entrent dans l'une des catégories définies par décret en Conseil d'État est subordonnée à l'obtention d'un 
certificat délivré par l'autorité administrative. (...)”. The categories defined by décret by the Conseil d’État 
correspond to the categories of the EEC Regulation’s Annex. Cf.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 296, fn. 344; El-
Bitar, J., 2006, p. 61. 
1396 Décret n°93-124 du 29 janvier 1993 relatif aux biens culturels soumis à certaines restrictions de 
circulation, JO 30 janvier 1993, p. 1600 as modified by Décret n°2001-894 du 26 septembre 2001 modifiant 
le décret n° 93-124 du 29 janvier 1993 relatif aux biens culturels soumis à certaines restrictions de 
circulation, JO 29 septembre 2001, p. 15393.  
1397 See further on the details of the procedure, e.g.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, pp. 62-64. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   287 12-10-2009   12:09:18
288  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
summary of the Dutch regime would be: “no restriction on disposal but…”, the English 
system comes down to “no disposal but…”. With regard to the French system the letter 
of the law could be characterised as “no disposal except where de-classification from the 
public domaine is possible” but in practice boils down to “no disposal”. As to the 
techniques of restricting disposal the systems either chose to restrict the owners’ rights 
to disposal or to declare objects as res extra commercium. 
Dutch law prevents disposal of objects from public collections in a limited number 
of scenarios by restricting the owners’ rights to disposal. While the analysis of the Dutch 
regime revealed that there exists no formal restriction to the disposal of an object from a 
public collection, the collection’s public destination may nevertheless prohibit the public 
authorities from disposing of the object where it satisfies the criteria of the CHP Act of 
irreplaceability and indispensability. Further to objects being considered as irreplaceable 
and indispensable, objects that have been acquired by means of donation or 
testamentary disposition require specific attention. While there exists no prohibition on 
the disposal of objects thus acquired as such, the donation or testamentary disposition 
might include conditions or obligations that prevent disposal explicitly or implicitly. 
However, even where this is the case it seems likely that the conditions can be altered in 
a legal procedure.  
Different from the Dutch regime that starts from the possibility that objects can be 
freely disposed from the public collections, the English and the French regime are 
characterised by a general ban on the disposal of objects from the majority of public 
collections. The analysis of restrictions on disposal of objects in UK, in particular from 
English public collections revealed extensive restrictions on disposal due to the interplay 
of trust law and statute law. As general stating point of trust law trustees may not 
dispose of any collection items except where provided for in their governing statute or 
in the Charities Acts 1993-2006. The analysis of the powers granted for disposal 
revealed that these are essentially limited to duplicates, unfit or useless objects. Disposal 
in order to return / restitute an object from a national collection is thus impossible 
unless the object concerned is a duplicate, unfit to be retained or otherwise useless. 
Further restrictions may emerge for objects that have been acquired by bequest or as a 
gift. Where the conditions attached to the bequest or gift stipulate that and object may 
not be disposed off, disposal is only possible if the statutory powers granted to the 
trustees explicity allow for the overriding of trust and other non-statutory conditions. It 
is thus not exaggerated to state that disposal is unavailable for restitution cases.  
Different from the Dutch and the UK system, the French system is based on res extra 
commercium legislation.1398 Res extra commercium is a legal concept that originates from 
Roman law.1399 Where an object qualifies as res extra commercium, it can neither be 
                                                     
1398 Two reasons can be listed for the UK not having opted for the technique of rendering objects in public 
collections res extra commercium: the nemo dat principle and the Anglican Church.  
1399 Roman law knew the following categories of res extra commercium: res communes, res divini iuris, and res 
publica. The first category refers to objects belonging to everyone, such as the air we breathe. Cf.: Vliet, L.P.W.v., 
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transferred under private or property law, nor can it be subject to acquisitive 
prescription.1400 Put differently, the object is inalienable and imprescriptable. What is 
characteristic of res extra commercium is the fact that the limitations on the object’s 
marketability is inherent to the object itself. It is an intrinsic characteristic of the object, 
rather than a restraint of the owner’s capacity to act or his entitlement to dispose of his 
property.1401  
The analysis of the French law above revealed that with regard to objects in public 
collections and historical monuments both the component of inalienability and 
imprescriptability are given, therewith rendering them res extra commercium.1402 However, 
the fact that a cultural object is presently res extra commercium does not exclude its 
reintroduction to trade. The analysis revealed the possibility of de-classification as a 
consequence of which the object is no longer inalienable. Consequently, the statement 
that res extra commercium is an intrinsic characteristic of the object must to some extent be 
nuanced in that the inherence of the characteristic is not permanent but can be changed 
by means of de-classification. De-classification is, however, perceived as an option that 
is rarely available, which is expressed by the very arduous procedure recently introduced 
with regard to objects belonging to the collections of the Musées de France. The de-
classification of objects not belonging to this circle of collections must follow the 
general rules on de-classification. According to the general rules, de-classification can 
take the form of a law, executive order or a decision. With regard to objects that have 
been acquired by means of donation or testamentary disposition or - where it concerns 
public collections not in State property - objects that have been acquired with financial 
public support that disposal is completely ruled out.  
Export restrictions  
Given that all countries addressed in this chapter are Member States of the European 
Community and therewith have to abide to Community law the analysis first addressed 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural 
goods (hereinafter: “the Regulation”)1403 before turning to the national export regimes. 
                                                                                                                                          
2007. The res divini iuris, which can be further divided into res sancrae, res religiosae and res sanctae, consists of objects 
dedicated to the gods. The res publicae, finally, are those objects that belong to the property of the state. Another 
possibility to subdivide the categories is to start with only two categories, the res divini iuris and the res publicae 
and to subgroup the res communes under the latter. See, e.g.: Weber, M., 2002, p. 5. One will, however, look in 
vain for reference to the expression res extra commericum in the Roman legal sources. Instead, they refer to 
“res quia commercium eius non est” (Marc. Dig. 20, 3, 1 § 2), to “res quarum commercium non est” (Inst. 2, 20 § 4, 
Pomp. Dig. 18, 1, 6 pr.); or to “res nullius in bonis” (Inst. 2, 1, 7; Gai. Dig. 1, 8, 1 pr.). Cf.: Weidner, A., 2001, 
p. 14. See for a treaties of the legal history of the legal concept res extra commercium: Weidner, A., 2001, pp. 
14-32; Weber, M., 2002, pp. 5-7.  
1400 Weidner, A., 2001, p. 15. 
1401 Ibid., p. 9. 
1402 Cf.: Art. L. 2112-1 GCPPP and Art. L. 3111-1 GCPPP; Art. L. 451-3 CHC and Art. L. 451-5 CHC; Art. 
L. 622-13 CHC and Art. L. 622-14 CHC. 
1403 The Regulation was complemented by Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of 
cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State (hereinafter: “the Directive”). The 
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The analysis of the Regulation revealed that the Regulation as such does not prevent any 
restitution. It is, however, not completely irrelevant in the context of restitutions in that 
it results in the requirement of a Community export licence where an object, which falls 
in one of the categories and accompanying financial thresholds as set out it its annex, is 
to be exported outside of EC territory. The decision as to whether the Community 
export licence will be granted is not decided by EC law but is a matter of the national 
export controls.  
The analysis of export controls under Dutch, UK, and French law leads to a 
different clustering of countries than with regard to restrictions to disposal from the 
national collections. With regard to export controls, the Dutch and English regime side 
together as very liberal regimes whereas the French system imposes greater restrictions 
to the export of objects from public collections. 
As for the Netherlands, Art. 14a CHP Act requires a written declaration by the 
object’s owner, or where not available by the Minister of Culture. Consequently, the 
export control does not provide for extra restrictions. Instead, the permission to export 
stands and falls with the decision on disposal, therewith constituting a very liberal export 
regime. Where an object is to be exported to a non-EC Member State, the written 
declaration must be accompanied by an EC Export Licence to be issued by the State 
Inspectorate. There exist no further criteria, next to the permission of the owner, that 
are tested by the State Inspectorate. 
The English export control is equally liberal in degree but employs the so-called 
Waverley criteria to determine whether or not an object of cultural relevance may be 
exported. Given the very selective character of the Waverley criteria only few objects 
would be prevented from export. With regard to restitution cases involving human 
remains, it can be concluded that they are not affected by the UK export control at all. 
With Section 2 juncto Schedule 1, Art. 1 speaking of “manufactured or produced” 
objects of cultural relevance the export control does not cover human remains, except 
for objects produced from human material.1404 In all cases that fall under the scope of 
application of the export control, 
In contrast to the Dutch and English system, France has chosen for a very restrictive 
export regime with regard to objects in public collections.1405 According to Art. L. 111-1 
                                                                                                                                          
Directive introduced domestic obligations in all Member States to return cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from another Member State. In the context of the present chapter looking into restrictions on 
disposal of objects from public collections and their export, the Directive is irrelevant. See further on the 
Directive above in chp. 1.§2.VI. 
1404 As an example of an object produced from human material one may cite a drinking cup made from a 
human skull or a flute made of human fermur bone. Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2003, p. 
31 where it is recommended to bring individual fossils of material value within the UK export control. In its 
response to the recommendation published on 16 December 2004, the Department for Culture Media and 
Sport agreed to further consider this. Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004b, p. 5. As of today the 
wording of the Export (Control) Order 2003 has not been amended to include (a definition of) fossils. 
1405 An interesting question but one that exceeds the scope of this study is the question whether the French 
export control is in conformity with EC Law. France could argue two ways to defend its legislation: it could 
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CHC all objects that either belong to public collections, objects classified as historical 
monument (as well as classified archives), and objects of significant relevance for the 
national heritage from the perspective of history, art or archaeology1406 qualify as 
national treasures that may not be permanently exported.1407 With regard to restitution 
cases, this ban on export is, however, less relevant than it might seem at first sight. 
Given that the export ban is linked to the objects presence in a public collection or 
designation as historical monument, they stand and fall with the objects’ inclusion in a 
collection / designation. Consequently, de-classification will not only allow for an 
object’s disposal from a collection but will at the same time release the object from the 
ban on export.  
In conclusion, different from the rules applicable to disposal of objects from public 
collections, restitution cases will not be hindered by export restrictions. The export will 
however be subject to administrative requirements such as the presentation of national 
export licences (or as far as the Netherlands is concerned written declarations) and 
where an export is to an entity outside of EC territory an EC export licence must be 
presented.  
Having analysed the law applicable to objects in public collections, especially in view 
of the possibility of disposing and export, we can now assess the way in which the 
countries chose to react to claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains. 
                                                                                                                                          
argue à Keck that its regulation with regard to public collections does not affect inter state trade and that its 
rules are not prima facie unlawful. Alternatively, if one accepted that the rules constitute a measure having 
equivalent effect under Art. 29 EC Treaty France could plead that the rules are justified by Art. 30 EC 
Treaty. France would have to show that the rules seek the protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value and that there exists no less restrictive measure to achieve this end. 
According to Maurer who analysed the national export control of the EC 15, all national legislation is in 
conformity with Art. 30. Maurer, C.H.M., 1997. 
1406 Art. L. 111-1 CHC: “Les biens appartenant aux collections publiques et aux collections des musées de 
France, les biens classés en application des dispositions relatives aux monuments historiques et aux archives, 
ainsi que les autres biens qui présentent un intérêt majeur pour le patrimoine national au point de vue de 
l'histoire, de l'art ou de l'archéologie sont considérés comme trésors nationaux”. 
1407 Cf.: El-Bitar, J., 2006, pp. 30 & 34.  
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   291 12-10-2009   12:09:18
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   292 12-10-2009   12:09:18
   
C H A P T E R  4  
Solutions Adopted for the Return of Nazi Spoliated Art and 
Human Remains at the National Level 
 In the present chapter we will explore the solutions adopted at the national level 
with regard to claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art (§1) and human remains (§2). 
From the analysis in Chapter 2 we know that public international law does not dictate 
the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. The soft-law character of the 
instruments analysed does not mean, however, that they are irrelevant to present day 
returns of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. Possessing a certain moral and 
political authority, the instruments certainly have an influence on the national solutions 
adopted. One must also not forget the mere practical relevance of these instruments in 
offering a number of solutions, be it legal or non-legal in character, to allow for the 
return of the objects concerned.1408  
In analysing the countries’ reactions to the increase in claims for the return of Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains this chapter seeks to provide insights about the nature 
of the policies implemented in the different countries. This is an important question as 
there often exists confusion about the nature of the policy and its contents.1409  
Further to sketching the relevant national policies, the following specific points will 
be addressed: with regard to Nazi spoliated art the role and relevance accorded by the 
national solutions to potential financial compensation received during the post WWII 
period will be addressed. This question emerged fom the finding of Chapter 1 according 
to which the post-war restitution efforts put great emphasis on financial compensation 
where physical restitution was not possible and the finding of Chapter 2 that the soft 
law instruments adopted by different institutions and fora at the international level do 
not touch upon the relevance of financial compensation. With regard to human remains, 
we will look out for signs that confirm the tendency of the international soft law 
                                                     
1408 See above chp. 2.§3. 
1409 See, e.g.: Kuitenbrouwer, F., 18 April 2002; Rijghard, R., 7 February 2006.  
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instruments to accord greater priority to the return of human remains in comparison to 
other cultural objects. 
Where countries have not (yet) adopted legislation and / or administrative policies, 
we will conduct case studies. Case studies are frequently relied upon in the museum 
sector and in the field of cultural property law.1410 It is important to note from the 
outset that while case studies allow us to extrapolate common patterns and principles 
they are first and foremost studies of a singular case only: “[c]ase study is the study of 
the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances”.1411 In the present context of the return of cultural objects 
from public collection case studies are not only important to understand how and why a 
particular case developed the way it did – they are also crucial in that they constitute 
important records for history and thus to some extent remedy the loss of a tangible 
object for a collection and the falsification of history. In documenting an irreversible 
process, case studies ensure the archival integrity of collections even where the actual 
object concerned is no longer part of the collection. 
After having analysed the national solutions we can come full circle by reflecting 
upon the relevance of the national initiatives on rules of international law on the return 
of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. As outlined in Chapter 2, one of the 
mechanisms in which soft law may turn into hard law is the creation of customary 
law.1412 By taking an inductive approach analysing the solutions adhered to at the 
national level we can assess whether there exists sufficiently extensive and convincing 
state practice.1413 In the final Chapter 5, we can then reflect upon the relevance of the 
developments with regard to Nazi spoliated art and human remains for the return of 
cultural objects from public collections more in general. 
§1. NAZI  SPOLIATED  ART   
I .  TH E  NE T H E R L A N D S:  TH E  I N TR O D U C T I O N  O F  A  L I B E R A L I S ED  G O V ER N M EN T  
P O L I C Y  A N D  TH E  W O R K  O F  TH E  RE S T I T U T I O N S  CO M M I T TE E  
 In the Netherlands the initiative to investigate the provenance of art works in 
public collections started in 1997. The main reason for doing so was the critical 
assessment in the local and foreign media of how the Dutch post-war restitution regime 
had been shaped and implemented.1414 One of the aspects that were particularly 
                                                     
1410 See, e.g.: Seligman, T.K., 1999; Timmer, P.M.Y. / Gubbels, G.J., 2007;  
http://www.culturalpropertyadvice.gov.uk/public_collections/case_studies (last visited 8 June 2009). 
1411 Stake, R.E., 1995, p. xi.  
1412 See above chp. 2.§3. See further on the constitutive elements of a rule of customary, state practice and 
opinio iuris, above in chp. 1.§1.VIII.  
1413 Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United 
States of America), ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 246, para. 111. 
1414 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 130; Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 6; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 9; 
Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 144. 
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discussed in the media was the way in which the Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(Stichting Nederlandsch Kunstbezit (SNK)) had fulfilled its task of re-uniting former 
owners or their heirs with artworks that had been restored from Germany.1415  
At first, the Dutch Government initiated a pilot project looking into the provenance 
of some hundred works of art in the so-called ‘Netherlands Art Property Collection 
(Nederlands Kunstbezit-collectie, hereinafter: NK Collection).1416 The NK Collection is 
part of the Dutch National Art Collection and consists of some 4000 works of art that 
had been recuperated after the war from West-Germany but could not or have not been 
given back to the original owners. The pilot revealed irregularities about the research 
that had formed the basis for decisions under the restitution policy from that period and 
concluded that there was a need to carry out a more extensive investigation into the 
provenance of the works in the NK Collection.1417 As a consequence the Origins 
Unknown Agency (Bureau Herkomst Gezocht) was established on 1 September 1998. 
The work of the Origins Unknown Agency was put under the supervision of a 
committee referred to as the ‘Ekkart Committee’ after its chairman Dr. R.E.O. 
Ekkart.1418.In the following we will summarise the main findings of the Origins 
Unknown Agency on the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation.  
1.  TH E  R E S UL T S  O F  T H E  I N V E S T I G A T I O N S  O F  TH E  P O S T -W A R  R E S T I T U T I O N  R E G I M E  
W I T H  R EG A R D  T O  A R T  W O R K S  R E C O V E R E D  F R O M  GE R M A N Y 
 In reaction to the results of the pilot study, which had revealed serious lack of 
knowledge of the provenance of works of art in the NK Collection, as well as of the 
functioning of the post-war restitution regime the Ekkart Committee recommended 
further research into the legal framework and the working methods of the Netherlands 
Art Property Foundation (SNK).1419 The aim of this research was two-fold: to lift the 
veil of secrecy and speculations with regard to the functioning of the SNK in returning 
recuperated art works from Germany to their former owners and secondly, to provide 
the Ekkart Committee with the information required for formulating new policy 
recommendations for the Government.1420  
The Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) had been established on 11 June 
1945. One of its main purposes was to recuperate artworks from abroad (primarily from 
                                                     
1415 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 6. In Dutch the Netherlands Art Property Foundation is 
referred to as Stichting Nederlands Kunstbezit. In the following we will refer to the foundation as 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK).  
1416 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 130; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 9.  
1417 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 20 May 1998, parliamentary year 1997-1998, 25013, nr. 23; Herkomst Gezocht / 
Origins Unknown, 1998; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 9. 
1418 Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen tot instelling van een tijdelijk 
adviescollege, 20 September 1999, WJZ/1999/31477 (8091).  
1419 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 7.  
1420 Cf.: Ibid. 
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Germany) and to arrange for their return to their lawful owners.1421 When the Council 
for the Restoration of Rights (Raad voor Rechtsherstel) was inaugurated on 20 August 
1945 with the task of the restoration of the pre-war legal system, the Netherlands Art 
Property Foundation (SNK) became part of the Council’s Administrative Department 
(Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI)).1422 The NBI was charged with the task of tracking 
down, administering and liquidating both enemy and collaborationist assets, as well as 
assets of absent and unknown owners.1423 The Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(SNK) thus became a specific organ of the NBI dealing exclusively with art works. 
With regard to the task of repatriating spoliated art works from Germany the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) closely cooperated with the Monuments, 
Fine Arts and Archives Branch (MFA&A) of the Allied Forces.1424 As to the restoration 
of the art works to their original owners within the Netherlands the work of the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) was based on the provisions of the Decree 
Recovery Legal Relations (Besluit Herstel Rechtsverkeer (Stb. E 100)) as adopted by the 
Dutch Government in exile on 17 September 1944.1425 In the research as instigated by 
the Ekkart Committee on the legal framework and the working methods of the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) the wide discretion of this Decree E 100 
was identified as one of the reasons for the incoherence and arbitrariness of how the 
restitution of art works had been effected by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(SNK).1426 
The Decree E 100 was one of the most important measures to implement Decree 
Occupation Measures (Besluit Bezettingsmaatregelen (Stb. E 93)), which foresaw in 
rules dealing with regulations that had been adopted by the occupying power.1427 The 
Decree E 100 introduced open standards and emphasised ‘reasonability’ as main norm 
for evaluating claims, therewith granting discretion to the judiciary in considering the 
various interests on a case by case basis.1428 The wide discretion on the part of the 
judiciary, the Judicial Division of the Council for the Restoration of Rights, necessarily 
led to a certain degree of randomness and unpredictability of its decision, if not 
                                                     
1421 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 7-8. The other main task of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation was to manage art 
works from enemy assets situated in the Netherlands in accordance with the Decree Enemy Property 
(Besluit Vijandelijk Vermogen (Stb. E 133)) 
1422 Further to the Administrative Department the Council for the Restoration of Rights consisted of a 
Judicial Division (Afdeling Rechtspraak), a Securities Division (Afdeling Effectenregistratie); a Division on 
Provisions for Absentees (Afdeling Voorzieningen voor Afwezigen); a Division on Legal Persons (Afdeling 
Rechtspersonen) and a Division for immovable property (Afdeling Onroerende Goederen). Cf.: Art. 4 
Decree Recovery Legal Relations (Besluit Herstel Rechtsverkeer (Stb. E 100)).  
1423 The latter first and foremost concerned the property of Jewish citizens that had been deported and 
murdered. Cf.: Veraart, W., 2005, p. 68.  
1424 For the Netherlands, the most important Collecting Points were in Munich and Offenbach.  
1425 Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 16. See for a detailed analysis of the decree and the activities of the 
Dutch Government-in-exile: Michielsen, J., 2004; and especially: Veraart, W., 2005.  
1426 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 259; Veraart, W., 2005, p. 87. 
1427 Veraart, W., 2005, pp. 60-61; see further on the decree E 100: Meijer, K., 2008.  
1428 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 62-64 & 547. 
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injustices.1429 Another characteristic of the Decree E 100 is the fact that it protected the 
interests of good faith purchasers over the interests of those who had lost their 
possession.1430 While good faith was not presumed but had to be demonstrated1431, this 
reversal of the burden of proof changed little about the fact that many original owners 
could not recover their property.1432 In these cases, the former owners could only seek 
financial compensation from the German State or the private party who had knowingly 
and deliberately sold the object concerned.1433  
Faced with the wide discretion of Decree E 100, the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK) had repeatedly asked for official guidelines on how to organise its 
tasks with regard to the management and restitution of art works.1434 The absence of 
such official guidelines is an indication of the little relevance that was accorded in the 
past to the restitution of art works at the ministerial level and the Dutch Parliament.1435 
In effect, the restitution of art works to their original owners was considered of 
secondary relevance compared to the interest in safeguarding and re-establishing the 
national cultural patrimony.1436 The latter was considered essential for the greater good 
of the Dutch nation and its people.1437 As a consequence lesser efforts were made with 
regard to the restitution of spoliated art works to dispossessed individuals.  
In those cases where works of art were returned to private individuals, the process 
was not without conditions. Claimants had to pay an administrative charge of 2.75% of 
the value of the object.1438 Also, where the original owner had received some form of 
remuneration, e.g. in case of a forced sale, restitution of the object depended on the 
paying of the respective sum to the Dutch State.1439 Further to these financial conditions 
for return, the research also revealed that the policy of the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK) was inconsistent. While some private individuals were given the 
option to re-purchase their property after restitution had been denied, which was often 
financially more attractive than restitution1440, others were denied this possibility. On top 
                                                     
1429 Cf.: Ibid., p. 547. 
1430 See Art. 27 sub 1 Decree E 100.  
1431 See Art. 32 Decree E 100.  
1432 Cf.: Veraart, W., 2005, p. 547. See further on the possibilities to seek compensation from the German 
state above in chp. 1.§4.  
1433 Cf.: Ibid.  
1434 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 259 referring to the following documents: C.M. Van der Does, 
'proces-verbaal relaterende het onderzoek naar onregelmatigheden door de Raad van Beheer van de 
Stichting Nederlands Kunstbezit, t.a.v. van een geschenk aan Prof. Vorenkamp', verklaring van J.K. van der 
Haagen, 22 september 1948. Ministerie van Financiën, archief Directie Bewindvoering, inv. Nr. 277.  
1435 Cf.: Ibid. 
1436 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 257-258.  
1437 Cf.: Ibid., p. 257.  
1438 Cf.: Ibid., p. 264.  
1439 Cf.: Art. 27 sub 5 Decree E 100. Cf.: Ibid; Campfens, E., et al., 2006, p. 417. 
1440 As mentioned above restitution was made subject to the repayment of any renumeration received and 
an administrative fee. Given the collapse of the art market and therewith the prices after the war it was 
often financially more attractive to pay the post-war market value than repaying the higher renumeration 
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of that the conditions made for the re-purchase varied per case.1441 Few claimants, 
however, made use of the possibility to appeal to the Judicial Department of the Council 
for the Restoration of Rights, which served as court of appeal for decisions taken by one 
of the other departments.1442  
While some of the flaws in the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK) appeared only from the research as instigated by the Ekkart 
Committee in the late 1990s, some irregularities had been known as early as the late 
1940s when the director Arie Bob de Vries and one of his close employees were arrested 
respectively convicted for fraud and personal unjustified enrichment.1443 As a result of 
the mismanagement, the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) not only received 
a new director, J. Jolles, but the tasks of the foundations were also transferred to the 
Office for Reparation Payments and Restitution of Property (Bureau Herstelbetalings- 
en Recuperatiegoederen in short and hereinafter: Hergo) as of 1 July 1950.1444 In July 
1951 the period for the submission of an application for claims lapsed.1445 However, the 
situation was not only problematic with regard to cases in which claimants had not filed 
their claim in due time, but also with regard to cases that had been filed but were not 
dealt with by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) respectively Hergo 
before the Dutch Government concluded the process of the restoration of rights. In a 
report dated 1 July 1951 Jolles remarked that hundreds of claims had not been dealt 
with.1446 While the restitution of art works had significantly improved under his 
direction the task could not be completed under the time-pressure as imposed by the 
Ministry for Finance. The Ministry, which had proven to be the most influential of all 
ministries in the implementation of the restoration of rights1447, was wary about the 
costs of the restoration framework and sought to dismantle the process as quickly as 
possible.1448 It is in this context some 4000 artworks, including ca. 1700 paintings were 
                                                                                                                                          
received when the market was still flourishing plus 2.75% of the object’s value. Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, 
H., 2002, p. 264. 
1441 Ibid; Veraart, W., 2005, p. 87, fn. 85. 
1442 Campfens, E., et al., 2006, p. 417. See for a case in which the claimants did appeal to the Judicial 
Division of the Council of Restoration of Rights the Gutmann case below.  
1443 See further: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, pp. 17-18. 
1444 Before August 1948, HERGO had existed under a different name: the “War loot department” (Oorlogs 
buit). The War loot department had been founded in December 1945 to take over the task to collect, 
administer, distribute and sell all goods that had been captured form the German armed forces from a 
comparable department under the Military Authority that had been founded almost a year earlier in January 
1945. In November 1946, recuperation of goods removed from the Netherlands and compensation 
payments were also assigned to the “War loot” department. This task would soon take up most of the 
department’s time and work, which is reflected in the change in designation: in August 1948, the 
department was changed into Bureau Herstelbetalings- en Recuperatiegoederen, which might be translated 
as Office for Reparation Payments and Restitution of Property. The SNK was officially disabanded on 1 
November 1952. 
1445 Cf: Campfens, E., et al., 2006, p. 417. 
1446 Rapport inzake de stand der werkzaamheden van het Bureau Herstelbetalings- en Recuperatiegoederen. 
1447 Veraart, W., 2005, p. 83. 
1448 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 263. 
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sold in auction.1449 The possibility to sell objects that had not been claimed within a 
certain time period was granted in Art. 113 sub 2 of Decree E 100.1450 Research into the 
practice of Hergo revealed that the provision was interpreted rather extensively: not 
only objects that had not been claimed were sold in auction; the same was true for 
artworks whose former owners were known but did not qualify for restitution (e.g. 
where the transaction was considered voluntary in nature) or refrained from making a 
claim.1451 It is estimated that objects (then) worth ƒ 2 million had been sold in auction 
on behalf of the Dutch treasury.1452  
Custodianship for artworks that were not sold in auction but were not restituted 
either was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the State Art Collections Service 
at the Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences in 1952. Hergo was dissolved on 1 
February 1953; its activities were transferred to the Administration Directorate at the 
Ministry of Finance. As of May 1988, the responsibility for the restoration of art works 
was also transferred to the Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Culture, now the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sciences, by Royal Decree 233 of April 20, 1988.1453 
2.  TH E  DEV E L O PM E N T  O F  A  L I BE R A L I S E D  R E TU R N  P O L I C Y  I N  A  D I A L O G U E  BE T W E E N  
T H E  GO V E R N ME N T  A N D  T H E  EK K A R T  CO M MI T T E E  
 Next to supervising the provenance work of the Origins Unknown Agency, the 
Ekkart Committee was asked to advise the Minister of Education, Culture and 
Science1454 on a future policy with regard to the return of art works from the NK 
Collection.1455 In the following we will analyse the recommendations made by the 
Ekkart Committee to the Government and the Governmental reactions in order to 
subsequently distil the current policy pursued by the Minister of Education, Culture and 
Science with regard to the return of artworks from the Dutch State collection 
respectively Dutch public collections.  
                                                     
1449 Cf.: Ibid., p. 255. 
1450 Art. 133 sub 2 Decree E 100 reads in Dutch: "Voor het geval de eigenaar binnen een nader door Ons te 
bepalen termijn niet is opgekomen, zullen de zaken, die niet reeds eerder zijn verkocht te gelde worden 
gemaakt en zullen de opbrengsten van alle zaken, elke ingevolge het bepaalde in dit hoofdstuk door den 
Raad zijn beheerd, worden aangewend tot een nader door Ons bepalen doel.“ 
1451 Cf.: Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, p. 237. 
1452 Cf.: Ibid., p. 255. See for an extensive discussion of the sale of artworks in auctions under Hergo: 
Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., 2002, pp. 236-256. 
1453 Besluit herindeling ministeriële taak recuperatie weggevoerde kunstvoorwerpen, Stb. 233. 
1454 Please note that for reasons of simplification we only refer to the Minister of Culture in the main text 
and do not distinguish between the Minister and the State Secretary. In some government terms there exist 
an additional State Secretary for Culture to support the Minister of Education, Culture and Science. Given 
that the final responsibility lies with the Minister we do not think it necessary to make the distinction. 
However, in the footnote references, we distinguish between them. 
1455 See Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen tot instelling van een 
tijdelijk adviescollege, 20 September 1999, WJZ/1999/31477 (8091), Art. 1 sub a with regard to the 
supervision of the Origins Unknown Agency and Art. 1 sub b with regard to the policy recommendations. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   299 12-10-2009   12:09:19
300  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
In reaction to the investigations of the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK) in general and the provenance research of objects in the NK 
Collection the Ekkart Committee issued a number of recommendations to the Dutch 
Government. In light of the claimants’ advanced age the Ekkart Committee sought it 
desirable to publish recommendations with regard to claims from private individuals at 
the earliest moment possible.1456 Therefore, the Ekkart Committee dropped the initial 
idea to await the final outcome of the research of the Origins Unknown Agency in 
favour of a phased issuing of recommendations.  
The first set of recommendations of the Ekkart Committee focusing on art works 
spoliated from private collections was published in April 2001. In January 2003, the 
second set of recommendations dealing with art works from dealers’ trading stocks 
followed. The final set of recommendations, which is more general in nature, dates from 
September 2004.  
Before addressing these three sets of recommendations, reference should be made to 
a government memorandum on restitution and recuperation of cultural objects dating 
from 14 July 2000.1457 The memorandum, which dates from after the establishment of 
the Ekkart Committee but predates its first set of recommendations, was adopted in 
reaction to a request by the standing Committee for Education, Culture and Science in 
respect of Resolution 1205 (1999) on Spoliated Jewish cultural property by the Council 
of Europe.1458 It contains information on the state of affairs regarding the restitution of 
Jewish cultural objects by the Dutch Government and sets out provisional policy rules 
for the handling of individual applications for the restitution of works of art in 
anticipation of the recommendations of the Ekkart Committee.1459  
The memorandum refers back to policy rules that had been formulated by the 
Minister of Culture in his letter to the House of Representatives dated 20 May 1998, 
which accompanied the report of the pilot study on the NK Collection.1460 According to 
these policy rules applications for the restitution of cultural objects from the Dutch NK 
Collection should be dealt with only where it concerned new applications or where new 
                                                     
1456 The Ekkart Committee explicitly chose to deviate from the initial intention to include the restitution 
policy recommendations to the Government in its final report, as it considered it “extremely desirable to 
speed up the restitution policy advisory process”. See: Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins 
Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), 2001, p. 5; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 28. 
1457 Brief en regeringsnotitie inzake restitutie en recuperatie van cultuurgoederen (letter and government 
memorandum in respect of restitution and recuperation of items of cultural value) d.d. 14 juli 2000, Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 25 839, nr. 16.  
1458 By adoptiong this memorandum the Dutch Government reacted to the appeal of paragraph 10 of 
Council of Europe Resolution 1205 asking national parliaments to “give immediate consideration to ways in 
which they may be able to facilitate the return of spoliated Jewish cultural property”. See further on 
Resolution 1205 above in chp. 2.§1.III.2.  
1459 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2003b, para. 2.3 on the 'Government position on second World War Assets', 21 March 2000. 
1460 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 20 May 1998, parliamentary year 1997-1998, 25013, nr. 23. See further above on the 
pilot study. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   300 12-10-2009   12:09:19
S O L U T I O N S  F O R  R E T U R N  A D O P T E D  A T  T H E  N A T I O N A L  L E V E L  |  301   
 
  
facts have become available. 1461 New applications were understood as applications that 
had not been settled previously by means of a decision by an authorised body for the 
restoration of property rights or by means of amicable restoration of property rights. 
According to the memorandum of 20 July 2000 these policy rules were also held 
applicable to works that are not part of the NK Collection but which belong to other 
parts of the Dutch national art collection.1462 The policy rules laid down in the 
memorandum dealt only with the eligibility of a claim for (re-) consideration. It did not 
lay down new criteria for the allowance or rejection of an application on substantive 
grounds. Instead, it stressed that until the Ekkart Committee had recommended 
otherwise, the assessment of a claim would be based on the rules as laid down by the 
post-war restoration of property rights.1463 In its first set of recommendation, the Ekkart 
Committee reacted to the policy as laid down in the memorandum. 
a) First series of recommendations of the Ekkart Committee, April 20011464  
On 26 April 2001 the Ekkart Committee presented its first set of recommendations 
to the Minister of Culture.1465 The general tone of the recommendations was that the 
                                                     
1461 Brief en regeringsnotitie inzake restitutie en recuperatie van cultuurgoederen (letter and government 
memorandum in respect of restitution and recuperation of items of cultural value) d.d. 14 juli 2000, Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 25 839, nr. 16; Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items 
of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2003b, para. 2.4, p. 12.  
1462 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2003b, para. 2.4, p. 12. 
1463 Ibid. 
1464 Commissie Ekkart, 2006, pp. 28-29 & Appendix 27. 
1465 Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), 2001. The 
Recommendation reads as follows:  
1. The committee recommends that the notion of "settled cases" be restricted to those cases in which the 
Council for the Restoration of Property Rights or another competent court has pronounced judgment or in 
which a formal settlement was made between the lawful owners and the bodies which in hierarchy rank 
above the SNK.  
2. The committee recommends that the notion of new facts be given a broader interpretation than has been 
the usual policy so far and that the notion be extended to include any differences compared to judgments 
pronounced by the Council for the Restoration of Property Rights as well as the results of changed 
(historic) views of justice and the consequences of the policy conducted at the time.  
3. The Committee recommends that sales of works of art by Jewish private persons in the Netherlands 
from 10 May 1940 onwards be treated as forced sales, unless there is express evidence to the contrary. The 
same principle should be applied in respect of sales by Jewish private persons in Germany and Austria from 
1933 and 1938 onwards, respectively.  
4. The Committee recommends that the sales proceeds be brought into the discussion only if and to the 
extent that the then seller or his heirs actually obtained the free disposal of said proceeds.  
5. The Committee recommends that for the purposes of applying this rule the rightful claimants be given 
the benefit of the doubt whenever it is uncertain whether the seller actually enjoyed the proceeds.  
6. The Committee recommends that whenever it is necessary to couple a restitution to the partial or full 
repayment of the sales proceeds, the amount involved be indexed in accordance with the general price-
index figure.  
7. The Committee recommends that the authorities, when restituting works of art, refrain from passing on 
the administration costs fixed by the SNK at the time.  
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Dutch Government should not hide behind the decisions taken in the post-war period 
and instead should introduce a more generous restitution regime.1466 The 
recommendations focus on the following five aspects: the question of what constitutes a 
settled case and new facts (nova)1467; the question of what constitutes a forced sale and 
how one should deal with the proceeds a claimant may have received in the 
transaction1468; the requirements with regard to proof of title1469; the settling of 
administration costs incurred by the Dutch Government1470; and the possibility for 
repurchase of objects that do not qualify for restitution1471.  
Settled cases and new facts (nova) 
With regard to the definition of a settled cases and new facts (nova) the Ekkart 
Committee reacted to the policy as laid down in the Government memorandum from 
14 July 2000. With regard to the question which cases should be considered as “settled” 
the Ekkart Committee held that only cases that had ended in a court ruling or in a 
formal settlement between the claimant and the Council for the Restoration of Rights or 
the Council’s Administrative Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI)) should 
be considered as settled. Furthermore, later formal settlements between the Dutch State 
and claimants should qualify as settled cases. Settlements between claimants and the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK), however, should not qualify as settled 
cases in the eyes of the Ekkart Committee. Put differently, cases concluded with a 
settlement with the SNK should be eligible for reassessment.  
With regard to the question of what constitutes a new fact (novum) the Ekkart 
Committee argued for a broad understanding. Rather than limiting the concept of nova 
to new, hard facts about the provenance of a works of art, differences between judicial 
judgments and decisions by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) should 
also be considered as new facts.1472 This latter point requires some further explanation: 
the research into the work of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) had 
revealed that only in a few cases where restitution had been refused, claimants had 
appealed to the Judicial Division of the Council for the Restoration of Rights. The 
research furthermore revealed a qualitative difference in how the Judicial Division and 
the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) had interpreted the provisions of 
                                                                                                                                          
8. The Committee recommends that a work of art be restituted if the title thereto has been proved with a 
high degree of probability and there are no indications of the contrary.  
9. The Committee recommends that owners who did not use an earlier opportunity of repurchasing works 
of art be reafforded such opportunity, at any rate insofar as the works of art do not qualify for restitution 
without any financial compensation according to other applicable criterions. 
1466 Cf.: Schrage, E.J.H., 2007, p. 45. 
1467 Recommendations 1-2. 
1468 Recommendations 3-6. 
1469 Recommendation 8. 
1470 Recommendation 7. 
1471 Recommendation 9. 
1472 Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 78. 
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Decree E 100.1473 The Judicial Division was more lenient towards the claimants in its 
interpretation of the provisions. E.g. in a case focusing on the question whether a sale 
qualified as involuntary loss, the Judicial Division held, in deviation from the practise of 
the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK), that a sale “under the influence of the 
special circumstances of the war” also qualified for annulment.1474 Consequently, the 
notion of nova should include differences between judgments pronounced by the 
Council for the Restoration of Property Rights and decisions of the Netherlands Art 
Property Foundation (SNK). Finally, the results of changed (historic) views of justice 
and the consequences should also be considered as nova. 
Forced sales 
A significant part of the recommendations dealt with the question of what 
constituted a forced sale. According to the research instigated by the Ekkart Committee 
this question pinpoints the most frequently occurring practical problem in the post war 
restitution practice.1475 The Ekkart Committee recommended that all sales of art works 
from private Jewish collections in the Netherlands from 10 May 1940 onwards should 
be considered as forced sales, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. In fact, this 
recommendation came down to a reversal of the burden of proof compared to the 
restitution practise under the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK). The Ekkart 
Committee furthermore argued for the application of the same principle in respect of 
sales by Jewish private persons in Germany and Austria from 1933 and 1938 onwards, 
respectively. 
With regard to the question of the repayment of sales proceeds, the Ekkart 
Committee held that different from the policy in the past the repayment should only be 
considered in cases where the claimant could freely dispose of the proceeds. In those 
cases where it cannot be established whether the claimant could freely dispose of the 
proceeds he should be given the benefit of the doubt.  
Evidence of ownership  
Further to the reversal of the burden of proof with regard to the possibility to 
dispose of sale proceeds in forced sales the Ekkart Committee suggested a lenient 
approach towards the requirements for proof of title to an artwork. Given the 
circumstances of war and the long time period that has passed since, it should be 
sufficient for a claimant to prove his title with a high degree of probability where there 
are no indications to the contrary.  
                                                     
1473 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
1474 Ibid., p. 78. See further on the treatment of transactions concluded under the circumstances of war 
below in chp. 4.§1.3.a) discussing the Gutmann case. 
1475 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Administration costs occurred by the Dutch Government 
With regard to the past practise of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) 
to pass on the costs of custodianship to the claimants, the Ekkart Committee held that 
the future policy should refrain from passing on the administration costs to the 
claimants.  
Repurchasing  
The evaluation of the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(SNK) had revealed that in a number of cases former owners were offered to buy back 
art objects that had been restituted to the Netherlands. For reasons such as the 
conditions stated for the repurchasing or for lack of financial resources not all former 
owners did make use of this possibility. The Ekkart Committee recommended that 
previously unused opportunities to buy back art works that had been denied during the 
post war practice should be re-opened for claimants. 
b) Reaction of the Dutch Government to the first series of recommendations of the Ekkart 
Committee  
The response of the Government to the first Ekkart recommendations is stretched 
over two letters of the Minister of Culture to the House of Representatives. In the first, 
initial letter dated 29 June 2001 the Minister of Culture reported that the Government 
planned to follow the main points of the recommendation:1476  
With regard to the question of what constitutes a settled case the Minister of Culture 
accepted the view of the Ekkart Committee, including (after some further exchange of 
information with the Ekkart Committee1477) the view that decisions by the Netherlands 
Art Property Foundation (SNK) do not constitute settled cases. With regard to the 
question what constitutes a “formal settlement” between the Dutch State and a 
claimant, the Minister of Culture elaborated that a case is settled where a claim resulted 
either in a conscious and deliberate settlement or when a claimant expressly renounced 
his claim for restitution. 
With regard to the interpretation of the concept of nova the Government generally 
endorses a broad interpretation of the concept. It agrees with the Ekkart Committee 
that greater relevance must be accorded to the criterions as formulated by the Judicial 
Division of the Council for the Restoration of Property Rights. With regard to the role 
that these criterions should play, however, the Government differs from the opinion of 
the Ekkart Committee: rather than understanding these criterions as nova as the Ekkart 
Committee suggested the Government they should be used for the substantive 
examination of restitution claims. Put differently, rather than playing a role in the 
                                                     
1476 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, 
parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26.  
1477 Ibid; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, p. 29.  
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decision as to whether or not a case should be re-accessed these criteria should become 
relevant only after it has been established that a case must not be considered as settled 
case. With regard to the suggestion to include changed (historic) views of justice and the 
consequences in the broader notion of nova, the Government postponed its definite 
answer and limited its first letter to making a preliminary reservation. 
The recommendation of the Ekkart Committee to consider in principle all sales by 
Jewish owners as forced sales was approved by the Government. The Government 
announced that it wanted to further study the implications of applying the principle also 
to sales by Jewish private persons in Germany and Austria from 1933 and 1938 
onwards, respectively. Furthermore, the Government wanted to study whether it was 
advisable and feasible to restrict the recommendation to Jewish private property or 
whether it should be extended to other population groups as well.  
With regard to the repayment of sales proceeds the Government states that the 
recommendation to relax the rules and to demand repayment only in cases were it has 
been proven that the former owner or his heirs could freely dispose of the proceeds is in 
line with the policy as already endorsed by the Government. The Government 
furthermore endorses the principle not to charge any administration costs in case of 
restitution.  
With regard to the required proof of title the Government accepts that documentary 
proof is difficult to produce and accepts the recommendation of the Ekkart Committee 
that art works should be restituted if title has been proven with a high degree of 
probability and in absence of indications to the contrary.  
With regard to the question of granting claimants the possibility to repurchase their 
works of art the Government states that it wishes to seek further advice on the 
implications of this recommendation. 
Further to its reaction to the specific recommendations of the Ekkart Committee, 
the Government also announced its plan to establish a committee with the task to 
advise the Minister of Culture on individual applications for the restitution of art works 
from the NK Collection. In reaction to the recommendation of the Ekkart Committee, 
and in the light of the Washington Principles and developments in France and the 
United Kingdom the Government considered a restitution committee as the most 
appropriate form to shape the future restitution policy based on a “more policy-based 
approach” rather than on a “purely legal approach”.1478  
c) The more detailed reaction followed by letter dated 16 November 2001 
On 16 November 2001 the Minister of Culture sent a second letter to the House of 
Representatives holding the definitive reaction of the Government with regard to the 
liberal interpretation of the notion of nova to include also changed (historic) views of 
justice; the extension of the reversal of the burden of proof with regard to forced sales 
from Jewish claimants to claimants from other population groups, and the re-opening of 
                                                     
1478 See on the Restitutions Committee below. 
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the possibility to repurchase works of art, which had not been purchased at an earlier 
occasion.1479  
With regard to the question in how far changed (historic) views should qualify as nova 
the Government upheld its reservation expressed in its first letter. As to the reversal of 
the burden of proof in cases involving forced sales the Government held that the 
principle should be applicable also to sales by Jewish private persons in Germany and 
Austria from 1933 respectively 1938 onwards and to other persecuted groups of the 
population, such as Sinti and Roma. With regard to the ninth recommendation of the 
Ekkart Committee, i.e. to reafford owners with the opportunity of repurchasing works 
of art, the Government declares that it cannot endorse it as it would introduce a 
situation in which the restoration of property rights would be repeated in a number of 
cases and therewith would collide with the general government position that the 
restoration of property rights should not be repeated.  
Finally, the second letter was supplemented with the decree establishing the 
'Advisory Committee on the Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items of 
Cultural Value and the Second World War'.1480  
d) Second series of recommendations of the Ekkart Committee, January 20031481 
On 28 January 2003 the Ekkart Committee presented its second series of 
recommendations that focus on the restitution of artworks from art dealers’ trading 
stocks. The Ekkart Committee was plain about the fact that it was harder to formulate 
clear and cohesive recommendations with regard to the art trade in comparison to 
objects from private collections. The following factors were identified as complicating 
the subject matter: first, the inherent interest of art dealers to sell works of art as a 
consequence of which one cannot assume that all sales in the period 1940-1945 
constituted forced sales. Secondly, where a so-called Verwalter had been appointed by 
the German occupying authorities it was difficult to draw the line between a sale by a 
Jewish art dealer and the Verwalter. Finally, the growing number of occasional art dealers 
that entered the business during the booming years of the art market during the war, 
next to long-established art galleries. 
Despite these factors preventing an integral application of the principles developed 
with regard to privately owned artworks the Ekkart Committee nevertheless declared six 
principles (1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) of the 2001 recommendation to equally apply to works of 
                                                     
1479 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 16 November 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, 
parliamentary year 2001-2002, 25 839, nr. 27. 
1480 Decree issued by the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science, F. van der Ploeg, establishing a 
committee to advise the government on the restitution of items of cultural value of which the original 
owners involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime and which are 
currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands, 16 November 2001 (Reference 
WJZ/2001/45374(8123). See further below in chp. 4.§1.I.3 on the characteristics and work of this 
Restitutions Committee. 
1481 Ekkart Committee, 2003; Commissie Ekkart, 2006, Appendix 10. 
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art from dealers’ trading stocks.1482 Consequently, only cases in which the Judicial 
Division of the Council for the Restoration of rights or another competent court had 
issued a judgement or in which a formal settlement had been reached between claimant 
being an art dealer and a body higher in hierarchy than the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK) are to be considered as settled cases. In case of a forced sale the sales 
proceeds only have to be repaid if the art dealer or his heirs had been able to freely 
dispose of them. In evaluating the question whether the sales proceeds could have been 
freely disposed the benefit of the doubt must be given to the art dealer. No 
administrative costs should be charged to the claimant and finally, with regard to the 
proof of valid title a high probability of such title and the absence of evidence to the 
contrary should be sufficient.  
The second principle of the 2003 recommendation extends the scope of application 
of the principles to the loss of property or transactions by Jewish dealers in Germany as 
of 1933 and in Austria as of 1938 onwards rather than applying only to the loss of 
property or transactions by Jewish dealers in the Netherlands. 
The third principle of the 2003 recommendation deals with the possibility that an art 
work could have belonged to an art dealer’s private collection rather than his trading 
stock. The Ekkart Committee recommends that where there are enough indications that 
an artwork did belong to a dealer’s private collection, the restitution claim should be 
dealt with in accordance with the standards for privately owned artworks. 
Principles 4, 5 and 6 of the 2003 recommendation all deal with the required proof as 
to the evaluation whether a loss from an art dealer’s stock constituted theft respectively 
confiscation, voluntary or involuntary sale. The Ekkart Committee suggested that where 
a first-hand statement of the art dealer or his heirs, i.e. in the form of a declaration form 
filled in after the war, is available the statement should be taken at face value, provided 
that there exists no evidence to the contrary. In the absence of a declaration form clues 
that provide for theft or confiscation must be accorded great relevance in considering 
restitution.1483 With regard to involuntary sales the recommendation lists a number of 
clues indicating the involuntary character of the transaction where a declaration form is 
missing: the treat of reprisal and the promise of the provision of passports or safe 
                                                     
1482 The first principle of the November 2003 Recommendations reads: "The committee recommends using 
the same points of departure for the art trade with regard to private art property". 
1483 The fourth principle of the November 2003 Recommendations reads: "The committee recommends 
that if in a declaration form after the war the transfer of artworks from the property of an art dealer has 
been qualified as theft or confiscation, and nothing has been discovered which refutes this, the qualification 
concerned should be accepted. If no declaration form was made or there is only an internal declaration 
form, clues which make it highly probable that the case concerns theft or confiscation must be considered a 
reason for restitution, whereby with regard to Jewish art dealers the threatening general circumstances must 
be taken into account". 
The fifth principle of the November 2003 Recommendations reads: "The committee recommends viewing 
the qualification binding in all cases in which the art dealer himself, his heirs or and immediate 
representative appointed by him or his heirs has filled in 'voluntary sale' unless very clear clues are 
submitted which make it probable that a mistake was made when the form was filled in or that the filling in 
of the form took place under disproportionately burdening circumstances". 
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conduct as part of the transaction. Furthermore sales by Verwalters or other managers 
not appointed by the owner from the stocks under their management in as far as the 
original owners or their heirs have not fully benefited from the transaction and have 
explicitly waived their rights after the war".1484  
If one squares the principles of this second set of recommendations with the first set 
it becomes evident that the Ekkart Committee did declare the majority of principles of 
the first set equally applicable to the restitution of works from art dealers’ stock. The 
two sets of recommendations differ, however, with regard to the presumption of a 
forced sale and with regard to the interpretation of new facts (nova). Whereas the 
Ekkart Committee did explicitly state that the principle of the presumption of a forced 
sale was not valid with regard to art dealers whose intrinsic business it is to sell works of 
art, it did not reflect upon or explicitly mention that it did not declare the broader 
notion of “nova” equally applicable to works from dealers’ trading stocks.1485  
e) Reaction of the Dutch Government to the second series of recommendations of the Ekkart 
Committee 
The reaction of the Government to the second set of recommendations of the 
Ekkart Committee was communicated to the House of Representatives on 5 December 
2003.1486 In the government reaction the Minister of Culture endorsed all six 
recommendations of the Ekkart Committee. With regard to the fourth and six 
recommendations dealing with forced respectively involuntary sales the Government 
states that these recommendations apply not only to Jewish art dealers but also to art 
dealers from other persecuted groups.  
                                                     
1484 The sixth principle of the November 2003 Recommendations reads: "In all cases in which after the war 
the party involved, his heirs or his immediate representative appointed by him or his heirs have filled in the 
qualification 'involuntary sale' on a declaration form and there are no indications that contradict this 
qualification, such a qualification should be accepted. In all cases in which such a declaration form is 
missing, clues – which make it highly probable that coerced sale took place – serve as the point of departure 
for the restitution policy. Clues indicating involuntary sale in any case include the treat of reprisal and the 
promise of the provision of passports or safe conduct as part of the transaction. Involuntary sales are also 
taken to mean sales by Verwalters or other managers not appointed by the owner from the stocks under 
their management in as far as the original owners or their heirs have not fully benefited from the transaction 
and have explicitly waived their rights after the war". 
1485 Ekkart Committee, 2003. See also: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of 
Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2003b, p. 29, fn. 16. The Restitutions Committee characterises 
this omission as “striking”. See for an analysis of how the Restitutions Committee deals with claims 
concerning the restitution of works from a dealer’s trading stock below under the analysis of the 
Goudstikker case. 
1486 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 5 December 2003 in respect of the second series of recommendations made by the 
Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 2003-2004, 25 839, nr. 34. 
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f) Final recommendations of the Ekkart Committee, September 2004 
On 30 September 2004 the Ekkart Committee presented its final recommendations 
to the Government.1487 At that point, its recommendations also took into consideration 
the experience of the Restitutions Committee in applying the liberalised return policy 
based on the previous two sets of recommendations and the respective government 
reactions. The Ekkart Committee did not consider it necessary to come back or amend 
any of its earlier recommendations or to comment upon their application by the 
Restitutions Committee. Instead, the Ekkart Committee focused on the conclusion of 
the period of liberalised restitution regime, the treatment of unjustly recuperated objects 
and how the Government should deal with the impression that it had been unjustifiably 
enriched. 
With regard to the finalisation of the period of the liberalized restitution policy the 
first, second and ninth principles of the recommendations are relevant. In the first 
principle the Ekkart Committee recommends to end the period in which claims for the 
restitution of works of art from the NK Collection can be made under the liberalised 
policy two years from the Government reaction to this final set of recommendations. In 
the eyes of the Ekkart Committee such a cut-off point was justified on two grounds: 
first, the liberalisation of the restitution policy had been intended as a temporary 
measure from the beginning. Secondly, with the ever greater passage of time and the 
death of the last eye witnesses it is considered unlikely that further successful claims will 
emerge. Principle 2 seeks to balance the cut-off point by advising the Government to 
widely publicize the impending lapse of this opportunity one year prior to the 
termination of the period. The ninth principle deals with the preservation and making 
available of the documentation compiled during the Origins Unknown Agency’s 
research. According to the Ekkart Committee this documentation should be preserved 
permanently and as complete as possible and be lodged in the National Archives where 
it should be made accessible to all interested parties.  
The second focus of the final recommendations is on artworks that were (possibly) 
unjustly recuperated to the Netherlands after the war. The principles suggested by the 
Ekkart Committee foresee both in the situation that an artwork is claimed by a foreign 
private individual and by a foreign state. According to the third principle claims from 
foreign private individuals should be dealt with conform the claims of (the heirs) of 
owners who lost works of art within the Netherlands.1488 With regard to claims by 
another state the fourth principle states that these claims should not be submitted to the 
Restitutions Committee but should be dealt with on the basis of bilateral consultations 
with the Government of the country concerned. 
                                                     
1487 Ekkart Committee, 2004. 
1488 See, e.g. for a recommendation by the Restitutions Committee dealing with an artwork that had not 
been lost within the Netherlands: Recommendation RC 1.71, 3 July 2008. The recommendation is available 
online at: http://www.restitutiecommissie.nl/en/rc_1.71/advies_rc_1.71.html (last visited 19.01.2009).  
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The remaining principles of the final recommendations make suggestions on how to 
deal with the situation of artworks that cannot be returned and on how to prevent or 
remedy the impression of unjustified enrichment by the Dutch State. With regard to 
artworks in the NK Collection, which were definitely or most certainly stolen, 
confiscated or lost to their original Jewish owners by forced sale and for which no 
legally entitled parties can be indicated the fifth principle states that these works should 
remain in the NK Collection and should be exhibited only in companionship of a plate 
commemorating their provenance. Furthermore, the corresponding financial value of 
these works should be donated in equal shares to the Jewish cultural charities mentioned 
in the seventh principle: the Cultural Heritage Foundation of the Portuguese-Israeli 
Community and the Jewish Historical Museum. Further to the donation based on 
unreturnable artworks still present in the NK Collection the sixth principle states that an 
indexed percentage of the proceeds of the recuperated works of art sold up until 1952 
should also be made available to these two Jewish cultural charities. Finally, according to 
principle 8 any possible incoming repayments for the restitution of works of art (i.e. in 
case where claimants had been able to freely dispose of sales proceeds) should also be 
allocated to these two Jewish cultural charities.  
With the presentation of its final recommendations the Ekkart Committee concluded 
its task of making recommendations to the Government.  
g) Reaction of the Dutch Government to the final recommendations of the Ekkart Committee 
The reaction of the Government to the final set of recommendations of the Ekkart 
Committee was communicated to the House of Representatives on 8 March 2005.1489 
The Minister of Culture integrally endorsed the final set of recommendations of the 
Ekkart Committee.  
h) Putting the Ekkart Recommendations and the Government Reactions together: the current 
policy of the Dutch Government regarding restitution of cultural property spoliated during the 
Second World War  
The current Dutch Government policy regarding restitution of cultural property 
spoliated during the Second World War is the result of a dialogue between the Dutch 
Government and the Ekkart Committee during the period 2000-2005. For reasons of 
transparency and legal certainty it would have been desirable if the policy as agreed had 
been summarised in a single document. This is particularly true with regard to claims 
concerning objects from previously private collections where the policy must be 
extrapolated from the provisional government memorandum from 14 July 2000, the 
first set of recommendations of the Ekkart Committee and two government reactions. 
With regard to objects from art dealers stock, respectively the final recommendations of 
                                                     
1489 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 8 March 2005 in respect of the final recommendations made by the Ekkart 
Commitee, parliamentary year 2004-2005, 25 839, nr. 36. 
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the Ekkart Committee on the conclusion of the period of liberalised restitution and 
measures addressing the impression of enrichment by the Dutch State the Government 
endorsed all recommendations by the Ekkart Committee.1490 For this reason, we will 
focus on summarising the valid principles with regard to private collections. 
General starting point of the liberalised return policy is that the restoration of 
property rights should not be repeated. Consequently, claims for the restitution of 
objects presently in the Dutch NK Collection or State Collection will only be considered 
if they qualify as new applications.  
A claim can qualify as a new application if it does not qualify as settled case. A settled 
case is understood as a case that had ended in a court ruling or in a formal settlement 
between the claimant and the Council for the Restoration of Rights or the Council’s 
Administrative Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI)). Furthermore, later 
formal settlements between the Dutch State and claimants could also qualify as settled 
cases where a claim resulted either in a conscious and deliberate settlement or when a 
claimant expressly renounced his claim for restitution.  
Settled cases can only be reassessed where new, relevant facts have become 
available.1491 With regard to new facts (nova) both the Ekkart Committee and the 
Government endorse a broad(er) understanding of what constitutes new facts: next to 
new insights into the provenance of an art work the case law of the Judicial Division of 
the Council for the Restoration of Rights is accorded a greater role under the notion of 
nova: where cases have been decided by the stricter interpretation of the provisions of 
Decree E 100 by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK), the more lenient 
interpretation by the Judicial Division of the Council for the Restoration of Rights of 
the same provisions should be considered as a new fact and allow for a reconsideration 
of the case. Changed (historical) insights in respect of the justice and consequence of the 
policy pursued at that time were not accepted as nova.1492 
                                                     
1490 The only material difference between the second recommdation of the Ekkart Committee and the 
reaction by the Government lies in the fact that with regard to the fourth and six recommendation dealing 
with forced respectively involuntary sales the Government extended the principles from Jewish art dealers 
to art dealers from other persecuted groups.  
1491 Brief en regeringsnotitie inzake restitutie en recuperatie van cultuurgoederen (letter and government 
memorandum in respect of restitution and recuperation of items of cultural value) d.d. 14 juli 2000, Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 25 839, nr. 16; Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items 
of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2003b, para. 2.4, p. 12. 
1492 Commissie Ekkart, 2006, pp. 28-29 & Appendix 7; Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for 
Education, Culture and Science to the House of Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of 
recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26, Letter [in 
Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of Representatives dated 
16 November 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 
2001-2002, 25 839, nr. 27. See for a different opinion: Vlies, I.C.v.d., et al., 2009, p. 102 who states that the 
State accepted the inclusion of changed historical insights as nova. The author of the present study was not 
able to find any information on the acceptance in the database Opmaat  
(http://opmaatnieuw.sdu.nl/opmaat/l/pages/opmaat/landingpage.xml). 
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With regard to the question of forced sales there exists a presumption that sales of 
works of art by Jewish private persons or from other persecuted groups in the 
Netherlands from 10 May 1940 onwards were forced sales. The same presumption 
applies in respect of sales by Jewish private persons or persons from other persecuted 
groups in Germany from 1933 and in Austria from 1938 onwards. Sales proceeds only 
have to be repaid (in accordance with the general price-index figure) where it has been 
proven that the former owner or his heirs could freely dispose of the proceeds. The 
proceeds are not paid into the Dutch treasury but are forwarded in equal shares to the 
Cultural Heritage Foundation of the Portuguese-Israeli Community and the Jewish 
Historical Museum.1493 No administration costs will be charged in case of restitution. 
With regard to the required proof of title it is sufficient that title has been proven 
with a high degree of probability and in absence of indications to the contrary.  
3.  TH E  RO L E  AN D W O RK  O F  TH E  ‘AD V I S O RY  CO M M I T T E E  O N  T H E  AS S E S S M E N T  O F  
RE S T I T U T I O N  AP P L I CA T IO N S  F O R  IT E M S  O F  CU L T U R A L  VA L U E  A N D  TH E  SE C O N D  
WO RL D  WA R’  
 In reaction to the first set of recommendation by the Ekkart Committee the 
Minister of Culture announced the plan to establish a committee with the task to advice 
on individual applications for the restitution of art works from the NK Collection.1494  
Four month later, by decree of 16 November 2001 the “Advisory Committee on the 
Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War” (hereinafter: the “Restitutions Committee”) was established.1495 It took up 
its work on 22 December 2001. The task of the Restitutions Committee is twofold: first 
and as main task the Restitutions Committee has to advise the Minster for Education, 
Culture and Science on decisions to be taken concerning applications for the restitution 
of items of cultural value of which the original owners involuntarily lost possession due 
to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime and which are currently in the 
possession of the State of the Netherlands.1496 The second task of the Restitutions 
                                                     
1493 Cf.: Ekkart Committee, 2004, principle 8.  
1494 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, 
parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26.  
1495 Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, dr. F. van der Ploeg, 
houdende Instelling van een commissie die adviseert over verzoeken om teruggave van cultuurgoederen 
waarover de oorspronkelijke eigenaar door omstandigheden die direct verband hielden met het nazi-regime 
onvrijwillig het bezit heeft verloren en die zich thans in bezit van de Staat der Nederlanden bevinden 
(Besluit adviescommissie restitutieverzoeken cultuurgoederen en Tweede Wereldoorlog) 
WJZ/2001/45374(8123) 16 November 2001, . The Restitutions Committee is often referred to as the Polak 
Committee after its first chairman mr. J.M. Polak. 
1496 Cf.: Decree issued by the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science, F. van der Ploeg, 
establishing a committee to advise the government on the restitution of items of cultural value of which the 
original owners involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime and 
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Committee concerns disputes about works of art that are not in the possession of the 
Dutch State. At the request of the Minister of Culture and provided that both parties to 
the dispute agree, the Restitutions Committee issues recommendations on the 
restitution of these cultural objects.1497 
The Restitutions Committee’s advisory framework with regard to the restitution 
claims for objects in possession of the Dutch State, both in the NK Collection and in 
the other state-owned collections consists of the policy as adopted by the Government 
in reaction to the recommendations by the Ekkart Committee (as outlined above).1498 
The recommendation of the Restitutions Committee can consist of recommending the 
Minister of Culture to reject a claim or to return a claimed object.1499 In the latter case, 
the Restitutions Committee can also recommend to make the return subject to certain 
conditions. E.g. where the object had been lost due to forced sale, and the former did 
receive the payment and could freely dispose of it, the Restitutions Committee can 
recommend to state a condition that the sales proceeds must be returned.  
Recommendations by the Restitutions Committee are not binding upon the State 
Secretary. However, so far the Minister of Culture followed all recommendations, albeit 
the motivation might have differed.1500 Decisions by the Minister of Culture can be 
challenged in a civil procedure.1501  
In cases involving art works that are not in the possession of the Dutch State the 
Restitutions Committee has to base its decision on the principles of reasonableness and 
fairness but may apply the liberalised policy in analogy.1502 
In agreement with the first and second principle of the final recommendations of the 
Ekkart Committee1503 the Dutch Government announced on 4 April 2005 that the final 
                                                                                                                                          
which are currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands, 16 November 2001 (Reference 
WJZ/2001/45374(8123), Art. 2 sub 1. 
1497 Cf.: Ibid., Art. 2 sub 2 juncto sub 3. See below the analysis of the binding advice given by the 
Restitutions Committee concerning the dispute over the restitution of A Prayer before Supper by Jan 
Toorop from the estate of E. Flersheim, currently in the possession of the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation 
(Binding Advice RC 3.45).  
1498 Cf.: Ibid., Art. 2 sub 4. 
1499 Cf.: Palmer, N., 2005, para. 21. 
1500 See in this respect below the Goudstikker case in chp. 4.§1.I.3.b). 
1501 Cf.: Uitspraak op het hoger beroep van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 
thans de Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, appellant, tegen de uitspraak in zaak no. AWB 
04/4576 van de rechtbank Amsterdam van 7 juni 2006 (200605289/1), para. 2.4.  
1502 Cf.: Decree issued by the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science, F. van der Ploeg, 
establishing a committee to advise the government on the restitution of items of cultural value of which the 
original owners involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime and 
which are currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands, 16 November 2001 (Reference 
WJZ/2001/45374(8123), Art. 2 sub 5. See further below in chp. 4.§1.I.c) on the Regulations on binding 
recommendation procedure in the section discussing Binding Advice RC 3.45 concerning a painting by 
Toorop. 
1503 See above.  
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deadline for the filing of new restitution claims was 4 April 2007.1504 At that point in 
time it was estimated that the Restitutions Committee would need one year from the 
cut-off point to make recommendations on all submitted requests. Given the significant 
increase of requests in reaction to the announcement of the cut-off point, however, the 
Restitutions Committee’s mandate was renewed until the end of 2010.1505  
With regard to the question of how claims would be treated that had been made only 
after that cut-off point, the Minister had originally indicated that recourse would be 
taken to the restitution policy as it was pursued prior to the liberalised policy as adopted 
by the Government in reaction to the recommendations of the Ekkart Committee.1506 
However, this plan was eventually abandoned due to international pressure and the 
number of claims received after the cut-off point.1507 More than twenty claims had been 
received after 4 April 2007 and have been referred to the Restitutions Committee.1508  
Cases 
By the end of 2007 the Restitutions Committee had received a total of 91 requests 
for recommendations.1509 Three cases have been referred to the Committee that did not 
concern objects in the possession of the Dutch State but instead concerned any case 
where the present holder is not the Dutch State.  
An analysis of all these cases and recommendations would exceed the scope of the 
present study. However, we nevertheless feel the need to discuss the cases to reflect 
upon how the Restitutions Committee applies the Government policy in practice. For 
the following reasons, we have chosen the Gutmann case, the Goudstikker case and the 
Toorop case: the Gutmann case was the first case decided by the Restitutions 
Committee and is crucial for the understanding of how the Restitutions Committee 
                                                     
1504 The following announcement was published in the Government Gazette on 4 April 2007 and in many 
national and foreign newspapers: "As of today, claimants have another two years in which they can seek to 
reclaim art spoliated by the Nazis. This is revealed in a government response to the final recommendations 
of the Ekkart Committee published today in this gazette. With the Committee, the Government recognises 
that a period of two years is necessary to gather the information required to submit a claim. Nevertheless, 
both the Government and the Committee consider a period longer than two years inappropriate because it 
is becoming ever more difficult to gather first and second-hand information about the situation during the 
Second World War". Government Gazette, 4 April 2005, no. 64, p. 13.  
1505 Amendment of the Decree establishing the Advisory Committee on the Assessment of Restitution 
Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 8 November 2007. 
1506 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2007, pp. 17-18. Amendment of the Decree establishing the Advisory Committee on the 
Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 8 
November 2007. Cf.: E-mail dated 27 January 2009, reference no. 96339 from Postbus 51 Informatiedienst. 
1507 Cf.: Ibid., p. 5  
1508 Interview with Inge van der Vlies, Professor for Administrative Law at the UvA and member of the 
Restitutions Committee on 6 March 2009. 
1509 In fact, a total of 94 requests had been referred to the Restitutions Committee: two of the requersts 
were deferred and one was combined with a request field later. Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution 
Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2007, p. 7. The annual report for 2008 
was not published by July 2009 when this research was finalised. 
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applied the broader notion of new facts (nova).1510 As for the category dealing with 
objects from art dealers’ trading stocks we will discuss the Goudstikker case. The 
Goudstikker case is without any doubt the most prominent case in the Netherlands and 
set the ball rolling. It was the first case decided by the Restitutions Committee where the 
Committee had to apply the principles specifically aiming at art dealer cases. The case is 
furthermore interesting in that it opens the door to restitution even where cases qualify 
as settled under the liberalised restitution policy. As to the third category concerning 
items of cultural value that are not in possession of the Dutch State but of a private 
individual, a foundation or a provincial or municipal government institution we will 
discuss the binding advice given by the Restitutions Committee concerning the dispute 
over the restitution of a painting by Jan Toorop from the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation 
to the estate of E. Flersheim 
a) The Gutmann Case 
On 24 January 2002 the Minister of Culture referred the request from the Gutmann 
family for the restitution of artworks formerly in the Gutmann collection from the NK 
Collection to the Restitutions Committee. The request for restitution concerned those 
artworks from the collection that had been sold during the war to the German art 
dealers Böhler and Haberstock.1511 After the war many of the objects sold to Böhler and 
Haberstock had been recovered from Germany. The children of Gutmann, who had 
survived the war, sought the restitution of these objects from the Netherlands Art 
Property Foundation (SNK). After a dispute between the heirs and the SNK regarding 
the question whether the sale had been voluntary the matter was referred to the Judicial 
Division of the Council for the Restoration of Rights.1512 
In 1952 the Judicial Division ruled that while the sales had not been made under 
duress they had nevertheless been made “under the influence of special circumstances”. 
For this reason, the Judicial Division held that the sale should be rescinded.1513 The 
Judicial Division ordered the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) to release the 
objects but added a reservation based on Art. 27 sub 5 Decree E 100 to the effect that 
the sales price of the object had to be refunded to the Netherlands Art Property 
Foundation (SNK).1514 The heirs of Gutmann stated that their father had never received 
the sales price and refused to refund the monies. Consequently, the objects remained in 
the possession of the Dutch State until their inclusion in the NK Collection was 
challenged by the heirs under the liberalised restitution policy.   
                                                     
1510 http://www.minocw.nl/english/doc/persbericht25.doc. 
1511 See further on the loss and restitution of further objects from the collection especially in Paris: 
Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 24, 1996); Feliciano, H., 1997, p. 188; Buomberger, 
T., 1998, p. 24; Aalders, G., 1999, pp. 90-91; Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., 1999, p. 266; Weil, S., 1999, pp. 
294-295.  
1512 Campfens, E., et al., 2006, p. 428. 
1513 See Art. 23 of the Decree E 100. 
1514 Cf.: Veraart, W., 2005, pp. 101-102.  
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In its “Advice concerning the application for restitution of the Gutmann collection” 
the Restitutions Committee started by stating four general considerations that would be 
recited in all subsequent recommendations:1515 
 
a. The Committee has drawn up its opinion with due regard for the relevant lines of policy as issued by 
the Ekkart Committee and the Government, as referred to in the Decree establishing the Advisory 
Committee on the Assessment of Restitution Applications. 
 
b. The Committee asked itself whether it is acceptable that an opinion to be issued is influenced by its 
potential consequences for decisions in other cases. The Committee resolved that such influence 
cannot be accepted, save cases where special circumstances apply, since allowing such influence 
would be impossible to justify to the applicant concerned. 
 
c. The Committee then asked itself how to deal with the circumstance that certain facts can no longer be 
traced, that certain information has been lost or has not been retrieved, or that evidence can no longer 
be otherwise compiled. On this issue the Committee believes that, if the problems that have arisen 
can be attributed at least in part to the lapse of time, the associated risk should be borne by the 
Government, save cases where exceptional circumstances apply. 
 
d. Finally, the Committee believes that insights and circumstances which, according to generally 
accepted views, have evidently changed since the Second World War should be granted the status of 
new facts. 
 
In particular the last consideration (sub d) concerning the treatment of changed 
insights and circumstances as new facts (nova) is interesting: the analysis of the Ekkart 
recommendations and the government reactions revealed that the Government 
explicitly refused to consider changed (historical) insights in respect of the justice and 
consequence of the policy pursued at that time as nova.1516 Consequently, with 
consideration sub d) the Restitutions Committee amended the policy according to its 
own views. 
In the Gutmann case consideration d) or rather the question of the qualification of 
new facts played a decisive role. The Restitutions Committee based its recommendation 
that the art works should be returned on the finding that the reservation stated by the 
Judicial Division in 1952, according to which the artworks were to be released upon 
refunding of the sales price to the State of the Netherlands, has become unacceptable in 
                                                     
1515 As of 12 November 2007 the general considerations had to some extent been amended in reaction to 
the recommendations with reagard to the art trade published by the Ekkart Committee in 2003 and the 
reponse of the Government. Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural 
Value and the Second World War, 2007, p. 16. See further on the general considerations in art trade cases 
below in chp. 4.§1.3.a) discussing the Goudstikker case.  
1516 Commissie Ekkart, 2006, pp. 28-29 & Appendix 7; Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for 
Education, Culture and Science to the House of Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of 
recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26, Letter [in 
Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of Representatives dated 
16 November 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 
2001-2002, 25 839, nr. 27. 
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view of the present government policy.1517 The Restitutions Committee refers to the 
recommendation of the Ekkart Committee to give a more liberal interpretation to the 
concept of nova than has been the case under the policy practice so far, such that the 
concept also covers deviations from the judgements issued by the Council for the 
Restoration of Rights, as well as the results of changed (historical) insights regarding the 
justification and consistency of the policy pursued at the time.1518 With regard to the sale 
and restitution of the objects from the Gutmann collection the Restitutions Committee 
states that “new facts have been presented. In view of the special circumstances in 
which the sales transactions took place, it cannot be assumed that the heirs would be 
unlawfully enriched by the restitution if they did not refund the sales proceeds”.1519  
While it is true that the Ekkart Committee did recommend in principle 2 of its first 
recommendation to accept changed (historical) insights in respect of the justice and 
consequence of the policy pursued at that time as nova1520 this interpretation was refused 
by the Government in its reactions from June and November 2001.1521 
Consequently, it is doubtful whether the Gutmann case should actually have been 
reassessed by the Restitutions Committee: if one sticks to the government policy 
according to which changed historical insights do not constitute a valid novum the 
Gutmann case was reassessed in spite of the existence of a new fact. The fact that under 
the liberalised return policy sales proceeds only have to be repaid were it has been 
proven that the former owner or his heirs could freely dispose of the proceeds this 
principle is not a novum that allows for the reconsideration of a case. Rather it is a 
principle on the treatment of claims that have not been settled or where new facts have 
emerged.  
On 18 April 2002, the Minister of Culture announced the return of 233 works of art 
from the Gutmann Collection.1522 
b) The Goudstikker Case 
The Goudstikker Case was the first case submitted to the Restitutions Committee 
that concerned the restitution of art works from the trading stock of an art dealer. The 
case concerned those works of art that had been part of the trading stock of the 
prominent art gallery of Jacques Goudstikker in May 1940. Goudstikker, his wife, and 
                                                     
1517 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2002. 
1518 Cf.: Ibid. 
1519 Cf.: Ibid. 
1520 Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), 2001. 
1521 Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, 
parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26; Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, 
Culture and Science to the House of Representatives dated 16 November 2001 in respect of 
recommendations made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 2001-2002, 25 839, nr. 27. 
1522 Van der Ploeg volgt advies commissie. Oorlogskunst uit rijksbezit naar erven, 18 April 2002. 
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Göring indicated his interest in the Goudstikker stock. As a result, on 13 July 1940, Ten 
Broek as company director sold part of the trading stock for ƒ 550,000 to Miedl, 
(hereafter: the “Miedl-Transaction”), and the other part for ƒ 2,000,000 to Göring 
(hereafter: the Göring-Transaction).1527 Appearantly, Miedl pledged himself to grant 
protection to the mother of Goudstikker.1528 Whether this pledge was written down in 
the agreement or was communicated only verbally is not clear. What is known is that 
Désirée Goudstikker as widow and heir of Jacques Goudstikker refused to grant 
permission for the sale of the trading stock (she represented 334 of the 600 shares, 
partly on behalf of her underage son) there was little she could do to prevent the sale in 
her absence due to the circumstances of the war.  
On 14 September 1940, Miedl founded the ‘Gallery formerly known as J. 
Goudstikker NV’ (Kunsthandel voorheen J. Goudstikker NV) and on 2 October 1940 
the Goudstikker NV was liquidated.1529 During the war years, Mield’s gallery flourished; 
he sold many works from the trading stock of Goudstikker NV, especially to German 
buyers, acquired new paintings for the stock and sold them again. Towards the end of 
the war, when the influence of Göring started to decline and Miedl, his Jewish wife and 
children no longer felt comfortable in the Netherlands and fled to Spain.1530 Miedl knew 
to smuggle out some 200 paintings. Amongst these paintings was the Penitent 
Magdalene depicted on the cover of this book.1531 
As a result of the sale to Göring, Miedls active selling during the war years, especially 
to German buyers, and his export of paintings to Spain a great number of art works 
from the stock of the Goudstikker NV was no longer present in the stock of the former 
Goudstikker NV at the end of the war. However, a significant amount of works was 
restored to the Netherlands at the end of the war and came under the administration of 
the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK).1532  
After the war, Goudstikker NV, represented by the widow of Goudstikker, now 
operating by the name of her second husband von Saher, sought for the restoration of 
rights. The liquidation of the Goudstikker NV was reversed with retroactive effect on 
26 February 1947. From the beginning the restoration of rights focussed on the art 
                                                     
1527 The Penitent Magdalene depicted on the cover was part of the Miedl-transaction. Together with some 
200 other paintings it was smuggled to Spain in 1944 by Miedl where it was kept in the Free Port of Bilbao.  
1528 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2005a, p. 5. During the war, Miedl, who was married to a Jewish woman, helped Jewish 
families. Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2005a, p. 6. 
1529 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2005a, p. 5. 
1530 See further on the details of the flight: Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., 1999, pp. 148-153. 
1531 Cf.: Ibid., p. 153. 
1532 Cf.: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War, 2005a, p. 12. See further on the process of the restoration of rights by the Allies in chp. 1.§1 & 
§4.  
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works that had been part of the Miedl and Göring transactions.1533 With regard to the 
works of art delivered to Miedl, von Saher signed a settlement agreement with the 
Administrative Department of the Council of Restorations of Rights (Nederlands 
Beheersinstituut (NBI)) on 1 August 1952. In this agreement von Saher waived the 
ownership rights to the objects delivered to Miedl. In the preamble of the settlement 
von Saher explicitly states that the reasons for agreeing with the settlement: the 
uncertain political situation and the possibly time-consuming litigation. She explicitly 
states she considers herself deeply deprived and that she does not acknowledge any of 
the other party’s statements.1534  
That part of the collection that had been purchased by Göring did not become part 
of the settlement agreement and no other attempt to annul the agreement with Göring 
was made.1535 Consequently, the paintings that had been covered by the Göring 
transaction remained in the NK Collection’ (Netherlands Art Property Collection). One 
must not disregard the fact, however, that from the sales proceeds of the transactions to 
Göring and Miedl (together ƒ 2,550,000) ƒ 1,363,752.33 had remained as assesst of the 
Goudstikker NV and as such available to the heirs to the Goudstikker NV.1536  
On 9 January 1998, i.e. prior to the introduction of the liberalised restitution policy, 
the heirs of Goudstikker requested the Minister of Culture to return all objects from the 
former Goudstikker collection from the NK-Collection, i.e. both works that fell both 
under the Miedl- and the Göring-Transaction. By decision dated 25 March 1998, the 
                                                     
1533 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2005b, p. 12. 
1534 In Dutch: “dat partij ter andere zijde deze beëindiging slechts wenst, in verband met de tijd, die met de 
procedure gemoeid kan zijn; (...) dat genoemde Mevrouw von Saher (Desirée Goudstikker remarried August 
E.D. von Saher) tot haar diepe teleurstelling moet ervaren, dat zij, om datgene te bereiken, hetgeen zij als 
rechtsherstel beschouwt, daarvoor misschien nog jaren zal moeten procederen, thans besloten heeft om 
zich, in verband met het vorenstaande en mede in het licht van de onzekere polititieke toestand, in te laten 
met een schikking; dat partij ter andere zijde derhalve zelfs bereid is, zich daarvoor opofferingen te 
getroosten, die zij als uitermate onredelijk beschouwt en dat zij uitdrukkelijk wenst vast te leggen, dat zij 
geen der door de wederpartijen in de voormelde procedure vastgelegde argumenten erkent en dat zij zich 
ten zeerste benadeeld acht, doordat zij onder meer generlei vergoeding subsidiair schadevergoeding heeft 
verkregen of verkrijgt voor door genoemde Alois Miedl en /of Miedl N.V. met het bedrijf van Goudstikker 
N.V. gemaakte winsten en voor het verliezen der goodwil van Goudstikker N.V.". Cf.: Schoordijk, H., C.F., 
2006, pp. 745-746; Velten, A.A.v., 2006a, pp. 242-243. 
1535 See Memorandum by Goudstikker’s lawyer M. Meyer dated November 10, 1949 and the report by 
A.E.D. von Saher (Goudstikker’s lawyer and second husband) from April 1952. Cf.: Velten, A.A.v., 2006b, 
p. 263. The Göring-Transaction had been mentioned in Art. 1.5 of a draft from June 1952 of the settlement 
agreement. A July draft and the final settlement agreement no longer contained the reference to the waiver 
of the rights to the works covered by the Göring-Transaction. Art. 1.6 of the final settlement agreement still 
contains a reference to the Göring Transaction. “Overigens is en blijft de partij Goudstikker gerechtigd om 
goederen en rechten die niet vallen onder de overeenkomsten die op 1 juli 1940 en op 13 juli 1940 met 
Alois Miedl en op 13 juli 1940 met Hermann Göring werden aangegaan op de vorderen". It is not clear 
whether the parties, especially the lawyer of von Saher simply forgot to remove the mentioning of the 
Göring Transaction at this place when the reference to the Göring-Transaction was removed from Art. 1.4 
on the waiver of the ownership rights.  
1536 Cf.: Kuitenbrouwer, F., 7 February 2006. 
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Minister of Culture rejected the application for the return of the Goudstikker Collection 
from the NK-Collection. The motivation was that the immediate post-war restoration 
of rights had been carefully settled, also when measured by current standards. 
Therefore, the Minister of Culture continued, there was no reason not to invoke the 
lapse of the limitation period. 
The heirs to the Goudstikker NV appealed the decision of the Minister of Culture 
before the Court of Appeal in The Hague. Together with their appeal the heirs 
submitted an application for the restoration of rights for the Göring-Transaction1537. 
The reason for not including the Miedl-Transaction was that the two transactions had 
been treated differently during the immediate post-war restitution procedures at the end 
of the 1940s and 1950s.  
By ruling dated 16 December 1999 the Court dealt with the appeal and the 
application for the restoration of rights in three different ways. In the first place, 
regarding the appeal against the decision of the State Secretary, the Court declared that it 
had no competence to hear the matter: while the Court acknowledged its function as 
successor of the Judicial Division of the Council of Restoration of Rights1538, a decision 
by the Minister of Culture does not qualify as a decision of a department of that 
Council.1539 Therefore, the appeal was turned down on procedural reasons. As second 
step, the court dealt with the application for the restoration of the ownership rights 
regarding the works of art covered by the Göring-Transaction. The application was 
based on the Decree E 100.1540 The Court found the application inadmissible, as the 
application had not been submitted within the application period that had expired on 1 
July 1951. Thirdly, the Court examined whether compelling reasons allowed for an 
official granting of the restoration of rights.1541 The Court did not follow the heirs of 
Goudstikker’s argument that von Saher had been misled during the 1950s by the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) and the Council’s Administrative 
Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI) to the effect that the Göring 
transaction had been voluntary in nature and with regard to the value of the paintings 
concerned. The Court held that the heirs of Goudstikker NV had been free, regardless 
of the position of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) to submit a request 
                                                     
1537 Gerechtshof Den Haag, eerste civiele kamer, 16 december 1999, req. nr. 98/298. Siehr, K.G., 2005 
1538 The Council of Restoration of Rights was disabanded in 1967. 
1539 The Minister of Culture is the successor of the Stichting Nederlandsch Kunstbezit (SNK). The SNK 
was a special post-war organisation assigned with the task of recuperating works of art from abroad. It was 
not a department of the Council of Restoration of Rights.  
1540 Art. 21 (1): “De bevoegdheden, in de volgende artikelen van dit hoofdstuk aan den Raad toegekend, 
kunnen worden uitgeoefend op grond van een schriftelijk verzoek daartoe, door of namens een 
belanghebbende ingediend". 
1541 Art. 21 (3) Decree on Restoration of Legal Transactions, E 100 from 1944 provides a discretionary 
power to allow for the restoration of rights in case of compelling reasons that is available to the Court even 
after 1 July 1951: “De den Raad in de volgende artikelen van dit hoofdstuk toegekende bevoegdheden 
kunnen ook ambtshalve, zelfs na afloop van den ingevolge het vorige lid vastgestelden termijn, door den 
Raad worden uitgeoefend". 
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for restitution to the Council for the Restoration of Rights (Raad voor Rechtsherstel) 
whatever the position of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) and the 
Council’s Administrative Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI) might have 
been. Furthermore, the Court held that von Saher had expert legal advisers who could 
have contested the voluntary nature of the transaction and who could have requested a 
counter appraisal of the paintings by independent experts. Consequently, the court held 
that von Saher had deliberately decided against seeking restoration of rights in respect of 
the Göring-Transaction.1542 The Court furthermore motivated its decision against an 
official granting of the restoration of rights as follows: first, the Court pointed out that 
more than fifty years had passed since the end of the application period for claims under 
the Decree on Restoration of Legal Transactions. The application for the restoration of 
rights regarding the Göring-Transaction, the second point the court dealt with, had been 
held inadmissible for the same reason. While this is a long period from a legal point of 
view the argument does not necessarily rule out the granting of restoration rights as the 
decree did not limit the restoration of rights in time.1543  
The ruling of the Court of The Hague with the twofold declaration of inadmissibility, 
and the declaration that no compelling reasons existed for the use of the Court’s 
discretionary power for an official granting of the restoration of rights was not the only 
legal procedure that had been initiated by the heirs of Goudstikker NV.1544 However, 
the other procedures were equally unsuccessful1545, or were stayed in the light of an 
application filed on 26 April 2004 that would result in the return of a total of 202 
paintings to the heirs on the basis of the liberalised restitution policy. 
On 26 April 2004, the Heirs of Goudstikker NV1546 filed an application for the 
return of a total of 276 works of art with the Minister of Culture who referred the 
application to the Restitutions Committee for advice.1547  
                                                     
1542 The Court referred to a memorandum of the lawyer of von Saher dated 10 November 1949, and a 
report by von Saher’s second husband A.E.D. von Saher dated April 1952: Gerechtshof Den Haag, eerste 
civiele kamer, 16 december 1999, req. nr. 98/298, para. 20.  
1543 Art. 21 (3) of that Decree allows for the restoration of rights in case of compelling reasons “even after 1 
July 1951”. 
1544 By letter dated 22 April 1998 the heirs had appealed against the decision of the State Secretary from 25 
March 1998 at a special committee for appeal within the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. See 
for a similar case, in which a decision by the State Secretary was appealed and the decision of the State 
Secretary not to deal with the appeal as the original decision did not qualify as decision in the sense of the 
Dutch General Administrative Code was unsuccesfully challenged in court: Minister wint zaak Koenigs-
collectie, 1 February 2007; Uitspraak op het hoger beroep van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en 
Wetenschap, thans de Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, appellant, tegen de uitspraak in zaak 
no. AWB 04/4576 van de rechtbank Amsterdam van 7 juni 2006 (200605289/1). Further to the appeal, the 
Heirs of Goudstikker NV had initiated a civil procdure at the Rechtbank Den Hag 10 januari 2001.  
1545 See for the civil procedure: Rechtbank Den Haag 10 januari 2001. 
1546 Technically speaking the applicant was the “Amsterdamse Negotiatie Compagnie NV”. It was the new 
name given to the former Gallery J. Goudstikker NV in 1952. As of 14 December 1955 until 28 February 
1960, the assets of the company were liquidated. On 31 March 1998, by order of the Amsterdam District 
Court, the liquidation was reopened.  
1547 Letters dated 10 June 2004 and 20 September 2005. 
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In order to fulfil its task to advise the Minister of Culture the Restitutions Committee 
first ordered to undertake further research on the facts and the background of the claim. 
The findings are written down in a report that forms an integral part of the final 
recommendation. The report deals with the following relevant historical developments: 
first, the loss of the works of art at the beginning of the war when J. Goudstikker and 
his family fled the Netherlands, and when the Gallery’s movable and immovable 
property was sold to Alois Miedl and Hermann Göring. Secondly, the report sets out 
the negotiations between the widow Goudstikker and the Dutch authorities on the 
restoration of rights in the post-war era (1947-1954), which resulted in two settlement 
agreements between von Saher and the administrators who were appointed on behalf of 
the Council’s Administrative Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI))1548. The 
first settlement concerned the Gallery’s immovable property.1549 The second agreement 
concerned the movable property of the Gallery, i.e. the works of art. The settlement 
reached on 1 August 1952, however, did not cover all works of art that had belonged to 
the Goudstikker NV trading stock in May 1940. Subsequently, the report deals with 
earlier attempts undertaken by the heirs of Goudstikker NV for restitution: the 1998 
application to the State Secretary, and the ruling of the Court of Appeal The Hague in 
1999. The last chapter of the report deals with the provenance of the works of art in 
order to verify whether the objects in stock were indeed the property of the 
Goudstikker NV at the time of the transactions to Miedl and Göring. 
Once the preparatory research had been conducted, the Restitutions Committee, in 
its final advise to the Minister of Culture on the decision regarding the return of the 
works of art, addressed the following questions: first, whether the transactions to Miedl 
and Göring must be regarded as involuntary.1550 Different from losses by private 
individuals the presumption of an involuntary sale does not apply to losses by art 
dealers.1551 The Committee concluded that the loss of possession must be considered 
involuntary under the current restitution policy, as the widow Goudstikker had explicitly 
refused her permission for the transactions to Miedl and Göring, and secondly, the new 
director who arranged for the sale of the objects had not been properly elected.  
The next question the Restitutions Committee addressed was whether the 
application to return the works of art was admissable. Only cases that qualify as new 
applications, or where new facts have emerged, may be assessed by the Restitutions 
Committee. According to the liberalised return policy a case has been settled when it 
                                                     
1548 The Netherlands Property Administration Institute.  
1549 Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), 2001. 
1550 See: Art. 2 of the Decree of 16 November 2001 on the tasks and responsibilities of the Restitutions 
Committee: “(…) for the restitution of items of cultural value of which the original owners involuntarily lost 
possession (…)”. Note that the Committee first established whether an application concerns an involuntary 
loss of possession before dealing with the question whether an application is admissible.  
1551 See further above in chp. 4.§1.I.2 on the principles developed by the Ekkart Committee and as adoted 
by the Dutch Government that deal specifically with the return of artworks from art dealers’ trading stock. 
See in particular principles 4-6.  
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had ended in a court ruling or in a formal settlement between the claimant and the 
Council for the Restoration of Rights or the Council’s Administrative Department 
(Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI)). Furthermore, later settlements between the Dutch 
State on the one hand and claimants on the other hand could also qualify as settled cases 
where a claim resulted either in a conscious and deliberate settlement or when a claimant 
expressly renounced his claim for restitution.1552  
 With regard to the settlement agreement with the Council’s Administrative 
Department (Nederlands Beheersinstituut (NBI)) signed by von Saher on 1 August 1952 
regarding the works delivered to Miedl the Restitutions Committee first verified whether 
the agreement constituted a valid formal settlement. The Restitutions Committee held 
that the settlement was valid.1553 The Committee was not “convinced by legal arguments 
that the agreement should not be deemed valid” because it came about under coercion 
and deception.1554  
Having concluded that the “Miedl settlement” is legally valid, the Committee 
subsequently held that the settlement must be regarded as definitive and the claim as 
settled: the settlement consisted of a solution agreed upon by parties that had formerly 
been in disagreement. The Restitution Committee furthermore held that different from 
a court ruling that is imposed from above, a settlement is the result of an active 
agreement. Also, the Committee held that there is a difference between the mere 
decision not to submit an application for the restoration of rights and the waiving 
ownership rights as Goudstikker had done in the agreement in the eyes of the 
committee.1555 Due to the definitive nature of the waiving of the ownership rights, the 
Committee concluded that the Miedl settlement constituted a “settled case” and was not 
admissible.  
As for the Göring transaction, the Committee set out that it was not covered by the 
1952 formal settlement. While a draft version of the Miedl settlement did mention the 
Göring transaction, the reference was later scratched and was absent in the final version. 
Consequently, and different from the Miedl settlement the decision by the Heirs of 
Goudstikker NV with regard to the Göring transaction qualifies as “mere decision not 
to submit an application”. The application could however be barred by the ruling 
handed down by the Court of Appeals of The Hague on 16 December 1999. In that 
ruling, the Court of Appeal had denied the existence of compelling reasons to officially 
grant restoration of rights as the Company had “intentionally and deliberately decided 
                                                     
1552 Brief en regeringsnotitie inzake restitutie en recuperatie van cultuurgoederen (letter and government 
memorandum in respect of restitution and recuperation of items of cultural value) d.d. 14 juli 2000, Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 25 839, nr. 16; Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items 
of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2003b, para. 2.4, p. 12. 
1553 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2005a, pp. 27-31.  
1554 Ibid., p. 9.  
1555 Ibid. 
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against seeking restoration of rights” in respect of the ‘Göring transaction’.1556 However, 
different from the Court the Restitutions Committee concluded that an intentional and 
deliberate decision not to seek restoration of rights, does not “automatically mean that 
the Applicant’s actual rights to the Göring collection have been surrendered”.1557 The 
Committee accepted that various reasons could have existed for Von Saher to decide 
against seeking restoration of rights without at the same time surrendering the 
ownership rights.1558 Further support for this argumentation was derived from the fact 
that the reference to the Göring collection had been removed from the 1952 Miedl 
Agreement.1559 On top of that, the Committee stressed that the 1999 court ruling 
predated the coming into existence of the liberalised return policy and thus could not 
have taken account of it. All taken together, the Restitutions Committee reached the 
conclusion that the application for restitution of the works of art delivered to Göring 
was admissible. Once the hurdle of admissibility had been taken, and in the light of its 
earlier finding that the loss of possession must be regarded as involuntary, the 
Committee came to the conclusion that the application for the return of the works 
covered by the Göring transaction should be granted.1560 
In reaching this conclusion the Restitutions Committee shortly reflected about the 
question whether, in light of the quantity and quality of the paintings involved, there 
could be a public interest that should be weighed as part of this recommendation. The 
Restitutions Committee held that when a collection or objects qualifies as irreplaceable 
and indispensable under Art. 2 of the Cultural Hertage Protection Act (Wet tot Behoud 
Cultuurbezit) this could constitute a matter of public interest to keep them permanently 
within the Netherlands.1561 However, the Restitutions Committee does not verify 
whether any of the objects involved qualifies as irreplaceable and indispensable for the 
following reason. According to the Restitutions Committee the establishing of a public 
                                                     
1556 Gerechtshof Den Haag, eerste civiele kamer, 16 december 1999, req. nr. 98/298, para. 20.  
1557 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2005a, p. 10. 
1558 An example given by the Committee is that the authorities responsible for restoration of rights 
wrongfully created the impression that Goudstikker’s loss of possession of the trading stock did not occur 
involuntarily.  
1559 Art. 1.5 of the draft version from June 1952 contained the surrender of ownership rights both for the 
Miedl and the Göring transaction. The July 1952 draft version no longer contained the reference to the 
Göring transaction. Art. 1.4 of the final settlement from August 1952 on the surrendering of ownership 
rights referred only to the Miedl transaction. Note that Art. 1.6 of the final settlement did contain a 
reference to the Göring transaction: “(…) Goudstikker remains the right to seek restoration of goods and 
rights that are not covered by the settlements dated 1st July 1940, 5th of July 1940, and 13th July 1940 
concluded with Alois Miedl and the settlement dated 13 July 1940 with Hermann Göring.” See also: 
Gerechtshof Den Haag, eerste civiele kamer, 16 december 1999, req. nr. 98/298. Verweerschrift 
landsadvocaat van de Staat, quoted in: Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of 
Cultural Value and the Second World War, 2005b, p. 36, para. 34.33.32 ‘Argumenten Staat’. 
1560 The same is true for the so-called “meta-paintings”: paintings Goudstikker co-owned with others and 
the “Ostermann painings” that were sold by the gallery’s staff to the German W. Lüpps in May 1940 before 
Miedl took over the gallery but after the Goudstikker family had left the Netherlands.  
1561 The Cultural Heritage Protection Act (CHP Act) is discussed in detail above in chp. 3.§2.I.1.  
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interest must be based on the situation of 1940, prior to the loss of possession, rather 
than on a present evaluation.1562 Given the fact that the CHP Act dates only from 1984, 
the Restitutions Committee holds that no public interest could be present. Furthermore, 
the Committee also states that any any post-war shift in the appreciation of the works of 
art cannot and should not have any influence on the recommendation to restore the art 
to the claimant.1563 
On 19 December 2005, the Restitutions Committee communicated its 
recommendation to the State Secretary. On 6 February 2006, the Minister of Culture 
announced the decision to return a total of 202 paintings to the heirs of the Goudstikker 
NV.1564 While the decision concluded almost a decade of conflict between the Dutch 
State and the heirs of Goudstikker, it did not end the controversy around the case. 
Following the announcement of the Restitutions Committee’s recommendation and 
the State Secretary’s decision to return the paintings that had been covered by the 
Göring transaction, commentators dicusssed whether the decision collided with the 
starting point of the liberalised return policy that the restoration of property rights 
should not be repeated. After all, restitution had been denied by the Court of Appeals of 
The Hague on 16 December 1999. Further to this first point that focussed on the 
Göring transaction, there was also debate on whether or not the Restitutions Committee 
had been correct in characterising the restoration of rights with regard to the Miedl 
transaction as settled case. In the following, we will first discuss the criticism regarding 
the Miedl case before discussing the return of the paintings form the Göring transaction 
in the greater context of the liberalised restitution policy. 
As outlined above, Von Saher had signed a settlement agreement with the 
Administrative Department of the Council of Restorations of Rights (Nederlands 
Beheersinstituut (NBI)) on 1 August 1952 concerning the works of art covered by the 
Miedl-transaction. According to this agreement, Von Saher waived the ownership rights 
to the objects delivered to Miedl. A reading of the preamble of the settlement reveals 
that Von Saher agreed to the settlement only with great resentment.1565 The applicant’s 
authorised representatives claimed that the settlement is null and void because it came 
about under coercion and deception. The Restitutions Committee, however, dismissed 
this argumentation in according greater weight to the fact that the widow Goudstikker 
signed the agreement than to the circumstances under which she signed.1566 According 
to the Restitutions Committee:  
 
                                                     
1562 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2005a, p. 14. 
1563 Ibid., p. 13-14. 
1564 See: ‘Rijk retourneert Goudstikkers', 4 February 2006; Gollin, R. / Schoonenboom, M., 9 February 
2006; Velten, A.A.v., 2006b, p. 262. Different from its general practice the recommendation was not 
published before the annunciation of the decision of the State Secretary. 
1565 See above where we summarise and cite the considerans.  
1566 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2005a, p. 9. 
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“the circumstance that she signed the settlement despite this disappointment indicates that she opted for 
the lesser of (what she considered to be) two evils. In legal terms, this cannot be termed coercion, and no 
compelling arguments to support the accusation of deception have been submitted nor found by the 
Committee”.1567 
  
The decision by the Restitution Committee to consider the agreement as a valid 
settlement has been criticised, in particular by Schoordijk.1568 According to Schoordijk 
the situation is comparable to the situation of a ship in distress at sea, which he 
characterises as prime example of an agreement concluded under undue influence. 
According to the old Commercial Code a ship could renegotiate an agreement 
concluded with another ship while in distress in view of being saved (the so-called 
“hulploonovereenkomst”).1569 Similar to a ship in distress Von Saher could only choose 
between two evils – the lengthy unsure legal procedure or the waiving of ownership 
rights. If one agrees with this argumentation the settlement was not valid respectively 
should have been invalidated by the Restitutions Committee. While we cannot 
definitively answer the question whether or not the settlement is the result of undue 
influence, it is certainy possible.  
When the Minister of Culture announced the decision to return the paintings 
covered by the Göring transaction it was emphasised that while the recommendation of 
the Restitutions Committee to return the paintings was followed, its reasoning was not 
shared by the Government.1570 The Minister of Culture was keen to stress that different 
from the view expressed by the Restitutions Committee the Government considered the 
restoration of rights in respect of the Göring transaction as a settled case: after all, the 
Court of Appeals of The Hague had given a definitive ruling in this case on 16 
December 1999. The Minister of Culture continued that while the case consequently fell 
outside the scope of the present restitution policy, there were nevertheless special 
reasons, such as circumstances of the involuntary sale of the paintings and the 
deficiencies of the restoration of rights during the post war era to nevertheless follow 
the recommendation of the Restitutions Committee to return the objects.1571 The reason 
for the Government’s wariness to follow the reasoning of the Restitution Committee 
might not so much lay in the Goudstikker case itself but in the potential effect such 
deviation from an earlier court decision could have for other cases.1572 The Government 
fears that the case could lead to the challenging of more settled cases, whether related to 
Nazi spoliated art or not and that it could impeach the credibility of the judiciary.1573  
Therefore the Government stated that the Göring transaction qualifies as settled 
case: according to the liberalised return policy a settled case is a.o. a case that had ended 
                                                     
1567 Ibid. 
1568 Schoordijk, H., C.F., 2006, pp. 745-746. 
1569 See Art. 555 of the old Commercial Code. Ibid., p. 746. 
1570 See, e.g.: Borg, L.t. / Rottenberg, H., 2006; Rijghard, R., 7 February 2006. 
1571 De staatssecretaris van Onderwijs Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2006; Kuitenbrouwer, F., 7 February 2006.  
1572 Cf.: Kuitenbrouwer, F., 7 February 2006. 
1573 Gollin, R. / Schoonenboom, M., 9 February 2006; Rijghard, R., 7 February 2006. 
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in a court ruling in which the Judicial Division of the Council for the Restoration of 
rights or another competent court had issued a judgement.1574 The Court of Appeal not 
only functions as successor of the Judicial Division of the Council of Restoration of 
Rights, it was also the competent court to hear the case in 1998/1999. Consequently, the 
State Secretary’s decision not to follow the argumentation of the Restitutions 
Committee was not an exaggerated measure of precaution to prevent corrosion of the 
judiciary but results from the framework of the liberalised restitution policy.  
Why, then, did the Government choose to follow the recommendation of the 
Restitutions Committee to return the paintings rather than rejecting the claim on the 
basis that it did not fall under the scope of the liberalised policy? The reason lies in the 
order of events in this case which distinguishes it from many other cases.1575 The 
Goudstikker case is special in that there exists a court ruling as late as 1999. In most 
other cases involving a judicial ruling the ruling dates from the 1950s.1576 In the 
Goudstikker case, the ruling of the Court of Appeal dates from 1999, i.e. less than two 
years before the liberalised return policy had been introduced.1577 While in 1999, when 
the Court of Appeal rendered its judgment, it was already known that the restoration of 
right during the post war era by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) had 
not been flawless, it was not until the year 2000 that the whole extent of the 
irregularities and flaws in the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(SNK) had been made known.1578 Had the Court of Appeal heard the case after the 
publication of the reports by the Origins Unknown Committee and the introduction of 
the liberalised policy on the restitution of rights it would have been unlikely that the 
court had held that there were no compelling reasons to grant restoration of rights. 
Consequently, in view of the chronology and presumably also in reaction to 
international pressure exerted, the Dutch Government decided to return the paintings 
despite the fact that the restoration of rights of the Göring transaction was strictly 
speaking settled.1579  
The previous paragraphs discussed the decision of the Dutch Government to accept 
the recommendation of the Restitutions Committee to return the paintings covered by 
                                                     
1574 Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), 2001, 
Recommendations 1-2; Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the 
House of Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart 
Commitee, parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26 
1575 See, e.g. above the Gutmann case where the ruling of the Judicial Division of the Council for the 
Restoration of Rights dates from 1952. 
1576 Ibid.  
1577 See above on the introduction of the liberalised policy in dialogue between the Ekkart Committee and 
the Government.  
1578 Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 1998; Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 1999; 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 2000; Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 2002; Muller, E. / 
Schretlen, H., 2002, pp. 6-8. 
1579 While it is difficult to obtain information about pressure exerted, we can quote by means of example a 
fax sent by Alfonse M. D’Amato, United States Senator to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, dated 10 May, 1998 (on file with the author).  
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the Göring transaction albeit on a different motivation and outside of the existing 
liberalised restitution policy. This interpretation of the Government was considered as 
based on the terms and conditions of the restitutions policy, in particular the 
understanding of what constitutes a settled case in the sense of the liberalised return 
policy. However, by presenting the decision to return the paintings as falling outside off 
the present framework of the reuturn policy, the Government effectively recognised an 
avenue of returning artworks next to the liberalised return policy as adopted in 2001. 
Consequently, also cases that qualify as settled under the liberalised return policy may 
nevertheless give rise to return.  
The analysis of Goudstikker case as a claim for the restitution of an art dealer’s stock 
furthermore showed how the Restitutions Committee applied the slightly different 
policy framework with regard to losses by art dealers rather than losses private 
individuals: the involuntary nature of the loss had to be proven and the Restitutions 
Committee did not elaborate upon the possibility of reopening the settlement with 
regard to the Miedl transaction on the basis of nova. 
c) The Toorop Case: the estate of E. Flersheim against the Zeeuws Museum in Middelburg 
The case concerning the painting ‘A Prayer before Supper’ (1907) by Jan Toorop is 
different from the previous two cases discussed in that it is not owned by the Dutch 
State. Instead, the painting belongs to the collection of the Zeeuws Museum. As a 
foundation that is significanty subsidized by public money, the Zeeuws Museum 
collections qualifies as a public collection in the sense of this thesis.1580  
While the Restitutions Committee was first and foremost established to advise the 
Minster for Education, Culture and Science on decisions to be taken concerning 
applications for the restitution of items of cultural value of which the original owners 
involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime 
and which are currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands1581 the 
Restitutions Committee may also give binding advice in disputes relating to art works 
that are not owned by the Dutch State.1582  
Regulations of the Restitutions Committee in dealing with claims concerning objects not in possession 
of the Dutch State 
Before discussing the claim concerning ‘A Prayer before Supper’ by Toorop and the 
binding advice given by the Restitutions Committee we will outline the regulations the 
                                                     
1580 See: Annual Report of the Zeeuws Museum. See above on the use of terminology in the present study 
in the Introduction (§2.III.1)  
1581 Cf.: Decree issued by the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science, F. van der Ploeg, 
establishing a committee to advise the government on the restitution of items of cultural value of which the 
original owners involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime and 
which are currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands, 16 November 2001 (Reference 
WJZ/2001/45374(8123), Art. 2 sub 1. 
1582 Cf.: Ibid., Art. 2 sub 2 & 3. 
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Restitutions Committee adopted in 2007 that further define the procedure for such 
claims.1583 The regulations provide rules governing the admissibility of applicants, the 
authority of the Restitutions Committee, and the hearing of disputes by the Restitutions 
Committee. According to these regulations the Restitutions Committee will only provide 
binding advice where a joint request of both parties has been referred to it by the 
Minister of Culture and on the precondition that both parties involved have signed an 
agreement stating that they accept the advice at issue as binding.1584 Where these 
preconditions have been fulfilled the Restitutions Committee will comply with its 
advisory task by giving a binding advice or by promoting a settlement between the 
parties.1585 The binding advice falls within the meaning of a settlement contract 
(“vaststellingsovereenkomst”) of Art. 7:900 Dutch Civil Code.1586 In formulating the 
binding advice the Restitutions Committee must follow the imperative of the 
requirements of reasonableness and fairness.1587 Furthermore, the Restitutions 
Committee may take aspects into consideration such as: 
 
a. the Government’s line of policy concerning the restitution of stolen works of art in so far as they 
apply by analogy; 
b. the circumstances in which possession of the work was lost; 
c. the extent to which the applicant has endeavoured to trace the work; 
d. the circumstances in which the owner acquired the work and the inquiries the owner made when 
acquiring it; 
e. the significance of the work for the applicant; 
f. the significance of the work for the owner; 
g. the significance for the public art collection.1588 
 
In fact, this list of aspects, which is not exclusive, spells out aspects that need to be 
taken into consideration in defining the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. 
The fact that the restitution policy may only be applied in analogy must not surprise: the 
framework was drafted in view of the post war era restitution as effected by the 
                                                     
1583 Regulations on binding recommedation procedure under Art. 2, paragraph 2 and Art. 4, paragraph 2 of 
the Decree establishing the Advisory Committee on the Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items 
of Cultural Value and the Second World War (hereinafter: “the Regulations”).  
1584 Art. 3 of the Regulations. 
1585 Art. 2, para. 2 of the Regulations. 
1586 Art. 7:900 DCC reads: “1. Bij een vaststellingsovereenkomst binden partijen, ter beëindiging of ter 
voorkoming van onzekerheid of geschil omtrent hetgeen tussen hen rechtens geldt, zich jegens elkaar aan 
een vaststelling daarvan, bestemd om ook te gelden voor zover zij van de tevoren bestaande rechtstoestand 
mocht afwijken.  
2. De vaststelling kan tot stand komen krachtens een beslissing van partijen gezamenlijk of krachtens een 
aan één van hen of aan een derde opgedragen beslissing.  
3. Een bewijsovereenkomst staat met een vaststellingsovereenkomst gelijk voor zover zij een uitsluiting van 
tegenbewijs meebrengt.  
4. Deze titel is niet van toepassing op de overeenkomst van arbitrage”. See for an analysis in detail of Art. 
7:900 DCC: Snijders, M.Y. / Meier, G.J., 2002, pp. 341-359. 
1587 Art. 4 Regulations. 
1588 Art. 4 Regulations. 
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Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) and as a result of which many objects 
remained in the NK Collection. Different from these objects, potentially disputable 
objects now in possession of other institutions did not necessarily pass through the 
hands of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK). Depending on the outcome 
of the assessment of the requirements of reasonableness and fairness the Restitutions 
Committee may recommend that:  
 
a. the work be returned to the applicant;  
b. the work be returned on payment by the applicant to the owner of a sum of money to be determined; 
c. the work be returned to the applicant subject to further provisions; 
d. the owner pay the applicant a sum of money to be determined, while the item remains in the owner’s 
possession; 
e. the work be exhibited, stating its provenance and the part played by the (heirs of the ) original owner; 
f. the application for restitution be denied, subject to further provisions, where applicable.1589  
 
According to Art. 18 of the Regulations the Restitutions Committee’s 
recommendation may only be reversed by an ordinary court, provided it has been 
submitted within two months after it has been sent to the parties. After two month, the 
recommendation becomes irreversible. Having outlined the most important provisions 
of the Regulations concerning the binding advice procedure we can now turn to the 
specific case concerning Toorop’s ‘A Prayer before Supper’.1590 
The Facts: the Flersheim Collection, the loss of the painting during the war era and the acquisition 
by the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation 
The painting ‘A Prayer before Supper’ by Toorop (hereinafter: “the painting”) had 
belonged, at least from 1909 onwards to Ernst Flersheim (1862-1944).1591 Ernst 
Flersheim lived in Germany until 1937 when he fled the Nazi regime to the Netherlands 
due to his Jewish descent. His wife followed him in 1938 and two of his three daughters 
fled to London and Brussels respectively. In May 1937, a substantial part of the family 
Flersheim art collection, was auctioned in Frankfurt. The painting was not included in 
the list of works, predominantly be German artists that were offered. Objects by non-
German artists had been stored with the international export firm ‘Dellihausen’ in 
Frankfurt. According to a statement made by Edith Eberstadt – Flersheim, the only 
family member that survived the war, to the Chamber of Reparation of the District 
Court of Frankfurt am Main (Wiedergutmachungskammer des Landgerichts) a number 
of artworks from the collection had been confiscated by the Gestapo around 1938, 
including the artworks that had been put into storage. According to her post war 
                                                     
1589 Art. 12 Regulations.  
1590 The facts oulined in the following are derived from the Binding Advice of the Restitutions Committee 
itself unless otherwise indicated.  
1591 See further on the family Flersheim, as well as their relationship with the painter Toorop: Vloten, F.v., 
2001.  
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Committee of the Dutch Museum Association (Nederlandse Museumvereniging 
(NMV)).1593 
The Recommendation by the Ethical Code Committee of the Dutch Museum Association in 2000 
The Dutch Museum Association dates back to 1926 when it was founded as think 
tank of and for museum directors. Since then it developed into the umbrella 
organisation for the museum sector with tasks such as lobbying and development of 
policies. In 1991 it introduced the first Dutch version of the ICOM Code of 
Professional Ethics for Museums.1594 The same year the ‘Ethical Code Committee’ 
(hereinafter: NMV Ethical Code Committee) was founded to advise museums about the 
Dutch ICOM Code and to hold their behaviour against the Dutch ICOM Code.1595 The 
Dutch ICOM Code has been revised several times to reflect the changes made in the 
international ICOM Code.1596  
In analysing the question whether or not the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation should 
return the painting the NMV Ethical Code Committee focused on three aspects:  
 
1. whether it has been established that the painting had belonged to the collection Flersheim and that it 
has been confiscated;  
2. whether the museum acted carelessly when acquiring the painting in 1981;  
3. what are the ethical imperatives on how a Dutch museum should react to the claim from the family 
Flersheim according to present perceptions and which aspects must be taken into consideration?1597  
 
With regard to the first aspect, the NMV Ethical Code Committee reached the 
conclusion that while the painting had certainly belonged to the Collection Flersheim its 
confiscation could not be established with certainty. However, given the great 
probability of this course of events and given the post war declaration by Edith 
Eberstadt – Flersheim the NMV Ethical Code Committee accepted that the painting 
had been confiscated.  
With regard to the second aspect, the conduct of the museum in 1981 when it 
acquired the painting, the NMV Ethical Code Committee held that the museum did not 
act carelessly in acquiring the painting without conducting further provenance research: 
in 1981 the museum could not /ought not to have known that the provenance of the 
                                                     
1593 Letter dated 7 December 1999 from the Chairman of the Foundation of the Zeeuws Museum to the 
director of the Dutch Museum Association. At this point the Restitutions Committee had not yet been 
established. 
1594 See further on the international ICOM Code above in chp. 2.§2.IV.3. 
1595 http://www.museumvereniging.nl/default.aspx?id=327 (last visited 6 July 2009). The NMV Ethical 
Code Committee was originally called in Dutch the ‘Commissie Museale Gedragslijn’. In 2007 the name was 
revised to “Ethische Codecommissie voor Musea”.  
1596 The last revision took place during 2004-2006 in response to the revised ICOM Code as adopted in 
Seoul in 2004. The integral text of the code can be found at:  
http://www.museumvereniging.nl/files/Ethische%20Code%20_versie%2020%20nov%202006_%20_2_.p
df (last visited 6 July 2009). 
1597 Commissie Museale Gedragslijn, 2000.  
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painting was problematic. The NMV Ethical Code Committee reached this conclusion 
on the basis of the following aspects: the museum relied on the reputation of Ivo 
Bouwman as an art dealer and his information according to which he had acquired the 
painting in the 1970s from the estate of the art dealer d'Audretsch. Furthermore, the 
date of acquisition preceded the increase in information available about the involvement 
of various actors in the spoliation of art works during the war, as well as the 
introduction of the first ethical codes for museums and the shift in the perception 
within the museum world on how to deal art works that had changed owners during the 
Nazi regime.  
With regard to the third aspect, dealing with the present ethical imperatives of how a 
Dutch museum should react to a claim such as from the family Flersheim the NMV 
Ethical Code Committee stresses that consequently great relevance must be accorded to 
the fact that the grandparents of the claimants had been murdered in Bergen Belsen and 
the emotional value of the painting for the claimants. However, the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee lists a number of aspects that must also be taken into consideration. Some 
of these aspects add further weight to restitution of the painting whereas other support 
the retention of the painting by the museum. For a number of criteria it is not evident 
how they impact the final balancing in that the NMV Ethical Code Committee confined 
itself to listing the aspects without explicitly balancing them.  
The fact that it has been sufficiently established that the painting had not been the 
object of a voluntary sales transaction is an aspect speaking in favour of restitution. 
Aspects speaking against restitution are the fact that the museum was not required to 
instigate further provenance research, as well as the relevance of the painting within the 
museum collection. The NMV Ethical Code Committee accepts that the painting – 
being painted in Zeeland, depicting a family from Zeeland in traditional costume, and 
being the only painting from Toorop owned by the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation, 
belongs to its core collection. 
Aspects mentioned by the NMV Ethical Code Committee whose weight in the 
balancing is not evident are the financial compensation of 3,000 DM granted to Edith 
Eberstadt-Flersheim in 1956 and the state of conservation of the painting. With regard 
to the financial compensation, which corresponds to the market value of the painting in 
1956 the NMV Ethical Code Committee states that it did not take away the validity of 
the current claim. In as far as the painting’s state of conservation is concerned it is noted 
that the condition of the painting, which is painted on card board was poor when 
acquired in 1981 but has nevertheless not been restored for lack of financial resources 
of the museum. Another aspect mentioned by the NMV Ethical Code Committee, 
which does not explicitly speak for or against restitution is the suggestion that in view of 
the sales price of ƒ 150.000 that was paid by the Museum with support of the 
Vereniging Rembrandt in 1981 the claimants should compensate the museum in case of 
restitution.  
Having listed these aspects the NMV Ethical Code Committee comes to the 
conclusion that the Zeeuws Museum does not act unjust by not returning the painting. 
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It does, however, suggest that the parties look further for an alternative just and fair 
solution that do justice both to the relevance of the painting for the claimant and for the 
museum collection.1598 
As result of the recommendation by the NMV Ethical Code Committee from May 
2000 the painting remained in the Zeeuws Museum.1599 The recommendation did not, 
however, solve the dispute between the heirs and the museums. Consequently, when the 
Restitutions Committee was established in November 2001 with one of its tasks being 
to give binding advice with regard to disputes of spoliated art works not in the 
possession of the Dutch State, the two parties decided, albeit not until 2006, to submit a 
joint request to the Minister for Culture to have the dispute settled by the Restitutions 
Committee. 
The binding advice by the Restitutions Committee from 2008 
The report published by the Restitutions Committee on 7 April 2008, which includes 
the binding advice to the parties starts out with an overview of the facts and background 
of the dispute, starting from Ernst Flersheim’s art collection, the fate of the family and 
their art collection during the war, the post-war restoration of rights, and the 
recommendation issued by the NMV Ethical Code Committee. The report subsequently 
sets out both the claimants’ position and the position of the Zeeuwse Museum 
Foundation as outlined already above, before describing the assessment of the facts and 
the formulation of the binding advice.  
The followings aspects were highlighted by the Restitutions Committee as relevant in 
formulating the binding advice: the circumstances in which the possession of the work 
was lost, the extent to which the party requesting restitution has exerted itself to retrieve 
the work, as well as the period and the circumstances in which the current owner 
acquired the work and the investigation carried out by the current owner before the 
work was acquired. Further aspects are the respective importance of the work for both 
parties and for the public art collection. In the following we will shortly summarise the 
view of the Restitutions Committee on these aspects before discussing how the 
Restitutions Committee finally balanced them.  
With regard to the circumstances of loss, the Restitutions Committee assumes that 
the painting was confiscated by the Gestapo around 1938.1600 As for the extent to which 
the Flersheim heirs have exerted themselves to retrieve the work the Restitutions 
Committee is satisfied with the attempts of the heirs.1601 The Restitutions Committee 
subsequently addressed the diligence of the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation when 
acquiring the painting in 1981. It rejects the argument of the claimants that the 
foundation did not act in good faith and endorsed an expert opinion of Prof. R.E.O. 
                                                     
1598 Cf.: Schrage, E.J.H., 2007, pp. 54-59. 
1599 Cf.: Heyting, L., 29 May 2000.  
1600 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2008, Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 5. 
1601 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 6. 
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Ekkart, the chairman of the Ekkart Committee, according to which museums and art 
dealers were not in the habit of researching whether or not works of art acquired had a 
war history in the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, Ekkart’s expert opinion states 
that the manner in which art works were traded in the past cannot be judged with the 
hindsight of the present knowledge and awareness. Consequently, the Museum did not 
act negligently by not instigating a special investigation into the painting’s provenance 
between 1933 and 1945 before acquiring it in 1981.1602 
Subsequently, the Restitutions Committee evaluated the importance of the painting 
for both parties. With regard to the claimants’ position, the Restitutions Committee 
emphasises that the painting belonged to their grandparents’ art collection and that it 
was one of several paintings the family had bought from the painter whom they 
personally knew from and befriended during their frequent holidays in Zeeland.1603 The 
Restitutions Committee recognises that the claimants attach great emotional value to the 
painting. With regard to the importance of the painting to the Zeeuws Museum, the 
Restitution Committee quotes the museum’s statement that  
 
“the loss of the work [would] constitute a huge loss for the museum. It is an important piece for the 
province of Zeeland because it links an international artistic movement (luminism; painting with light) with 
a local theme. It is a family portrait of Toorop’s friends from Domburg, the Louwerse family. In addition, it 
is a portrait that represents the painter’s glorification of piety of the citizens of Zeeland. In sweeping 
brushstrokes, the painting depicts the divine glow that surrounds the family during their evening prayer”.1604  
 
Having set out these aspects, the Restitutions Committee first ascertained the 
legitimacy of the claimants and that the claim had not been settled previously. The 
Restitutions Committee found no evidence of a court ruling concerning restitution of the 
painting or of an explicit waiver of rights. With regard to the compensation of DM 3,000 
received by Edith Eberstadt-Flersheim the Restitutions Committee does not deem it an 
impediment in the current application for restitution.1605 Subsequently, the Restitutions 
Committee turned to the balancing of the aspects and the formulation of the binding 
advice. 
With regard to the evaluation of the facts, the Restitutions Committee held that 
different from the argument made by the claimants, the Government’s line of policy 
concerning the restitution of spoliated art works does not directly apply to the present 
case but may be applied in analogy.1606 Another aspect to be taken into account in 
balancing the aspects is the fact that the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation did not wish to 
invoke the prescription of Flersheim’ heirs’ claims.1607  
                                                     
1602 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 7. 
1603 See further on the relationship between the family Flersheim and Toorop: Vloten, F.v., 2001. 
1604 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2008, Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 8. 
1605 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, paras. 3 & 4. 
1606 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 1. 
1607 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 2.  
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Balancing the aspects on the grounds of reasonableness and fairness the Restitutions 
Committee reached the conclusion that the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation should return 
the painting to the heirs of Flersheim upon payment by the heirs of EUR 121,500 to the 
Zeeuwse Museum Foundation.1608 Should the heirs decide to sell the work within the 
next ten years, they will be obliged to offer it for sale to the Museum first. Furthermore, 
the heirs are obliged to cover the costs of insuring and transporting the painting from 
the moment of transfer from the Museum and to indemnify the Museum against third-
party claims to the painting.  
The following aspects outweighed the museum’s interest in keeping the painting, 
which the Restitutions Committee did also recognise as considerable interest: first, the 
involuntary loss of the painting by Flersheim precipitated by the Nazi regime, secondly, 
the emotional importance of the painting to the claimants, thirdly, the willingness of the 
heirs to compensate the museum financially and finally the fact that even though the 
Museum cannot be reproached for acting carelessly when acquiring the painting there 
are elements in the provenance of the work that point to dubious dealings.1609 However, 
the Restitutions Committee’s binding advice does not only stipulate that the museum 
must return the painting: the requirements of reasonableness and fairness require that 
the duty on behalf of the museum is matched with duties on behalf of the claimants: 
claimants have to reimburse the museum for the sale price (ƒ 150,000) indexed 
according to the general price index (EUR 121,500). Furthermore, claimants have to 
cover the costs of insurance and transport and have to guarantee the museum the right 
of first refusal where the painting is resold within ten years.1610  
As a result of the binding advice of the Restitutions Committee the painting ‘A 
Prayer before Supper’ by Toorop was returned to the heirs of Ernst Flersheim. 
However, half a year later the painting returned to the museum: the heirs had offered 
the museum to buy back the painting for EUR 380,000. Almost one third of the amount 
was paid by the sum paid by the heirs to the museum.1611 
In the previous paragraphs we have discussed the binding advice of the Restitutions 
Committee concerning the dispute between the heirs of Ernst Flersheim and the 
Zeeuwse Museum Foundation. According to the Restitutions reasonableness and 
fairness dictate the museum to return the painting to the heirs while the heirs must 
refund the sales price paid by the museum in 1981. The Restitutions Committee 
consequently arrived at a different conclusion from the NMV Ethical Code Committee, 
which had decided in 2000 that the museum was not required to return the painting. An 
aspect that might explain the opposed findings of the two committees is the fact that 
the Zeeuwse Museum Foundation had explicitly stated when accepting the authority of 
the Restitutions Committee that it did not wish to invoke the prescription of Flersheim’ 
                                                     
1608 Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 9. 
1609 Ibid. 
1610 Ibid. 
1611 Toorop terug naar Zeeuws Museum, 28 November 2008.  
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heirs’ claims.1612 However, the decision of the museum not to invoke the defense of 
prescription was not listed amongst the aspects that have been highlighted by the 
Restitutions Committee as outweighing the museum’s interest in keeping the 
painting.1613 Instead, the Restitutions Committee had stressed the involuntary loss of the 
painting by Flersheim precipitated by the Nazi regime, the emotional importance of the 
painting to the claimants, the willingness of the heirs to compensate the museum 
financially and finally the fact that even though the Museum cannot be reproached for 
acting carelessly when acquiring the painting that there are elements in the provenance 
of the work that point to dubious dealings. Consequently, whether the decisive 
difference between the findings of the two committees can be explained by the waiver 
of the defence of the prescription by the museum remains subject to speculation. 
Another explanation could be that public opinion and awareness about how to deal with 
spoliated art had shifted after the recommendation of the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee in 2000 but before the binding advice of the Restitutions Committee in 
2008.1614 From our analysis above on the introspection of the restoration of right during 
the post war era by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) we know that by 
the year 2000 the whole extent of the irregularities and flaws in the functioning of the 
Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) had been made known.1615 While the case 
of the Toorop is unrelated to this chapter of Dutch post war history in that the painting 
had not been dealt with by the Netherlands Art Property Foundation (SNK) we can 
assume that by 2000 there was general awareness about the problem of Nazi spoliated 
art, for sure amongst the members of the NMV Ethical Code Committee. On the other 
hand, the recommendation of the NMV Ethical Code Committee preceded the first 
recommendation by the Restitutions Committee, which dates from March 2002. 
Consequently, one could also argue that while factual knowledge had been present full 
awareness about the consequences had not yet been developed. We will not further 
speculate about the explanation for the different results of the two committees, but 
focus on two other interesting aspects from comparing the exercising of the Restitutions 
Committee in giving binding advices from its other task of making recommendations 
with regard to objects from the SNK Collection.  
Different from making recommendations with regard to objects in the SNK 
Collection the Restitution Committee does not base its binding advices on the 
liberalised return policy as adopted by the Government in 2001. Instead, its main 
parameters are the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. It does, however, apply 
                                                     
1612 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2008, Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 2.  
1613 See above and Ibid., Assessment of the facts in the dispute, para. 9. 
1614 See above where we discuss this possibility with regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the 
Goudstikker case.  
1615 Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 1998; Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 1999; 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 2000; Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, 2002; Muller, E. / 
Schretlen, H., 2002, pp. 6-8. 
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the liberalised return policy in analogy. In the present case of the Toorop, e.g. we saw 
that the Restitutions Committee was prepared to accept the involuntary loss of the 
painting without conclusive evidence. While the Restitutions Committee did not go as 
far as to fully apply the presumption of involuntary loss as applied under the liberalised 
return policy in full, it did adopt a lenient approach towards the burden of proof of the 
claimants.  
Another interesting aspect we wish to comment on is the financial compensation 
received by Edith Eberstadt-Flersheim in the post war era for the loss of the painting. 
Both the recommendation of the NMV Ethical Code Committee and the binding advice 
of the Restitutions Committee mentioned the fact that the sole surviving heir of Ernst 
Flersheim did receive financial compensation of 3,000 DM in 1956.1616 It is furthermore 
stated that this amount corresponds to the 1956 market value of the painting. Both the 
NMV Ethical Code Committee and the Restitutions Committee state that the 
compensation received does not constitute an impediment in the application for 
restitution. Neither committee further incorporates the fact in its decision making 
process or in the formulation of a just and fair solution.  
As of today, the Restitutions Committee has given a binding advice only in a very 
limited number of cases. However, it is possible that this number will increase in light of 
the start of an initiative researching the provanance of works acquired by museums in 
the period 1933-1939.1617 Given the time period, this research is irrelevant with regard to 
the NK Collection but might identify objects in other public collections.  
4.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  T H E  NE TH E R L A N D S 
 In the present section we have summarised the main findings of the Origins 
Unknown Agency on the functioning of the Netherlands Art Property Foundation 
(SNK) during the post war era and analysed the liberalised return policy as introduced 
on the basis of recommendations by the Ekkart Committee in 2001 by the Dutch 
Government. The liberalised return policy applies to objects from the NK Collection 
and other national collections. It may, however, be applied in analogy to disputes 
concerning objects not held by the Dutch State where the parties involved agree.  
A crucial aspect of the liberalised return policy is the understanding of new facts - 
‘nova’. Only cases that qualify as new applications, or where new facts have emerged, 
may be assessed by the Restitutions Committee. While the Government endorsed a 
broader interpretation of nova it did not follow the suggestion of the Ekkart Committee 
                                                     
1616 Unfortunately, neither the recommendation of the NMV Ethical Code Committee nor the binding 
advice of the Restitutions Committee elaborate on the legal basis of the restitution. Generally speaking, the 
Federal Restitution Law (BRüG) would be the appropriate law. However, it was adopted only 1957 whereas 
both the NMV Ethical Code Committee and the Restitutions Committee speak of 1956 as the year in which 
Edith Eberstadt-Flersheim was granted compensation. See further on the BRüG above in chp. 1.§4.IV.  
1617 Museumonderzoek Museale Verwervingen 1933-1940 en 1948-heden, 2009. The results are expected to 
be published in 2013.  
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to include changed (historic) views of justice.1618 The Restitutions Committee, however, 
which was established to advise the Government on the basis of the liberalised 
restitution policy, chose to apply the broader notion as originally suggested by the 
Ekkart Committee. According to the Restitutions Committee, changed insights and 
circumstances should be granted the status of new facts. Consequently, the Restitutions 
Committee amended the liberalised return policy with regard to the interpretation of 
nova according to its own views. As result they extented the scope of cases that qualify 
for reassessment and to a certain extent undermine the general starting point of the 
Government that the restoration of rights should not be repeated.  
An alternative to subsuming settled cases under the liberalised return policy by a 
more extensive interpretation of nova, as the Restitutions Committee did in the 
Gutmann case, was introduced with regard to the Goudstikker case. When the Minister 
of Culture announced the decision to return the paintings covered by the Göring 
transaction it was emphasised that while the case fell outside the scope of the present 
restitution policy for having been settled in the past, there were nevertheless special 
reasons to follow the recommendation of the Restitutions Committee to return the 
objects on moral grounds.1619 Put differently, the Government chose to return the 
objects from the Goudstikker collection despite the fact that the Göring transaction 
qualified as settled case on the grounds of the 1999 ruling of the Court of Appeal. 
Consequently, the Government recognised the existance of an additional avenue, next 
to the liberalised restitution policy, that allows for the restitution of objects from already 
settled cases.  
Our analysis furthermore revealed that in assessing claims for the return of objects 
from the NK Collection on the grounds of the liberalised return policy, the Restitutions 
Committee accords little weight to the relevance an object may have for the public 
interest.1620 Where it discussed the public interest of the Goudstikker collection – given 
its quantity and quality the Restitutions Committee somewhat intricately argued that the 
public interest should be assessed on the basis of the objects’ relevance in 1940, prior to 
the loss of the objects rather than according to the present relevance. In 2007, and 
according to the Restitutions Committee due to reports about a legal dispute between 
the heirs of the Goudstikker NV and their lawyers and the auctioning off of 
Goudstikker works that had been returned in 2006, questions emerged about the 
legitimacy of returning spoliated items of cultural value and the relevance that should be 
accorded to preserving valuable or unique items of cultural value in public art 
collections in the Netherlands.1621 The Restitutions Committee noted that the debate 
touches on the core of restitution policy but did not further elaborate.  
                                                     
1618 See for a different opinion: Vlies, I.C.v.d., et al., 2009, p. 102. 
1619 De staatssecretaris van Onderwijs Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2006; Kuitenbrouwer, F., 7 February 2006.  
1620 Cf.: Kuitenbrouwer, F., 7 February 2006.  
1621 Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World 
War, 2007, pp. 9-10. 
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Different from cases dealing with objects in the NK collection, the Restitutions 
Committee seems to accord greater weight to the public interest in cases dealing with 
objects that are not held by the Dutch State. According to the regulations adopted by 
the Restitutions Committee in 2007 with regard to the issuing of binding advice 
concerning disputes over objects not in the NK collection, the Restitutions Committee 
may take the significance of the object for the public art collection into 
consideration.1622 In our analysis of the case of the painting by Toorop, we have seen 
that the relevance of the painting for the museum and the general public is 
acknowledged by the Restitutions Committee but was outweighed by a number of other 
aspects.  
Little discussion can also be noted with regard to question of the relevance of 
financial compensation received during the post war era. From the cases we discussed, 
only the Toorop case mentioned financial compensation received by the (heir of the) 
original owner. Interestingly, the fact that the (heir of the) original owner had received 
financial compensation representing the market value of the missing painting, was not 
taken into account when assessing the validity of the claim or in deciding on a just and 
fair solution. 
I I .  UN I T E D  K IN G DO M 
 In the United Kingdom the scrutinising of public collections for art works 
dispossessed during the period 1933-1945 started in 1998 with the initiative of the 
National Museum Directors’ Conference (NMDC) to formulate a 'Statement of 
Principles and Proposed Action'.1623 The NMDC is a UK wide voluntary association of 
26 national cultural institutions receiving funding from the central government and 
including 20 museums, the three national libraries, the Royal Botanical Gardens in Kew 
and Edinburgh and the Public Record Office.1624 The Statement of Principles provides 
as follows:  
 
“i) NMDC recognises and deplores the wrongful taking of works of art that constituted one of the many 
horrors of the Holocaust and World War II.  
 
ii) NMDC members support the principle outlined in the Museums Association Code of Practice for 
Governing Bodies dated 1994 which states that “Collections Management Policy should ensure, through the 
appropriate documentation, that the museum does not acquire or exhibit any stolen or illegally exported 
works and that it acquires legal title to items accessioned to its collections”. 
 
iii) NMDC is committed to working with other institutions and organisations both within the UK and 
internationally to increase awareness and understanding of the facts surrounding the spoliation of works of 
art by the Nazis and others during the Holocaust and World War II period. 
                                                     
1622 Art. 4 Regulations, sub g.  
1623 Cf.: Bailey, M., 2005, p. 58; Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 172.  
1624 Cf.: National Museum Directors' Conference (NMDC), 1998, para. 1.2. 
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iv) NMDC is committed to giving prompt and serious consideration to claims to title for specific works in 
their collections. 
 
v) In line with its members’ general policies for and commitment to increasing public access to information 
about their collections, NMDC advocates a practical approach to reviewing and making accessible 
information relating to the provenance of their collections, taking into account the nature and size of the 
collections concerned and the resources available. 
 
vi) NMDC advocates a process of reviewing, reporting and researching the issue of works of art wrongfully 
taken which respects the dignity of all parties and the complexity of the issue. Each claim represents a 
unique situation which must be reviewed thoroughly on a case by case basis taking into account both the 
interests of individuals and the statutory and legal responsibilities of the institutions”. 
 
In a nutshell the statement by the NMDC stresses that the associated institutions 
share the concern for Nazi spoliated art and calls for transparency and dialogue while 
observing the legal framework, including legal obstacles to disposal.1625 The Statement 
of Principles also states that “for the purposes of interpreting this document, wrongful 
taking shall mean any act of theft or other deprivation, the legality of which is open to 
reasonable challenge, and which was committed during the Holocaust and World War II 
period”. With regard to the mechanism of how claims should be solved the NMDC 
assumed that this would be done by each institution individually, albeit in conjunction 
with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.1626  
In reaction to the NMDC initiative and international developments with regard to 
the restitution of Nazi spoliated art the Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
considered it desirable to establish an independent body that could examine claims and 
propose solutions.1627 On 13 April 2000, the Spoliation Advisory Panel was established. 
Before outlining the Panel’s constitution and terms of reference we will shortly reflect 
upon the UK situation which is different from the situations in the Netherlands and 
France. Different from these two countries in continental Europe neighbouring 
Germany, the UK had not been occupied during World War II. While it was attacked 
and fought the Axis forces1628 as one of the Allied Forces, it had never been occupied by 
the Nazis. Consequently, there had not been any losses of works of art by UK citizens 
comparable to those by French or Dutch citizens, first and foremost Jews. This means 
that most objects in UK public collections are the result of acquisitions or donations 
during or after the Nazi regime. Given the relevance of the UK art market the number 
of objects spoliated in Continental Europe that were at some stage traded in the UK 
might not be insignificant. Further to transactions of objects sold after having been 
spoliated, the strength of the UK art market also resulted in a number of forced sales 
                                                     
1625 See in particular principles 2. 4; 2.5; 2.6 and 5.4 of the Ibid. Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 27. See for a more 
detailed discussion of the 'Statement of Principles and Proposed Action’: Range, D., 2004, pp. 665-667. 
1626 Cf.: National Museum Directors' Conference (NMDC), 1998, para. 5.4. 
1627 Cf.: Bailey, M., 2005, p. 58. 
1628 The major Axis powers, next to Germany, were Italy and Japan. 
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being effected in the UK. E.g. the collection of Italian Maiolica from the Pringsheim 
Collection was sold at Sotheby’s, London on 7-8 June and on 19-20 June 1939 in 
accordance with the terms of the German Office for Foreign Exchange Control:1629 the 
collection was to be exported to London and to be auctioned at Sotheby’s in order to 
raise foreign currency for the German treasury. Of the net benefit to the German State, 
Pringsheim should receive only 40%.1630  
Consequently, while the strenth of the UK art market certainly attracted spoliated art 
works that may still be part of the public collections, the UK does not have an 
equivalent to the Dutch NK-Collection or the French MNR-Collection.1631 For this 
reason the introspective aspect of the initiatives in the Netherlands and France with 
regard to the post-war restoration of rights is missing in the UK. The first policy 
measurement was taken over fifty years after the end of WWII, when the UK 
Government established the Spoliation Advisory Panel. 
1.  TH E  SP OL IA T IO N  AD VI S O R Y  PA N E L  
The UK Spoliation Advisory Panel (hereinafter: “the Panel”) was established in 2000 
to consider claims from people, or their heirs, who “lost possession” of a cultural object 
during the years 1933-1945 where that object is now in the possession of a UK national 
collection or in the possession of another UK museum or gallery established for the 
public benefit.1632 The mandate of the Panel is therefore not limited to claims by (heirs 
of) former Jewish owners, nor is it limited to cases of outright confiscation by the Nazis 
or forced sales but applies to any form of loss.1633 The Panel may also advise on claims 
between two private parties provided that there has been a joint request by the 
                                                     
1629 See file from the Munich State Archive: WB I a 2407. Later internal communication between different 
agencies of the Reich spoke, however, of different a allocation of the net proceeds with only 20% of the net 
proceeds up to £ 20,000 and 30% thereafter to be accorded to Pringsheim. But even this intention was not 
kept. Communication of 8 November 1938 – O1729/1896/38 B III b Ja/St Re: maiolica collection of 
Councillor Pringsheim, Munich, translated and published in: Falke, O.v., 1994, p. 96. 
1630 See export report by Otto von Falke, undated, certifying that the Pringsheim maiolica Collection could 
be removed from the German list of national treasures and suggesting England and the United States as 
best markets for the sale. He mentions the donated objects: “the donation of some especially valuable 
maiolicas (…) and two silver goblets by the famous 16th century silver smith Ludwig Krug, which are 
depicted in Pantheon 1933, volume XI, p. 191.  
1631 See further below in chp. 4.§1.III on the MNR-Collection. 
1632 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 2. Note that while the content of the 
Panel’s Constitution and Terms of Reference did not change the numbering was revised in 2007. Our 
references are to the most recent manner of numbering. Examples of “another UK museum or gallery 
established for the public benefit” are the Courtauld Institute of Art and the art collection owned by the 
Glasgow City Council. Cf.: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 3; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a, para. 
2.  
1633 See e.g. the Benevento Missal Case where the Spoliation Panel decided that a missal currently in the 
collection of the British Library should be returned to despite the fact that it could not be proven when, 
whether, and if by whom the manuscript was spoliated in what form whatsoever (confiscation, sale, sale at 
an undervalue, etc). Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005. 
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parties.1634 The Panel advises the Secretary of State on what action should be taken 
regarding a specific claim as well, where it deems it appropriate, on general issues raised 
by a case.  
Claimants can make a claim by submitting the claim in writing to the Panel, having 
gathered a comprehensive amount of evidence to support themselves (comprising of 
witness statements and documents) which the institution in possession of the claimed 
cultural object must reply to within six weeks.1635 The Panel is supported by a secretariat 
and can consult independent legal advisors.1636 The Panel is charged with evaluating a 
claim both to the legal force, and the moral quality.1637 The Panel is construed as an 
alternative to litigation, not as process of litigation.1638 The paramount parameter of the 
Panel is to find solutions that are fair and just both to the claimant and to the institution, 
respectively to both private persons where a dispute concerns private property.1639 For 
this purpose the following concrete steps are listed:  
 
(a) make such factual and legal inquiries, (including the seeking of advice about legal matters, about cultural 
objects and about valuation of such objects) as the Panel consider appropriate to assess each claim as 
comprehensively as possible;  
(b) assess all information and material submitted by or on behalf of the claimant and the institution or any 
other person, or otherwise provided or known to the Panel;  
(c) examine and determine the circumstances in which the claimant was deprived of the object, whether by 
theft, forced sale, sale at an undervalue, or otherwise;  
(d) evaluate, on the balance of probability, the validity of the claimant's original title to the object, 
recognising the difficulties of proving such title after the destruction of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust and the duration of the period which has elapsed since the claimant lost possession of the object;  
(e) give due weight to the moral strength of the claimant's case;  
(f) evaluate, on the balance of probability, the validity of the institution's title to the object;  
(g) consider whether any moral obligation rests on the institution taking into account in particular the 
circumstances of its acquisition of the object, and its knowledge at that juncture of the object's provenance; 
take account of any relevant statutory provisions, including stipulations as to the institution's objectives, and 
any restrictions on its power of disposal;  
(i) take account of the terms of any trust instrument regulating the powers and duties of the trustees of the 
institution, and give appropriate weight to their fiduciary duties;  
(j) where appropriate assess the current market value of the object, or its value at any other appropriate 
time, and shall also take into account any other relevant circumstance affecting compensation, including the 
value of any potential claim by the institution against a third party;  
(k) formulate and submit to the claimant and to the institution its advice in a written report, giving reasons, 
and supply a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, and  
(l) formulate and submit to the Secretary of State any advice pursuant to paragraph 4 in a written report, 
giving reasons, and supply a copy of the report to the claimant and the institution.1640  
                                                     
1634 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 3.  
1635 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Rules of Procedure, s 1 and s 2. 
1636 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 2; s 12 (a).  
1637 Ibid, s 5 & 6; s 12 (d-g). 
1638 Ibid, s 6. 
1639 Ibid, s 11.  
1640 Ibid, s 12. 
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Where the Panel reaches the conclusion on the basis of the aforementioned steps 
that a claim should be upheld it can choose between a number of remedies: it may 
recommend the return of the claimed object, the payment of compensation to the 
claimant, or the payment of an ex gratia payment by the Government. With regard to the 
later two remedies which imply that the object concerned stays in the public collection 
the Panel may also recommend a commemorative notice on the provenance of the 
object to be exhibited alongside the object.1641 In as far as the amount of a 
compensation payment is concerned it is for the Panel to decide, taking into account all 
relevant circumstances including the current market value, but not tied to that current 
market value. The recommendations issued by the Panel are not legally binding on any 
of the parties involved.1642 However if the claimant accepts the recommendation of the 
Panel and the recommendation is implemented then the claimant is expected to accept 
this as “full and final settlement of his claim”.1643  
From the outline of the Panel’s terms above it appears that while the Panel will 
consider legal issues relating to title to the object its recommendations are based upon a 
broader assessment of claims beyond merely legal rights. Instead, the Panel also takes 
into account the “moral strength of the claimant's case” and the “moral obligations” 
that may rest on a holding institution. The Panel’s Constitution and Terms of Reference 
do not further explicate what is meant by moral strength or moral obligations. 
Consequently, the Panel enjoys a certain margin of appreciation as to what constitutes 
moral strengths and obligations. In order to get a better understanding of how the Panel 
applies these notions we will have to look at the cases for which the Panel has already 
issued recommendations.  
Until the end of 2008 the Panel, which has been referred to as being “(…) without 
doubt one of the most elegant organisms ever created by government”1644, had 
completed reports into nine claims to objects held in the following collections: the Tate, 
the British Library, the Glasgow City Council (as part of the Burrell Collection), the 
Ashmolean Museum, the British Museum, the Courtauld Institute of Art and the 
Fitzwilliam Museum.1645 In the following, we will shortly summarise the Panel’s 
                                                     
1641 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 13. 
1642 Ibid, s 7. 
1643 Ibid, s 8. 
1644 Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence Examination of Witnesses 
(Questions 320-329), Q322 (Chairman).  
1645 Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of a painting now in the possession of the Tate 
Gallery, 18 January 2001 (hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001); Report of the Spoliation Advisory 
Panel in respect of a painting now in the possession of Glasgow City Council, 24 November 2004 
(hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004); Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of a 12th 
century manuscript now in the possession of the British Library, 23 March 2005 (hereinafter: Spoliation 
Advisory Panel, 2005); Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of a painting held by the 
Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, 1 March 2006 (hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006a); Report of 
the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of four drawings now in the possession of the British Museum, 27 
April 2006 (hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b); Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in 
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recommendations before seeking to extract common grounds, in particular with regard 
to Panel’s interpretation of moral strength and obligations.  
a) The case of ‘A View of Hampton Court Palace’ by Jan Griffier the Elder’ claimed from the 
Tate Gallery 
In this case, the heirs of a Jewish couple laid claim to a picture that had been in the 
collection of the Tate Gallery since its donation in 1961 by the Friends of the Tate. The 
painting by Griffier had been sold in 1939 by the mother of the claimants for very little 
money, next to other paintings from the family’s collection in order to finance her basic 
necessities as a Jewish refugee in hiding in Belgium after her husband had been shot. 
After the war, she sought and was awarded compensation from the German 
Government for three painting allegedly stolen in transit. The Panel was informed that 
the compensation files do not make any reference to the Griffier painting.1646 
The Panel examined the factual evidence produced by the claimants, most of which 
was based on the claimants’ recollection or on information derived from their deceased 
mother. In line with their principle of generous interpretation of evidence - given the 
difficulties of proof after the destruction of WWII and the duration of the period which 
has elapsed since - the Panel accepted the evidence regarding the family’s original 
ownership and loss of the painting in a forced sale. 
As next step the Panel addressed the question who presently holds title to the 
painting. In order to evaluate the validity of the Tate’s title at that moment the Panel 
examined all transfers, starting with the forced sale in Brussels until the final transfer 
when the Friends of the Tate acquired the painting in 1961. The Panel found that in 
accordance with the Limitation Act 1939 the claimant’s title was extinguished in 1967, 
clothing the Friends of the Tate and thereafter the Tate with an unassailable title. 
Consequently, the claimants do not have a valid legal claim to the picture. 
                                                                                                                                          
respect of three drawings now in the possession of the Courtauld Institute of Art, 24 January 2007 
(hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a); Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of three 
Rubens paintings now in the possession of the Courtauld Institute of Art, London, 28 November 2007 
(hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007b); Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of pieces 
of porcelain now in the possession of the British Museum, London and the Fitswilliam Museum, 
Cambridge, 11 June 2008 (hereinafter: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008). The claim for the return of 
porcelain from the former Rothberger Collection from Vienna against the British Museum and the 
Fitzwilliam Museum were dealt with by the Panel in one single report, explaining that the number of cases 
(9) exceeds the number of published reports (8). On 24 June 2009, after the research in the context of this 
thesis was closed, the Panel published its 9th Report (Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2009), on eight drawings 
now in the collection of the Courtauld Institute of Art in London.The Report concludes that, whilst the 
predominant reason for the sale of the drawings in 1933 by the owner, Professor Dr Curt Glaser, was Nazi 
oppression, the moral claim was insufficiently strong to warrant the transfer of the drawings. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Panel took account of the fact that the sale prices achieved at the time were reasonable 
and that Dr Glaser’s widow had received compensation from the German compensation authorities after 
the War. See for the report: http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/429961_HC757_PROOF.pdf 
(last visited 30 June 2009). For reasons of timing, the recommendation could not be integrated in this study 
but will be discussed in the epilogue. 
1646 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001, paras. 8-9. 
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and their knowledge of its provenance at that point as possibly giving rise to moral 
obligations. The Panel recognised that the Tate had investigated the provenance of the 
work by writing to previous dealers and archives but nevertheless asked the question of 
whether the Tate should have done more provenance research. In answering this, the 
Panel held that the question must be judged by the standard of the times, i.e. the 1960s 
when “museum buyers were characteristically concerned with the history and 
importance of the picture rather than with any considerations of spoliation”.1648 
Consequently, the Panel did not find any grounds for criticising the conduct of the Tate 
in moral terms.  
Having upheld the claim, the Panel addressed the question as to the appropriate 
remedy. In principle, the first option would be to recommend the return of the pictures 
to the claimants. Nevertheless, the Panel decided to award an ex gratia payment of 
£125,000 calculated as to reflect the current market value of the painting, deducted by 
the costs borne by the holding institution for insurance, and restoration. The amount 
was furthermore balanced by the benefit derived by the holding institution from the 
possession of the work of art.  
While it clearly motivated its choice against compensation in being inappropriate 
given the absence of a legal claim, the Panel did not explicitly state the decisive reasons 
for preferring an ex gratia payment to be paid by the Government over restitution. It did 
mention that the claimants did not seek its return and that the return would be debarred 
in any case under the present statute. The Panel also recommended displaying the 
picture in the future with a plaque commemorating its history and provenance.  
b) The case of ‘Still Life’ formerly attributed to Jean-Baptist- Siméon Chardin claimed from the 
Glasgow City Council 
The heirs of former Jewish shareholders of an art gallery in Munich claimed a ‘Still 
Life’ formerly attributed to Chardin from the City of Glasgow. The painting, which until 
recently was believed to be an authentic Chardin had been part of the stock of the 
Munich gallery, which had been forced to auction its entire stock in 1936. A few days 
after the auction, the painting had been resold to Sir William Burrell who donated his 
entire art collection to the City of Glasgow in 1944. The claimants held that the gallery 
was forced to liquidate its stock to satisfy an extortionate tax demand which they had to 
pay in order to be allowed to emigrate from Germany. The claimants contended that 
they had received the tax demand shortly after a new tax officer with Nazi sympathies 
had been appointed. Consequently, the claimants case centred on the fact that they had 
been deprived of their freedom to retain or dispose of their property as they wished to.  
They referred to the restitution principles adopted by the Allied Forces after the war, 
which presumped that all transactions made in the period 1933-1945 by a person 
belonging to a persecuted group qualify as an act of confiscation. Only if positive 
evidence was provided according to which the transfer would also have taken place in 
                                                     
1648 Ibid., para. 50. 
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the absence of National Socialism or resulted in the successful protection of a property 
interest of the original owner could the presumption be refuted.1649 
The Panel accepted the claimants’ evidence that the Jewish shareholders of the 
gallery had been confronted with an extortionate tax demand and that the auctioning of 
its stock was a direct consequence. Squared with the restitution principles of the Allied 
Forces and the 1943 London Declaration the Panel recognised a strong moral case in 
the claimant’s favour.  
With regard to the moral position of the City of Glasgow, the Panel looked at the 
steps taken in 1944 when it took possession of the collection of Sir William Burrell. The 
City of Glasgow contended that Sir William Burrell had recorded everything he knew 
about his collection in his purchase book and when the city took over the collection 
they missed man-power to conduct further provenance research. Taking the size of the 
collection as well as the missing resources into account, the Panel did not find the City 
of Glasgow under a moral obligation.  
Having recognised a “sufficiently robust moral case to justify the award of a remedy” 
on behalf of the claimants the Panel first discussed the fact that the Jewish shareholders 
had been paid DM 75,000 by the German Government as compensation for their loss 
on the sale. While the report refers only to the “Federal Compensation Act” the 
compensation was presumably based on the Federal Restitution Law (BRüG) as adopted 
in 1957.1650 The Panel remarks that it had been informed that the sum received 
represented an overall payment for the entire loss of which only a fraction would be 
attributable to the painting. It does not reflect upon the consequences of compensation 
received, i.e. the impact of compensation payments on the remedy determined but turns 
immediately to establishing the current market value of the painting and the appropriate 
remedy.1651 The Panel also did not further elaborate upon the fact that since the 
compensation payments, the painting is no longer considered as a Still Life by Chardin, 
but would realise a price of approximately £7,500 when sold in auction.  
The Panel notes that the claimants seek either the return of the painting or an ex 
gratia payment, while the City of Glasgow pleads for an ex gratia payment funded by the 
Government for being debarred from granting restitution under the terms of the 
memorandum of agreement with Sir William Burrell. The memorandum stipulated that 
“the donnees shall not be entitled on any pretext whatever to sell or donate or exchange 
any item or part of the Collection once it has formed part of the Collection (…)”.1652 
Despite this contractual rather than statutory impediment the Panel reached the final 
conclusion that the “just and fair solution in the present case is restitution of the picture 
to the claimants”.1653 It lists a number of reasons that it considered as speaking against 
                                                     
1649 See further on the restitution principles above in chp. 1.§4.  
1650 Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz (BRüG) 19 July 1957, BGBl. I-734. See further on the BrüG above in chp. 
1.§4.IV. 
1651 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 24.  
1652 Ibid., para. 22. 
1653 Ibid., para. 36. 
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an ex gratia payment: first, it mentions the discrepancy in value between 1936 when the 
painting fetched a generous price as a genuine Chardin and the current market value as 
an attributed work. Secondly, the Panel refers to the compensation payments received 
from the German Government and states that while it would be prepared to disregard 
the “tiny fraction” received, it would need to make allowance for the expenses 
(insurance and conservation) which the claimants would have incurred had they retained 
possession. Consequently, the amount of an ex gratia payment would be restricted to an 
amount representative of the claimants’ loss of their right of disposal plus some 
allowance in recognition of the public benefit derived from the painting having been 
exhibited all these years. The Panel concludes that it would not “shrink from proposing 
a figure if this were the only course available, we doubt whether such an assessment 
would seem fair to either side”.1654 Instead, but without further motivation, the Panel 
decided for full restitution of the painting as just and fair solution.  
c) The case of the ‘Beneventan Missal’ claimed from the British Library  
The claim was brought by the city of Benevento in Italy for the return of a 
manuscript originating from the Chapter Library in Benevento, now in the possession of 
the British Library. The claimants held that it lost possession of the manuscript between 
1943 and 1944. The exact circumstances of when and under which conditions the 
claimants had lost the manuscript were unknown. In fact, the case did not have a direct 
Nazi connotation, as a consequence of which the Panel first had to decide whether the 
case came within its jurisdiction.  
As outlined above the Panel can hear claims from people, or their heirs, who “lost 
possession” of a cultural object during the years 1933-1945 where that object is now in 
the possession of a public UK institution.1655 While the terms of reference do not 
require that the loss of possession is a direct result of Nazi intervention the loss must 
have occurred during the years of the Nazi reign. Whereas the claimants held that this 
was the case, this was disputed by the British Library. In evaluating the arguments made 
by both sides concerning proof of the manuscripts’ presence in the Chapter Library 
until the outbreak of WWII and its loss before the end of the war the Panel took into 
account the difficulties of proof after the Destruction of WWII and the duration of the 
period which has elapsed since. The Panel came to the conclusion that the 
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the claimants is “sufficiently robust” to support 
their claim that the manuscript was spoliated between 1943 when the city of Benevento 
was bombed and 1944, when the missal was discovered by an English captain in a 
bookshop in Naples.1656 Consequently, the case fell into the jurisdiction of the Panel, 
which turned as next step to evaluate the moral positions of the parties. As for the legal 
                                                     
1654 Ibid., para. 28.  
1655 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 2. Note that while the content of the 
Panel’s Constitution and Terms of Reference did not change the numbering was revised in 2007. Our 
references are to the most recent manner of numbering.  
1656 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005, para. 52.  
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title to the manuscript it was accepted from the outset that the British Library’s title is 
impregnable under the Limitation Acts.1657   
In evaluating the moral positions of the parties, the Panel first explicated two 
instruments that inform its duty to give weight to moral considerations: the 1943 
London Declaration, which had been referred to also in the two previous cases heard by 
the Panel and the National Museum Directors’ Conference’s (NMDC) 'Statement of 
Principles and Proposed Action' introduced above.1658 The reason for explicitly referring 
to the NMDC Principles could have been that in 2000, under the auspices of the 
NMDC, the British Library published a “List of works with incomplete provenance 
during the period 1933 to 1945”, which includes the missal. The entry significantly states 
that “the manuscript was not identified directly by research, but may have been 
spoliated during the Nazi period”.1659 
Concerning the claimants’ moral position the Panel accepts as “central pillar of their 
case” vindicating their moral claim for the manuscript’s return the argumentation of the 
claimants that as an object of war time looting, the subsequent acquisition of the 
manuscript by the English captain in Naples in 1943 was both unlawful and immoral 
and falls within the scope of the 1943 London Declaration.1660 The Panel dismissed the 
British Library’s argument that the long period of inactivity on behalf of the Chapter 
Library in seeking the return of the manuscript dismissed their moral claim.1661 
The Panel then discussed the British Library’s moral position. Given the fact that the 
moral discussion focuses on the acquisition of the manuscript and the knowledge about 
its provenance at that point it is important to note that the missal was originally acquired 
by the British Museum in 1947 and was transferred to the British Library on the latter’s 
foundation under the terms of the British Library Act 1972. Consequently, the 
discussion of a moral obligation necessarily focuses on the behaviour of the British 
Museum in the late 1940s rather than on the British Library. In evaluating the conduct 
of the British Museum in acquiring the manuscript the Panel held that under the 
circumstances applicable the British Museum should have made further attempts to 
investigate its provenance. Crucial for its decision to criticise the British Museum’s 
behaviour was the fact that when the British Museum was contacted by the English 
Captain who had acquired the manuscript in Naples for an evaluation in 1946, its deputy 
keeper explicitly informed the captain that the manuscript could have been spoliated 
property. Despite this awareness, when the manuscript came up in auction at Sotheby’s 
only a year later, the British Museum acquired the object without further provenance 
research. Regardless of the fact that the standards of provenance research were less 
                                                     
1657 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 3. 
1658 Cf.: Bailey, M., 2005, p. 58; Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 172.  
1659 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 62. 
1660 Ibid., paras. 62 & 66.63. 
1661 Ibid., paras. 64 & 66.63. 
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rigorous back then, the Panel criticises the conduct of the British Museum from a moral 
point of view.  
Having established that “the claimants have made good their moral claim” the Panel 
then turns to the appropriate remedy.1662 The Panel follows the wish of the claimants to 
have the manuscript returned and to recommend to the Government the introduction 
of appropriate legislation to enable the manuscript to be returned.1663 Consequently, the 
Panel recommends that legislation should be introduced to amend not only the British 
Library Act 1972, but also the British Museum Act 1963 and the Museums and Galleries 
Act 1992 to permit restitution of objects lost in the period 1933-1945. Until such 
legislation would be realised the manuscript should be returned to Benevento on the 
basis of a loan agreement.1664  
d) Portrait of a Young Girl in a Bow window, attributed to von Landshut claimed from the 
Ashmolean Museum  
In 2002, the heirs of the Jewish German banker Jakob Goldschmidt sought the 
return of the ‘Portrait of a Young Girl in a Bow window’, attributed to von Landshut 
from the collection of the Ashmolean Museum. The painting had been sold at auction 
in Germany in 1936 after Goldschmidt had already left the country for the United 
States. In evaluating the claim, the Panel had to establish whether or not the sale of the 
painting was forced or whether the sale was the result of financial problems 
Goldschmidt had occurred already prior to the Nazi rise to power. The Danatbank, 
which had been founded by Goldschmidt, encountered significant problems in result to 
the 1929 world financial crisis and had to declare bankruptcy in July 1931. In reaction to 
this, Goldschmidt concluded a number of agreements with the Danatbank in 1931 and 
with its successor the Dresdner Bank and Thyssen in 1932. Having analysed these 
agreements the Panel reached the conclusion that by the end of 1931 Goldschmidt had 
transferred all assets from his households, including the painting in dispute as security 
for his debt to the Donatbank. Consequently, at that point in time ownership of the 
painting had been transferred to the Donatbank. In a number of agreements in 1932 
between Goldschmidt, the Dresdener Bank and Thyssen it was subsequently agreed the 
whole art collection of Goldschmidt that had been kept in his house in Berlin would be 
secured in favour of Thyssen. In light of these agreements the Panel reached the 
conclusion that the 1936 sale at Hugo Helbing was not forced by the demands of the 
Nazi regime but instead had to meet the debt to Thyssen. As additional supportive 
evidence of its finding the Panel mentions the fact that in 1936 Goldschmidt had already 
emigrated to the United States and that the sale proceeds were directly paid to 
Thyssen.1665 The Panel furthermore verified that the painting had not been sold at an 
                                                     
1662 Ibid., para. 72. 
1663 Ibid., paras. 73 & 79. 
1664 Ibid., para. 80. 
1665 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006a, para. 35. 
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undervalue. It concluded its analysis of Goldschmidt’s position with the finding that it 
would involve too many speculative steps to conclude that he could have been able to 
repay his debts by 1936 if the Weimar Republic had continued in existence. Translating 
the findings into the moral force of the case the Panel qualified it as weak.1666  
With regard to the legal and moral position of the Ashmoleon Museum, the Panel 
held that its legal title to the painting is impregnable and that the museum behaved in an 
entirely appropriate manner when it acquired the painting by means of bequest in 
1967.1667 Having reached the conclusion that the Ashmoleon Museum had unassailable 
legal title to the painting and was under no moral blame whatsoever while the moral 
force of the claimant was weak the Panel rejected the claim.1668  
e) Four drawings claimed from the British Museum 
The case, in which heirs of the late Dr Arthur Feldmann claimed four drawings from 
the collection of the British Museum, has already been introduced above in Chapter 3 
(§2.II.1.a)) where we discussed the case Attorney-General v Trustees of the British 
Museum.1669 The case was advanced in 2002 on the ground that the drawings1670 had 
been seized in March 1939 by the Gestapo from Dr Feldmann’s house in Brno when 
the Nazis invaded Czechoslovakia. Three of the drawings had entered the museum's 
collection through a sale at Sotheby's in 1946, while the fourth was part of a bequest to 
the museum in 1949. The British Museum’s trustees agreed that the four drawings ought 
to be returned to the heirs of Arthur Feldmann as they felt they had a moral obligation 
to do so given the “exceptional atrocities committed during the 1933-1945 era”.1671 
However, in the light of the statutory restrictions on disposal of the British Museum Act 
1963 and the findings of the Vice-Chancellor in the High Court judgment that “no 
moral obligation can justify a disposition by the Trustees of an object forming part of 
the collections of the museum in breach of section 3(4) of the 1963 Act”1672, the 
claimants and the British Museum had made a joint submission to the Panel proposing 
as “preferred solution” that the paintings remains in the collection of the British 
Museums and that the claimants should be awarded full financial compensation.1673  
In evaluating the claim the Panel does not further consider the legal title of the 
British Museum, presumably as it had been confirmed already by the Vice-Chancellor 
                                                     
1666 Ibid., paras. 42 & 48 (vii). 
1667 Ibid., para. 47. 
1668 Ibid., para. 49. 
1669 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum). See further on the case above in chp. 3.§2.II.1.a). 
1670 The Holy Family, by Niccolo dell'Abbate; An Allegory on Poetic Inspiration with Mercury and Apollo, 
by Nicholas Blakey; Virgin and Infant Christ adored by St Elizabeth and the Infant St John, by Martin 
Johann Schmidt; St Dorothy with the Christ Child, by a follower of Martin Schongauer. 
1671 The High Court judgement of 24th May 2005 [2005] EWCH 1089 (Attorney-General v. Trustees of the 
British Museum), para. 5.  
1672 Ibid., para. 45.  
1673 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b, para. 4. 
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and directly addressed the moral issues involved. For the first time, the Panel explicitly 
mentioned the 1998 Washington Declaration as international instrument giving weight 
to moral considerations next to the 1943 London Declaration. While the 1998 
Washington Declaration had been annexed to all earlier recommendations the Panel had 
never chosen to refer to it before in its report. The Panel limited itself to pointing out 
that the declaration “stresses the need to achieve a just and fair solution”.1674 
With regard to the claimants position the Penal held that the loss of the drawings by 
gross act of spoliation by the Gestapo, furnishes an unassailable moral strength to the 
claim.1675 As for the position of the British Museum, the Panel held that the lack of 
investigation at the time the drawings were acquired is “with hindsight regrettable” and 
would “by modern standards be unacceptable” but cannot justify criticising the museum 
given the less rigorous standards previously applicable.  
In determining the appropriate remedy the Panel respects “preferred solution” of the 
two parties and hence does not recommend the return of the drawings. Instead, the 
Panel recommends an ex gratia payment. The Panel held that given the continued profit 
of scholars and the public and given the fact that no legal liability or moral blame rested 
on the British Museum an ex gratia payment borne by the Government was more 
appropriate than compensation paid by the museum. As for the amount of the ex gratia 
award, it was based on the valuation of the drawings, balanced by the expenses the 
claimants would have had occurred had they retained the drawings. In the present case, 
these were only insurance costs and potential sale expenses, suggesting a final payment 
of £175,000 to the claimants. 
f) Three drawings claimed from the Courtauld Institute of Art 
The claim for three drawings from the collection of the Courtauld Institute of Art 
was also made by the heirs of the late Dr Arthur Feldmann.1676 According to the heirs 
the drawings had been seized, together with the rest of Dr Feldmann’s art collection in 
March 1939 by the Gestapo from Dr Feldmann’s house in Brno.1677 Consequently, the 
underlying fact on which the claimants rely are similar to those considered in the case 
concerning the four drawings in the collection of the British Museum discussed above 
and will not be further discussed here.1678 In fact, the drawings had been included in the 
same sale at Sotheby’s on 16 October 1946 as three of the drawing in the collection of 
the British Museum. The drawings were acquired by an art dealer who sold them the 
same day to Sir Robert Witt (1872-1952). In 1952, the drawings were part of the Witt 
                                                     
1674 Ibid., para. 33. 
1675 Ibid., para. 34. 
1676 See above the case concerning four drawings claimed from the British Museum.  
1677 “A lion”, attributed to Carl Ruthart (1630-1703), black chalk, brown wash, watercolour, heightened with 
white; “A dog lying down”, attributed to Frans Van Mieris the elder (1635-1681), black and red chalk, 
brown wash, pen and ink; “An architectural capriccio”, attributed to Giuseppe Bibiena (16961756), black 
chalk, pen and brown ink, brown and blue wash. 
1678 See further: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a, paras. 5-10. 
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bequest to the Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London. In 2002, the Courtauld 
Institute acquired independent legal status. In as far as the legal title of the Courtauld 
Institute to the three drawings is concerned, it is impregnable.  
With regard to the moral issues, the Panel referred to the terms of the 1943 London 
Declaration and the 1998 Washington Declaration. As for the claimants’ position the 
Panel repeated its earlier finding from the case involving the British Museum that the 
claim of the heirs had an unassailable moral strength given the deprivation of the 
drawings by a gross act of spoliation by the Gestapo.1679 With regard to the moral 
position of the Courtauld Institute, the Panel mentioned the fact that there is no 
evidence of any provenance research at the time of acquisition. However, in the light of 
the less rigorous standard at that time and the fact that the drawings were part of an 
enormous bequest the Panel reached the conclusion that it would not be fair to criticise 
the Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London and the present Courtauld Institute 
as its successor.1680  
Having established valid legal title but no moral blame on the side of the Courtauld 
Institute and a claim of unassailable moral strength on behalf of the claimants, the Panel 
then addressed the question of appropriate remedy. Similar to the British Museum case, 
the parties had made a joint request that they would prefer the solution in which the 
drawings remained in the collection of the Courtauld Institute whereas the claimants 
would be offered an ex gratia award. Different from the British Museum case, there 
exists no statutory bar on the disposal of objects from the collection of the Courtauld. 
Consequently, return of the object was also a realistic option and in the end the remedy 
considered most appropriate by the Panel. From the report it appears that the decisive 
reason to decide in favour of restitution and against an ex gratia award was not simply 
the fact that restitution was legally feasible. Instead, the Panel held that the poor quality 
of two of the drawings could not justify the paying of an ex gratia award from the tax 
payers’ money as the public benefit derived from the drawings was negligible. 
Consequently, the Panel recommended restitution as the most appropriate remedy in 
the present case.1681  
g) Three Rubens paintings claimed from the Courtauld Institute of Art1682 
In 2006, the Trustees of the Samuel Courtauld Trust received a claim from Ms 
Christine Koenigs for the return of three oil sketches by Peter Paul Rubens currently in 
the possession of the Courtauld Institute of Art (hereinafter: “the Courtauld”).1683 Ms 
                                                     
1679 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a, para. 21.  
1680 Ibid., para. 22. 
1681 Ibid., paras. 28-29. 
1682 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007b. 
1683 St. Gregory the Great with Ss. Maurus and Papianus and St. Domitilla with Ss. Nereus and Achilleus. 
1606–1607, oil on panel, 62.9 x 46.7 cm; The Conversion of St. Paul, c.1610–1612, oil on panel, 57.4 x 80.2 
cm; The Bounty of James I Triumphing Over Avarice, for the ceiling in the Banqueting House, Whitehall, 
c.1632–1633, oil on panel, 46.2 x 30.8 cm. 
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Koenigs is the granddaughter of Franz W. Koenigs, a German businessman who 
acquired Dutch nationality in 1939. In the beginning of 1940 he lost his art collection of 
Old Master drawings when he was living in the Netherlands. The recommendation of 
the Panel centred on the question whether the loss of the collection was precipitated by 
the Nazi reign or whether it was a loss suffered for commercial reasons. Only in the 
former case could the request of the claimant have any moral strength. In as far as the 
legal title to the oil sketches is concerned the Panel held that the Courtauld’s legal title is 
impregnable.1684 
In evaluating the moral issues of the case, the Panel analysed the following facts: in 
1935 Koenigs lent his collection of Old Master drawings and paintings to the Boymans 
Museum in Rotterdam. The same year he took out a loan from the Lisser & Rosenkranz 
Bank in Hamburg, under an agreement formalising an earlier loan made in 1931. The 
collection of Old Master drawings at the museum was provided as collateral to secure 
the loan. While Koenigs himself was not Jewish, the proprietors of the bank were for 
the most part Jewish. In the face of the Nazi oppression of the Jewish people in 
Germany the bank had moved to the Netherlands. On 2 April 1940, about a month 
before the German invasion of the Netherlands, the Bank went into voluntary 
liquidation and exercised its right to call in the loan. The liquidators contacted the 
Museum with the intention to realise their security by taking possession of the works of 
art, with the knowledge of Koenigs. Part of the collection, including the three oil 
sketches in question, were acquired in May 1940 by Count Antoine Seilern who 
subsequently bequeathed them to the Home House Society in 1978 as part of the 
Princes Gate Bequest.1685 
Having heard the claimant’s case and the response of the Courtauld and having 
sought further expert evidence, the Panel reached the view that the claimant’s 
grandfather was deprived of his art collection as a result of the bank calling in the loan 
and realising its security, rather than by theft, forced sale or by sale at an undervalue. 
The bank had had the right to sell the collection because of the loan agreement entered 
into by Koenigs in 1935, making the loss suffered by Koenigs one of commercial 
reasons and not as result of Nazi spoliation or any form of duress. While the Panel held 
that this finding was already sufficient to resolve the case in the Courtauld’s favour, it 
furthermore held that the claimant could not have a moral claim as there was no 
evidence that Koenigs ever intended to leave his art collection to his heirs.  
Denying the claimant’s case any moral strength and emphasising that no criticism 
attaches to the Courtauld in respect of the manner and circumstances of its acquisition 
                                                     
1684 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007b, para. 32.  
1685 The facts are also discussed in: Koenigs, C.F., 1997; Leistra, J., 1997.  
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of the oil sketches, the Panel issues the recommendation that the claim should be 
rejected.1686  
h) Pieces of porcelain claimed from the British Museum and the Fitzwilliam Museum1687  
In these two cases the claimant, the sole heir of Heinrich Rothberger contested rare 
and distinctive objects of porcelain in the collection of the British Museum and the 
Fitzwilliam Museum.1688 According to the claimant, Mrs Gutmann, the objects had been 
seized by the Gestapo from her uncle’s house in Vienna in 1938. Given the overlap 
between the two cases the Panel decided to consider them jointly.  
The Panel accepted the evidence that the porcelain dish and the monteith formed 
part of Rothberger’s collection prior to 1938 and were amongst the family assets that 
had been seized by the Gestapo in 1938.1689 Due to this clear evidence of spoliation the 
Panel held that the claimant had a strong moral claim both to the porcelain dish in the 
collection of the British Museum and to the monteith in the collection of the Fitzwilliam 
Museum.1690 Both holding institutions were attested impregnable legal title1691 and the 
Panel did not wish to criticise their behaviour at the time of acquisition on moral 
grounds for the fact that the standard of provenance research was raised only recently to 
the current standards.1692  
Despite this great overlap between the cases, the Panel held different remedies 
appropriate. With regard to the porcelain dish in the collection of the British Museum 
the Panel respected the solution that had been jointly proposed by the two parties: to 
award Mrs Gutmann an ex gratia award reflecting the value of the dish to be established 
in the light of independent valuations while the dish remains in the collection of the 
British Museum, which will, whenever the dish is published or exhibited, acknowledge 
that it once belonged to the collection of Heinrich Rothberger and rehearse the 
circumstances of its expropriation and sale by the Nazis, and the generous goodwill of 
the heir of Heinrich Rothberger in agreeing that it should remain in the British 
Museum.1693 The Panel motivated its choice for an ex gratia payment by the fact that 
restitution of the dish is debarred under section 5 of the British Museum Act 1963 and 
that despite its earlier recommendation in the British Library case no action had been 
undertaken to remove the legal bar to de-accession and thus return. In this light and 
                                                     
1686 Cf.: the recommendation of the Dutch Restitutions Committee with regard to the Koenigs Collection: 
Advisory Committee for Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War, 
2003a.  
1687 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008.  
1688 A Viennese (Du Paquier) dish of handpaste porcelain and a Sèvres seau crennelé or monteith used for 
cooling glasses.  
1689 The Rothberger collection is discussed in Sophie Lillie’s book on Vienna’s plundered art collections: 
Lillie, S., 2003, pp. 990-997. 
1690 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008, paras. 13 & 28-29. 
1691 Ibid., paras. 12& 28. 
1692 Ibid., paras. 6& 25.  
1693 Ibid., para. 23 juncto para. 20.  
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given the little likeliness that the law will be changed within due time the Panel held that 
it would not be realistic or fair to the claimant to defer their decision in the present case. 
Consequently, the Panel recommended that the Government should make an ex gratia 
payment of £18,000 to the claimant. The Panel furthermore reflected upon the future 
public benefit of the dish, which legitimised the burdening of the tax payer to fund the 
agreement.  
As to how exactly the Panel arrives at setting the amount of the award, is not clear. 
The report quotes three valuations:  
 
Sotheby’s:  £12-£18,000 (on behalf of the claimant) 
Bonhams:  £16.000 (on behalf of the British Museum) 
Manners:   £20,000 (on behalf of the Panel)  
 
The Panel subsequently states that “taking the three valuations into account, and 
bearing in mind that if the dish had remained in the family’s possession they would 
probably have incurred insurance expenses, we have concluded that a fair valuation is 
£18,000".1694 Not only does the Panel mix up the valuation with the subsequent 
balancing of aspects that must be distracted from the award, such as costs incurred by 
the holding institution which would have otherwise been born by the claimant 
(insurance and conservation cost, selling costs), it is also not clear how the Panel 
decided that £18,000 (or even a higher amount given the Panel already balanced it by 
potential insurance expenses) was the correct valuation. Different from its earlier 
recommendations of an ex gratia award the Panel did not reflect about the setting of the 
amount.1695 
No statutory bar prevented the restitution of the monteith from the collection of the 
Fitzwilliam Museum. Consequently, and in line with the wish of the claimant the Panel 
recommended that restitution is the appropriate remedy.1696 
i) Analysis of the cases and recommendations 
Until the end of 2008, the Panel has made recommendations in nine cases. In seven 
cases the Panel found the claim valid. All seven cases have in common that the holding 
institution had valid legal title and that the claimant had a strong moral claim. In all 
cases, except for the case of the Benevento missal in the possession of the British 
Library, the Panel furthermore held that the holding obligation was under no moral 
obligation, despite the fact that the conduct of some institutions was considered 
regrettable by current standards. However, the Panel decided that the conduct cannot be 
criticised for being in accordance with the less rigorous standards previously applicable. 
With regard to the British Library case, the Panel did criticise the conduct in acquiring 
the missal in the years 1946-1947. Under the circumstances in which the British 
                                                     
1694 Ibid., para. 20. 
1695 Cf.: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b. 
1696 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008, para. 36. 
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Museum [sic] acquired the missal it should have made further attempts to investigate its 
provenance for the possibility that the missal had been spoliated.1697 However, with 
regard to the remedy accorded, the absence of any moral obligation or criticism in the 
majority of the cases proved immaterial. Presumably, the criticism of a holding 
institution on moral grounds would matter in cases where the Panel would decide 
between compensation to be borne by the museum itself and an ex gratia award paid by 
the Government. In the case of the Benevento Missal the criticism of the British 
Museum’s behaviour did not have any measurable effect, except for the public naming 
and shaming, in that the Panel decided for restitution.  
In four of the cases in which the Panel had upheld the claim, it recommended that 
the claimed object should be returned to the claimant: in the case involving a painting 
previously attributed to Chardin in the possession of Glasgow City Council; in the case 
of the Beneventan Missal in the collection of the British Library; in the case of three 
drawings now in the possession of the Courtauld Institute of Art, and finally in the case 
of a piece of porcelain now in the possession of the Fitzwilliam Museum. The fact that 
the Panel recommended the return of the objects does not necessarily mean that the 
holding institutions are legally able to do so. In fact, only the Courtauld Institute of Art 
and the Fitzwilliam Museum are presently able to live up to the recommendation of the 
Panel. The Glasgow City Council and the British Library are debarred from returning 
the objects concerned for reasons of contractual terms of a donation agreement, 
respectively statutory provisions.1698  
In the other three cases where the Panel upheld the claim, it awarded an ex gratia 
payment: the case of a painting now in the possession of the Tate Gallery; the case of 
four drawings now in the possession of the British Museum and in respect of a piece of 
porcelain now in the possession of the British Museum. Compensation in the legal sense 
was not considered a just and fair solution seeing that the claimants did not have a legal 
claim. Different from compensation to be borne by the holding institution an ex gratia 
payment is paid by the Government, i.e. by the tax payers’ money. In two of the cases 
the Panel carefully calculated the amount of the ex gratia award on the basis of the 
current market value of the painting, deducted by the costs borne by the holding 
institution for insurance, restoration, safekeeping etc. The amount is furthermore 
balanced by the benefit derived by the holding institution from possessing and 
exhibiting it. In the case of the porcelain dish in the possession of the British Museum 
the Panel’s calculation of the award was less thoroughly motivated.  
With regard to the painting in the Tate Gallery and the piece of porcelain from the 
British Museum collection the recommendation furthermore stipulated that future 
                                                     
1697 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005, para. 69.61-62. The missal was originally acquired by the British 
Museum in 1947 and was transferred to the British Library on the latter’s foundation under the terms of the 
British Library Act 1972.  
1698 The developments in order to broaden the power of national museums to allow for disposal in cases 
involving Nazi spoliated artworks will be discussed in chp. 4.§1.II.2.  
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exhibition of the object should be accompanied by a display commemorating the 
object’s history and provenance during and since the Nazi era. As to why such a 
commemorative agreement was not considered or recommended in the British Museum 
case is not known but regrettable. Commemorative plaques are a powerful reminder and 
instructor to the general public of the story of those who suffered at the hands of the 
Nazis.1699 
In comparing the four cases where the Panel considered restitution an appropriate 
solution with the three cases in which the Panel recommended ex gratia payment it is 
interesting to pose the question whether one can detect a pattern as to which aspects are 
decisive for the panel’s choice of recommendation. Given the fact that the Panel opted 
for restitution in two cases where the holding institutions were (and still are) legally 
debarred from disposing of the object the legal feasibility is not decisive. Where the 
claiming party seeks restitution and the Panel upheld the claim it has always 
recommended the restitution of the object concerned. The Panel has only opted for an 
ex gratia payment in those cases where the claiming party had indicated that it would 
prefer or accept financial compensation. However, the Panel does not automatically 
recommend an ex gratia payment where the claiming party asks for it. In two cases, 
concerning the drawings from the Feldmann collection in the collection of the 
Courtauld Institute and the ‘Still Life’ attributed to Chardin in the collection of the 
Glasgow City Council, the Panel decided against the claimant’s wish to endorse an ex 
gratia payment. In the case of the Feldmann drawings, the following two aspects were 
decisive in the Penal’s decision to recommend restitution rather then an ex gratia 
payment: the fact that restitution was not legally debarred and the quality of the drawing 
could not justify the burdening of the tax payer for the payment of an ex gratia award for 
the public benefit derived from the drawings was too minimal.1700 In this respect the 
case of the Feldmann drawings in the Courtauld Institute diametrically opposes the 
constellation in the case of the porcelain dish from the Rothberger collection, now in 
the collection of the British Museum: in the latter case the Penal listed the following 
reasons for deciding in favour of an ex gratia payment: first, that the restitution of the 
porcelain dish was legally debarred and that for this reason the claimant preferred 
compensation of restitution and secondly, that the object was of considerable 
importance for the collection of the British Museum, which justified the reliance on 
public money. 
In the case involving the ‘Still Life’ in the collection of the Glasgow City Council, the 
argumentation of the Panel as to why it preferred restitution over financial 
compensation is less apparent. The Panel listed the following aspects as speaking against 
an ex gratia payment: first, the discrepancy in value between 1936 when the painting 
realised a generous price as a genuine Chardin and the current market value as an 
attributed work. Secondly, the Panel refers to the compensation payments received from 
                                                     
1699 Messer, K., 1008, p. 19. 
1700 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a, paras. 28-29.  
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the German Government and states that while it would be prepared to disregard the 
“tiny fraction” received, it would need to make allowance for the expenses (insurance 
and conservation) which the claimants would have incurred had they retained 
possession. Consequently, the amount of an ex gratia payment would be restricted to an 
amount representative of the claimants’ loss of their right of disposal plus some 
allowance in recognition of the public benefit derived from the painting having been 
exhibited all these years. The Panel concludes that it would not “shrink from proposing 
a figure if this were the only course available, we doubt whether such an assessment 
would seem fair to either side”.1701 Unfortunately, the Panel does not elaborate upon its 
doubts as why such an assessment would not be fair and why in the given situation 
restitution was fairer to both sides than a financial compensation taking account of the 
facts that the 1936 sale did fetch a generous price (especially if one takes into account 
that the painting is currently no longer accepted as a genuine work by Chardin) and the 
original owners had received some compensation from the German Government for 
the loss based on the 1936 sales price. 
Leaving out the reasoning of the Panel in the case of the attributed Still Life the 
following pattern in the hierarchy of remedies emerges (provided of course that the 
Panel upholds a claim and that there exists no legal claim): where the claimant seeks 
restitution the Panel will recommend restitution regardless of the current legal feasibility 
of the object’s disposal.1702 The Panel will also recommend restitution – even against the 
preference of the claimants and the holding institution - where the quality of an object 
cannot justify the reliance on public money. However, where the quality of an object can 
justify the payment of an ex gratia payment for being of sufficient public benefit and the 
claimant prefers or accepts payment instead of restitution the Panel will recommend an 
ex gratia payment.  
In two cases, the Panel recommended to reject the claim: the case of a painting held 
by the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford and the case of three Rubens paintings now in 
the possession of the Courtauld Institute of Art. In both cases the Panel reached the 
conclusion that the loss of the artwork concerned was for commercial reasons and not 
precipitated by the Nazi reign. The cases, especially the Koenigs case, are an indication 
of the difficulty of where to draw the line. In the case of the Benevento missal in the 
collection of the British Library the Panel had adopted a very lenient approach in 
accepting that the loss of an object was precipitated by the Nazi regime. In the cases of 
Goldschmidt and Koenigs, it held that it would involve too many speculative steps to 
consider what would have happened had the Weimar Republic continued in existence 
(such as the questions what would have happened if proprietors of the bank where 
Koenigs had taken out the loan had not been Jewish or whether the bank not have gone 
                                                     
1701 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 28.  
1702 See below on the discussion of the Panel’s general recommendation to the Secretary of State to amend 
legislation to allow for disposal in restitution cases and its increasing frustration about the long period of 
inactivity.  
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into voluntary liquidation just before the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands and would it 
not have exercised its right to call in the loan). 
Having analysed the cases in which the Panel has issued recommendations we can 
now turn to the question how the Panel has used the margin of appreciation it is granted 
as to what constitutes “moral strength of the claimant's case” and “moral obligations” 
that may rest on a holding institution. As explained above, the Panel’s Constitution and 
Terms of Reference do not further explicate these notions.  
In further defining its moral framework, the Panel chose to refer to the following 
instruments: the 1943 London Declaration or in full the ‘Inter-Allied Declaration against 
Acts of Dispossession committed in territories under Enemy Occupation or Control’; 
the restitution principles adopted by the Allied Forces after the war, the National 
Museum Directors’ Conference’s (NMDC) 'Statement of Principles and Proposed 
Action' and the 1998 Washington Declaration. According to the London Declaration, 
which we discussed in detail in Chapter 1 (§1.V), the signatory countries had the right to 
declare invalid any transaction within an occupied territory, regardless of the 
circumstances of the transaction.1703 With regard to the possibly affected transactions 
the London Declaration adopted a broad approach ranging from outright confiscations, 
to forced sales, forced donations and abandonments.1704 The London Declaration is 
referred to in all cases where the Panel upheld the claim, except in the recommendation 
concerning the ‘Still Life’ in the collection of the Glasgow City Council, presumably for 
the reason that the loss had occurred within Germany rather than in an occupied 
territory, and as such does not fall under the scope of the London Declaration. Instead, 
in this case the Panel referred to the restitution principles adopted by the Allied Forces 
after the war with regard to the restoration of rights within Germany. The principles 
were based on the presumption that all transactions made in the period 1933-1945 by a 
person belonging to a persecuted group qualify as an act of confiscation. Only if positive 
evidence was provided according to which the transfer would also have taken place in 
the absence of National Socialism or resulted in the successful protection of a property 
interest of the original owner could the presumption be refuted.1705  
The NMDC Statement of Principles is only referred to in the case of the Benevento 
Missal. Why the Panel chose to refer to the NMDC Statement of Principles is not so 
evident at first sight. While it stresses that the associated institutions share the concern 
for Nazi spoliated art and call for transparency and dialogue, it recognises the legal 
                                                     
1703 The London Declaration refers to “any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and interests of 
any description whatsoever which are, or have been situated in the territories which have come under the 
occupation or control, direct or indirect, of the Governments with which they are at war, or which belong, 
or have belonged to persons (including juridical persons) resident in such territories”. The London 
Declaration is not numbered; hence no specific reference to the quoted passage can be given. 
1704 Cf.: Schwarz, W., 1974, p. 15.  
1705 See further on the Allied restitution principles above in chp. 1.§4.  
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framework, including legal obstacles to disposal.1706 However, the Statement of 
Principles also states that “for the purposes of interpreting this document, wrongful 
taking shall mean any act of theft or other deprivation, the legality of which is open to 
reasonable challenge, and which was committed during the Holocaust and World War II 
period”. Another reason for the Panel to explicitly refer to the NMDC Statement of 
Principles could have been that in 2000, under the auspices of the NMDC, the British 
Library published a “List of works with incomplete provenance during the period 1933 
to 1945”, which includes the missal. The entry significantly states that “the manuscript 
was not identified directly by research, but may have been spoliated during the Nazi 
period”.1707  
The 1998 Washington Declaration, which we discussed in detail in Chapter 2 
(§1.III.1) has been explicitly referred to since the case of the Feldmann drawings in the 
British Museum. However, the Panel limited itself to pointing out that the declaration 
“stresses the need to achieve a just and fair solution”.1708 For the sake of completeness it 
should be mentioned that the 1998 Washington Declaration had been annexed to all 
earlier recommendations. 
While the Panel essentially limited itself to referring to or quoting a relevant passage 
from these documents, we can conclude from these references that the Panel wishes to 
apply a very broad notion as to transactions that may qualify for a remedy and that it 
will work with the presumption that all transactions made in the period 1933-1945 by a 
person belonging to a persecuted group qualify as an act of confiscation. From the 
analysis of the recommendations it becomes evident that the Panel recognises the 
existence of a moral claim in all cases where there existed a legal right that is no longer 
enforceable. In the understanding of the Panel, moral rights mirror legal claims as they 
existed after the war with the crucial difference that the moral claim is not subject to the 
lapse of limitation periods. Where a loss is not precipitated by demands of the Nazi 
regime but by commercial reasons, no moral force is recognised.1709 
It must be admitted that the decision of the Panel to accept a moral claim on behalf 
of the City of Benevento for the return of the missal is difficult to fit into this 
dichotomy for the circumstances of the loss of the manuscript are not clear. Regardless 
of that, the Panel accepted as “central pillar of their case” vindicating their moral claim 
for the manuscript’s return the claimants’ argumentation that as an object of war time 
looting, the subsequent acquisition of the manuscript by the English captain in Naples 
in 1943 was both unlawful and immoral, and falls within the scope of the 1943 London 
Declaration.1710 While one could argue that the Panel applied the presumption of war-
                                                     
1706 See in particular principles 2. 4; 2.5; 2.6 and 5.4 of the National Museum Directors' Conference 
(NMDC), 1998. Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 27. See for a more detailed discussion of the 'Statement of 
Principles and Proposed Action’: Range, D., 2004, pp. 665-667. 
1707 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005, p. 62.  
1708 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b, para. 33. 
1709 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006a, paras. 42 & 48 (vii).  
1710 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005, paras. 63 & 66.63..  
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   364 12-10-2009   12:09:25
S O L U T I O N S  F O R  R E T U R N  A D O P T E D  A T  T H E  N A T I O N A L  L E V E L  |  365   
 
  
related loss to the Chapter Library, despite not belonging to the group of persecuted 
people, we cannot but conclude that the Panel might have overstretched its mandate in 
this case: 1711 the finding that the loss falls within the scope of the 1943 London 
Declaration is not correct in that the London Declaration warned the Axis powers and 
neutral countries that the signatory countries had the right to declare invalid any 
transaction within an occupied territory, regardless of the circumstances of the transaction 
(emphasis added). Italy was not an occupied territory but instead belonged to the Axis 
Powers.  
Interestingly, the assessment of the moral strength of a claim is limited to the 
circumstances of loss in the years 1933-1945 and does not pay any regard to the 
developments in the post-war era. As outlined in Chapter 1 (§1.V / §4), both the Allied 
Forces and Germany undertook great efforts with regard to external and internal 
restitution. The analysis revealed that where physical restitution was not an available 
option for the cultural object either being destroyed or lost, financial compensation was 
paid. Compensation for lost property was calculated according to the estimated 
replacement value at the time the compensation was granted.1712 While it would be naïve 
to assume that compensation has been paid in each case where physical restitution was 
not available, always corresponded to the market value or in all cases effectively reached 
the claimant, it is nevertheless a fact one could expect to be included in the discussion of 
what constitutes just and fair solutions. After all, compensation is paid with the 
intention to compensate the original owner for the loss. While one could argue that only 
physical restitution can remedy the loss of an art work, this is not the point of view 
adopted by the Panel, which recommended also ex gratia awards. Consequently, financial 
compensation is accepted as a form of “full and final settlement of claim”.1713 If 
financial compensation awarded by the Panel is accepted as settling a claim, logic 
dictates that financial compensation received during the post-war period should also be 
taken into account. Unfortunately, the Panel has so far not reflected upon the relevance 
of compensation received in the past more in general. However, from the analysis of the 
Panel’s recommendation it appears that financial compensation received in the past is 
considered of little relevance. 
                                                     
1711 See in this respect also the Consultation document discussed further below (chp. 4.§1.II.2) on the 
introduction of legislation allowing for the disposal of objects spoliated in the Nazi era from national 
museums. DCMS also identifies the case of the Beneventan Missal as problematic as it would not fall under 
the definition of loss according to which it would be necessary for the claimants to demonstrate that the 
circumstances surrounding the loss were caused by the actions of the Nazis in the relevant period. DCMS 
mentions the option of introducing a separate provision to allow for the disposal of the missal. Department 
for Culture Media and Sport, 2006a, paras. 3.18-13.19. 
1712 According to the BRüG, which was in particular relevant for those claims dealing with property that no 
longer existed or which had disappeared from either within or outside the German territory compensation 
for lost property was calculated according to the estimated replacement value as of April 1, 1956. See 
further on the BRüG above in chp. 1.§.4.IV.   
1713 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, s 8. 
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The aspect of financial compensation during the post war era was mentioned in three 
cases heard by the Panel.1714 In the case of the Griffier painting in the collection of the 
Tate Gallery and in the case of the ‘Still Life’ in the collection of the Glasgow City 
Council the Panel’s reports mention that the original owner(s) of the painting had 
sought and been awarded compensation. In the case of the Griffier painting the Panel 
did not further investigate the compensation files, but was satisfied with the information 
that “the claim files do not make any reference to the Griffier painting”.1715 In respect of 
the ‘Still Life’ formerly attributed to Chardin the Panel mentioned the fact that the 
Jewish shareholders had been paid DM 75,000 by the German Government as 
compensation for their loss on the sale. The Panel remarks that it had been informed 
that the sum received represented an overall payment for the entire loss of which only a 
fraction would be attributable to the painting and does not further reflect upon whether 
or not and if so to what extent such compensation should be taken into account in 
formulating just and fair solutions.1716 In two further cases the report suggests that the 
victimised family sought compensation after the war: the cases of the drawings from the 
Feldmann collection that were claimed from the British Museum respectively the 
Courtauld Institute.1717 However, the report does not further elaborate whether the 
claim was awarded and if so whether it included the drawings.  
As for the cases in which no mention of past compensation payments was, we 
cannot exclude the possiblity that the claimants in the other cases might have received 
some form of financial compensation after the war. In order to establish this, a detailed 
analysis of the relevant archives, including the archives holding the files dealing with the 
restoration of rights under the German Federal Restitution Law BRüG, would be 
required.  
Having discussed the fact that the moral strength of a claimant’s case depends 
exclusively on the circumstances of loss in the period 1933-1945, we can now 
summarise how the Panel determines whether a holding institution is under any moral 
obligation. It appears from the recommendations that the moral obligation of the 
holding institution also focuses on the past, i.e. the moment when the institution 
                                                     
1714 After the main research of this study was closed in the beginning of June 2009, the Panel has issued its 
9th report, in which the Panel did take financial compensation payments received after the war into account. 
Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2009. According to the Panel, while the predominant reason for the sale of eight 
drawings now in the collection of the Courtauld Institute of Art in London in 1933 by the owner, Professor 
Dr Curt Glaser, was Nazi oppression, the moral claim was insufficiently strong to warrant the transfer of 
the drawings. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel took account of the fact that the sale prices achieved at 
the time were reasonable and that Dr Glaser’s widow had received compensation from the German 
compensation authorities after the War. See further on the case in the epilogue. 
1715 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001, paras. 8-9. 
1716 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 24.  
1717 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b, para. 19; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2007a, para. 10: “Heinrich 
Rosorius, the Nazi-appointed Trustee of the Feldmann estate, gave evidence in a compensation claim made 
in Germany that, when he took over in 1940 or 1941, the Gestapo had seized everything other than the villa 
itself and a briefcase containing some artistic drawings. Otherwise there is no evidence of the whereabouts 
of the collection until after the war”.  
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acquired the object. Depending on the circumstances of acquisition and the knowledge 
of the object’s provenance at that moment in time, the Panel judges whether the 
institution lived up to the then applicable standards. In applying the standards the panel 
adopted a pragmatic account, taking into account also the amount of objects to be 
checked where the acquisition consisted of a greater group of objects (donation 
/bequest) and the resources available. Where the institution’s provenance research failed 
to meet the applicable standards at the time of the acquisition, it is held to be under a 
moral obligation. Where an institution is held to be under no moral obligation, this does 
not mean that the institution will not have to return the disputed object concerned. 
Where the Panel accepts a moral claim on behalf of the claimant the object concerned 
will either be returned or the claimant will receive a financial payment. The question 
whether the institution is under any moral obligation is only relevant where the Panel 
has to decide upon the question who has to bear the costs of financial compensation. 
Where the museum is held to be under no moral obligation the Panel might opt for an 
ex gratia payment borne by the Government.  
2.  CH A N G I N G  T H E  L A W  T O  EX T EN D  T H E  P O S S IB I L I T Y  F O R  M US E U M S  T O  D I S P O S E  O F  
O B J E C T S  T H A T  H A V E  B E EN  L O S T  D U R I N G  T H E  NA Z I  E RA?   
 In five of the nine cases in which the Panel was asked to give a recommendation 
it was confronted with the situation that restitution was legally barred.1718 In the majority 
of cases the disposal of the disputed objects was prevented by statutory rules. Only in 
one case disposal was prevented by contractual impediments.1719 In fact, the need to 
broaden the power of national museums to allow for disposal in cases involving Nazi 
spoliated artworks had been pointed out by the UK Parliament at several occasions 
since 2000. In 2000, the Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport of the House of 
Commons concluded that the case for special treatment for cases of alleged wrongful 
taking during the period 1933 to 1945 had been convincingly established and that it 
would be absurd if restitution were not possible due to the dilatoriness of Ministers in 
DCMS.1720 At that point the Government thought about bringing legislation forward by 
an order under the Regulatory Reform Bill.1721 However, in 2003 during a follow up 
inquiry of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee of the British House of Commons it 
was recognised in dismay that no such order had been passed.1722 At that point the 
Government considered the need for legislative change to have evaporated. The 
                                                     
1718 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005; 
Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2006b; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008. 
1719 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2004, para. 22.  
1720 Seventh Report of Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Session 1999–2000, Cultural property: return and 
illicit trade, HC 371, para. 193. 
1721 Cf.: Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence Examination of Witnesses 
(Questions 320-329), Q322 (Chairman). 
1722 First Report of Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Session 2003–04: Cultural objects: developments 
since 2000, December 2003 HC 59, paras. 59–62. 
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expected flood of claims had not materialised and the Secretary of State had “come to 
rest on the absence of a recommendation of the Panel that its powers were inadequate 
to the task before them”.1723 
While the Secretary of State was correct in that the Panel had not made use of its 
power according to section 14 of its Terms of Reference to “recommend any action 
which they consider appropriate, and in particular (…) direct the attention of the 
Secretary of State to the need for legislation to alter the powers and duties of any 
institution” until 2003, the Panel did make such a recommendation two years later. In 
2005, in its recommendation concerning the Benevento Missal in the collection of the 
British Museum, the Panel recommended to the Secretary of State that legislation should 
be introduced to amend the British Museum Act 1963, the British Library Act 1972, and 
the Museums and Galleries Act 1992 so as to permit restitution of objects in this 
particular category.1724 
In July 2006, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) launched a 
consultation inviting views on how far a power to make restitution of objects lost during 
the Nazi era should extend, who should be responsible for taking decisions on 
restitution, and what continuing role the Panel should have.1725 One of the conclusions 
of the consultation was that there is great support for removing the statutory restrictions 
that stop museums from de-accessioning works of art lost during the Nazi era. 
In response to the consultation, the UK government was planning on implementing 
legislation allowing for the disposal of Nazi spoliated artworks under moral grounds, 
claiming that “the Government are committed to introducing legislation as soon as 
possible to allow all national museums, that are currently prevented from doing so by 
the acts of parliament under which they are founded, to return works of art spoliated 
during the Nazi era.”1726 The legislation was supposed to be a component of the 
Heritage Protection Bill. The Heritage Protection Bill was supposed to introduce a 
legislative framework for a unified and simpler heritage protection system. A draft of the 
Heritage Proctection Bill was published in April 2008. However, the draft was dropped 
in December 2008, apparently for the emergence of new priorities with the turbulence 
in the financial markets.1727  
After the Heritage Protection Bill was dropped, the initiative to introduce legislation 
that allows for the de-accessioning of cultural objects from museums that are presently 
prevented from doing so was taken over by a Member of Parliament in the form of a 
                                                     
1723 Cf.: Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence Examination of Witnesses 
(Questions 320-329), Q321. 
1724 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2005, para. 77: “(…) we have come to the conclusion that it would be right 
to accede to the invitation of the Select Committee, and to recommend to the Secretary of State that 
legislation should be introduced to amend the British Museum Act 1963, the British Library Act 1972, and 
the Museums and Galleries Act 1992 so as to permit restitution of objects in this particular category”. 
1725 Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2006a. 
1726 Copping, J., 18 October 2008.  
1727 See, e.g.: http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/server/show/nav.20038 (last visited 18 May 2009).  
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Private Member's bill.1728 The aim of the draft of this Holocaust (Stolen Art) Restitution 
Bill is to enable specified national museums to remove cultural objects spoliated 
between 1933 and 1945 from their collections and to return them to claimants when the 
return is recommended by an advisory body established by the Secretary of State and 
when the Secretary of State accepts that body’s recommendation. Such an advisory body 
already exists in the shape of the Panel. The power to de-accession objects would apply 
only to those cases in which the Panel upheld the claim and recommended the return of 
the object, and in which the Secretary of State had accepted that recommendation. The 
Bill would not prescribe any return but would allow for de-accession with the final 
decision remaining with the museum trustees.  
The Bill was presented to Parliament on 26 January 2009 for a First Reading. During 
a Second Reading on 15 May 2009 no Member of Parliament opposed it. 1729 On 24 
June 2009, the Government confirmed its backing for the Bill. The Bill is due to have its 
3rd Reading and Report Stage in the Commons, where it was introduced, on Friday 26 
June 2009. Given the Government support it is not unfeasible that the Bill will be 
adopted, thus finally enabling the national museums to remove cultural objects spoliated 
between 1933 and 1945 from their collections and to return them to claimants when the 
return is recommended by an advisory body established by the Secretary of State. 
3.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  T H E  UN IT E D  K I N G DO M 
 In the present section we have described the introduction of the Panel as an out 
of court mechanism to hear claims concerning objects lost during the Nazi reign. The 
Panel may make recommendations concerning objects in the possession of a UK 
national collection or in the possession of another UK museum or gallery established 
for the public benefit. Furthermore, the Panel may also make recommendations to 
private parties where both parties agree to the jurisdiction of the Panel (effectively 
committing themselves). In order to get a better understanding of the Panel’s decision-
making framework, in particular of the non-legal obligations to be taken into account, 
we took an inductive approach starting from the cases and recommendations of the 
Panel. 
Our analysis revealed with regard to the timeframe/ situation of loss scrutinised by 
the Panel that it may assess all cases in which the loss of a cultural object occured during 
the years 1933-1945 and was to some extent precipitated by the Nazi reign. Where a 
transaction was the result of an economic situation, which had manifested itself prior to 
the year 1931, the Panel refused to recognise that the loss was precipitated by the Nazi 
reign. Furthermore, the assessment of the moral strength of a claim by the Panel does 
                                                     
1728 http://www.andrewdismoremp.com/uploads/3b30f5fe-4d99-49d4-c97f-c9a974611bc7.pdf (last visited 
18 May 2009). See further on private Members’ bills:  
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/private_members.cfm (last visited 28 May 2009). 
1729 http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2008-09/holocauststolenartrestitution.html (last visited 18 May 
2009). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   369 12-10-2009   12:09:26
370  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
not take into account the developments in the post-war era. Consequently, financial 
compensation received by claimants at an earlier stage is not taken into account when 
assessing the validity of a (moral) claim or the remedy to be accorded.  
With regard to the balancing of the moral strength of a claim and the moral 
obligations that may rest on an institution, the analysis revealed that the crucial aspect is 
the moral strength of a claimant’s case. Where the Panel accepts a moral claim on behalf 
of the claimant the object concerned will either be returned or the claimant will receive a 
financial payment, irrespective of whether or not the institution is found to have a moral 
obligation. An institution is held to be under a moral obligation when its provenance 
research at the time of acquisition did not live up to the standards applicable at that 
time. The question whether the institution has a moral obligation, is however relevant in 
view of the remedy chosen by the Panel.  
The analysis of the remedies applied by the Panel revealed a preference of physical 
restitution of the object over compensation payments borne by the museum or the 
Government. The only situation where the Panel will decide against physical restitution 
(leaving aside rejected claims) is where the claimant explicitly opted for financial 
compensation and the object concerned is of sufficient quality and relevance to justify 
expenses by the institution or the Government. It is only in those cases where the 
museum is held to be under no moral obligation the Panel might opt for an ex gratia 
payment borne by the Government.  
The emphasis on physical restitution has in a number of cases led to the situation 
that the remedy could not be provided for being prohibited in law. Whether the law, 
preventing the national museums from de-accessioning objects from their collections, 
will be changed in the near future, remains to be seen. Presently, all hopes are set on a 
Private Member’s Bill. Should the bill fail, a slot would need to be found in the 
legislative programme of the Government. In any event, the legal changes as foreseen 
will not be compelling in nature; they would be limited to allowing for the 
implementation of the remedies as recommended by the Panel.  
I I I .  FR A N C E 
 The investigation of the spoliation of Jewish people during World War II in 
France were triggered in particular by the publication of Hector Feliciano’s book ‘Le 
musée disparu’ in 1995 criticising France’s covert management of artworks spoliated by 
the Nazis.1730 The same year, the French Government took responsibility for the 
deportation of French Jews by the Vichy regime during World War II.1731 Also, at the 
end of 1995 a report by the French audit office (Cour des Comptes) criticised the 
French state and museum curators of failing to adequately publicise the existence of 
                                                     
1730 Feliciano, H., 1995. In 1997, an English translation was published: Feliciano, H., 1997.  
1731 Chirac, J., 1995. Cf.: Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, p. 135; Hershkovitch, C., 2006, p. 444. 
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artworks recuperated after the war and to draw up a proper inventory.1732 In reaction to 
these developments, on 5 February 1997, the French Prime Minister established a 
committee with the task of: 
 
“study[ing] the conditions in which movable and immovable property belonging to French Jews was 
confiscated, or more generally, obtained by fraud, under duress, or by misrepresentation, or by the 
occupying force as well as by the Vichy government, between 1940 and 1944”.1733  
 
The ‘Study Mission on the Spoliation of Jews in France’ is also known as the 
‘Mattéoli Committee’, in reference to its chairman.1734 
1.  TH E  MA T T É O L I  CO M M I T T E E  
 In order to carry out its task the ‘Mattéoli Committee’ set up nine specialised 
study groups. One of the sub-groups focused on the looting of artworks (hereinafter: 
the ‘Artworks Sub-Committee’).1735 This Artworks Sub-Committee studied the history 
and provenance of those artworks that had been recovered by France after the war and 
that were still under the custody of the French Museums.1736 This collection of works of 
art is known as Musées Nationaux Récupération (MNR). 
The Artworks Sub-Committee established that after the war a total of 61,233 
artworks had been recovered by France from the more than 100,000 artworks that had 
been spoliated during the occupation.1737 Put differently, almost 40,000 works had not 
been recovered after the war. Of the recovered works 74%, i.e. 45,441 artworks had 
been returned to their original owners or their heirs by 1950.1738 With regard to the 
approximately museums remaining artworks a selection committee was appointed in 
1949 to decide upon which of these artworks were of sufficient relevance and quality to 
be kept under French custody and which objects were to be sold.1739 Given the scarcity 
of sources documenting the work of this committee the criteria of the selection process 
                                                     
1732 Troisième Chambre de la Cour des Comptes, 1995. Cf.: Lichfield, J., 28 January 1997; Falconer, K.A., 
2000, pp. 419-420. 
1733 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, p. 8. 
1734 In French: la Commission pour l’indemnisation des victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des 
législations antisémites en vigueur pendant l’Occupation.  
1735 Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 150. 
1736 Le Masne de Chermont, I. / Schulmann, D., 2000. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 150. 
1737 Le Masne de Chermont, I. / Schulmann, D., 2000, p. 34. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 151; Hershkovitch, 
C., 2006, p. 443. The figures were confirmed by JP Bady in his presentation on 'The Policy of 
Compensation for Plundered Works of Art in France', London 18 October 2006, at the Conference on 
Dispute resolution and holocaust related art claims organised by the Institute of Art and Law. JP Bady is a 
member of the CIVS. 
1738 Cf.: Ruzié, D., 2004, www.civs.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Livret_Ruzie_avril_07.pdf (originally published in: 
Liberté, justice, tolérance - Mélanges en l'honneur du Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan (pp.1351-1370); 
Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 140. 
1739 Décret n° 49-1344 du 30 septembre 1949 relatif à la fin des opérations de la commission de 
récupération artistique (Journal officiel du 02.10.1949). Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 152. 
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could not be retraced by the Artworks Sub-Committee.1740 From the roughly 16,000 
objects, the selection committee selected less than 14% (2,143 objects) to be kept under 
French custody. After having been exhibited from 1950-1954 in the National Museum 
of the Chateau de Compiègne, these artworks were spread over French museums where 
only their label on the stretcher ‘MNR’ as acronyum for Musées Nationaux Récupération 
identifies them as belonging to the collection of artworks recuperated after the war. The 
objects did, however, remain listed in the MNR inventory and did not become the 
property of the holding museums.1741 By decree, the museums were appointed to be 
“precarious holders” of the art works given into their custody, with the responsibility to 
preserve and exhibit them and to assist dispossessed collectors.1742 The 14,043 artworks 
that were considered of insufficient relevance or quality were auctioned off by the State 
Property Office.1743  
As a result of the research of the Artworks Sub-Committee, whose main task it was 
to establish the provenance of each artwork of the MNR collection, 32 objects were 
returned to the (heirs of the) former owners.1744 The objects that could not be returned 
on the basis of the research of the Artworks Sub-Committee remained in the MNR 
Collection subject to supervision by the Directorate of the Musées de France. In view of 
future decisions to be taken for these artworks the Artworks Sub-Committee divided 
the works into three categories: first, objects for which there exist proof beyond 
reasonable doubt that they were spoliated by the Nazis. This category is the smallest one 
comprising only 10% of the objects from the MNR collection. The second and largest 
category consists of objects that had been bought by Germans on the Parisian art 
market. According to the research of the Artworks Sub-Committee this category 
accounts for 65% of the objects now in the MNR collection. The final category 
consisted of those remaining 25% of objects whose provenance and circumstances of 
loss could not be established.1745  
The Artworks Sub-Committee did not make further recommendations as to future 
measures to be taken with regard to these three categories but left this to the Mattéoli 
Mission. Also, and in accordance with its mandate to focus on objects in the MNR 
Collection, the Artworks Sub-Committee did not elaborate upon the approximately 
                                                     
1740 Le Masne de Chermont, I. / Schulmann, D., 2000, p. 37. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 152. 
1741 Cf.: Country Reports of the conference "Spoils of War and Restitutions. The Destiny of French Works 
of Art During the Second World War", Paris, 17 November 1996, http://www.dhh-
3.de/biblio/bremen/sow3/crfrance.htm; Bourlet, M., 1997, pp. 113-114; Feliciano, H., 1997, pp. 214 & 
218-219; Falconer, K.A., 2000, p. 419.  
1742 Décret n° 49-1344 du 30 septembre 1949 relatif à la fin des opérations de la commission de 
récupération artistique (Journal officiel du 02.10.1949). Cf.: Falconer, K.A., 2000, p. 419 
1743 Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 152. 
1744 Cf.: Ibid., p. 153. See for a list of all objects that have been returned from the MNR Collection until 
June 2009:  
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/public/mistral/mnrbis_fr?ACTION=CHERCHER&FIELD_4=LOCA&VA
LUE_4=Restitu%e9&DOM=All&REL_SPECIFIC=1 (last visited 25 June 2009).  
1745 Le Masne de Chermont, I. / Schulmann, D., 2000, pp. 60-69. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 153.  
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40,000 artworks that had not been recovered after the war and whose present locations 
are unknown. This category of spoliated artworks was, however, addressed in the final 
report of the Mattéoli Mission discussed in the following section. 
2.  TH E  R E P O R T S  T O  T H E  PR I M E MI N I S T E R 
 The Mattéoli Mission issued two interim reports in December 1997 respectively 
February 1999 before publishing its final report in April 2000.1746 In its second interim 
report the Mattéoli Mission proposed the creation of an indemnification commission do 
deal with financial wrongs that had not yet been addressed.1747 
In its final report the Mattéoli Mission made nineteen recommendations on the 
future course of restoration of rights in France. The recommendations deal with the 
following aspects: access to and preservation of archives (recommendations no. 1-4), 
subjects on which future research is required (recommendations no. 5-7), the assessment 
of individual claims (recommendations no. 8-10), the establishment of a memorial 
foundation (recommendations no. 11-12), artworks (recommendations no. 13-17), as 
well as bank accounts and insurance policies (recommendations no. 18-19).1748 
Further to recommendations 13-17 dealing specifically with artworks (mainly objects 
in the MNR Collection and to a lesser extent with artworks that had not been recovered 
and whose present locations are unknown), the recommendations dealing with archives, 
future research and the assessment of individual claims are also relevant for the 
treatment of claims dealing with spoliated art. In the following we will discuss the 
relevant principles starting with the more general ones. 
With regard to archives, the Mattéoli Mission pleaded for better access to and 
indexing of public and private archives.1749 Furthermore, in view of future research, the 
Mattéoli Mission stated the necessity of taking measures for the conservation of archival 
sources and of preserving its own research findings.1750 As to subjects requiring further 
research the Mattéoli Mission pointed to the provenance of artworks in the collections 
of the Musées de France. While the Mattéoli Mission recognised that much work had been 
undertaken in identifying works, whose provenance did not rule out the possibility of 
having been spoliated, it argued for continuation of this research.1751 Such research 
could not only contribute to identifying former owners of objects from the MNR 
Collection but could also result in the identification of artworks that had never been 
officially recovered by France but that had nevertheless found their way into the 
collections of the Musées de France.  
                                                     
1746 Cf.: Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, pp. 135-136. 
1747 Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France: rapport d'étape: janvier - décembre 1998, 1999. 
Cf.: Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, pp. 135-136. 
1748 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, pp. 168-173. 
1749 Ibid., Recommandation n° 1, p. 168. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 156. 
1750 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, Recommandation n° 2-4, p. 168-169. 
1751 Ibid., Recommandation n° 5, p. 169. 
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In light of the special situation of artworks from the MNR Collection compared to 
other spoliated objects or artworks whose present locations are unknown, the Mattéoli 
Mission issued a number of specific recommendations: artworks that were not spoliated 
by the Nazis should become the legitimate property of the French museums.1752 
Artworks that were either spoliated with certainty or which have been the subject of 
forced sales should stay in the collections of the Musées de France for the present to allow 
for the pursual of a double objective consisting of the return of the objects and the 
education of the public. As specific measures to achieve these two aims, the Mattéoli 
Mission suggested to make the MNR catalogue widely and easily accessible to the 
public; to include information on the provenance when exhibiting the artworks and to 
launch a special MNR Internet site.1753 In order to allow for greater exposure, the 
Mattéoli Mission also recommended the exhibition of spoliated art works in museums in 
Jerusalem.1754 To encourage future commitment and to increase transparency the 
Mattéoli Mission recommended the publication of an annual report by the board of the 
Musées de France on their progress concerning restitution and the information of the 
public.1755 
 With regard to approximately 40,000 artworks that had not been recovered after 
the war the Mattéoli Mission proposed to intensify and to systematise the efforts to 
recover these objects. As concrete measure the Mattéoli Mission recommended the 
introduction of a new permanent body assigned with this task. While the Final Report 
does not elaborate upon the specific form of this body it suggested the following three 
tasks: to complete and update the inventory of all artworks that have been claimed and 
are still missing; to undertake research on these claimed and missing objects and to 
actively seek the recovery of these objects. With regard to the latter the Final Report 
stresses the need of international co-operation and suggested the establishment of cross-
border governmental bodies with Russia, Austria and Germany.1756  
With regard to the indemnification of individual claims for objects the Mattéoli 
Mission states as general principle that such loss must be compensated regardless of any 
lapse of prescription periods.1757 However, given the findings of the Mattéoli Mission 
that a great number of spoliated objects had either been restituted after the war or their 
loss had been compensated under French or German legislation the Mattéoli Mission 
                                                     
1752 Ibid., Recommandation n° 13, p. 174. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 155. 
1753 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, Recommandation n° 14, pp. 171-172. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 155. The third 
measure has been implemented at the following website:  
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/documentation/mnr/pres.htm# (last visited 21.01.2009).  
1754 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, Recommandation n° 15, p. 172. In 2008, an exhibition “To whom do these 
canvases belong? French policy on seeking the provenance, custodianship and restitution of art works 
spoliated during World War II” was held at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem (February 19 to June 4) and at 
the Musée d’art et d’histoire du Judaïsme in Paris (June 24 to September 28). 
1755 Ibid., Recommandation n° 16, p. 172. 
1756 Ibid., Recommandation n° 17, p. 172. Cf.: Anglade, L., 2000, p. 157. 
1757 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, Recommandation n° 8, p. 170. 
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stressed that compensation must be limited to those cases in which the rightholders had 
not been compensated in the past.1758  
3.  CO M M I S S I O N  P O U R  L ’ IN D E M N I S A T IO N  D E S  V I C T I M E S  D E  S P O L IA T IO N S  
I N T E R V E N U E S  D U  F A I T  D E S  L É G I S L A T I O N S  A N T I S É M I T E S  EN  V I G U E U R  P EN D A N T  
L ’OC C U P A T I O N  (CIVS)  
 In reaction to the proposal of the Mattéoli Mission concerning the establishment 
of a non-adversarial claims resolution body the ‘Commission pour l’indemnisation des 
victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur 
pendant l’Occupation’ (in short and hereinafter: CIVS) was created in September 
1999.1759 As the name indicates, CIVS hears claims that seek compensation for the 
spoliation resulting from anti-semitic legislation in force in France during the 
Occupation.  
CIVS constitutes a new procedure created in law that functions outside the court 
system and whose frame of reference is not limited to the strict letter of the law.1760 
CIVS is asked to adopt a pragmatic attitude and to seek solutions where courts actions 
are barred due to lapse of limitation periods.1761 The commission has a broad 
“jurisdiction” dealing with claims for material or financial spoliation, including the 
forced seizure of companies, looting of equipment, furniture, apartments, blocked bank 
accounts, insurance policies and other valuables including artworks.1762  
                                                     
1758 Ibid., Recommandation n° 9, p. 170 ; Ruzié, D., 2004,  
www.civs.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Livret_Ruzie_avril_07.pdf (originally published in: Liberté, justice, tolérance - 
Mélanges en l'honneur du Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan (pp.1351-1370). 
1759 Decree No. 99-778 of 10 September 1999, establishing a Commission for the Compensation of 
Victimes of Spoliation under the anti-Semitic Legislation in force during the Occupation (Décret 99-778 du 
10 Septembre 1999) avialable at:  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005628500&dateTexte=20090120 
(last visited: 20 January 2009). The recommendation to create such a body was made by the Mattéoli 
Mission in its second interim report: Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France: rapport d'étape: janvier - 
décembre 1998, 1999. Cf.: Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, pp. 135-136. 
1760 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 104. 
1761 Cf.: the Preamble of the Decree according to which “[i]t is not contemplated to create a body of a 
jurisdictional nature since [a judicial body] would often have to reject the claims. On the contrary, the 
Commission (…) shall proceed to the examination of the files by taking all of their aspects into account. It 
should try to reconcile the parties with a view to obtaining an agreement between the claimant and the 
relevant institution. In case it fails to reach such an agreement, the Commission may issue 
recommendations”. Cf.: Anglade, L., 1999, p. 308 who interprets the edict as insisting, “that the new 
Commission must act in a pragmatic and efficient way in order to avoid the undue complications sometimes 
caused by legal formalism”. 
1762 According to Art. 1 of the Decree of 10 September 1999 the task of the CIVS is “[t]o examine 
individual claims emanating from victims of their families in order to indemnify them for the damages they 
have sustained as a result of the looting of properties which occurred by the operation of the anti-Semitic 
laws adopted during the Occupation by the [Germans] as well as by the Vichy authorities”. Cf.: Ibid., p. 307; 
Palmer, N., 2000a, pp. 104; Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, p. 139. 
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4.  CL A I M S  D EA L IN G  W I T H  A R TW O RK S:  S P L I T  R E S P O N SI B I L I T Y  B Y  C IVS  A N D  T H E  
AR C H I V E S  DEPA R T M E N T  O F  TH E  MIN I S T R Y  O F  FO R E IG N  AF F A I R S  
 Where a claim deals with spoliated artworks an application to CIVS is not the 
only procedure available to claimants. CIVS is first and foremost concerned with the 
evaluation of claims for indemnification, i.e. claims dealing with objects that are lost or 
no longer exist. Where the claim concerns an object presently in the MNR Collection, 
the main responsibility to decide on and to order the return of an object lays with the 
Archives Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Direction des Archives du 
Ministère des Affaires étrangères).1763 The Archives Department cooperates with the 
Directorate of the Musées de France that is in charge of the MNR Collection. While CIVS 
may also make recommendations in claims seeking the physical return of objects from 
the MNR Collection1764, the final decision on returning the object remains with the 
Archives Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1765 CIVS may also make 
recommendations concerning claims for the return of an object from a public collection 
designated as Musée de France.1766 It is not competent to make recommendations in 
cases dealing with objects in private collections.1767 
In order to submit a claim to the CIVS, victims or their heirs have to send an 
informal letter to the CIVS, accompanied by all relevant documentation.1768 Each claim 
will be assigned to a “rapporteur” who is responsible for the further investigation of the 
claim, for hearing parties and witnesses and for consulting experts.1769 After the stage of 
preliminary investigations, cases are passed to the decision-making panel (sitting in 
either plenary or restricted formation) for final examination. The final decision-making 
of CIVS is based on equitable principles. In the absence of absolute proof, CIVS will 
take the following aspects into account: the probability of the loss in the light of the 
circumstances during the Nazi reign, the sincerity of the claimant, the moment since 
when and the consistency in pursing the claim, as well as the absence of other 
competing claims. When CIVS reaches the conclusion that a claim is valid and should 
be acknowledged it can choose between the following measures: returning the object, 
compensation payments, or other measures of reparation.1770 The amount of the 
compensation payments is based of the value of the work at the date of plunder, as 
                                                     
1763 Commission pour l'indemnisation des victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations 
antisémites en vigueur pendant l'Occupation' (CIVS), p. 18. 
1764 Cf.: Ibid., p. 19. 
1765 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 18-19; De Bastier, M., 2009, Re: questions en concernant le service de CIVS à propos la 
restitution / l'indemnification des objets d'arts. Email dated 23 June 2009 on file with the author.  
1766 De Bastier, M., 2009, Re: questions en concernant le service de CIVS à propos la restitution / 
l'indemnification des objets d'arts. Email dated 23 June 2009 on file with the author.  
1767 Ibid. 
1768 Art. 4 of the Decree of 10 September 1999. 
1769 Ibid.  
1770 Art. 1 of the Decree of 10 September 1999. 
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adjusted by the price index reflecting the average change in prices between the war years 
and the presence.  
 
Joseph Vernet, Marine, clair de lune, oil on canvas, 115x 163 cm. ©Réunion des musées nationaux. 
 
As part of its investigations, CIVS checks whether the claims submitted have not 
already been the subject of compensation by France under the 1946 Act on War 
Damage1771 or under the German Federal Restitution Law (BRüG).1772 For this purpose 
the CIVS operates an office in Berlin with the task to study the files on the application 
of the BRüG in view of possible applications for damages in the past.1773 In those cases 
where compensation had been received a claim is denied. Where only partial 
compensation was received, CIVS may order for supplementing the amount.1774 The 
                                                     
1771 Law 46-2389 of October 28, 1946 (Loi n°46-2389 du 28 octobre 1946 Réparation des Dommages) put 
forth the principle of full compensation for direct material damage caused by acts of war to personal 
property, real property and business assets. All victims of events occurring during World War II were 
eligible for this compensation. These measures therefore benefited both victims of anti-Semitic laws and 
other war victims. Claims under this act were administered by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing 
(M.R.L.). Source: http://www.civs.gouv.fr/spip.php?article580.  
1772 Information Brochure: Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from the 
Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force during the Occupation (CIVS), p. 3; Kalfon, L., 2006, p. 437. Given the 
destruction of relevant files in French archives in the years 1957-1970 the BRüG files also serve as 
important source on restitutions under French law as the files often bear information on damages paid by 
the French State. Cf.: Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., 2006, p. 139.  
1773 See for a description of the BRüG above in chp. 1.§4.IV.  
1774 Kalfon, L., 2006, p. 439. 
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files of the hearings and recommendations by CIVS are not available to the public.1775 
For this reason, different from the previous sections discussing the Dutch and UK 
situation, no case studies are included. 
Recommendations by the CIVS are non-binding with the final decision-making 
power resting upon the Prime Minister.1776 Where compensation payments are ordered 
they are paid by the department of the Prime Minister. The possibility for appeal is 
limited to the emergence of new facts or clerical error. 
Since the establishment of the CIVS until the end of 2008, the CIVS had received 
25,542 claims, all losses combined.1777 1593 files concern claims that deal with cultural 
objects in the broad sense, including furniture. 1253 of the files have been handeld so 
far. Of these files, 389 concern missing cultural objects.1778 797 cases dealt with missing 
furniture. In two cases CIVS recommended restitution. Both cases concerned objects in 
the MNR Collection.1779 65 claims were rejected as the claims did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of CIVS.1780 
                                                     
1775 De Bastier, M., 2009, Re: questions en concernant le service de CIVS à propos de la restitution / 
l'indemnification des objets d'arts. Email dated 23 June 2009 on file with the author.  
1776 During a presentation in October 2006 it was reported that up until then all recommendations by the 
CIVS had been followed and implemented. Cf.: Presentation by JP Bady 'The Policy of Compensation for 
Plundered Works of Art in France', London 18 October 2006, Conference on Dispute resolution and 
holocaust related art claims organised by the Institute of Art and Law. 
1777 Cf.: Commission pour l'indemnisation des victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations 
antisémites en vigueur pendant l'Occupation' (CIVS), p. 17. 
1778 The present numbers do not mention in how many cases CIVS recommended compensation payments. 
The numbers presented in the annual report of 2006 represented the following numbers: of the 107 files 
dealing with artworks in the narrow sense, CIVS approved 71 compensation payments. In ten of the cases 
the payments were supplementing earlier payments received under the BrüG. 34 claims were denied and in 
two cases restitution was recommended. Cf.: Commission pour l'indemnisation des victimes de spoliations 
intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur pendant l'Occupation' (CIVS), pp. 13-14. 
1779 Both cases concerned paintings from the MNR collection: in the first case paintings by Vernet, "Marine, 
Clair de Lune" and Courtois, "Bataille contre les Turcs" were returned to the heirs of Maurice Lehamnn 
(http://www.culture.gouv.fr/public/mistral/mnrbis_fr?ACTION=RETROUVER&FIELD_4=LOCA&V
ALUE_4=Restitu%e9&NUMBER=8&GRP=0&REQ=%28%28Restitu%e9%29%20%3aLOCA%20%29
&USRNAME=nobody&USRPWD=4%24%2534P&SPEC=1&SYN=1&IMLY=&MAX1=1&MAX2=10
&MAX3=50&DOM=All ; 
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/public/mistral/mnrbis_fr?ACTION=RETROUVER&FIELD_98=ATIT&V
ALUE_98=Marine&NUMBER=9&GRP=0&REQ=((Marine)%20%3AATIT%20)&USRNAME=nobody
&USRPWD=4%24%2534P&SPEC=&SYN=1&IMLY=&MAX1=1&MAX2=1&MAX3=50&DOM=All 
(last visited 25 June 2009). The second case concerned the painting ‘Tête de femme” by Pablo Picasso. The 
painting originally belonged to Alphonse Kann. His art collection was spoliated by the German troops. In 
1945 the painting was restored to France where it became part of the MNR Collection and was kept in the 
Musée Nationale d’ Art Moderne (Centre Georges Pompidou). In 1998, the heirs of Kann sought the return of 
the painting. In May 2002, the CIVS recommended the return of the painting, which was effected in 2003. 
(http://www.culture.gouv.fr/public/mistral/mnrbis_fr?ACTION=RETROUVER&FIELD_1=Caut&VA
LUE_1=picasso&FIELD_2=Cdate&VALUE_2=&FIELD_3=Ctitre&VALUE_3=tete&FIELD_4=LOC
A&VALUE_4=&FIELD_5=Ctexte&VALUE_5=&FIELD_6=Domaine&VALUE_6=&NUMBER=1&
GRP=0&REQ=%28%28picasso%29%20%3aAUTR%2cAATT%2cATTR%2cECOL%20%20ET%20%2
0%28%28tete%29%20%3aTITR%2cATIT%2cAUTI%2cPTIT%2cDENO%2cDESC%2cSUITE%20%29
%29&USRNAME=nobody&USRPWD=4%24%2534P&SPEC=9&SYN=1&IMLY=&MAX1=1&MAX2
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5.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  FR A N C E 
 In the present section we have summarised the findings of the Mattéoli 
Committee with regard to the looting of art works from France and their recovery and 
have further analysed the CIVS as the non-adversarial claims resolution body, which was 
established by the French Government in reaction to the findings of the Mattéoli 
Committee. CIVS is different from the bodies introduced in the jurisdictions discussed 
so far in that it does not deal solely with claims dealing with art works. Instead, works of 
art constitute only one category of assets dealt with by CIVS. In as far as claims dealing 
with artworks are concerned CIVS is first and foremost competent to deal with claims 
seeking compensation for missing art works. Where objects are presently held in the 
MNR Collection or a public collection designated as Musée de France, the most suited 
institution to contact is the Archives Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The framework governing the decision-making of CIVS, or the ‘doctrine’ as CIVS 
refers to it in order to distinguish it from the judicature1781, takes a lenient approach 
towards the required proof with regard to former ownership of an object and with 
regard to the involuntary circumstances of the loss. Where no conclusive evidence can 
be provided, CIVS works on the basis of probabilities. Where the former ownership and 
loss of the object as result of the measures of the Vichy regime or the German 
occupation is probable, CIVS will recommend the return of the object or, where this is 
not possible, the payment of compensation. Where prior compensation has been 
received, a claim will be denied, or, where only partial compensation was received, 
supplementary compensation will be recommended.  
§2. HUMAN REMAIN S   
I .  TH E  NE T H E R L A N D S:  V A R I O US  F O R M S  O F  SE L F -G O V E RN A N C E  A T  M U S E UM  L E V E L  
 In the Netherlands no official policy on the return of human remains from public 
collections has been endorsed by the Dutch Government. Consequently, we will have to 
rely upon case studies to extrapolate the principles applicable to the return of human 
remains from Dutch public collections. At the time we collected the research material 
for the case studies only two cases involving requests for the return of human remains 
                                                                                                                                          
=10&MAX3=50&DOM=All (last visited 25 June 2009). Cf.: Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 398 ; 
Presentation by JP Bady 'The Policy of Compensation for Plundered Works of Art in France', London 18 
October 2006, Conference on Dispute resolution and holocaust related art claims organised by the Institute 
of Art and Law.  
1780 De Bastier, M., 2009, Re: questions en concernant le service de CIVS à propos la restitution / 
l'indemnification des objets d'arts. Email dated 23 June 2009 on file with the author. Cf.: Commission pour 
l'indemnisation des victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur 
pendant l'Occupation' (CIVS), . 
1781 Deutscher Bundestag (Ausschuss für Kultur und Medien), 2007, p. 11,  
http://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/a22/anhoerungen/raubkunst/a22_Prot31.pdf. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   379 12-10-2009   12:09:26
380  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
from a public collection in the Netherlands had been decided: the case of the "West 
Frisian Eskimo" from the collection held by the Westfries Museum in Hoorn and the 
case of the Toi Moko from the collection held in the National Museum of Ethnology 
(Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde) in Leiden. In reaction to these two cases and the 
developments abroad a third institution - the KIT Tropen Museum in Amsterdam- 
decided to not await an actual claim but to reflect upon its policy with regard to human 
remains in a pro-active manner. This initiative of the KIT Tropen Museum has been 
studied as a third case study.  
More recently, a number of new claims have been received by Dutch public 
collections. While these cases will not be analysed for having occurred only after we 
concluded the gathering of material for case studies, we will shortly introduce them. 
Only one of the cases is international in character; the other one is an intra-Dutch claim: 
in 2007 an interest group consisting of Dutch citizens from the village of Urk requested 
the return of eight skulls presently in the collection of the University Museum in 
Utrecht.1782 The skulls had been removed for scientific research purposes from the local 
cemetery during the 19th century.1783 Until the end of 2008, no agreement had been 
made between the interest group, seeking the reburial of the skulls and the University 
Museum, wishing to preserve them as important objects representing part of Dutch 
scientific history. The second case, which is international in character, concerns the head 
of the former Ghanaian King Badu Bonsu II. The head, preserved in formaldehyde had 
entered into the collection of Leiden University’s Medical Laboratory in the second half 
of the 19th century. It was discovered by Dutch writer Arthur Japin who started an 
initiative to return the head to Ghana on personal title. At some point, the Ghanaian 
Government officially took up the request for the return of the head. By the time we 
had finalised our research, the Dutch Government announced to return the head. The 
details of the return were yet to be discussed.1784  
The case notes are presented in chronological order. Each case note starts with the 
summary of the main facts and then describes the discussions and developments with 
regard to the request for return, respectively repatriation of human remains more in 
general in the first case study. The case studies will be concluded with the identification 
of the main principles that governed the decision-making process. As conclusion of this 
section on the repatriation of human remains from Dutch public collections we will 
compare the principles thus identified with each other in order to see whether there 
                                                     
1782 See http://www.urkerschedels.blogspot.com/ (last visited 19 April 2009). Until 1939, when Urk 
became conntected to the mainland by a dyke, Urk was an island in the Zuidersee. This isolation made the 
study of its inhabitants of particular interest to Dutch physical anthropology. It was believed that the people 
of Urk represented the archaic inhabitant, the “Batavus genius” of the territory now constituting the 
Netherlands. Cf.: Lubina, K.R.M., 2007, p. 84. See, e.g.: Harting, P., 1853. 
1783 The skulls were taken by J.F. van Hengel, a doctor from Hilversum in 1877. Having sent away the guard 
of the cemetary he exchanged the skulls with other skulls he taken along for this purpose. 
1784 Leiden geeft hoofd Badu Bonsu II terug, 21 March 2009. The head was returned on 23 July 2009, after 
this research had been concluded. See, e.g.: Dutch return Ghana chief's severed head, 2009,  
http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2309332.ece/Dutch_return_Ghana_chiefs_severed_head.  
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and the remains were part of the West Frisian museum’s permanent exhibition and were 
presented to the public, in accordance with the style of the kayak, as being of “Eskimo 
origin”.  
While the presence of these alleged Inuit or Greenlandic remains in the Westfries 
Museum had been known to some representatives of Greenland since the beginning of 
the seventies1786, the official claim by Greenland for the return of the remains was made 
in 1998, after the matter had been discussed at the 8th General Assembly of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference.1787  
At the time when the Westfries Museum received the claim, it had just agreed to give 
the remains in loan for an exhibition on the subject of human remains in Dutch public 
collections. The exhibition at the museum Kunsthal Rotterdam titled “Bone by Bone – 
human remains in museums”1788 was scheduled from 7 November 1998 – 10 January 
                                                                                                                                          
available report on the kayak, which dates from 1890, does not mention the human remains raises some 
doubts on the relationship between the remains and the kayak. The 1890 catalogue only mentions the 
“Eskimosche boot (kayak) van walvis ribben en zeehondvel vervaardigd, met pagaai en zitbank” Brouwer, 
D., 1890, p. 3. The 1891 catalogue, however, does mention the remains in connection with the kayak: “(…) 
Het schijnt dat dit vaartuigje drijvende in zee werd aangetroffen met het lijk van een verdwaalde en van 
honger omgekomen man. Ouderen van dagen herinneren zich althans, dat zich een verdroogd in leder 
gekleed menselijk lichaam in het bootje bevond, (…). Dit menselijk lichaam is bij de verschillende 
verhuizingen langzaamerhand verdwenen (…)” Brouwer, D., 1891. Since then, the museum catalogue 
mentions the remains in connection with the kayak. E.g. the 1934 catalogue states: “(…) Het schijnt, dat dit 
vaartuig in zee drijvende werd aangetroffen met het lijk van een Eskimo er in. Niet zo lang geleden waren er 
nog menschen, die zich herinnerden, dat zich een verdroogd, in leder gekleed, menselijk lichaam in het 
bootje bevond, dat toen in één der zalen van de klinische school alhier was geplaatst. Ook de overblijfselen 
van den Eskimo zijn ondergebracht in het museum.” With the museum catalogues not being conclusive on 
the question as to whether or not the remains were indeed those of the kayak’s peddler, Nooter initiated 
investigations on the finger prints and for the determination of the hair typology. The investigations failed 
to provide a conclusive answer. While Nooter acknowledges the possibility that the remains were added to 
the kayak only at a later point, he concludes his analysis that “On the basis of the discussion in the 
introduction concerning the ways in which kayaks could have reached The Netherlands, with or without a 
paddler, it follows that this must certainly have been a Greenlander who escaped or was put over the side of 
a homeward-bound ship. The tradition cannot be verified, because the skin remnants did not permit exact 
determination”. Nooter, G., 1971, p. 34 
1786 The existence of the remains in the Westfries Museum was a.o. known as the Greenland National 
Museum and Archives closely cooperated with the Dutch anthropologist Gert Nooter, author of the 1971 
study on “Old Kayaks in the Netherlands” who discussed the remains in his study (Source: Personal Email-
Correspondance with Claus Andreasen from the Greenland National Museum and Archives from 3 
October 2007. On file with the author). Probably in reaction to Nooter’s study, a group of Greenlanders 
visited the Westfries Museum in 1980. In 1993, an advisor on Greenlandic Affairs at the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Finn Lynge, visited the Westfries Museum. At that point, the remains were not exhibited 
but were kept in the deposit. It was not possible to get access to the remains in the deposit, but the 
inspection of the exhibited kayak revealed that what appeared at first sight as a kayak glove, were in fact the 
remains of the hand of the canoeist.  
1787 The plan for repatriation was formulated at the 8th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference that took place in July 1998. (Source: Boekel, J.v. / Groot, G.d., 1998/1999, p. 1). 
1788 The original title in Dutch was: Botje bij Botje – Menselijke Resten in Musea. See above for the flyer of 
the exhibition. 
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1999. When it became evident that the Westfries Museum wanted to go ahead with the 
loan developments accelerated.  
Greenland fiercely opposed the inclusion of the remains in the exhibition. A meeting 
was called upon between the minister counsellor for Greenland to the EU, the Attaché 
of the Royal Danish Embassy1789, and ‘Artic Peoples Alert’1790 on the one hand and the 
director of the Westfries Museum and other representatives from Dutch public 
collections1791 on the other. The meeting was cancelled at short notice when it became 
evident that the Westfries Museum was determined to go ahead with the loan.1792  
After the meeting had been cancelled, representatives from other Dutch public 
collections - curators of the museum “Museon” in The Hague and the National 
Museum of Ethnology in Leiden sought to mediate between the parties and appealed to 
the Westfries Museum to refrain from the loan. After this proved not to have any effect, 
they appealed to the mayor of Hoorn, the Dutch State-Secretary of Culture, as well as 
the alderman of culture of the city of Rotterdam. But neither their efforts, nor efforts by 
the Dutch foundation Arctic Peoples Alert prevented the remains from being included 
in the exhibition that opened its doors to the public on 7 November 1998. 
On 29 November 1998, the Danish Ambassador officially intervened on behalf of 
the Government of Greenland.1793 He requested the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to persuade the Kunsthal to remove the Greenlandic human remains from the 
exposition.1794 On 20 January 1999, ten days after the exposition in the Kunsthal had 
ended, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Danish ambassador that 
neither the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, nor the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had any responsibility for the collection held by the Westfries Museum, nor for 
the exposition policy of the Kunsthal Rotterdam: “[i]n the Netherlands, the 
Government is supposed to abstain from judging the independent and artistic content 
of art and culture”.1795  
                                                     
1789 While Greenland has been granted self-government in 1979, its foreign affairs are exercised by 
Denmark, which explains the involvement of the Danish Embassy. 
1790 Artic Peoples Alert is a Dutch foundation, which was established in January 1992. It had been asked by 
representatives from Greenland to locally support the repatriation claim. See e.g. letter from Emil Rosing, 
director of the Greenland National Museum and Archives to Artic Peoples Alert dated 9 November 1998 
(on file with the author). 
1791 The curator of the National Museum of Ethnology and the curator of the museum Museon. 
1792 Fax by the director of the Westfries Museum, Ruud Spruit, to Peter Bettenhausen, conservator of the 
Museon Den Haag. Cf.: Bettenhaussen, P., 2000, p. VI.Bettenhaussen, P., 2000 
1793 See above fn. 1789.  
1794 Boekel, J.v. / Groot, G.d., 1998/1999, p. 1.  
1795 Boekel, J.v. / Groot, G.d., 1999, p. 5: “Het is in Nederland gebruikelijk dat de regering zich onthoudt 
van het geven van meningen over de onafhankelijke en artistieke inhoud van kunst en cultuur”. This quote 
is a direct reference to the so-called “Thorbecke principle”. Thorbecke, who lived in the 19th century, was 
one of the most important Dutch politicians. As Minister of Internal Affairs he stated that “(…) the 
Government may make no judgement of the science and the arts”. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 
1862/1862, Verslag p. 36.  
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In the meantime, the Westfries Museum had announced that it was willing to 
consider returning the human remains to Greenland. While the ultimate decision lay 
with the city of Hoorn as the owner of the collection the attitude of the museum as 
holder of the collection was important in the decision-making process. In its 
deliberations, the Westfries Museum sought advice from the Dutch Museum 
Association (Nederlandse Museumvereniging (NMV)). 
The Dutch Museum Association dates back to 1926 when it was founded as think 
tank of and for museum directors. Since then it developed into the umbrella 
organisation for the museum sector with tasks such as lobbying and development of 
policies. In 1991 it introduced the first Dutch version of the ICOM Code of 
Professional Ethics for Museums.1796 The same year an ‘Ethical Code Committee’ 
(hereinafter: NMV Ethical Code Committee) was founded to advise museums about the 
Dutch ICOM Code and to hold their behaviour against the Dutch ICOM Code.1797 The 
Dutch ICOM Code has been revised several times to reflect the changes made in the 
international ICOM Code.1798  
When the Dutch Museum association received the request for advice by the 
Westfries Museum it referred the matter to the NMV Ethical Code Committee. 
However, the Director of the Dutch Museum Association saw it fit to ask the NMV 
Ethical Code Committee not only to advise on the specific case but to on the return of 
human remains more in general by appending the following questions:  
 
1. Are there reasons speaking in favour of returning the remains of the so-called West Frisian Eskimo to 
Greenland? 
2. Which requirements does a claim for repatriation have to meet? 
3. Will the return of human remains be subject to conditions and which ones? 
4. Does the decision to return human remains have to be considered as a precedent? 
5. Does the problematic situation of this case justify the elaboration or revision of the Dutch ICOM 
Code? 
6. What is the relationship between the return of human remains with that of cultural property in 
general?1799  
 
                                                     
1796 See further on the international ICOM Code above in chp. 2.§2.IV.3. 
1797 http://www.museumvereniging.nl/default.aspx?id=337 (last visited 27 March 2008). The NMV Ethical 
Code Committee was originally called in Dutch the ‘Commissie Museale Gedragslijn’. In 2007 the name was 
revised to “Ethische Codecommissie voor Musea”.  
1798 The last revision took place during 2004-2006 in response to the revised ICOM Code as adopted in 
Seoul in 2004. The integral text of the code can be found at:  
http://www.museumvereniging.nl/files/Ethische%20Code%20_versie%2020%20nov%202006_%20_2_.p
df (last visited 27 March 2008). 
1799 Letter from the Director of the Dutch Museum Association NMV to the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee dated 25 May 1999.  
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b) The Recommendation by the NMV Ethical Code Committee 
After the questions had been referred to the NMV Ethical Code Committee, the 
Committee met twice, in July and October 1999 before presenting its recommendation 
in December 1999.1800  
The actual recommendation is preceded by a statement concerning the improper use 
of terminology when speaking of the remains of an “Eskimo” as a pejorative reference 
to part of a people that refers to itself as “Inuit”. Furthermore, the reference to the 
remains as “Greenlandic Eskimo” gives a false impression by suggesting that the 
Greenlandic origin of the remains has been confirmed, which was not the case. Also, 
the NMV Ethical Code Committee did not consider the term “mummy” appropriate as 
the remains consisted only of parts of the skin, which must either have been tanned, or 
dissected, and which had been stuffed at some later point in time. They did, however, 
qualify as “human remains” in the eyes of the NMV Ethical Code Committee. 
According to the Committee human remains in the sense of the ICOM Code are 
“everything that once formed part of a human body and can be traced back to a specific 
individual”. Against this background, the NMV Ethical Code Committee chose to speak 
of the “human remains of an Inuit” in its recommendation.  
After the reflections upon terminology, the actual recommendation starts with the 
general view that the return of human remains should be treated as the return of cultural 
property in accordance with Art. 4.4. sub b of the Dutch ICOM Code (1999 version).1801 
According to this provision: 
 
“[i]n case of requests for the return of cultural property to the land of origin, museums should be prepared 
to initiate dialogues based on scientific and professional principles (in preference to action at a 
governmental or political level). The possibility of developing bilateral or multilateral cooperation with 
museums in countries that have lost a significant part of their cultural heritage should be explored”.1802 
 
                                                     
1800 Commissie Museale Gedragslijn, 1999. The original recommendation is available online at: 
http://www.museumvereniging.nl/files/2_ethiek_adv-eskimo.pdf (last visited 5 January 2009).  
1801 The 1999 version was the second, revised translation of the ICOM Code. As outlined in chp. 2.§2.IV.3, 
it was only in 2001 that a paragraph was added to the international ICOM Code dealing with the return of 
human remains (para. 6.6). Consequently, the Dutch 1999 ICOM Code did not include any provision 
dealing explicitly with requests for the return of human remains. The current version of the Dutch ICOM 
Code, which was adopted on 8 November 2006, and which is based upon the 2004 version of the 
internatioanal ICOM Code, does include a provision dealing with requests for the return of human remains 
(para. 4.4). Below, where we extrapolate the principles that guide the recommendation of the NMV Ethical 
Code Committee, we will take this development into account.  
1802 Art. 4.4 sub b: “Als er verzoeken komen om de teruggave van cultureel bezit aan het land van 
oorsprong, dan behoren musea bereid te zijn een dialoog op gang te brengen op basis van 
wetenschappelijke en professionele principes (te verkiezen boven actie op overheids- of politiek niveau). Er 
behoort nagegaan te worden wat de mogelijkheden zijn om bilaterale of multilaterale 
samenwerkingsprogramma’s te ontwikkelen om musea te helpen met het opzetten van goede museale 
infrastructuur in landen waarvan wordt aangenomen dat ze een belangrijk deel van hun cultureel erfgoed 
hebben verloren”.  
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Hence, as a general starting point, a Dutch museum that receives a request for the 
return of human remains should be open to dialogue and the exploration of 
cooperation. The provision makes no case that the human remains would need to be 
returned.  
Different from the starting point that human remains should be dealt with in 
accordance with Art. 4.4. sub b of the Dutch ICOM Code, the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee holds that some requests merit a different treatment. This is the case where 
the request for the return of the remains is motivated by the wish of (re-) burial 
respectively other funeral arrangements. In these cases the interest of the claimants can 
prevail over the interest of retaining the cultural property.1803  
The following conditions were discussed by the NMV Ethical Code Committee as 
necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) conditions:  
First, the request for the return of human remains for funeral arrangements has to be 
made by probable relative(s). Second, a close family link/next-of-kin relationship 
between the requesting party and the human remains must be established with the 
burden of proof resting upon the requesting party. Evidence of such a relationship can 
be given by means of genetic research (such as the testing of DNA) or can otherwise be 
documented. If the requesting party fails to establish a family link or kinship, the NMV 
Ethical Code Committee holds that there can be no specific interest in funeral 
arrangements and the request must be judged in accordance with Art. 4.4 sub b Dutch 
ICOM Code. On the other hand, a successful proof of family link or kinship does not 
necessarily lead to the return of the remains: in case of positive proof the NMV Ethical 
Code Committee states that the human remains in question may be returned. They do 
not have to be returned.  
While the recommendation does not explicitly refer to the notion of the national 
heritage, it departs from the understanding that the status quo of public collections 
should be preserved in as far as possible and should only be compromised in very 
limited circumstances, i.e. only for the reburial of human remains. Such extensive 
protection can only be understood if the NMV Ethical Code Committee attaches great 
relevant to the preservation of the national heritage.  
After outlining the conditions for the restitution of human remains, the NMV 
Ethical Code Committee dealt with the six questions submitted by the Director of the 
Dutch Museum Association. As to the first question, whether there were any reasons 
speaking in favour of returning the Inuit remains, the NMV Ethical Code Committee 
held that the claim as it then stood did not meet any of the established conditions. In 
the light of the negative answer to the first question, the NMV Ethical Code Committee 
did not further address the second question asking for requirements a claim for the 
return of human remains has to meet, nor did it further reflect upon the third question 
asking for further conditions a return could or should be subjected to. The fourth 
question, as to whether a decision to return human remains must be considered as a 
                                                     
1803 (Emphasis added). 
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precedent, was negated by the NMV Ethical Code Committee referring to the stringed 
conditions it set in the recommendation.  
In response to the fifth question, whether the return of human remains calls for a 
revision of the Dutch ICOM Code, the NMV Ethical Code Committee held that this 
was not the case.1804 The sixth and last question asking for the relationship between the 
return of human remains with that of cultural property in general is not directly 
answered. Instead, the NMV Ethical Code Committee referred back to its 
recommendation where it held that a special regime for human remains applies only if a 
specific interest in funeral arrangements exists, which, according to the Committee 
presupposes a direct link between the claimant and the remains in question. In the 
absence of such a link /interest the request must be judged in accordance with Art. 4.4 
sub b Dutch ICOM Code.1805 
The NMV Ethical Code Committee concludes its elaborations on the return of 
human remains more in general and the present case by advising the Westfries Museum 
to adapt the exhibition of the remains in accordance with Art. 6.7 of the Dutch ICOM 
Code which asks for the payment of respect1806 and to include in the information 
provided to visitors the insights concerning the unsure origins of the Inuit remains. 
                                                     
1804 It might be interesting to know that in the past the Dutch ICOM Code had been revised only once. In 
1998 one article was revised and a supplement was added. The latter regulates how to deal with “dead 
material of animals derived from zoos”. 
1805 The actual recommendation of the NMV Ethical Code Committee was numbered from 1-7. To answer 
the question of the relationship between human remains and cultural property, the Committee only stated 
that “The answer on the last question is provided for under point 6”. In fact, the sixth point does not 
address this issue at all but only states that human remains can be returned if the requesting party succeeds 
in proving the family ties, provided that upon return the remains will be buried or otherwise disposed of. 
The cross-reference only makes sense and has been understood in the present analysis as referring to the 
seventh point instead where it is stated that in case kinship between the claimant and the human remains 
cannot be established, the specific interest in funeral arrangements does not apply and consequently, the 
only issue at stake is the cultural importance of the human remains, which is dealt with in article 4.4 sub b 
of the Gedragslijn.  
1806 Art. 6.7 of the 1999 Dutch ICOM Code on human remains and objects of religious significance reads:  
a. In case a museum possesses or collects human remains and religious objects, it has to provide for secure 
storage and meticulous maintenance for them as objects of scientific collections in research institutions. The 
objects have to be available for competent researchers and educators at all times, but not for people with a 
sick curiosity.  
b. Research on these objects and the storage and maintenance must be carried out in a manner that is 
acceptable to colleagues, and to people from different religions, in particular those of the religious or ethnic 
group concerned. While it will occasionally be necessary to exhibit human remains and other sensitive 
material in explanatory exhibitions, this must be done with respect to the feelings for human dignity of all 
peoples.  
The original version in Dutch reads:  
a Wanneer een museum collecties van menselijke resten en religieuze voorwerpen bezit of verzamelt, dan 
behoren deze veilig gehuisvest en zorgvuldig onderhouden te worden als studieverzamelingen in 
wetenschappelijke instellingen. Ze behoren altijd beschikbaar te zijn voor bevoegde onderzoekers en 
educatoren, maar niet voor mensen met een ziekelijke nieuwsgierigheid. 
b Onderzoek van dergelijke voorwerpen en hun huisvesting en zorg behoort te geschieden op een manier 
die aanvaardbaar is voor vakgenoten,en ook voor mensen van verschillende religies, in het bijzonder leden 
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c) Developments after the recommendation 
In response to the recommendation by the NMV Ethical Code Committee, the 
requested remains from the Westfries Museum were subjected to a DNA- test by the 
Panum Institute in Copenhagen.1807 
While the results of the DNA-analysis were pending, the Board of Trustees of the 
Westfries Museum advised the City Council of Hoorn, as the relevant decision making 
organ of the city of Hoorn1808 as owner of the collection, to return the remains to 
Greenland should the DNA-test provide that the remains were indeed of Greenlandic 
origins.  
In line with the advice of the museum’s Board of Trustees, the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen issued a proposal in favour of return should the DNA-research proof the 
Greenlandic origin of the remains.1809 On 11 July 2000, the proposal was adopted by the 
City Council of Hoorn.1810 The City Council of Hoorn did, however, make the 
(potential) return dependent on a guarantee that the human remains were not to be 
exhibited upon their return to Greenland but had to be given a last resting-place in 
conformity with the customs of Greenland.1811 The Council motivated this extra 
condition as to prevent a precedent.1812 The City Council also mandated the Mayor and 
Aldermen to deal with practical matters once the results of the DNA-research were 
known.  
                                                                                                                                          
van de betreffende gemeenschap, etnische of religieuze groep. Hoewel het incidenteel noodzakelijk is om 
menselijke resten en ander gevoelig materiaal te gebruiken in verklarende tentoonstellingen,behoort dit met 
tact en respect voor de gevoelens voor menselijke waardigheid van alle volkeren gedaan te worden.) 
1807 Whether this is the same institute that conducted the research documented in Nooter’s Study on ‘Old 
Kayaks in the Netherlands’ is not known. Nooter wrote the following on the research: “I had hoped that an 
investigation performed for me in Copenhagen on the characteristics of the hair still present on the skin, 
would permit determination of whether this is indeed the skin of a Greenlander, but unfortunately no 
conclusions could be drawn on this point. (…) An investigation performed in Freiburg on the fingerprints 
of the skin belonging to the right hand also failed to supply an answer to the question of whether this is the 
skin of a Greenlander”. Nooter, G., 1971, p. 34. In the documentation of available on the case of the 
Westfries Eskimo and in the final report on the DNA/ radiocarbon research (Institute of Forensic 
Medicine, 2001), no reference is made the investigations performed on behalf of Gert Nooter.  
1808 Prior to the entry into force of the Act on Dualism (Wet van 28 februari 2002 tot wijziging van de 
Gemeentewet en enige andere wetten tot dualisering van de inrichting, de bevoegdheden en de werkwijze 
van het gemeentebestuur" (Wet Dualisering Gemeentebestuur) in 2002, the city council was indeed the 
correct organ to decide upon legal acts under private law of the municipality.  
1809 Raadsvoorstel nr. 12, 11 July 2000, Registratienummer: 99.01622: “…to return the Inuit to Greenland in 
the case of an affirmative result of the DNA-analysis provided that the Inuit shall not be exhibited in 
Greenland but shall be laid to rest. With this strict condition setting a precedent will be prevented.” (…over 
te gaan tot teruggave van de Inuit aan Groenland indien middels DNA-onderzoek de Groenlandse 
herkomst bewezen is, waarbij als voorwaarde wordt gesteld dat de Inuit in Groenland niet als object van 
beschouwing of tentoonstelling zal dienen, maar daar een laatste rustplaats zal krijgen. Door deze strikte 
voorwaarden wordt precedentwerking voorkomen). 
1810 Ibid.   
1811 Ibid.   
1812 Ibid.   
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After the municipal decision making process had been finalised but before the 
completion of the DNA-research and the radiocarbon analysis, the Westfries Museum 
reconsidered its position on the return of the remains: given the fact that the Greenland 
National Museum also had mummies of Greenlandic origin in its collection and 
exhibition, the Board of Trustees of the Westfries Museum no longer considered it 
necessary to return the remains. 1813 The City of Hoorn, however, did not find it 
necessary to revise its decision. While the mayor of Hoorn wrote a letter to the Danish 
ambassador asking for clarification of the facts, which was redirected to the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs1814, the City Council stood by its earlier decision.  
On 29 March 2001, the Greenland Government announced the results of the DNA 
and radiocarbon analysis. According to the report by the Department of Forensic 
Genetics, it had been impossible to extract DNA from the specimens.1815 From the 
radiocarbon analyses, however, it appeared that the specimen presumably dated from a 
period around 1670 AD or [sic] the latter part of the 18th century.1816 It also indicated 
that the deceased must have had an almost exclusively terrestrial diet. This latter finding 
was crucial in the present case as the diet of Greenland Inuit consisted mainly of marine 
food intake.1817 Consequently, it was concluded that the remains could not have been 
that of a Greenland Inuit. This negative conclusion was supported by the existence of 
an ear piercing, which has never been described for Thule Culture Eskimos.1818  
With the finding that the human remains from the collection held by the Westfries 
Museum were not of Greenlandic origin the case came to a rest. The remains are still 
exhibited in the Westfries Museum.1819  
d) Extrapolation of principles 
The fact that the remains did not prove to be of Greenlandic origin does not mean 
that we cannot extrapolate the principles that underlie the decision-making process. This 
is the more the case in that the recommendation by the NMV Ethical Code Committee 
is meant to constitute general guidelines rather than applying only to the specific 
case.1820 In the following we will reformulate the recommendation by the NMV Ethical 
Code Committee in the form of principles.  
                                                     
1813 Coalitie blijft bij besluit over teruggeven mummie, 2000.  
1814 'IJsbrand' nu op bordje Groenland, 23 September 2000. 
1815 Institute of Forensic Medicine, 2001, p. 2. 
1816 Ibid., p. 3. 
1817 See further on the possibility of dietary reconstruction by isotope research: Larsen, C.S., 1997.  
1818 Institute of Forensic Medicine, 2001, p. 3. 
1819 Timmer, P.M.Y. / Gubbels, G.J., 2007, p. 191. Telephonic inquiry on 17 July 2009. 
1820 Cf.: the terms of references of the NMV Ethical Code Committee: ‘Reglement van de Commissie 
Museale Gedragslijn’, para. 4.1821 Cf.: Aarts, B., 2000, p. 82. In section 2(1) of NAGPRA cultural affiliation 
is defined as “a relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonable traced historically or 
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier 
group”. 25 U.S.C.3001 (2) (2004). See further on NAGPRA above in chp. 2.§2.II.2.  
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The solution introduced by the NMV Ethical Code Committee does not accord 
greater weight and legitimacy to the return of human remains than to the return of 
cultural objects in general. In fact, the solution proposed by the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee does not distinguish between human remains on the one hand and cultural 
artifacts on the other but instead accords greater weight and legitimacy only to claims 
for the return of human remains that are motivated by the wish for reburial.  
Furthermore, the wish for reburial will only be accepted where expressed by close 
family members or next-of-kin with the burden of proof of such relationship resting 
upon the claimants. According to one source the NMV Ethical Code Committee had 
considered to allow also for claims by culturally affiliated groups similar to the US 
federal legislation NAGPRA.1821 In its final recommendation, however, any reference to 
a broader group of claimants was dropped in order to avoid misunderstanding with 
regard to the historical relevance of human remains as witness of past views and 
practices.1822  
The NMV Ethical Code Committee’s approach is furthermore characterised by 
putting great emphasis on the interests of third parties: not only does it stress the need 
for conservation where human remains are not claimed with the underlying motive to 
bury them; even where this is the case and claimants have proven the required close 
family link, the retention of the remains can prevail over returning them.  
In short, we can summarise the underlying principles as follows: 
 
1. As a general principle, the return of human remains should be treated as the return of cultural 
property in accordance with Art. 4.4. sub b of the Dutch ICOM Code (1999 version): “[i]n case of 
requests for the return of cultural property to the land of origin, museums should be prepared to 
initiate dialogues based on scientific and professional principles (in preference to action at a 
governmental or political level). The possibility of developing bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
with museums in countries that have lost a significant part of their cultural heritage should be 
explored”.  
2. Where requests are motivated by the wish of (re-) burial respectively other funeral arrangements, 
reburial might outweigh the interests of the holding institution in retention. 
3. For a request to qualify as being motivated by the wish of (re-) burial it must be expressed by relatives 
/ next of kin who have provided proof of their relationship with the remains in form of DNA-testing 
or other form of documentation.  
 
                                                     
1821 Cf.: Aarts, B., 2000, p. 82. In section 2(1) of NAGPRA cultural affiliation is defined as “a relationship 
of shared group identity which can be reasonable traced historically or prehistorically between a present day 
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group”. 25 U.S.C.3001 (2) (2004). 
See further on NAGPRA above in chp. 2.§2.II.2.  
1822 C.f.: Ibid. Aarts’ information is based on an interview with Renée van Kempen, then secretary of the 
NMV Ethical Code Committee.  
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the National Museum of Ethnology, but explicitly mentioned a tattooed and preserved 
head (Toi Moko) with inventory number RMV 360-5763.1827 The provenance of the Toi 
Moko, or rather the circumstances under which it had left New-Zealand were unknown. 
During the eighteenth century expeditions under James Cook to New Zealand, a 
great number of objects were taken from New Zealand. It is therefore possible that the 
Toi Moko was amongst these objects. Captains, civil servants, and travellers brought 
these objects back home and traded them. Batavia, the main Eastern base of the Dutch 
trade, was at that time an important centre of the trade with Asia and the Southern 
hemisphere, and many Dutch citizens were sailing in the South Pacific Ocean.1828  
The inventory numbering suggests that the Toi Moko entered the collection of Royal 
Collection of Rarities in The Hague between 1827 and 1876.1829 The Royal Cabinet had 
been founded by King William I (1772-1843) in 1816 in The Hague.1830 The cabinet 
contained three categories of object: objects from the royal family; items that referred to 
the Dutch history; and finally ethnographic objects that had been acquired on trading 
missions to the East Indies or had been donated. The ethnographic part of this Royal 
Collection later formed the basis for the current National Museum of Ethnology.  
After the National Museum of Ethnology had received the request to return the 
remains from the Te Papa, it informed the Minister of Culture about the request.1831 As 
one of the former state museums that were converted from decentralised ministerial 
departments into independent legal entities in the 1990s1832 the National Museum does 
not own the collection including the Toi Moko but holds it on behalf of the Dutch State 
– the owner of the collection. Consequently, it is the Minister of Culture who has the 
authority to decide upon the return of the Toi Moko.1833 As holder of the collection, the 
                                                                                                                                          
2009 from Encyclopædia Britannica Online; Maori (2009), In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved April 17, 
2009, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.  
1827 From the available documentation it appears that further to the Toi Moko the National Museum of 
Ethnology does not contain other human remains of Māori or Moriori origin. An internal document states 
that the National Museum of Ethnology collection contains "no more than 35 objects of Māori origin”. 
While it does not explicitly state that these objects are not of human origin, the use of the word object 
(“voorwerp” in Dutch) suggests that there were no human remains amongst them. CB, 2002, Aan MT 
(Management Team). Betreft voorstel antwoord aan Te Papa en als aanhangsel de verschillende 
overwegingen die hieraan ten grondslag liggen. In Dutch the relevant passage reads: “Overigens omvat onze 
collectie van de Māori niet meer dan 35 voorwerpen”.  
1828 C.f.: Effert, R.A.H.D., 2005. 
1829 C.f.: Ibid. 
1830 See for an analysis of the history of the Royal Cabinet of Curiosities: Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003, pp. 15-63; 
Effert, R.A.H.D., 2008. The nucleus of the collection had been built by the father of King William I: 
Stadhouder prins Willem V (1748-1806). See further on his collection: Campen, J.v., 2000, pp. 202-221. 
1831 Engelsman, S., 23 October 2002, Letter to State Secretary of Culture Van Leeuwen. 
1832 See for the Conditions of privatisation: Memoire van Toelichting van de Wet verzelfstandiging 
rijksmuseale diensten kamerstukken II 1991/1992, 22771, nr. 3 and art. 21 van de Comptabiliteitswet, wet 
van 8 december 1976, Staatsblad 1976, nr. 671, laatstelijk gewijzigd bij Wet van 24 juni 1992, staatsblad 
1992, nor. 351.  
1833 Engelsman, S., 23 October 2002, Letter to State Secretary of Culture Van Leeuwen.  
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National Museum of Ethnology suggested to prepare a recommendation on behalf of 
the State Secretary.1834 
In the following, before turning to the recommendation submitted to the State 
Secretary, the internal deliberations amongst the curatorial staff of the National Museum 
of Ethnology shall be summarised as it allows for a view behind the curtains and 
provides an overview of the possible attitudes and arguments that can be expected to 
live within any public institution confronted with a claim for the return of human 
remains.  
The preparation of a recommendation on behalf of the Minister of Culture started 
with an internal survey of opinions held by the curatorial staff working at the National 
Museum of Ethnology. The following arguments for retention respectively he return of 
the Toi Moko emerged from the internal discussions:1835  
As arguments speaking against return were mentioned the insecurity as to whether 
the Te Papa qualified as legitimate stakeholder to claim the remains. Secondly, the 
relevance of the Toi Moko in the tradition of collecting and collections was emphasized. 
The head had entered the collection in the 1840s and consequently belongs to the 
nucleus of the collection held by National Museum of Ethnology. As one of the most 
senior objects from the collection, the Toi Moko has “become part of a European 
museum tradition, the preservation of which also should be recognized a highly serious 
responsibility (…)”.1836 Furthermore, a return of the Toi Moko would harm the integrity 
of the collection and thereby would result in a “falsification of the history”.1837 Finally, 
the loss of the Toi Moko for future research was mentioned. This aspect was considered 
far more important than the loss of the object for exhibition purposes.  
The following aspects were brought forward as speaking in favour of return: in the 
first place returning the Toi Moko would contribute to good relationships with the Te 
Papa and the region. Furthermore, by returning the Toi Moko, the National Museum of 
Ethnology would “make history” and could serve as good example for other museums. 
Finally, reference was made to the ethical imperative.1838  
Parallel to its internal deliberations the National Museum of Ethnology decided to 
seek external advice from an ethics committee, the (preparatory) ‘SVCN Ethnological 
Ethics Committee’.  
                                                     
1834 Ibid. 
1835 While a number of variations to retention on the one hand and return on the other were mentioned, the 
discussion soon focussed on the question as to whether or not return the remains. The following variations 
of how the National Museum of Ethnology could react to the request were not further considered: to limit 
itself to explaining its point of view and to guaranteeing that it continues to pay due respect to the Māori 
and Moriori culture. Alternatively, to invite the Te Papa to attend a ceremony during which the Toi Moko 
would be transferred to a special storage place within the National Musuem of Ethnology’s deposit.  
1836 CB, 2002, Aan MT (Management Team). Betreft voorstel antwoord aan Te Papa en als aanhangsel de 
verschillende overwegingen die hieraan ten grondslag liggen. 
1837 Ibid. 
1838 Ibid. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   394 12-10-2009   12:09:28
S O L U T I O N S  F O R  R E T U R N  A D O P T E D  A T  T H E  N A T I O N A L  L E V E L  |  395   
 
  
b) The recommendation of the (preparatory) ‘SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee’  
While the National Museum of Ethnology is a member of the Dutch Museum 
Association NMV, it did not turn to the NMV Ethical Code Committee that had issued 
the recommendation on the alleged Inuit remains held by the Westfries Museum. 
Instead, the National Museum of Ethnology sought advice from the ethics committee 
that was founded by the ‘Foundation of Ethnological Collections in the Netherlands’ 
(hereinafter: “Foundation of Ethnological Collections (SVCN)”).1839 This Foundation of 
Ethnological Collections represents eight institutions holding public collections of 
predominantly ethnological character.1840 The particular needs and questions that may 
arise from caring for ethnological collections is reflected in the aims and composition of 
the ethics committee as founded by the Foundation of Ethnological Collections (SVCN) 
(hereinafter the: SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee): its main task is to advise 
Dutch Ethnological Museums on questions regarding human remains, potential illegal 
objects, and the repatriation of objects or collections.1841 As for the composition of the 
SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee, it consists of representatives from the associated 
museums, a representative of the art trade, and an independent chairman.1842 In fact, the 
SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee was officially established only in 2004. However, 
prior to the official establishment of the SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee a 
preparatory committee had been appointed (“kwartiermakende commissie”). While its 
main task was to define the scope and procedural rules of the SVCN Ethnological 
Ethics Committee it also made a number of substantial recommendations, one of them 
being on the request to return the Toi Moko.  
On 29 January 2003, the National Museum of Ethnology approached the 
(preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee for feedback on the 
aforementioned scenarios of responding to the request for the Toi Moko. The National 
Museum of Ethnology also sought advice on the two conditions it wanted to make: first, 
that the Toi Moko may never be destroyed as it is part of Dutch cultural property, and 
secondly that it would remain accessible for scientific research. 
The (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee dealt with the request for 
advice of the National Museum of Ethnology during its meeting of 3 April 2003. While 
it was the first time that the (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee had to 
decide upon a case on the return of human remains it was not the first time that the 
treatment of human remains was discussed amongst members of the Foundation of 
Ethnological Collections (SVCN). In May 2002, a symposium on the treatment of 
human remains had been organised amongst the associated ethnological museums.1843 
As a result of the symposium, a (draft) ethical code on the treatment of human remains 
                                                     
1839 In Dutch: Stichting Volkenkundige Collectie Nederland (SVCN).  
1840 http://www.svcn.nl/nieuws.asp?identifier=272 (last visited 27 March 2008). 
1841 See: http://www.svcn.nl/nieuws.asp?identifier=160 (last visited 27 March 2008). 
1842 See: http://svcn.collectionconnection.nl/nieuws.asp?identifier=160 (last visited 17 April 2009). 
1843 The SVCN Symposium on human remains was held on 13 May 2002 in Amsterdam.  
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was formulated.1844 The code applies to the treatment of human remains ranging from 
their acquisition, management, research, presentation and restitution and refers to the 
ICOM Code as starting point:  
Collections of human remains and material of sacred significance should be housed 
securely and respectfully, and carefully maintained as archival collections in scholarly 
institutions. It should be available for legitimate study on request. Research on such 
materials, its housing, care and use (exhibition, replication, and publication) must be 
accomplished in a manner consistent with professional standards and the interests and 
beliefs of the members of the community, ethnic or religious groups from which the 
object originated. When sensitive material is used in interpretive exhibits, this must be 
done with great tact and with respect for the feelings of human dignity held by all 
peoples.1845 
From this provision of the ICOM Code the SVCN deducted a number of guidelines 
for the treatment of human remains by its associated institutions. With regard to the 
return of human remains paragraphs 2 and 6 are relevant.  
According to paragraph 2 museums have to provide for registration and 
documentation of existing collections of human remains. Where source communities 
approach a museum with a request for information on human remains, museums must 
share their information with them.1846 Hence, the code does not foresee in a pro-active 
duty to provide source communities with information about human remains but 
requires the members of the Foundation Ethnological Collections (SVCN) to keep (or 
bring) their inventories and documentation up-to-date and to respond diligently to 
requests for information.  
Paragraph 6 deals with various requests concerning human remains ranging from 
transfer of management responsibilities, research, exhibition and restitution.1847 
                                                     
1844 Legêne, S., et al., 2001. The code was officially adopted by the board of the Foundation Ethnological 
Collections on 27 June 2003 – shortly after the (preparatory) Ethnological Ethics Committee had issued its 
advise on the return of the Toi Moko. Presently, the SVCN Ethical Committee as officially established in 
2004 is working on the drafting of guidelines on the repatriation of objects from their members’ collection, 
including human remains. Cf.: Email by Annelies Valgaeren dated 1 April 2009, re: ‘introductory text for the 
expert meeting of the SVCN, Friday 3th of April 2009’ on file with the author.  
1845 Interestingly, despite being adopted in 2003, the SVCN ethical code on the treatment of human remains 
refers to the 1986 version of the ICOM Code and not to the ICOM Code as amended in 2001, which 
includes an additional sentence explicitly dealing with the removal of human remains from display and 
requests for the return of human remains. However, given the non-binding character of the ICOM Code 
and the fact that the tone of the two versions of the ICOM Code did not change, this reliance on the 
outdated ICOM Code is of no further relevance. See further on the evolution of the international ICOM 
Code above in chp. 2.§2.IV.3.  
1846 Para. 2 reads in Dutch: “Ieder museum dient zorg te dragen voor registratie en documentatie van 
bestaande collecties menselijke resten en heeft daarover desgevraagd aan de betrokken gemeenschappen een 
informatieplicht. Indien de betreffende menselijke resten deel uitmaken van een grafvondst waaruit ook 
andere objecten in de collectie zijn opgenomen wordt dit expliciet gedocumenteerd”. 
1847 Para. 6 reads in Dutch: “Ieder museum gaat open en afgewogen ter werk bij eventuele verzoeken met 
betrekking tot overdracht van het beheer, tot onderzoek, tentoonstellen of restitueren van menselijke resten 
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Museums are required to deal with such requests in an open and deliberate manner. The 
SVCN ethical code does not give any further guidance upon the criteria that may or 
should be taken into consideration when deciding upon a claim for the return of human 
remains. E.g. the wish for funeral arrangement, which plays a crucial role in the eye of 
the NMV Ethical Code Committee in its advice on the alleged Inuit remains, is not 
mentioned in the SVCN ethical code. Also, the code does not elaborate upon who 
qualifies as “legitimate representatives of the community concerned”. The SVCN ethical 
code does, however, explicitly require the associated institutions to share with the 
requesting party the decisive criteria on which its decision on the request is based. This 
requirement indirectly contributes to the quality of the decision-making process by 
requiring the institution to explicitly formulate its criteria. The responsibility and 
discretion given to the associated institutions is to some extent mitigated by the fact that 
institutions may always consult the SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee for further 
guidance. 
In the present case dealing with the request for the return of the Toi Moko, the 
(preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee discussed the two scenarios that 
were put forward by the museum: to either “return” the Toi Moko in form of a loan and 
under the conditions that it may never be destroyed as belonging to Dutch cultural 
property, and that it remained accessible for scientific research or to fully and 
unconditionally return the Toi Moko. The (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committtee dismissed the claim that the object belonged to the Dutch cultural heritage 
as weak. Consequently, it came to the conclusion that the most appropriate solution was 
the full and unconditional transfer of the property to the Te Papa.1848  
 On the basis of recommendation of the (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committtee and its internal deliberations the National Museum of Ethnology drafted its 
recommendation to the State Secretary, which will be discussed in the following.  
c) Recommendation on behalf of the state secretary 
On 7 May 2003, the National Museum of Ethnology sent its recommendation to the 
Minister of Culture. As a general starting point, National Museum of Ethnology 
emphasizes that human remains must be considered as sensitive parts of the 
collection.1849 Consequently, any decision-making process involving human remains 
should take due account of the views of all stakeholders, including those from the 
country of origin.1850  
                                                                                                                                          
aan legitieme vertegenwoordigers van de betrokken gemeenschap. De criteria die worden gebruikt om tot 
een eindoordeel te komen worden expliciet aangegeven”.  
1848 Verslag Ethische Commissie van de SVCN d.d. 3 april 2003 (on file with the author), . 
1849 Engelsman, S., Letter by Steven Engelsman to State Secretary of Culture Van Leeuwen re: "Maori-
hoofd 360-555763", 7 May 2003. 
1850 The recommendation sought to illustrate this point with reference to the case of the Westfries Eskimo. 
It stated that the National Museum of Ethnology would not have exhibited the remains of the so-called 
West Frisian Eskimo “as it is known that this is highly problematic for the Inuit”. With exhibiting mummies 
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With regard to claims for the return of human remains, the National Museum of 
Ethnology starts with the possibility of returning human remains. After recognising the 
de-accessioning and returning of human remains as realistic scenario, the 
recommendation reflects upon factors that are relevant for the decision-making process. 
One crucial question for the decision-making is whether the claiming party qualifies as 
direct stakeholder. With regard to the burden of proof of the relationship with the 
claimed remains it is held that it rested upon the claimant. 
Having suggested the foregoing general parameters to the State Secretary, the 
recommendation by the National Museum of Ethnology applies them to the specific 
claim of the Toi Moko. It informs the Minister of Culture that it is sceptical whether the 
Te Papa qualifies as direct stakeholder. While it was recognised that the Te Papa was an 
institution acting in the interest of the Māoris’, the National Museum of Ethnology 
suggested that one should only return the Toi Moko to the Te Papa after its mandate 
had been confirmed by the New-Zealand Government and the Māoris.1851 The National 
Museum of Ethnology nevertheless suggested dealing with the merits of the case in 
order not to give the impression that one was hiding behind procedural arguments.  
Consequently, the National Museum of Ethnology advised the Minister of Culture to 
agree in principle with the return of the Toi Moko to the legitimate stakeholder. 
Furthermore it asked to be mandated to start negotiations with the Te Papa and to make 
binding agreements. According to the National Museum of Ethnology, one should aim 
in the present case at returning the Toi Moko under a loan agreement and preferably on 
the conditions that the Toi Moko would never be destroyed as it belongs to Dutch 
cultural property, and that it would remain accessible for scientific research. Only if a 
“return” in form of a loan and under the aforementioned conditions proved unfeasible, 
the property of the Toi Moko should be transferred, full and unconditional.  
The Minister of Culture agreed with the recommendation as prepared by the 
National Museum of Ethnology.1852  
d) Stakeholder question  
While the advice of the SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee clearly provided that 
the Toi Moko should be returned unconditionally, it did not take away the doubts 
voiced with regard to the question whether the Te Papa Museum could legitimately 
                                                                                                                                          
originating from Peru not being problematic in Peru, the National Museum of Ethnology does not consider 
it problematic to exhibit Peruvian remains.  
1851 In the documentation that was submitted by the Te Papa with the official request, it was stated that “in 
regard to the repatriation of human remains, both the New Zealand Government and Māori tribes have 
agreed in principle to Te Papa’s role in this work, but no policy direction has yet been defined by the 
Government”. The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, 2001.  
1852 A copy of that confirmation is not included in the file; the letter by the state secretary is referred to in 
Engelsman, S., 2004b: “…in antwoord op mijn brief van 7 mei 2003 (…) heeft het Ministerie van OC&W 
mij laten weten dat de Staatssecretaris akkoord gaat met de voorgestelde acties”. (…in response to my letter 
dating 7 May, 2003, the Ministry of OC&W has informed me that the State Secretary agreed with the 
proposed plan), 
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claim the remains. In order to erase these doubts the National Museum of Ethnology 
sought advice from the Dutch Ambassador in New-Zealand. The Dutch ambassador 
discussed the matter with a leading Māori Chief, Darcy Nicholas, who is also general 
manager of the Museum Pataka in Porirua, New Zealand.1853 His reaction shows that 
the mission of the Te Papa is not uncontested: according to Nicholas, it was not for the 
Te Papa to claim the “guardianship” of Māori human remains: “We Māori are our own 
guardians!”1854 The Dutch Ambassador advised the National Museum of Ethnology to 
wait with the return of the Toi Moko until the iwis (Māori groups)1855 had adopted a 
common policy.1856 
On 30 June 2004, the Te Papa sent a letter to the National Museum of Ethnology 
confirming that it “had been mandated by the New Zealand Government to undertake a 
repatriation programme for Māori and Moriori ancestral remains”.1857 The programme, 
titled ‘Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation Programme’, had formally been adopted in July 
2003. The letter also stressed that as national museum of New Zealand, the Te Papa 
works closely together with Māori communities and tribal authorities.  
After continued communication between the Dutch and the New Zealand 
institution1858, the Te Papa submitted further documents to endorse the official status of 
Te Papa’s repatriation scheme: a letter from the Chief Executive of Te Manatu Taonga / 
Ministry for Culture and Heritage, dated 31 August 2004 on the “Repatriation of Koiwi 
Tangata Māori (Māori Ancestral Human Remains)1859, a briefing note prepared by Te 
Papa especially designed for overseas institutions on the role and status of the Te Papa 
in the repatriation of koiwi tangata1860; as well as a document entitled Te Papa 
Tongarewa and Repatriation. 
By letter dating from 7 October 2004, the National Museum of Ethnology informed 
the Te Papa that it accepted the letter written by Chief Executive Matthews of Te 
Manatu Taonga / Ministry for Culture and Heritage as proof for the New Zealand 
Government’s mandate for the Te Papa to implement a repatriation policy for koiwi 
tangata Māori. As far as the Māori support for the repatriation policy is concerned, 
however, the National Museum of Ethnology stated that: “it would be extremely helpful 
for our decision process to have an explicit statement in which the iwi express their 
                                                     
1853 Nachenius, A.d.B., 18 February 2003, Letter to the Director of the Museum van Volkenkunde - subject: 
Maori head and Te Papa. 
1854 Ibid. 
1855 An “iwi”is defined as “the traditional Māori tribal hierarchy and social order made up of hapu (kin 
groups) and whanau (family groups), having a founding ancestor and territorial (tribal) boundaries.” 
Retrieved April 5, 2005, from http://www.courts.govt.nz/Māorilandcourt/glossary.htm.  
1856 Nachenius, A.d.B., 18 February 2003, Letter to the Director of the Museum van Volkenkunde - subject: 
Maori head and Te Papa. 
1857 Te Puni, J. / Nesus, C., 30 June 2004, Letter to the Director of the Museum van Volkenkunde - subject: 
Maori ancestral remains. 
1858 Engelsman, S., 2004a. 
1859 Matthews, M., 2004. 
1860 The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, . 
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support for Te Papa’s repatriation policy. Such a document would be an elegant 
companion to the New Zealand Government’s mandate”.1861 
The return of the Toi Moko  
While it does not appear from the available documentation whether an expicit 
statement by one of the Māori iwis was ever presented, or which other developments 
might have triggered the decision, by August 2005 the National Museum of Ethnology 
was ready to return the Toi Moko. By letter dating from 11 August 2005 the director of 
the National Museum of Ethnology asked the Secretary of Culture to be mandated to 
return the Māori head to the Te Papa.1862 By letter dating 14 September 2005, the 
Minister of Culture gave the mandate to the director of the museum, Steven Engelsman, 
to transfer the property of the Toi Moko. On 9 November 2005 the head was returned 
to representatives of the Te Papa during a small ceremony attended by curators, 
scientists, academics and journalists.1863  
Extrapolation of principles 
In the following we will extract the principles with regard to the return of human 
remains as proposed in the case of the Toi Moko by the National Museum of Ethnology 
(RMV) and as confirmed by the (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committee.1864 Before reformulating the analysis in a number of principles, we need to 
reflect upon the relevance accorded in the present case to the notion of cultural national 
heritage. 
 In the above analyse, the relevance of the Toi Moko for the Dutch cultural heritage 
was touched upon in several instances. On the one hand, the relevance of the Toi Moko 
for the Dutch cultural heritage was emphasised: as an item from the collection of Royal 
Collection of Rarities the head was held to have “become part of a European museum 
tradition (…)”.1865 The initial idea of the RMV to return the Toi Moko under a loan 
agreement and on the conditions that the Toi Moko would never be destroyed gives 
expression to this perception of the head as belonging to Dutch cultural heritage. The 
(preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee on the other hand dismissed the 
claim that the object belonged to the Dutch cultural heritage as weak. It did not 
motivate its finding. However, based on our analysis in Chapter 3 of the regulation of 
Dutch public collections we can now discuss the status of the Toi Moko for the Dutch 
cultural heritage more in depth.  
                                                     
1861 Engelsman, S., 2004c, Letter to Mrs. Catherine Nesus - Repatriation Project Leader of the Te Papa. 
1862 Engelsman, S., 2005.  
1863 See, e.g.: Kaam, A.v., 9 November 2005.  
1864 We will evaluate them, together with the principles extrapolated from the other case studies at the end 
of this section discussing the return of human remains from the Netherlands. 
1865 CB, 2002, Aan MT (Management Team). Betreft voorstel antwoord aan Te Papa en als aanhangsel de 
verschillende overwegingen die hieraan ten grondslag liggen. 
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From the analysis in Chapter 3 (§2.I) we know that the Dutch perception of its 
national cultural heritage is very exclusive: only objects that are irreplaceable and 
indispensable in the sense of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (CHP Act) qualify 
as objects of the national cultural heritage.1866 While the CHP Act aims at the protection 
of cultural objects of national relevance in private collections, it applies analogously to 
objects in public collections. An object is irreplaceable if there are no similar objects 
present in the Netherlands.1867 While the Toi Moko might have been irreplaceable1868 it 
is doubtful whether it fulfils one of the functions (symbolic function; “linking function”; 
“reference function”) stipulating indispensability.1869 It clearly does not have a symbolic 
function: being of unknown provenance it cannot serve as memory of historically 
important persons or events.1870 However, the Toi Moko might have a “linking 
function” (in Dutch: schakelfunktie). This notion of indispensability is explained as the 
“functioning of an object or collection as an essential element in a development that is 
of great importance for the exercise of scholarly work, including cultural science 
studies.”1871 While one could clearly argue that the Toi Moko is not irrelevant for 
scientific research and cultural science studies it seems unlikely that the object is of such 
great importance that it fulfils a ‘linking function’ and is thus indispensable.  
Yet a different matter is the status of the Toi Moko as part of the greater collection 
of the Royal Collection of Rarities. This collection clearly satisfies the criteria of 
irreplaceability and indispensability.1872 Not only can the collection serve as memory of 
King William (1772-1843) as founder of the collection, which suggests a symbolic 
function; even more relevant is the collection’s “linking function” and “reference 
function”: the foundation of the collection is typical for the emergence of public 
collections out of private collections at the end of the 18th century within Europe.1873 
While the disposal of the Toi Moko cannot diminish the meaning and significance of 
the collection as such it is nevertheless important that its loss for the collection will be 
absorbed in as far as possible by documentation. Such documentation would reduce the 
harm done to the integrity of the collection and would counteract the fear of “falsifying 
                                                     
1866 Art. 2. CHP Act. See above in chp. 2.§2.I.1 for a discussion of these criteria.  
1867 Art. 2(2) CHP Act. 
1868 The author is not aware of other Toi Moko’s present in Dutch public collections.  
1869 Art. 2(3) CHP Act. 
1870 Art. 2(3)(a) CHP Act.  
1871 Art. 2(3)(b) CHP Act. See also: Memorie van Toelichting, 27812, nr. 3, p. 8 para. 7. An example of an 
object listed for its “linking function” is a stone sculpture of a standing triumphing Jesus Christ. The 
sculpture dates from the Roman period and is one of very few similar sculptures that are present in the 
Netherlands. The sculpture is thus important for the studying of stone sculptures in the Maas area. Cf.: 
Raad voor Cultuur, 2001. See further on the relevance of the collection: Effert, R.A.H.D., 2003; Effert, 
R.A.H.D., 2008.  
1872 See with regard to collections Art. 3 juncto Art. 2 sub 2 and 3. 
1873 Cf.: the motivation of designating the Bibliotheca Thysiana as protected collection on the list of the 
CHP Act. Raad voor Cultuur, 2001, available online at: http://www.minocw.nl/documenten/brief2k-2002-
doc-8733b.pdf (last visited 8 April 2009). 
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history”.1874 In conclusion, our reflection of the Toi Moko’s relevance for the Dutch 
cultural heritage revealed that the head as such did not form part of the Dutch national 
cultural heritage but its de-accession should be accompanied by precise documentation 
to compensate for its loss for the Royal Collection of Rarities and thus to safeguard the 
collection’s integrity. 
Having “dismissed” the Toi Moko as object of crucial relevance for the Dutch 
cultural heritage we can now turn to the extrapolation of principles that were decisive in 
the decision-making process of the return of the Toi Moko:  
 
1. Human remains must be considered as sensitive parts of the collection;  
2. Any decision-making process involving human remains should take due account of the views of all 
stakeholders, including those from the country of origin; 
3. the holding institution must share with the claimant the criteria that were decisive in the decision-
making process; 
4. While return in form of a loan must not be dismissed as an option, full and unconditional transfer of 
human remains is the most appropriate option where the remains do not form part of the Dutch 
cultural heritage; 
5. In deciding upon requests for return collection holders must pay attention to the question whether 
the requesting party qualifies as appropriate stakeholder; 
6. The requesting party has to provide proof of being the appropriate stakeholder.1875 
 
3.  TH E  P RO-A C T I V E  A P P R O A C H  O F  T H E  KIT  TR O P EN M U S E UM 
a) The facts 
Different from the previous two case-studies the case study on the KIT 
Tropenmuseum1876 in Amsterdam does not deal with a specific claim for the restitution 
of human remains. Instead, it deals with the pro-active initiative taken by the KIT 
Tropenmuseum (hereinafter: the KIT) in studying and reflecting upon its collection of 
human remains. The decision of the KIT to deal with this subject matter was triggered 
by the return of a long-term loan and by the restitution claims that resonated in 
museums around the world.1877  
The long-term loan concerned the physical anthropological collection of human 
remains, animal remains and plaster casts from the KIT that had been given to the 
University of Amsterdam’s Museum Vrolijk in 1973. The loan had been meant to 
supplement the medical anatomical collection of the Vrolijk Museum at a time when the 
                                                     
1874 CB, 2002, Aan MT (Management Team). Betreft voorstel antwoord aan Te Papa en als aanhangsel de 
verschillende overwegingen die hieraan ten grondslag liggen. 
1875 See further below for an update on the developments within the SVCN with regard to the drafting of 
guidelines on the return of human remains. 
1876 The Tropenmuseum (literally: the “tropical museum” or the museum of the tropical) is part of the 
Royal Tropical Institute (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen). The abbreviation KIT refers both to the 
museum and the institute. Cf.: Duuren, D.v., et al., 2007, p. 5 
1877 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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KIT no longer conducted physical anthropological research.1878 The loan was designed 
as a long-term loan, with no termination date. In 2000, the Vrolijk Museum decided to 
return the loan. Given the developments challenging the status of human remains in 
(public) collections world-wide the KIT decided to take the return of the loan as starting 
point of researching the history of its Department of Physical Anthropology and to 
reflect upon its current policy with regard to (the restitution of) human remains.1879  
The first phase of the research project consisted of an internal research in which the 
provenance of all objects from the returned physical anthropological collection was 
investigated.1880 The internal research of the collection revealed that the collection of 
human remains had been brought together between 1915 and 1964. This core period of 
collecting human remains essentially stretches over the period of existence of the KIT’s 
predecessor, the Colonial Institute. The Colonial Institute in Amsterdam had been 
established in 1910 as Dutch centre of expertise in a range of subjects relating to Dutch 
colonialism, including ethnology. Part of the Colonial Institute was the Colonial 
Museum, which had a bi-parte structure consisting of a section dealing with trade in 
tropical objects and an ethnographic section. As of 1915, physical anthropology 
occupied a prominent part in the scientific and public policy of the institute.1881 In 1964, 
with the retirement of R.A.M. Bergman as director of the Colonial Institute, the era of 
physical anthropology came to an end. Since then, the activities in this field were 
confined to the keeping of the already assembled objects.1882  
An exact calculation of the number of human remains in the collection is difficult to 
make. Often, a single inventory number designates some hundred bones and bone 
fragments.1883 Most of the human remains are so-called dry specimens (bones). This 
category splits into contemporary remains and much older, archaeological remains.1884 
Only a comparatively small number of specimens is preserved in alcohol.1885  
With regard to the geographical origin of the collection most of the human remains 
that had been acquired prior to World War II had a colonial provenance: most remains 
were obtained in the Dutch colonies, in particular the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), 
and the former Dutch New Guinea (Papua).1886  
With regard to the composition of the collection and the circumstances in which the 
remains had been acquired the research was not conclusive given the absence of any 
written collection or research policy in the available archival records. The lack of 
information stems to some extent from the fact that physical anthropologists rarely 
                                                     
1878 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 5 & 36. 
1879 Cf.:Ibid., p. 40. 
1880 Cf.: Ibid.with further details on the process and the collection management tools employed, such as the 
Museum System (TMS).  
1881 Cf.: Ibid., p. 24.  
1882 Cf.: Ibid., p. 27. 
1883 Cf.: Ibid., p. 42. 
1884 Cf.: Ibid. 
1885 Cf.: Ibid. 
1886 Cf.: Ibid., p. 41. 
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recorded the circumstances of acquisition of their material.1887 Consequently, little is 
known about the original relevance of the remains for source communities and the 
circumstances of acquisition. The fragmented and inbalanced composition of the 
collection (a “potpourri of rare ethnological, archaeological and recent human 
remains”)1888 suggests donations as main means of acquisition.1889 
 On the basis of its research findings the KIT formulated a draft policy to be 
discussed with experts from different academic, museological, and national 
backgrounds. The draft policy differed between four categories of human remains:  
 
A. Physical anthropological remains in the strict sense of the term;  
B. Ethnographical remains;  
C. Archaeological remains, at least two hundred years old plus worked human remains;  
D. Recent historical remains from the World War II, found in Dutch New Guinea.1890 
 
According to the draft policy, each of these categories merits different treatment: 
physical anthropological remains, i.e. dry specimen such as skulls, parts of skulls and 
bones and specimen preserved in alcohol should either be “destroyed” or be disposed. 
Destruction was understood as ranging from cremation and burial to donations for 
academic use. Given the poor conditions and anonymity of the remains cremation or 
burial were thought as the most obvious option. With regard to ethnographic remains, 
as well as archaeological remains, the draft policy stated that both categories required 
(further) re-evaluation as to their ethnographical, historical and cultural importance. 
With regard to the fourth category, consisting of skeletal remains of soldiers that had 
died in Dutch New Guinea during World War II, the policy recommended their 
repatriation.1891  
The draft policy was discussed during an expert meeting that had been convened for 
this purpose by the KIT in February 2006. Experts from different academic, 
museological, and national backgrounds1892 had been invited to discuss the “past, 
present and future” of the collection of human remains of the KIT.1893  
                                                     
1887 Cf.: Ibid., p. 43. 
1888 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 50 & 40. 
1889 Cf.: Ibid. 
1890 Cf.: Lubina, K.R.M., 2007, p. 85. 
1891 Cf.: Ibid. 
1892 Dr. Laura van Broekhoven – National Museum of Ethnology Leiden, Dr. Andries van Dam, Museum 
of Anatomy Leiden, Dr. Katherine Goodnow – University of Bergen, Prof. Dr Ton Hol- Utrecht 
University, Einar Lund Jansen – National Museum of Denmark, Viktor Kasiepo – Representatie Papua 
community in The Netherlands, Prof. Dr. Sankot Marzuki – Eijkman Institute for Molecular Biology 
Jakarta, Prof. Dr. Norman Palmer, Dr. Laura Peers – Pitt Rivers Museum, Dr. Ciraj Rassool, University of 
the Western Cape, Drs. Laurens de Rooy – Museum Vrolijk, Dr. Hedley Swain – Museum of London. 
From the KIT: Indrea Bergval, Drs. Koos van Brakel, Drs. David van Duuren, Denise Frank, Prof. Dr 
Susan Legêne, Lejo Schenk, Drs. Pim Westerkamp. The morning session was attended by Riet de Leeuw, 
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. The author was allowed to attend the meetings.  
1893 The following summary of the expert meeting is based on: Lubina, K.R.M., 2007.  
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As to the four categories proposed in the draft policy and the diverging treatment, 
the group of experts unanimously agreed that there exists no clear-cut distinction 
between the categories: the distinction between physical anthropological material and 
ethnographic material, as well as archaeological remains however is not as self-evident as 
it appears in the first place. In principle, ethnographical remains are physical 
anthropological material with a historic, local, and/or scientific context. Vice versa, 
ethnographical remains also qualify as physical remains. Neither does a clear-cut 
distinction with archaeological remains exist. Consequently, the group of experts held 
that all human remains in the collection of the KIT should be re-evaluated instead of 
limiting re-evaluation to ethnographical and archaeological remains. The re-evaluation 
should cover the original meaning of the remains to the source-community, their 
current meaning within the collection of the KIT, as well as their current meaning 
outside the KIT to source-communities and other institutions.  
The experts pleaded for a more nuanced approach both with regard to the 
destruction and restitution of human remains: with regard to the KIT’s original idea to 
destroy most physical anthropological objects it was stressed that the objects may very 
well have scientific value: the remains originated from parts of the world that are or may 
not be (well) represented in other collections and thus should not be automatically 
destroyed. With regard to the restitution of human remains, the discussions amongst the 
experts highlighted that restitution should not be done for the wrong reason: restitution 
should not be motivated by the wish to get rid of the material. On the other hand, 
restitution should not be understood as simply giving back material from one country to 
another: restitution is not about restitution of remains in the first place, but about the 
restitution of authority over these remains. In this understanding, restitution can also 
mean that the remains stay in the museum while ownership or the management is 
transferred. Also, restitution can mean that remains are given a specific status within, or 
even outside the museum collection (e.g. from owner to custodian with limited rights).  
It was agreed during the expert meeting that until restitution in this broad sense 
could be realised, human remains were best taken care of by the KIT itself. In the 
meantime, the KIT should continue analysing its one own intellectual history and 
engage in new relationships with formerly colonized peoples. The latter requires more 
provenance research of the human remains. The research should be extended from the 
archives of the KIT to include also archives of private collectors who might have 
introduced the objects to the collection of the then colonial museum, as well as archives 
in other European countries. The experts pointed out that the identification of source 
communities could lead to the following paradox: with successful identification of 
source communities of human remains as necessary condition for any restitution, the 
scientific value of human remains increases. Put differently: with the increase in 
documentation and knowledge of the remains their scientific value increases as well. 
Until such information is found the remains from the anthropological collection have 
little significance for the KIT in its current understanding as ethnographic museum. 
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However, by putting the remains in their historical, cultural and geographical context 
they may gain a new dimension of significance for scientific research.1894  
Regardless of this potential conflict between restitution and scientific research the 
seeking of dialogues with source communities was stressed as an important, if not the 
most important next step for the KIT to take. It was expressed that the KIT should 
seek as much openness and transparency to allow for dialogue with source communities.  
Extrapolation of principles 
As a result of the expert meeting the KIT came to the conclusion that its attempt to 
formulate and implement a clear-cut policy making an a priori distinction between 
different categories of human remains in its collection was not sustainable. While its 
draft policy proved very valuable in initiating the process of reflecting upon the 
collection the KIT learned to approach the restitution of human remains as a process 
that could not be dealt with by the implementation of certain guidelines but as a process 
that had only been initiated and involved a broad understanding of restitution and 
greater understanding of the value of the collection as a whole. In agreement with the 
expert recommendations to strive for openness and transparency the KIT published its 
research findings on its physical anthropological collection in a special volume of its 
bulletin series.1895 With the publication of “Physical anthropology reconsidered - Human 
remains at the Tropenmuseum” the KIT signalled its willingness to engage in a dialogue 
with other stakeholders. Also, the KIT is currently cooperating with the Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam and the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie 
NIOD in a research project, investigating a.o. the origin of human remains, allegedly 
Japanese soldiers with the aim to repatriate them.1896 
While the KIT came to the conclusion that it is not possible to define a clear-cut 
policy with regard to the treatment and repatriation of human remains we can 
nevertheless extract principles that guide the decision-making process: 
 
1. Human remains must be treated with sensitivity bearing in mind their original meaning to the source-
community, their current meaning within the collection of the KIT, as well as their current meaning 
outside the KIT to source-communities and other institutions; 
2. The relevance of human remains for research should be assessed against a global context. 
3. Repatriation is not only about the actual act of returning human remains:  
a. motivation of the holding collection matters 
b. repatriation is about the restitution of authority;  
4. Repatriation can have various manifestations ranging from physical return to transferring ownership 
or management to granting the remains a specific status within, or even outside the museum 
collection; 
                                                     
1894 Cf.: Duuren, D.v., et al., 2007, p. 59. 
1895 Ibid. 
1896 See for a description of the project: ‘Sites, Bodies and Stories - The dynamics of heritage formation in 
colonial and postcolonial Indonesia and the Netherlands’:  
http://www.onderzoekinformatie.nl/nl/oi/biza/d34000o/OND1331303/ (last visited 17 April 2009).  
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5. Dialogue with source communities is essential. 
 
4.  CO M P A R I S O N  O F  T H E  P R I N C I P L E S  EX T R A P O L A T E D  I N  V I E W  O F  I D EN T I F Y I N G  K E Y  
E L E M E N T S  F O R  A  DU T C H  P O L I C Y  O N  T H E  R EP A T R IA T ION  OF  H U M A N  REM A IN S  
 At the end of each case-study we have extracted the principles that underlie the 
decision-making in the respective case. In the following, we will compare these 
principles in order to see whether they allow us to formulate more general principles or 
to identify key elements with regard to the repatriation of human remains from Dutch 
public collections.  
At first sight already, a comparison of the principles extrapolated in the case studies 
suggests that it is impossible to identify common ground in the principles extracted. 
While there exists significant agreement between the principles put forward by the 
National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) / (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committee and those underlying the pro-active reflection by the KIT there exists little if 
no overlap with the principles that underlie the recommendation of the NMV Ethical 
Code Committee. One of the principles that underlie both the decision-making by the 
National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) / (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committee and the reflection of the KIT is that all human remains must be treated with 
great sensitivity. In contrast, the NMV Ethical Code Committee expressed the principle 
that in principle human remains should not be treated any different from the return of 
other collection items. It is nevertheless correct to state that the principle that human 
remains should be considered as sensitive parts of the collection and should be treated 
with respect and sensitivity constitutes a general principle of Dutch policy on the 
repatriation of human remains: in 2006, the Dutch translation of the international 
ICOM Code has been updated. This change is relevant in that the Dutch ICOM Code 
form the basis of the recommendations of the NMV Ethical Code Committee.1897 While 
the 1999 version that underlies the recommendation with regard to the “West Frisian 
Eskimo” did not include any provision dealing explicitly with the return of human 
remains the present Dutch version dating from 2006 does contain such provision. 
Paragraph 4.4 of the Dutch ICOM Code (2006) is an accurate translation of the 
provision from the international 2004 ICOM Code:  
Requests for removal from public display of human remains or material of sacred 
significance from the originating communities must be addressed expeditiously with 
respect and sensitivity. Requests for the return of such material should be addressed 
similarly. Museum policies should clearly define the process for responding to such 
requests.1898 
                                                     
1897 http://www.museumvereniging.nl/default.aspx?id=327 (last visited 17 April 2009).  
1898 In Dutch: 4.4 Verwijdering uit een openbare tentoonstelling: Verzoeken tot verwijdering van menselijke resten 
of objecten met een religieuze betekenis uit een openbare tentoonstelling, komende uit de betrokken 
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With this provision dealing specifically with human remains and stressing the need of 
respect and sensitivity, the general starting point of the recommendation of the NMV 
Ethical Code Committee to treat requests for the return of human remains no different 
from any other request seeking the return of cultural property can no longer be upheld. 
Instead, paragraph 4.4. of the current version of the Dutch ICOM Code supports the 
general principle that ‘human remains must be considered as sensitive parts of the 
collection and must be treated with respect and sensitivity’.  
A second, however, irreconcilable difference between the three sets of principles 
concerns the motivation for which human remains may legitimately be claimed. Again, it 
is the policy as expressed by the NMV Ethical Code Committee that cannot be 
reconciled with the principles underlying the decision by the National Museum of 
Ethnology (RMV) / (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee and the 
reflection of the KIT. According to the NMV Ethical Code Committee only requests 
motivated by the wish of (re-) burial respectively other funeral arrangements will be 
considered. The two other policies took a much broader perspective on repatriation and 
did not formulate any conditions on the treatment of remains after their return. In fact, 
while the National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) contemplated about including a 
condition prohibiting the burial of the Toi Moko, the (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological 
Committee stated that where an object does not qualify as belonging to Dutch cultural 
heritage, a return must be full and unconditional. The KIT’s pro-active initiative does 
not make mention of any conditions for returns. Instead, it starts from the perception 
that repatriation is about the transfer of authority and that it can have various 
manifestations ranging from physical return to transferring ownership or management 
to granting the remains a specific status within, or even outside the museum collection. 
Both the (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Committee and the KIT did not state any 
other substantial criteria that should guide the decision making process. Instead, both 
put more emphasis on the decision-making process. Before turning to this aspect we 
have to conclude that no general principle can be formulated with regard to substantial 
criteria: the emphasis the NMV Ethical Code Committee put on the motivation of 
reburial is not shared by the other two policies and no further substantial criteria have 
been provided.  
In the absence of substantial criteria, the decision-making process becomes crucial. 
Both the National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) / (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological 
Ethics Committee and the KIT stress the relevance of dialogue between the holding 
institution and the claimants. While the policy of the NMV Ethical Code Committee is 
silent in this respect, it does not oppose dialogue and the sharing of the criteria on 
which its decision on the request is based with the requesting party. Consequently, we 
take the liberty to formulate as key element for a Dutch general policy that the decision-
                                                                                                                                          
gemeenschappen, worden met respect en gevoel behandeld. Voor verzoeken tot teruggave geldt hetzelfde. 
Voor de behandeling van dergelijke verzoeken worden heldere richtlijnen vastgesteld. 
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making process should be characterised by dialogue.1899 As minimum measure 
institutions must share the decisive criteria with the requesting party. 
The principle that the decision-making process should be characterised by dialogue 
presupposes a second party to discuss the matter. From the case notes, especially the 
note discussing the return of the Toi Moko, it became apparent that the identification 
and confirmation of the legitimate negotiating party or stakeholder is more complex 
than appears at first sight. Who should be accepted as legitimate stakeholder? The NMV 
Ethical Code Committee took a very restrictive approach as to whom to accept as 
stakeholder: only relatives / next of kin who have provided proof of their relationship 
with the remains in form of DNA-testing or other form of documentation are accepted 
as stakeholder. Such approach demonstrates a Euro-American conception of kinship: “a 
conception in which the notion of direct kin, or in fact the transmission of “blood” or 
genetic material, is considered the unambiguous and only determinant for a person’s 
place in the network of relations”.1900 The Euro-American conception of kinship 
consequently does not pay any relevance to shared experiences or substances other than 
blood and genetic material in shaping the network of relations between people. 
However, since the mid-1990s, anthropology has adopted a broader perspective, 
encompassing “norms, roles, institutions and cognitive processes referring to all the 
social relationships that people are born into or create later in life, and that are expressed 
through, but not limited to, an etic biological idiom”.1901 Consequently, under the 
current concept of kinship relatedness can be established through other means than 
blood and genetic material.1902 According to one source, the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee had considered to allow also for claims by culturally affiliated groups similar 
to the US federal legislation NAGPRA.1903 In its final recommendation, however, any 
                                                     
1899 Such principle would also be in line with the so-called polder model that is often stressed as being 
typical for Dutch mentality. The polder-model refers to the decision-making by consensus. The name 
polder-model is derived from one of the possible explanations of the emphasis put on consensus: according 
to this explanation the unique geography of the Netherlands, largely consisting of polders forced different 
societies to cooperate. Polders, land regained from the sea, require constant pumping and maintenance of 
the dykes. Consequently, even when different cities in the same polder were fighting each other, they still 
had to cooperate in taking responsibility for the dykes. See further on the polder-model: Bos, D., et al., 
2007. 
1900 Dousset, L., 2002, http://www.ausanthrop.net/research/kinship/kinship2.php (unnumbered 
document).  
1901 Ibid., (unnumbered document); Stone, L., 2001, p. 2. 
1902 Dousset gives the following examples of practices: “in New Guinea, two persons that regularly drink 
from the same cup and eat the same food become brothers. They share substance, they establish kinship 
through consubstantiality. Among the Inuit or Eskimos, you do not always have to hunt with or fish with 
your kin, but an unrelated hunting partner may well become close relatives, as if they were born by the same 
mother. Among Noongar (…) rearing up is an important mechanism in the establishment of kin ties. Of 
course, those who are reared up together do not have to be what Euro-American culture calls blood 
relatives”. Dousset, L., 2002, http://www.ausanthrop.net/research/kinship/kinship2.php (unnumbered 
document). 
1903 Cf.: Aarts, B., 2000, p. 82. In section 2(1) of NAGPRA cultural affiliation is defined as “a relationship 
of shared group identity which can be reasonable traced historically or prehistorically between a present day 
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reference to a broader group of claimants was dropped in order to avoid 
misunderstanding and stress the historical relevance of human remains as witness of 
past views and practices.1904 As consequence, culturally affiliated groups cannot validly 
claim human remains according to the NMV Ethical Code Committee. 
In contrast to the dated Euro-American conception of kinship as embraced by the 
NMV Ethical Code Committee the National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) / 
(preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee did not define or restrict the circle 
of legitimate stakeholders in advance. Instead, they limited themselves to emphasising 
the relevance for the holding institutions to pay attention to the question whether the 
requesting party qualifies as appropriate stakeholder. This question has to be decided 
case-by-case and on the basis of proof provided by the requesting party. In the present 
case the National Museum of Ethnology (RMV) accepted the Museum of New Zealand 
Te Papa Tongarewa (“the Te Papa”) as “replacement” stakeholder in the absence of 
clarity as to which of the Māori communities (iwi) the Toi Moko should be returned to.  
The KIT did not explicitly reflect upon the notion of stakeholder or who qualifies as 
legitimate party seeking the return of human remains. The absence of this reflection can 
be explained by the fact that the case of the KIT is an pro-active introspection rather 
than a reaction to a request made by another party. From the fact that the KIT does 
refer repeatedly to the interests of source communities we can nevertheless conclude 
that the KIT has a broad understanding of who can qualify as stakeholder.  
Again, we have identified a situation in which the KIT and the National Museum of 
Ethnology (RMV) / (preparatory) SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee expressed 
similar ideas with regard to whom may qualify as legitimate stakeholder. According to 
their approach the circle of legitimate stakeholders should not be limited in advance. 
Proof of a valid interest must be provided by the requesting party. The NMV Ethical 
Code Committee again represents a dissenting opinion starting from an Euro-American 
conception of who may qualify as legitimate stakeholder. In light of the developments in 
the field of anthropology since the mid-1990s, in particular the adoption of a broader 
perspective on kinship encompassing “norms, roles, institutions and cognitive processes 
referring to all the social relationships that people are born into or create later in life, 
and that are expressed through, but not limited to, an etic biological idiom”1905, we deem 
it appropriate to attach less value to the principle expressed by the NMV Ethical Code 
Committee. Consequently, the third and final general principle we were able to identify 
by comparing the sets of principles from the case studies is that ‘great relevance must be 
paid to the question whether the requesting party qualifies as appropriate stakeholder. 
                                                                                                                                          
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group”. 25 U.S.C.3001 (2) (2004). 
See further on NAGPRA above in chp. 2.§2.II.2.  
1904 C.f.: Ibid. Aarts’ information is based on an interview with Renée van Kempen, then secretary of the 
NMV Ethical Code Committee.  
1905 Dousset, L., 2002, http://www.ausanthrop.net/research/kinship/kinship2.php (unnumbered 
document); Stone, L., 2001, p. 2. 
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This question has to be decided case-by-case and on the basis of proof provided by the 
requesting party’. 
5.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  T H E  NE TH E R L A N D S 
 In the Netherlands no official policy on the return of human remains from public 
collections has been endorsed by the Dutch Government. Instead, institutions affected 
by a claim or wishing to adopt a pro-active attitude are essentially free to decide about 
whether or not to return human remains. The Dutch Government was, however, 
involved in the case of the Toi Moko claimed from the Museum of Ethnology in 
Leiden. As owner of the collection, the state, represented by the Minister of Culture had 
to agree with the de-accession of the object from the collection.1906 In the absence of 
government regulations, public collection have sought external advice from professional 
bodies advising museums about ethical problems or from an ad-hoc group of experts.  
In the case of the alleged Inuit remains the West Frisian sought advice from the 
NMV Ethical Code Committee, which was founded to advise museums about the 
Dutch ICOM Code and to hold their behaviour against the code.1907 In the case of the 
Toi Moko from the collection of the National Museum of Ethnology a different 
committee was relied upon: the (preparatory) ‘SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee’. 
The committee was founded by the Foundation of Ethnological Collections (SVCN) in 
order to better represent the particular needs and questions that may arise from caring 
for ethnological collections. When the case of the Toi Moko was referred to the 
committee, it was not yet fully established. In fact, the SVCN Ethnological Ethics 
Committee was officially established only in 2004. Consequently, the case of the Toi 
Moko was heard by a preparatory committee, which had been appointed to define the 
scope and procedural rules of the SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee but also made 
a number of substantial recommendations. The KIT, finally, did not seek advice from 
any of the two permanent professional bodies but instead invited a number of experts to 
seek feedback on its envisioned policy.  
Our analysis of the recommendations of the professional ethics bodies /expert 
group revealed that it is difficult to arrive at one common set of ethical principles. Only 
three principles, essentially procedural in character, could be identified as principles of 
general validity: 
 
1. Human remains must be considered as sensitive parts of the collection and must be treated with 
respect and sensitivity; 
2. The decision-making process should be characterised by dialogue. As minimum measure institutions 
must share the decisive criteria with the requesting party; 
                                                     
1906 Cf.: chp. 3.§2.I. on the management of cultural objects in ownership of the Dutch State.  
1907 http://www.museumvereniging.nl/default.aspx?id=337 (last visited 27 March 2008). The NMV Ethical 
Code Committee was originally called in Dutch the ‘Commissie Museale Gedragslijn’. In 2007 the name was 
revised to “Ethische Codecommissie voor Musea”.  
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3. Great relevance must be paid to the question whether the requesting party qualifies as appropriate 
stakeholder. This question has to be decided case-by-case and on the basis of proof provided by the 
requesting party. 
 
Consequently, while there exists some guidance for institutions in the Netherlands 
on how to deal with a claim for the return of human remains no clear-cut practice 
instructing the decision-making process from a substantive point of view could (yet) be 
identified. How must one evaluate the finding that with regard to the Dutch situation 
we have been able to identify only three principles of procedural character? At first sight 
this finding is clearly disappointing. However, they might very well be realistic. While we 
will postpone further evaluations until after we have extrapolated also the principles 
valid in the United Kingdom and France, we would like to make mention of the findings 
by an expert group with regard to the formulation of principles on repatriation. On 3 
April 2009 the SVCN Ethical Code Committee (i.e. the now fully established successor 
of the preparatory SVCN Ethical Code Committee) convened an expert meeting on the 
drafting of guidelines with regard to the repatriation of objects, including human 
remains from the collections of their associated member institutions.1908 After having 
discussed international developments, philosophical aspects of repatriation and 
restitution, as well as case studies of various Dutch institutions1909 the meeting was 
concluded with emphasising the need of open-minded and transparent dialogue with 
requesting parties. Such dialogue should be facilitated by a list of aspects that could or 
should be discussed. Similar conclusions were also drawn for the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom, which will be discussed in the following section. 
I I .  UN I T E D  K IN G DO M   
 In the United Kingdom, the introspection of its public collections and the 
reflection upon how to deal with human remains and future claims was triggered by two 
events in particular: the publication of a report by the Select Committee on Culture 
Media and Sport of the House of Commons (hereinafter: “the Select Committee”) and a 
joint statement by the prime ministers of the UK and Australia.  
In July 2000, the Select Committee published a report titled ‘Cultural Property: 
Return and Illicit Trade’.1910 The report focused inter alia on policies and procedures of 
museums relating to the acquisition and return of cultural property which has been 
illicitly removed. The Select Committee touched upon human remains as one type of 
material that falls under the broad notion of “cultural property” as defined in the 1970 
                                                     
1908 Email by Annelies Valgaeren dated 1 April 2009, re: ‘introductory text for the expert meeting of the 
SVCN, Friday 3th of April’ on file with the author.  
1909 The case studies were not limited to human remains. As for human remains only the case of the Toi 
Moko was discussed. 
1910 Seventh Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade, 2000.  
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UNESCO Convention.1911 With regard contested cultural property, the Select 
Committee stated that the nature of the claims for the return varies: “[t]he types of 
material subject to claims are very diverse, from human remains, to works of art and 
domestic and religious objects”.1912 During the process of the inquiry, the Select 
Committee became convinced that the category of return claims dealing with human 
remains deserved separate analysis.1913 Consequently, and based upon further insights 
gained during the inquiry, the Select Committee recommended further analysis, 
including a consultation exercise of claims dealing with human remains and the handling 
of human remains in public collections more in general.1914 The same year, in July 2000, 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Prime Minister of Australia John Howard issued a 
joint statement according to which both governments were to increase efforts to 
repatriate human remains to Australian indigenous communities.1915  
In response to this statement and the recommendations of the Select Committee and 
the Government of the United Kingdom established a working group to provide for a 
comprehensive analysis of the subject before undertaking a consultation exercise.1916  
1.  TH E  WO RK IN G  GR O U P  O N  HU M A N  RE MA I N S  I N  MU S E U M  CO L L E C T I ON S   
 The “Working Group on Human Remains in Museum Collections” (hereinafter: 
“WGHR”) was established in May 2001, with the following terms of reference: 
 
• to examine the current legal status of human remains within the collections of 
• publicly funded museums and galleries in the United Kingdom; 
• to examine the powers of museums and galleries governed by statute to 
• deaccession, or otherwise release from their possession, human remains within 
• their collections and to consider the desirability and possible form of legislative 
• change in this area;  
                                                     
1911 Ibid., para. 124. The Select Committee stated that the concept of cultural property of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was “extremely broad and subjective, in that it is assumed that importance is to be 
defined by a State. Objects that can be subject to trading restrictions or prohibitions range from human 
remains to postage stamps” (Emphasis added).  
1912 Ibid. 
1913 The Select Committee referred to developments in other countries, especially NAGPRA. Ibid., paras. 
153-155. See for an outline of NAGRPA and its relevance for the internationalisation of claims seeking the 
return of human remains: chp. 2.§2.II.2 / 3.  
1914 Ibid., para. 199. The principal conclusions and recommendations stated in subsection xiv) - xvi) that 
there should be discussions with museum representatives, claimant communities, and governments to 
prepare a statement of principles and accompanying guidance relating to the care and safe-keeping of 
human remains and to the handling of requests for return of human remains; that access to information on 
holdings of indigenous human remains for all interested parties, including potential claimants, needs to be 
improved; and that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport should undertake a consultation exercise 
on the terms of legislation to permit the trustees of national museums to remove human remains from their 
collections. 
1915 See for the full text of the statement: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, para. 4.  
1916 Ibid., para. 3: Hansard, HC, vol. 368, col. 115W, 8 May 2001, A. Howarth; and Hansard, HL., vol. 625, 
Part 75, col. WA240, 10 May 2001, Lord McIntosh of Haringey. 
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• to consider the circumstances in which material other than, but associated with, 
• human remains might properly be included within any proposed legislative 
• change in respect of human remains; 
• to take advice from interested parties as necessary; 
• to consider the desirability of a statement of principles (and supporting guidance) relating to the care 
and safe keeping of human remains and to the handling of requests for return; if the Working Group 
considers appropriate, to draw up the terms of such a statement and guidance;  
• to prepare a report for the Minister for the Arts and make recommendations as to proposals which 
might form the basis for a consultation document (to be used for consultation under the Regulatory 
Reform Bill).1917 
 
In November 2003 the final report of the WGHR was published.1918 Within the two-
and-a-half years of research the members of the WGHR carefully analysed questions 
such as the information and other gains to be expected from retention of human 
remains; the arguments for and circumstances favouring restitution or relocation; UK 
institutional treatment of contemporary human remains; alternatives to compelled 
physical relocation; and the volume (size and distribution of collections; measurement; 
resource implications) of the collections.1919 In its deliberations, the WGHR adopted the 
following definition of human remains:  
                                                     
1917 Ibid., pp. 1-2, para. 1. 
1918 The report of the WGHR consists of thirteen chapters and an appendix of ten documents. chp. 1 sets 
out the establishment of the WGHR and its terms of reference. Chapters 2 and 3 provide background 
information on the volume and source of human material currently within the collections of English 
museums and other institutions. Chapter 4 summarises the written and oral evidence received by the 
WGHR of scientists, communities of origin and holding institution. Chapter 5 gives an account of modern 
developments concerning the return of human remains both by English museums and overseas national 
initiatives and discusses other cases of return, in particular the restitution of material spoliated during the 
period 1933-1945. Chapter 6 outlines the contemporary law applicable to human remains in England and 
Wales. Amongst the legal aspects addressed is the so-called no-property rule, which will be discussed more 
in detail below. Chapter 7 marks the first Chapter to discuss the future treatment of human remains in 
England by reflecting upon the notion of consent; in particular in how far its application with regard to 
human remains in museum collections should equal or parallel its relevance for the future acquisition, 
retention and use of bodily material by medical institutions. In Chapter 8 the WGHR made an attempt to 
pin down the notion of ‘objects associated with human remains’. Chapter 9 sets out principles that the 
WGHR believes should inform the discussion of all future care, treatment and return of human remains in 
UK collections. Chapter 10 is a recapitulation of those aspects of law and practice discussed in the previous 
chapter that need to be improved. The process for the evaluation and decision making on claims for the 
return of human remains is outlined in Chapter 11, whereas Chapter 12 summarises all recommendations of 
the WGHR. Chapter 13 presents a statement of dissent by one of the members of the WGHR. 
The appendix consists of the following documents: 1) Powers of disposal for museums; 2) Law on human 
remains in museum collections – a working survey; 3) Repatriation of Human Remains and the Human 
Rights Act; 4) Case summaries relating to human remains; 5) International Agreements; 6) Professional and 
Institutional Approaches to Human Remains; 7) Terms of reference; 8) Draft Code of Practice for the 
Treatment, Care and Safe Keeping of Human Remains in English Museums and Collections; 9) Working 
Group on Human Remains submissions; 10) The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA): A detailed analysis. 
1919 Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 5-6, para. 17; Woodhead, C., C., 2004, pp. 179-180. 
With regard to the extent of holdings of human remains in England, the HRWG commissioned a survey. 
The results of this survey are published in: Weeks, J. / Bott, V., 2003. The survey is available online at: 
 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   414 12-10-2009   12:09:30
S O L U T I O N S  F O R  R E T U R N  A D O P T E D  A T  T H E  N A T I O N A L  L E V E L  |  415   
 
  
“human remains should be understood as including all forms of human material and should be specifically 
taken as including:  
• osteological material (whole or part skeletons, individual bones or fragments of 
• bones, teeth); 
• soft tissue including organs, skin, hair, nails etc (preserved in spirit or wax or 
• dried/ mummified); 
• slide preparations of human tissue; 
• artefacts made wholly or largely from any of the above”.1920 
 
In basing its definition on the human origin of the material, regardless of the later 
treatment of the remains, such as the processing of a skull into a drinking vessel or the 
processing of a fermur bone into a flute, the WGHR adopted a rather broad definition 
of human remains, excluding only human fossils and sub-fossils.1921  
In the following, before summarising the conclusions drawn by the WGHR and the 
recommendations it issued, we would like to reflect upon one particular aspect of the 
report more in detail: the legal status of human remains, more in particular whether 
human remains in public collections may be subject to property rights. The reason for 
focusing on this aspect is that it is frequently discussed in English academic literature. In 
Chapter 6 outlining the contemporary law applicable to human remains in England and 
Wales, the WGHR discusses the so-called no-property rule. As the name indicates, the 
no-property rule holds that there can be no property in a corpse. The relevance of the 
rule for the return of human remains, should it apply also to human remains in museum 
collections lies in the fact that it would allow for the disposal of human remains 
regardless of the general ban outlined in above on disposal of objects from the national 
museums. This statement requires some further explaination: the analysis in Chapter 3 
(§2.II) on the regulation of the national museums in the UK revealed that objects vested 
in the trustees as part of the collections of the Museum shall not be disposed of by them 
except for in a number of very limited exceptions.1922 The term “vested” implies 
ownership.1923 Consequently, where the no-property rule applied to human remains in 
museum collection the ban on disposal may not be valid as the human remains have 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/ScopingSurveyWGHR.pdf (last visited 22 April 2009). See 
for a summary of the findings: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 10-27, paras. 30-83; 
Woodhead, C., C., 2004, p. 180. 
1920 Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 7-8, para. 19. Note that in subsuming artifacts, such as 
sculptural renderings of human beings, under the definition of human remains the WGHR differs from the 
perception of the Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, which strictly distinguished between the 
remains of actual human beings and human remains which have been physically modified (Seventh Report 
of the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport, Cultural Property: Return and 
Illicit Trade, 2000, para. 163). 
1921 The WGHR does not motivate its decision not to include human fossils and sub-fossils. 
1922 See above in chp. 3.§2.II on the analysis of the regulation of English (national) museums, in particular 
the analysis of Section 3(4) of the British Museum Act 1963, sections 6(3) and 14(3) of the National 
Heritage Act 1983, sections 4(3), 4(4), 4(5), 4(6) of the Museums and Galleries Act 1992.  
1923 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 110-111, para. 271. 
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never been vested in the Trustees.1924 The rule, which as been established in case law, is, 
however, not without exceptions. In the following, we will shortly introduce the no-
property rule - the general common law rule that dead bodies (and separated materials) 
cannot be the subject of property rights – and the exception of the application of skillful 
work according to which most human remains in museum collections are capable of 
being property. 
The first binding judicial pronouncement of the no-property rule dates back to the 
case R. v Sharpe from 1857.1925 According to Erle J the law applicable does not 
recognise property in a corpse.1926 Erle J. based himself on the ealier Hayne’s case. The 
Hayne’s case dates from 1614 and dealt with the theft of a burial shroud.1927 One of the 
questions that arose in this case was who was the owner of the winding sheets in which 
the dug up bodies had been wrapped. According to the judge, a corpse could not own 
property. Consequently, the taking of the sheets did not qualify as theft. While the judge 
did not state that the corpse could not qualify as property, the case was subsequently 
wrongly interpreted as stating exactly this. Consequently, in the case of R. v Sharpe, Erle 
J.’s obiter dicta that the law does not recognise property in a corpse was lacking a proper 
precedent. Subsequent case law followed the ‘no-property’ principle with its dubious 
historical origins.1928  
In 1908, in the case Doodeward v Spencer, the no-property rule was qualified in 
view of the effects of lapse of time.1929 According to Griffith C.J. the incapability of 
human remains to being owned at their moment of death does not prevent them from 
loosing this status over time. Griffith C.J. referred to mummies and other anatomical 
and pathological specimens in support of his position.1930 The distinction between mere 
corpse and body which had been subjected to a process of preservation was confirmed 
in Dobson v North Tyneside Area Health Authority.1931 In this case the Court of 
Appeal accepted the proposition that there is no property in a corpse, but that the 
                                                     
1924 Note that the lawyers of the UK “Working Group on Human Remains in Museum Collections” 
(hereafter: “WGHR”) that has been established by the Minister for the Arts in May 2001 all agreed that no 
legislation was necessary in order to allow for the de-accession of human remains (private conversation with 
Norman Palmer, Chairman of the UK WGHR on Thursday, April 2006). Cf.: also: Ibid., p. 111, para. 271. 
1925 R v Sharpe (Sharpe's Case (1856-1857) Dears & Bell 160; 169 ER 959. The case dealt with the removal 
of the remains of Sharpe’s mother, a dissenter of Church of England, from unconsecrated grounds 
belonging to protestants. Sharpe pretended to bury his father’s remains in his mother’s grave but instead 
removed her body. Sharpe was charged for trespassing the licence by abusing it for a different purpose.  
1926 Ibid., para. 163.  
1927 Haynes's Case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113; 77 ER 1389.  
1928 Forster v Dodd (1867) L.R. 3 QB 67, para. 77; R v Lynn (1788) 2 T.R. 733, 100 E.R. 394. Cf.: 
Hardcastle, R., 2007, chp. 2 & 3. 
1929 Doodeward v. Spence (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406 
1930 Ibid., para. 414. 
1931Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1997] 1 WLR 596 (CA). See for a case note: Palmer, N., 
1996. 
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principle is subject to the qualification the process or application of human skill can 
render a corpse the subject of property.1932  
The process or application of human skill as an exception to the no-property rule 
was further explicated in the case R v Kelly.1933 The case arose after the artist Anthony 
Noel Kelly had asked the co-defendant Niel Lindsay, who worked at the Royal College 
of Surgeoens to provide him with some 40 human body parts. Kelly had paid Lindsay 
£400 for the body parts and used the parts to make casts. The Southwark Crown Court 
found Kelly and Lindsay guilty of theft and convicted them.1934 Kelly and Lindsay 
appealed to Divisional Court arguing a.o. that given the no-property rule they could not 
have commited a theft. The Court of Appeal confirmed the judgement of the 
Southwark Crown Court: while there had existed an English common-law rule of 
‘questionable’ historical origins for over 150 years body parts were exceptionally capable 
of being property for the purposes of the Theft Act 1968, where “they have acquired 
different attributes by virtue of the application of skill, such as dissection or preservation 
techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes”.1935  
Leaving aside the “conspicuously dubious historical origins” of the no-property 
rule1936 we can conclude that the exception introduced in Doodeward v Spence and as 
further explicated in R.v Kelly according to which human body parts can become 
subject to property rights by by virtue of the application of skill applies to most human 
remains in public collection as these remains have undergone some form of 
preservation.1937 Consequently, with human remains in public collections being capable 
of ownership, they are vested in the trustees as part of the collections of the Museum 
and do not by their nature enjoy a broader range of de-accession possibilities.  
a) The main conclusions of the WGHR 
The WGHR identified two fundamental responsibilities of museums with regard to 
curated human remains: on the one hand, to respect the diversity of beliefs with regard 
to the significance of ancestral remains and how they should be treated; on the other 
hand, to recognize the relevance of human remains for scientific research. As to the co-
existence of these two responsibilities the WGHR noted that at times they cannot be 
reconciled.1938 According to the WGHR, when assessing the responsibilities museums 
must be aware of the asymmetric sphere of influence in which they are operating: this 
sphere of influence consists of implications of cultural diversity, the relevance of 
scientific research, and the anger and pain that can be felt by source communities. In 
                                                     
1932 Cf.: Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 N.S.W.L.R. 680. 
1933R v Kelly and another [1999] QB 621 (CA); Palmer, N., 1998a.  
1934 Section 1(1) of the Theft act 1968 reads: "A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates 
property belonging to another with the intention of permantently depriving the other of it". 
1935 Per Rose L.J at pp 749-750; R v Kelly and another [1999] QB 621 (CA). 
1936 Hardcastle, R., 2007, p. 28. 
1937 Cf.: Woodhead, C., C., 2002, p. 320.  
1938 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a, p. 23, para. 28.21. 
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view of this asymmetric sphere of influence the WGHR identified the removal of legal 
barriers to repatriation as one of the most urgent steps in achieving even-handed 
solutions.1939 Without taking away the legal barriers to deaccession considerations to 
requests for return are missing the serious and constructive context they require.1940 
Further to changing the law, the WGHR also concluded that there is a need for 
formal licensing and regulation of museums holding human remains to ensure the 
highest standards of care in the treatment and safe keeping of human remains. The 
WGHR referred to the anticipated bill with regard to the regulation of human tissue in 
the medical context and stated that similar regulation was needed in the museum 
context, if possible under the umbrella of the same act.1941 Similar to the treatment of 
human tissue in the medical context, the retention and treatment of human remains by 
museums should be based on consent. The WGHR’s conclusions were inconclusive 
with regard to questions such as how to identify the person or community whose 
consent should be sought, how far the requirement for consent should be extended; and 
whether parties having a relationship other than one being based on genealogical ties 
should be in a position to give or withhold consent.1942 It did, however, express a strong 
view that the views of close family or direct genealogical descendants on the treatment 
or return of human remains should be regarded as paramount. Where such views clash 
with scientific interests, the former should be decisive.1943  
As to the best practice in situations where close family or genealogical descendants 
cannot be identified, the opinions within the WGHR differed: according to the majority 
opinion, a person or group, which in its own culture or belief system enjoys a status or 
responsibility comparable to that which UK institutions would recognise as conferring 
authority to withhold consent, should be able to determine any future act in relation to 
the human remains in question. According to the minority opinion, however, the views 
of such persons or groups should not be understood as over-riding requirement for 
consent but should be taken into account, next to other factors such as the age of the 
remains and their relevance for scientific research.1944  
With regard to question of how to resolve disagreement between claimants and 
holding collections the WGHR favoured alternative dispute resolution procedures over 
formal legal processes.1945 Possible alternative dispute resolution procedures could 
consist of panels set up within individual museums and the establishment of a national 
                                                     
1939 See above chp. 3.§2.II for an overview of the restrictions on the disposal of objects in public collections 
in the United Kingdom (UK), in particular in England.  
1940 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a, p. 23, para. 28.23. 
1941 Cf.: Ibid., p. 23, para. 28.24. 
1942 Cf.: Ibid., p. 23, para. 28.25. 
1943 Cf.: Ibid., p. 23, para. 28.26. 
1944 Cf.: Ibid., p. 23, para. 28.27. 
1945 Ibid., p. 23, para. 28.28. 
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panel of independent experts. Such a “Human Remains Advisory Panel” could be 
inspired by the form and mandate of the Panel.1946  
On the basis of its conclusions the WGHR issued a number of recommendations, 
which we will summarise in the following.  
The main recommendations of the WGHR1947  
While the conclusions were supported by all members of the WGHR, the 
recommendations were not unanimous.1948 We will first summarise the majority view 
before discussing the dissenting opinion, which proposed alternative recommendations. 
The statement of dissent was submitted by the Director of the Natural History 
Museum, Neil Chalmers. 
The majority recommendations deal with the law, dispute resolution, regulation, and 
a number of additional issues (“other matters”). As far as the law is concerned the 
WGHR recommends the removal of the present legal restrictions on museums’ ability 
to dispose of human remains.1949 While the WGHR considered recommending 
mandatory disposal and repatriation it did not deem it the most appropriate response. 
At present, permissive legislation supplemented by public regulation and a credible 
dispute resolution procedure would be a more appropriate response to the present 
situation.1950 While the WGHR had reviewed a number of possible forms of legislative 
provision to give effect to a power of disposal, it did not recommend a particular 
approach. However, in as far as possible the provisions permitting disposal to be 
enacted for all museums, including national museums, should be uniform.1951 
With regard to dispute resolution, the WGHR had reached the conclusion that 
disputes between holding institutions and communities of origin should be dealt with by 
alternative dispute resolution methods rather than by formal legal procedures. As 
concrete recommendations the WGHR suggested that all museums should introduce a 
procedure for the determination of claims and controversies concerning the repatriation 
of human remains. The criteria by which museums assess a claim are to be published.1952 
The WGHR furthermore made a number of recommendations concerning the 
establishment of advisory panels within individual museums to consider issues 
concerning the return or treatment of human remains. Such panels would need to have 
objective standards of independence, fairness, consistency and transparency. Also, the 
                                                     
1946 See further above in chp. 4.§1.II.1 the description of the Spoliation Advisory Panel. 
1947 Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a.  
1948 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 177, paras. 171.171-171.172. 
1949 See above in chp. 3.§2.II.2 on the statutory restrictions on the disposal of items within the collections fo 
the national museums. 
1950 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a, p. 25, para. 29.23. 
1951 Cf.: Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, p. 161, paras. I-II. 
1952 Cf.: Ibid., p. 162, para. IV.  
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panels need to have appropriate representation drawn from outside the institution in 
question.1953 
Next to the procedures at individual museum level the WGHR recommended the 
establishment of a national Human Remains Advisory Panel, consisting of independent 
experts. Such a panel should be accessible to all relevant parties but will give 
recommendation only where the reference is by common consent of the parties. The 
functions of the panel should be in broad conformity with the functions and powers of 
the Panel.1954 
Further to changes in the law and dispute resolution the WGHR made 
recommendations on the regulation of human remains collections in museums. Inspired 
by the proposal for the Human Tissue Act, which foresees in licensing requirements for 
human tissue in the medical context, the WGHR recommended that similar licensing 
requirements should be introduced on the holding, return, treatment, handling and 
disposal of human remains from museum collections.1955 Under such regime, the 
licensing authority under the Human Tissue Act would have power to grant, withhold 
and withdraw licences, to impose conditions on the grant of licences, to direct the 
disposal of, and provide for the management of human remains, as well as investigating 
complaints. While the Human Tissue Authority would be able to set and enforce 
standards relating to the care of remains it would not have any power to give guidelines 
relating to, or arbitrate in, claims for repatriation. The Working Group rounded off its 
recommendations on licensing with the suggestion that institutions should be required 
to subscribe to a code of practice on the care and management of human remains.1956  
One of the subjects discussed under the category of additional issues ("other 
matters") was the question of consent. The WGHR recommended that, in light of the 
relevance many communities of origin attach to human remains, no museum should 
keep human remains, or do research on them, where there is reason to believe that the 
original removal of the remains occurred without consent, and that the present 
treatment of the remains is without the consent of close family or direct genealogical 
descendants of the dead person. In this case, museums should try to identify family or 
descendants. With regard to the situation where no close family or descendants can be 
identified the opinions within the WGHR differed: a majority of the WGHR 
recommends that museums should then seek instructions from someone from the dead 
person’s own religion or culture who has a status or responsibility comparable to that of 
close family or direct genealogical descendants for consent. A minority of the WGHR 
took the view that in this case decisions should be based on consultation, taking account 
of a wide range of interests, rather than on a requirement for consent. Rather, than 
                                                     
1953 Cf.: Ibid., p. 164, para. IV. 
1954 Cf.: Ibid., p. 164, para. V.  
1955 Cf.: Ibid., p. 165, para. VIII.  
1956 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 165-168, para. VIII-XII. See for a draft code of practice, drawn up by the Working 
Group, in Appendix 4 of the report. 
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seeking consent from parties (not being family or descendants) their interests with 
regard to the human remains should be factored in the decision-making process 
alongside factors such as scientific and social benefits of retention and research.1957 
b) Dissenting recommendations 
As stipulated above the WGHR was not unanimous in its recommendations. A 
statement of dissent was submitted the Director of the Natural History Museum, Neil 
Chalmers. In the following we will discuss his alternative recommendations for they 
agree significantly with the recommendations finally adopted by the UK Government. 
Chalmers identifies three main reasons for dissenting with the recommendations of the 
WGHR as summarised above: first, the recommendations do not arrive at a proper 
balance between the public benefits deriving from medical, scientific and other research 
on the one hand and the wishes of claimant communities on the other.1958 Secondly, he 
dismisses some of the recommendations as disproportionately complicated1959 or, as third 
reason as unworkable.1960  
In as far as the proper balance between the public benefits deriving from retaining 
human remains and the wishes of claimant communities on the other is concerned, 
Chalmers supports the recommendation that return should be based on permissive 
rather than mandatory reason. He criticises, however, that this recommendation is 
lacking a fundamental, ethically-based reason and is instead based upon pragmatic 
reasons that favour permissive rather than mandatory return.1961 Chalmers’ 
argumentation is somewhat slanted: while it is true that the reasons provided by the 
WGHR for preferring permissive rather than mandatory return are pragmatic in 
character, the majority opinion of the WGHR also mentioned a “fundamental, ethically-
based reason for coming to this conclusion”. According to the majority opinion of the 
WGHR, the need to redress human remains in museum collections lies in the respect 
for and well-being of claimant communities: not granting authority to these 
communities about their ancestral remains confirms and prolongs the discriminatory 
treatment indigenous peoples have suffered since the era of Imperialism. Furthermore, 
the WGHR stresses that claimant societies must be enabled to fulfil their obligations 
towards their ancestors as it otherwise impairs their spiritual well-being.1962 Regardless of 
                                                     
1957 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 170-171, para. XV.  
1958 This criticism aims at recommendations I-III of the majority opinion of the WGHR.  
1959 This criticism aims at recommendations IV to XII and XIX of the majority opinion of the WGHR.  
1960 This criticism aims at recommendations XV, XVI and XVIII (lxiv) of the majority opinion of the 
WGHR.  
1961 Working Group on Human Remains, 2003, pp. 177-178, paras. 172.171-172.172. Chalmer refers to pp. 
122-125, paras. 309-319 as the relevant sections listing the pragmatic reasons.  
1962 “1. To many indigenous peoples the return of their ancestors to the homeland is essential to the health 
of the descendant community. Such a community should be allowed to decide for itself how its members 
are treated. Any derogation from this principle is a discriminatory subordination of indigenous peoples and 
a demeaning relegation of them and their concerns to inferior status. It also prevents them from fulfilling a 
solemn obligation, the neglect of which causes acute pain. There is little question that the original taking of 
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the fact that the WGHR preferred permissive rather than mandatory repatriation the 
starting point of the WGHR’s majority opinion is that human remains should be 
repatriated.  
Chalmers, in his minority opinion, does not start from a general acceptation that 
human remains should be returned. Instead, his starting point is that there is no 
generally valid ethical imperative for repatriation of human remains in abstracto. Rather, 
he suggests to introduce a system in which in every case the benefits and disadvantages 
of repatriation or retention are compared, balancing a number of factors affecting the 
strength of the claim for repatriation and factors affecting public benefit, especially 
research, that arise from retention. Chalmers refers to the duty to show respect for 
persons, the duty to be sensitive to cultural differences and the duty not to exploit the 
vulnerable as principles to assess the benefits and disadvantages of repatriation. In some 
cases, the assessment will point to repatriation as the ethically right course of action; 
whereas in other cases the arguments for repatriation will not outweigh the profits of 
retention.1963 As second criticism of Chalmers of the balance between the wishes of 
claimant communities and public benefits deriving from retaining human remains deals 
with the WGHR’s proposition to make the continued retention of human remains 
subject to consent from the claimant community.1964 According to Chalmers such a 
system would effectively introduce a mandatory regime to repatriate human remains. He 
states that a mandatory regime of repatriation, regardless of whether effected by means 
of legislation or by making consent by claimant communities as precondition for 
retention, would be unacceptable.  
In light of his criticism Chalmers recommends to change the law affecting the 
holding of human remains in order to allow museums to return human remains. Such 
legislation, nor any other measures to be introduced (e.g. the requirement of consent) 
should result in a mandatory regime of repatriation.1965 
Chalmer’s second reason for dissenting with the recommendations of the WGHR is 
that he deems a number of recommendations as disproportionately complicated. First, 
Chalmer criticises that a system entailing not only the museums themselves, but also a 
new licensing authority, a purely advisory national panel, with the additional option of 
                                                                                                                                          
these remains was often morally, if not legally, wrongful, that such dispossession would not be tolerated 
today, and that English museums will no longer acquire indigenous remains in violation of the wishes of 
their parent communities. Why, then, should it make any difference that particular remains are already in the 
possession of a museum? 
2. Until this wrong is redressed, there will be no closure in respect of past injustices and an arguable 
enduring violation of fundamental human rights. The physical and psychological health, and indeed the 
social advancement, of indigenous communities are in consequence impaired. No other class of society 
finds its lack of consent overridden, its autonomy subverted, and its spiritual needs unilaterally subordinated 
to other interests in this way. Equality and justice demand the return of ancestral remains. People grieve and 
will continue to grieve until the spirits of their ancestors are at rest”. Cf.: Ibid., pp. 122-123, para. 311.  
1963 Cf.: Ibid., p. 178, para. 172.173. 
1964 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 170-171, para. XV.  
1965 Cf.: Ibid., p. 179, paras. 173.173-173.176. 
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local panels, and the possible intervention of the Minister for the Arts. A system 
involving this many participants would be excessively complicated and untransparent to 
claimant societies while at the same time not adequately protecting the public interest of 
research into human remains.1966 The Minority Report agrees with the recommendation 
that museums should be required to conform to procedures specified by the new 
licensing authority. However, different from the majority opinion, the licensing 
authority would not only specify standards with regard to the care of human remains in 
museum collections but would also specify procedures for dealing with requests for 
repatriation of human remains from claimant communities.1967 While the licensing 
authority would wake over museums to live up to high standards of care, the decision 
on repatriation of human remains should rest with the governing bodies of the 
museums themselves. Chalmers prefers each licensed museum setting up its own ethics 
committee rather than relying on a (national) Human Remains Advisory Panel and/ or 
ministerial intervention.1968  
After having criticised a number of recommendations of the WGHR’s majority’s 
opinion as unbalanced and disproportionately complicated, Chalmer’s final criticism is 
that a number of recommendations are unworkable, in particular the requirement for 
museums to seek consent of claimant communities and the requirement to consult 
overseas public authorities to seek guidance on unclaimed human remains. If 
implemented, these recommendations would effectively mean a halt on all research 
upon human remains from claimant communities, and consequently cannot be said to 
strike a fair and workable balance between the interest of claimant communities and the 
public benefits that arise from research.1969 As an alternative, Chalmers suggests the 
introduction of guidelines that would constitute an ethical framework for decision-
making. Such guidelines should look at aspects, such as whether the identity and 
geographical or community origins of the deceased are known; how recently or far in 
the past the deceased lived; how closely the claimants are related to the deceased, and on 
the circumstances by which the deceased came into the museum’s possession. Further 
to these aspects establishing the strength of a claim for repatriation, the guidelines must 
also take into account the relevance of the remains for research purposes.1970 Finally, 
Chalmers dismisses the recommendation that museums should proactively seek advise 
on the display, research and storage of human remains from the close family or direct 
genealogical descendants of deceased persons, respectively their community surrogates, 
or failing that all other concerned parties whose concerns are known to the museum as 
„disproportionate, unrealistic and unworkable“.1971 
                                                     
1966 Cf.: Ibid., p. 179, paras. 174.171. 
1967 Cf.: Ibid., p. 179, paras. 174.172. 
1968 Cf.: Ibid., p. 179, paras. 174.173-174.174.  
1969 Cf.: Ibid., p. 182, para. 185.181.  
1970 Cf.: Ibid., p. 182, para. 185.182.  
1971 Cf.: Ibid., p. 182, para. 185.183.  
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In comparing the recommendations of the minority opinion with those of the 
majority opinion, it becomes clear that they are based on different starting points. 
Whereas the majority opinion considers the wishes of the deceased as paramount and 
consequently should transcend the interests of science1972, the minority opinion does not 
accept a generally valid ethical imperative for repatriation of human remains in 
abstracto. Instead, the minority opinion puts great emphasis on the relevance of 
retention of human remains for public interest, in particular research, and accepts 
repatriation only in specific cases as ethically the right course of action.1973 In the 
following, we will discuss the developments since the publication of the WGHR’s report 
and recommendations. We will first discuss the inclusion of section 47 in the Human 
Tissue Act, as direct result of the WGHR’s report before discussing the 'Guidance for 
the care of Human Remains in Museums' as finally approved by DCMS.  
2.  HU M A N  T I S S UE  AC T  2004  A N D  T H E  P O W ER  T O  D I S P O S E  O F  H U MA N  R EM A I N S  
Following the recommendations of the WGHR, the Government immediately 
moved to legislate to enable nine national museums to dispose of human remains from 
their collections.1974 At the time the WGHR presented its report in 2003 the 
Government was considering the introduction of new legislation on the question of 
human tissue and organs. Given the difficulty to find a place in the legislative 
programme, it was decided to subsume the legislative changes necessary for the disposal 
of human remains from public collections under the same legislation dealing primarily 
with the regulation of human organs and tissue in hospitals and medical research 
institutions. The need to legislate on the question of human tissue and organs had 
appeared from a number of revelations during 1999 and 2000 about the retention of 
human organs and tissue by hospitals and health authorities, in particular at Bristol 
Royal Infirmary, the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital (Alder Hey). Inquires about 
the practices at the two hospitals revealed that organs and tissue from children who had 
died had been removed, stored and used without proper consent of the parents.1975 
Further reports revealed a more general practice in the past of storing and using organs 
and tissue without proper consent.1976 These practices had occurred against the 
                                                     
1972 Cf.: Woodhead, C., C., 2004, pp. 192-193. 
1973 Cf.: Steel, P., 2004, p. 22. 
1974 See above chp. 3.§2.II for an overview of the restrictions on the disposal of objects in public collections 
in the United Kingdom (UK). 
1975 Cf.: Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, Interim Report: Removal and Retention of Human Material (May 
2000); The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report (The Stationery Office 2001) H.C. [Session 2000-1]; 
112-II, . Cf.: Price, D., 2005, p. 798. 
1976 The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report (The Stationery Office 2001) H.C. [Session 2000-1]; 
112-II; Chief Medical Officer, Report of a Census of Organs and Tissues Retained by Pathology Services in 
England, January 2001, available online at:  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_4006720; 
Department of Health, Human Bodies, Human Choices: The Law on Human Organs & Tissue in England 
& Wales - A Consultation Report, (2002), . 
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backdrop of the Human Tissue Act 1961. Under this act, the person lawfully in 
possession of a human body, i.e. the hospital wherein the person died, was permitted to 
authorise the removal and use of human material for the purposes of therapy, education 
and research where there was no reason to believe that either the deceased or any 
surviving spouse or relative objected to it.1977  
The purpose of the Human Tissue Act 2004 is to introduce a legislative framework 
for all issues relating to the taking, storage and use of human organs and tissue that is 
based on ‘informed consent’ rather than an ‘absence of objection’. Part I of the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 deals with obtaining 'appropriate consent' for the removal, storage and 
use of human organs and other tissue for a number of specified purposes. 'Appropriate 
consent' is defined in section 3 as the consent of the person whose remains are to be 
used. Where it concerns the tissue derived from a child and the child is not competent 
to give consent, 'appropriate consent' refers to the consent of the parents. By making 
the treatment of human tissue subject to the requirement of 'appropriate consent', the 
act aims to strike a balance between the rights and expectations of individuals and 
families, and the general interest, such as research, education, training, pathology and 
public health.  
The Human Tissue Act 2004 was introduced into the House of Commons on 3 
December 2003. On 29 June 2004 it was brought to the House of Lords. On 19 
November 2004 it passed through the Upper House to receive Royal Assent on 15 
November 2004.1978 The Act repeals in their entirety the Human Tissue Act 1961, as 
well as the Anatomy Act 1984 and the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (except with 
regard to Scotland), and the Human Tissue Act (Northern Ireland) 1962.1979 It entered 
into force in various stages as was specified in commencement orders.  
As for human remains, sections 1, 9, 16 and 47 are relevant.1980 According to Section 
1, there exist a number of situations that are exempted from the general requirement to 
obtain ‘appropriate consent’. Section 1(5) excludes imported bodies from this 
requirement, whereas Section 1(6)(c) excludes all material that came from the body of a 
person who has been dead for more than one hundred years (on a rolling basis). Also 
exempted from the requirement of ‘appropriate consent’ are human remains and tissue 
that have been held for the purposes now regulated by Part I of the Human Tissue Act 
2004 prior of the entry into force of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (section 9).1981  
Part 2 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 outlines the introduction and tasks of a 
Human Tissue Authority (sections 13-15). According to section 16, a licence of the 
Human Tissue Authority is required for purposes including the storage of anatomical 
                                                     
1977 Price, D., 2005, p. 799. 
1978 Ibid., p. 798. 
1979 Ibid. 
1980 In the context of this study we will focus on the relevance of the Human Tissue Act for the treatment 
of human remains in public collections. See further on the principal matters of the relating to human 
material in hospitals and medical research facilities, e.g.: Ibid; Hardcastle, R., 2007, chp. 4. 
1981 Cf.: Shelbourn, C., 2006, pp. 188-189. 
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specimens and the public display of human tissue or remains. Failure to comply with the 
requirement to obtain a licence or with the conditions stipulated in a licence constitutes 
an offence (section 25). However, similar to Sections 1(6)(c) and 9 discussed above, 
there is no need to obtain a licence from the Human Tissue Authority where the 
activities concern remains of persons who deceased more than one hundred years ago 
(on a rolling basis) or which had been held at the moment the Human Tissue Act 2004 
entered into force (section 16(4)).1982 Also excluded from the licensing requirements of 
the Human Tissue Act 2004 are the use and storage of religious relics (section 40).  
As a result of these exemptions with regard to the requirement to obtain ‘appropriate 
consent’ and of holding a licence, the activities of museums fall largely outside the 
application of the Human Tissue Act 2004. Different from the majority conclusions of 
the WGHR it does not impose a requirement to obtain consent for human remains in 
museum collections retrospectively to authorise continued storage and use of existing 
holdings.1983 Most of the human remains in public collection are either older than one 
hundred years or had been collected prior to the entry into force of the Human Tissue 
Act 2004. Also, human remains from people who deceased more than one hundred 
years ago (on a rolling basis) or which had been held at the moment the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 entered into force do not fall within the remit of the Human Tissue Authority 
and the licensing regime.1984 However, where museums wish to acquire new human 
material for their collections and this material is not imported and less than one hundred 
years old, the museum requires the consent of the donor and a licence from the Human 
Tissue Authority. The latter requirement applies also when the human tissue is 
imported.1985  
                                                     
1982 Cf.: Ibid., p. 189. 
1983 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a, p. 19, para. 17.18.  
1984 Cf.: Ibid., p. 20, para. 27.12.  
1985 The exceptions that have been introduced for curated human remains already in possession of the 
museums at the time the Human Tissue Act 2004 entered into force corresponds to the preferences 
expressed in the consultation exercise of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS): Ibid. The 
consultation document invited comments on the recommendations of the WGHR. The key areas of the 
consultation were: whether the museums sector should be brought fully under the remit of the Human 
Tissue Authority; what model of consent should be adopted in dealing with any claims for repatriation; 
whether the Government should establish a Human Remains Advisory Panel, to mediate claims for 
repatriation of human remains and whether a statement of principles should be published as guidance to 
museums? Forty-seven responses were received by DCMS ranging from UK national and non-national 
museums, archaeological groups as well as cultural and religious groups. As to the question whether the 
museums sector should be brought fully under the remit of the Human Tissue Authority, 29% of 
respondents supported to bring all activities of museums under the licensing regime of the Human Tissue 
Authority. 53% opposed this, including 12 respondents that would support licensing only for human 
remains less than 100 years old. Many museums indicated that regulation exceeding the regime to be 
introduced by the Human Tissue Act 2004 would lead to costs of compliance that would adversely affect 
operations. In particular, smaller provincial museums might not be able to sustain their collections under 
more restrictive regulation. With most human remains in UK collections being uncontentious licensing of 
all museum activities was perceived as disproportionate. 
With regard to the question whether the treatment and retention of human remains by museums should be 
based on consent 72% of the respondents agreed that where close family or direct genealogical descendents 
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Whereas the sections of the Human Tissue Act 2004 discussed so far do not change 
the status of human remains in museum collections, Section 47 does effectively change 
the situation of human remains in nine named museums.1986 According to this section, 
the Royal Armouries, the British Museum, the Imperial War Museum, the Museum of 
London, the National Maritime Museum, the National Museums and Galleries on 
Merseyside, the Natural History Museum, the Science Museum and the Victoria and 
Albert Museum:  
 
“may transfer from their collection any human remains which they reasonably believe to be remains of a 
person who died less than one thousand years before the day on which this section comes into force if it 
appears to them to be appropriate to do so for any reason, whether or not relating to their other 
functions”.1987  
 
Section 47(2) grants the trustees or governors of the named museums the possibility 
to dispose of human remains. Consequently, different from all other objects in public 
collections human remains may be de-accessioned. Trustees or governors are never 
under an obligation to dispose of human remains. The regime introduced by section 
47(2) is a permissive rather than mandatory one. 
The power to dispose human remains is not unlimited: it applies only to human 
remains that are less than 1000 years old (on a rolling basis). Also, the power granted for 
de-accession does not affect any ‘trust or condition’ under which the trustees or 
governors may hold the human remains concerned and which might prevent them from 
disposing (Section 47(4)).1988 Parliament does not regard it as in the public interest to 
create powers to override the terms of gifts to museum collections. On the other hand, 
Section 47 does not limit the possibility of disposal to certain claimant groups (e.g. lineal 
descendants). In fact, the power granted under Section 47 is not limited to disposal 
motivated by a wish to repatriation but is available “for any reason”.1989 Furthermore, 
Section 47(3) extends the power of disposal also to things that are mixed or bound up 
with human remains, provided that it is undesirable, or impracticable, to separate them. 
                                                                                                                                          
could be identified, research of human remains should be subject to their consent. 48% of respondents held 
that where no direct genealogical descendents could be identified, the use and custody of human remains 
should require consultation rather than consent. While consultation with wider groups was supported, the 
notion of consent should not exceed family and direct descendents. With regard to the question of the 
duties of museums in identifying the remains respectively genealogical descendants there was general 
agreement that museums should allow for the identification by providing clear and open information over 
their collection holdings. The need to pro-actively seek out descendants was dismissed for being 
unreasonable. 
1986 Section 47 entered into force on 3 October 2005: Human Tissue Act 2004 (Commencement No. 2) 
Order 2005/2632.  
1987 Section 47(2). 
1988 Cf.: Shelbourn, C., 2006, p. 190. 
1989 Cf.: Ibid. 
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Examples of objects mixed or bound up with human remains are masks that include 
human hair or a bark canoe that is sewn around infant bones.1990 
Whereas section 47 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 applies only to nine national 
museums, its relevance exceeds the removal of legal barriers in repatriating human 
remains from these museums. By passing section 47 the UK parliament took a stand in 
the debate on the repatriation of human remains in favour of repatriation and granted 
more authority to repatriation claims.1991 
 
Table summarising the main provisions of the Human Tissue Act 20041992 
 
Section I: Storage and use of 
human tissue for anatomical 
examination or display 
Part II: Anatomical examination, 
storage and public display of 
human tissue 
Section 47: Power to de-
accession human remains (and 
items intimately associated with 
them)
Consent of donor required Licence required from Human 
Tissue Authority 
Permissive not mandatory – 
where trustees consider it 
‘appropriate for any reason’  
Consent not required where the 
human tissue has been imported 
Licence not required where the 
human tissue is from a person 
who died before the Act came 
into force
Power to de-accession given only 
to 9 named museums 
Consent not required where 
human tissue is from a person 
who died more than 100 years 
ago (on a rolling basis) 
Licence not required where the 
human tissue is from a person 
who died more than 100 years 
ago 
Power applies only to human 
remains less than 1000 years old 
(on a rolling basis) and material 
bound up with it (where 
practically not separable) 
Consent not required where 
human tissue is part of a museum 
collection held before the Act 
entered into force 
Licence not required to hold and 
display human tissue which is a 
religious relic 
 
 
3.  ‘GU I D A N C E  F O R  T H E  CA R E  OF  HU M A N  RE MA I N S  I N  MU S EU M S’  
In 2005, DCMS approved the ‘Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in 
Museums’, which had been prepared by a drafting group.1993 The guidance is not 
                                                     
1990 Flessas, T., 2007, p. 4. 
1991 Cf.: Shelbourn, C., 2006, p. 190.Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a 
1992 The table has been developed by: Shelbourn, C., 2006, p. 191. 
1993 Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2004a, available online at:  
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/GuidanceHumanRemains11Oct.pdf (last visited 22 June 
2009). The drafting group had been commissioned by DCMS in reaction to the positive feedback received 
during the consultation on the introduction of a code of practice. See further on the consultation above in 
footnote 1985. Nearly 70% of the respondants were in favour of a code of practice. The consultation also 
identified a number of aspects that should be provided for in such a code: acknowledgement of the special 
nature of human remains both in human terms and for science; emphasis on good curation; differentiation 
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statutory and therefore can only recommend what is considered as best practice rather 
than prescribing it.1994 It provides advice to museums and other institutions holding 
human remains (except collections kept purely for medical teaching) on how to curate 
and use human remains appropriately and, most importantly, on how to deal with claims 
for their repatriation.1995 The guidance understands ‘human remains’ as  
 
“the bodies, and parts of bodies, of once living people from the species Homo sapiens (defined as 
individuals who fall within the range of anatomical forms known today and in the recent past). This includes 
osteological material (whole or part skeletons, individual bones or fragments of bone and teeth), soft tissue 
including organs and skin, embryos and slide preparations of human tissue”.1996 
 
Furthermore, human remains also include any of the above that may have been 
modified in some way by human skill and/or may be physically bound-up with other 
non-human materials to form an artefact composed of several materials. Another, but 
less frequently encountered category of material included within the understanding of 
human remains is that of artworks composed of human bodily fluids and soft tissue. 
Not included in the definition, in line with the Human Tissue Act 2004, are hair and 
nails, although it is acknowledged that some cultural communities do give these a sacred 
importance.1997  
The guidance consists of three parts: Part 1 outlines the legal and ethical framework 
for the treatment of human remains; Part 2 deals with the curation and use of human 
remains, and Part 3 provides for a decision-making framework on how to deal with 
claims for the return of human remains. 
a) Part 1 of the Guidance: legal and ethical framework 
Part I consists essentially of a summary of the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 
2004 that are relevant for the care and disposal of human remains in museums. In view 
of the situation that museums are encountering restrictions to disposal that are not 
remedied by Section 47 of the Human Tissue Act 2004, the guideline encourages them 
to remove any such restrictions from the constitution documents. As for the ethical 
framework, the guidelines take a unpretentious stand in admitting that the ethical issues 
raised by human remains in museums are complex and that consensus, if at all, will only 
emerge with time and experience. Consequently, the ethical framework proposed in the 
guideline is meant as starting point for the museums only.1998 The ethical framework 
                                                                                                                                          
between different types of human remains (e.g. in respect of their origin from within and outside the UK); 
recognition of the multiple accountability of all institutions holding human remains; need for holding 
institutions to inventorise and know their collections in detail; emphasis on openness and communication in 
all discussions. Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, para. 4.1. 
1994 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2005, p. 7. 
1995 Cf.: Lohman, J., 2006a, pp. 11-12. 
1996 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2005, p. 9. 
1997 Cf.: Ibid. 
1998 Cf.: Ibid., p. 13. 
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splits in two parts: the first part provides for a number of procedural principles that 
should be demonstrated in making decisions concerning the care of human remains, or 
in dealing with claims for their return. In handling human remains and claims relating to 
remains, museums should demonstrate: 
 
• Rigour – act rationally with appropriate knowledge, skill and care and justify your decisions;  
• Honesty and integrity – be worthy of trust by others; declare conflicts of interest; show honesty in 
communicating knowledge with all interested parties; act in a principled manner;  
• Sensitivity and cultural understanding – show sensitivity and compassion for the feelings of 
individuals; show understanding of different religious, spiritual and cultural perspectives;  
• Respect for persons and communities – show respect for individuals and communities; minimise any 
adverse affect on people and communities; respect privacy and confidentiality;  
• Responsible communication, openness and transparency – listen, inform and communicate openly 
and honestly; 
• Fairness – act fairly; give due weight to the interests of all parties; act consistently.1999 
 
b) Part 2 of the Guidance: guiding principles 
The second part of the ethical frameworks seeks to provide principles that may guide 
and instruct museums’ thinking and decision-making concerning the handling and care 
of human remains, and with regard to claims relating to them: 
 
• Non-maleficence – doing no harm; 
• Respect for diversity of belief – respect for diverse religious, spiritual and cultural beliefs and attitudes 
to remains; tolerance;  
• Respect for the value of science – respect for the scientific value of human remains and for the 
benefits that scientific inquiry may produce for humanity;  
• Solidarity – furthering humanity through co-operation and consensus in relation to human remains;  
• Beneficence – doing good, providing benefits to individuals, communities or the public in general.2000  
 
A reading of this list of principles shows that some of the principles (may) collide 
with one another. First, this may be the case for the respect for diversity of beliefs and 
the respect for the value of science: the principle for diversity of beliefs requires 
decision-makers to give appropriate consideration to the cultural and historical 
backgrounds, beliefs and values relevant to all parties concerned, including source 
communities. In particular it would require a museum to recognise and respect that a 
community may place a different cultural or religious value on human remains that 
requires their reburial. While the beliefs of other communities, especially of indigenous 
peoples are not necessarily anti-science, past experience has shown that at times the 
belief system of claimants and the values of science did not coincide.2001  
                                                     
1999 Cf.: Ibid., p. 14. 
2000 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
2001 See, e.g. the Kennewick Man Case discussed in chp. 2.§2.II.2.a). Cf.: Steel, P., 2004, p. 25 who reports 
of case where indigenous peoples from Australia claimed the return of four Aboriginal skulls from the 
Manchester Museum. 
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A second set of principles that may collide are the principle of non-malenficence and 
the principle of beneficence: while these two principles will in some cases act as two 
sides of a single coin differing more in appeal or tone concerning the activities of the 
acting person or institution, they may also be in conflict with one another. Both, the 
principle of non-maleficence – or put differently the principle of doing no harm and the 
principle of beneficence or of doing good looks at the interests of individuals, 
communities or the public in general. Consequently, it is possible, e.g. in respect of 
scientific medical research of human remains that the principle of non-maleficence 
speaks against conducting the research for it would do cause distress ot the familiy or 
community of origin of the remains whereas the principle of beneficence speaks in 
favour of conducting this research in the interest of the general public. 
Where the principles of the respect for diversity of beliefs and the respect for the 
value of science, respectively the principles of non-malenficence and of beneficence 
collide, the principle of solidarity might become important. According to the guideline, 
the principle of solidarity:  
 
"recognises that we all have a shared humanity and an interest in furthering common goals and tolerating 
differences that respect fundamental human rights. Mutual respect, understanding and co-operation 
promote solidarity by fostering goodwill and a recognition of our shared humanity. This principle 
emphasises the importance of rising above our differences to find common ground, co-operation and 
consensus. It would be reflected, for example, by seeking to find a consensus in relation to competing 
claims over human remains that all parties can accept".2002 
 
In a sense the principle of solidarity constitutes an umbrella principle comprising the 
prinples for respect for diversity of beliefs, for the value of science, respectively the 
principles of non-malenficence and of beneficence. While striving for consensus in 
relation to competing claims over human remains is certainly noble, it is doubtful in 
how far the principle constitutes an additional value next to the more specific principles.  
A final observation is that the principles may in themselves be contradictory or at 
least indecisive as to the ethically right way of acting. This is especially the case for the 
principle of beneficence, which may at the same time dictate that scientific research 
should be conducted in view of advancing knowledge that is of benefit to humanity and 
that human remains should be returned in view of respecting the wishes of an 
individual.  
c) Part 3 of the Guidance: framework for handling claims 
In the light of the unclearities and sometimes conflicting messages of the principles 
provided under the ethical framework in part 1 of the guideline, the framewok for 
handling claims for the return of human remains provided in part 3 of the guidelines 
                                                     
2002 Cf.: Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2005, p. 15. 
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becomes more important.2003 While it applies in the first place to claims for the return of 
human remains originating from outside the UK, it should be veiwed as an overarching 
set of guidelines for claims regardless of their origin.2004 At the heart of this third part 
focusing solely on claims for the return of human remains is a list of criteria that 
museums should take into consideration when deciding upon a claim for return. Before 
discussing this list of criteria we will shortly address other relevant instructions to 
museums contained in part 3.  
General starting point for museums is that requests should be dealt with as an open 
and constructive dialogue between the museum and the claimants.2005 In order to be 
prepared for the situation that a request for return is made, museums should prepare 
clear guidance on the criteria by which a claim will be assessed, the time span a request 
will take to be considered, the position of individuals within an organisation who will 
take responsibility for decision-making and communication and who will be consulted 
externally. Furthermore, the individual museum guidelines should set out who will be 
responsible for bearing the museum costs of processing a claim, although this should 
normally be the museum. The guidance should be prepared and be made public before 
any case for return is dealt with. Another preparation museums may wish to take is the 
establishment of an advisory panel of experts to provide support in dealing with 
claims.2006  
Where a museum leaves the prepartory stage in having received a request for the 
return of human remains it can turn to the list of criteria that should be taken into 
consideration when deciding upon a claim for return. 
The first criterion (A) addresses the status of those making the request and 
continuity with remains. Three possible claimant groups are identified: genealogical 
descendants, the cultural community of origin and the country of origin. Not 
suprisingly, the guideline accords most weight to claims by individuals who can 
demonstrate a direct and close genealogical link to the human remains. This is especially 
the case where the remains are less than 100 years old. The older the remains the more 
decendants they may have many from more than one community. As a consequence, 
genealogical descent is less evident to determine the outcome of the decision-making 
                                                     
2003 At this point we jump directly from Part I setting out the legal and ethical framework to Part 3 
focussing on claims for the return of human remains. The reason for skipping Part 2 is that it is mainly 
concerned with how human remains should be cared for within institutions. It does, however, provide some 
guidance on how museums should deal with cases where they wish to de-accession human remains in 
situations where they did not receive a request for their return. In this case, the guideline instructs museums 
to pro-actively seek to establish whether there exist any genealogical or cultural decendatns who might wish 
to make claim for return or reburial. Where this is not the case, human remains may be disposed of, 
provided this is done in a safe and respectful manner. Cf.: Ibid., p. 18. 
2004 Cf.: Ibid., p. 23. 
2005 Cf.: Ibid., p. 24. 
2006 Cf.: Ibid. Cf.: above the procedural principles that should be demonstrated in making decisions 
concerning the care of human remains as provided under part 1 of the guideline. 
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procedure.2007 Where a request is not based on genealogical descent but instead on 
cultural links, its assessment becomes more difficult for the concept of a community is 
difficult one to define. The guideline stresses the need for museums to verify that the 
group they are dealing with is the only potential claimant, or that, if it is not, the other 
potential claimants support them. Advice can be sought from the national government 
concerned or by looking for precedents for how a community has acted in the past. As 
minimum standards to consider a claim in the first place a continuity of belief, customs 
or language must be demonstrated between the claimants and the community from 
which the remains originate. Also relevant for the cultural relationship may be the 
location of the claimant community and the origin of the remains. A clear 
demonstration of a continuity of association between the claimant and the remains will 
be of great importance in dealing with any claim: where a claimant group does not either 
occupy the land from which the remains came, practice the same religious beliefs, share 
the same culture or language, or cannot not demonstrate why this is no longer the case 
museums are advised not to recognise the claim.2008 The final claimant group consists of 
countries of origin. In a number of cases a claim is excerted by a nation either on behalf 
of a particular community or for all of its nationals. The guideline recommends 
assessing such claims along similar lines to claims based on cultural community.2009  
The second criterion (B) looks at the cultural, spiritual and religious significance of 
the remains. Demonstration of strong continuous cultural, spiritual or religious 
significance of the human remains concerned, will add weight to a claim. The cultural, 
spiritual or religious significance may consist in the relevance of correctly laying the 
remains to rest, in ending the feeling of grief amongst claimants where the continued 
holding of the remains may cause harm to the spiritual well-being to individuals or the 
community, or where the reamisn are from an important family or representing war 
dead, or victims of a particular event, such as a massacre.  
 Criterion C addresses the age of the human remains. Archaeological and historical 
research indicates that it is very difficult to demonstrate genealogical, cultural or ethnic 
continuity far into the past. For this reason it is considered that claims are unlikely to be 
successful for any remains over 300 years old, and are unlikely to be considered for 
remains over 500 years old. The suggested time spans correspond not only with the 
majority of claims that have been made for return of human remains so far; they also 
correspond with the period of European Imperialism and its subsequent effect on 
Indigenous peoples. An exception might be made for cultures that put more emphasis 
on association with land that has a cultural, spiritual or religious importance and less on 
relative age.  
Further to the chronological age of the remains the circumstances of their removal 
may matter. Consequently, criterion D considers how the remains were originally 
                                                     
2007 Cf.: Ibid., p. 26. 
2008 Cf.: Ibid. 
2009 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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removed and acquired. While there are cases where human remains have been removed 
and studied without dispute there are other instances, particularly during the 19th and 
early 20th century, where remains were removed against the will of individuals, families 
and communities, or at least outside its laws and normal practices. The latter will add 
more weight to a claim.  
Criterion E turns away from the meaning of the remains for the claimants and 
focusses on the status of the remains within the museum. Next to ensuring the exact 
legal status of the remains within their collections and their right to make decisions over 
their fate, the museums should clarify why they are being held and how they have been, 
and are likely to be, used:  
 
1. Are the remains fully documented and the information about them publicly available?  
2. Do they have continued, reasonably foreseeable, research potential?  
3. Do they form part of a documented access strategy?  
4. Are they curated according to the very highest standards?  
5. Are they curated in such a way as their long-term preservation is assured?  
6. Can the long-term security of the remains be guaranteed within the museum?  
 
The guideline does not further elaborate upon how these aspects translate into the 
weighing of the claim. One can assume that where the long-term preservation is not 
assured or the long-term security cannot be guaranteed this might speak in favour of 
return whereas the finding that the remains have further research potential might factor 
into the reasons against return. The relevance of the remains for science, education and 
the studying of history is more explicitly addressed in criterion F.  
According to criterion F, the value of human remains for research, teaching and 
display must be accorded great relevance in the decision making process. It may 
override other factors in favour of return, such as the wishes and feelings of 
genealogical descendants or cultural communities. Criterion G, which suggests the 
scientific relevance human remains have had in the past as yard stick for their future 
scientific value does not constitute a genuine criterion on its own but is better 
characterised as sub-criterion to criterion F. 
Criterion H then turns away from the past scientific value of human remains and 
focuses on the consequences that a return of the remains might have on future research, 
teaching or even display. The criterion seems to suggest that where claimants are 
prepared to keep the remains in such a way that their scientific and educational 
relevance will not be diminished; museums should be more readily prepared to return 
the remains.  
Criterion I deals with the documentation of the remains. Where a record of the 
remains exists, or can be made before return, return is less drastic for a museum in that 
a “footprint” of the remains will continue to exist in its archive.  
Under Criterion J museums are asked toexplore alternatives to the extreme options 
of retention and return. Where possible, an alternative or comprise where the remains 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   434 12-10-2009   12:09:32
S O L U T I O N S  F O R  R E T U R N  A D O P T E D  A T  T H E  N A T I O N A L  L E V E L  |  435   
 
  
would stay in the museum but the claimant group would be accorded a certain level of 
control over their future use is to be preferred over full return. 
Criterion K draws the attention of museums to the legislation or policy as developed 
in the country of origin of the claimants. Museums are advised to consider how a claim 
would be resolved if made in the country of origin for this might give an indication of 
the expectations on the side of the claimant. Again the guideline does not take an 
explicit stand on how the findings concerning the legislation or policy of the country of 
origin must be factored in the evaluation of a claim pending in the UK; while it might be 
the case that the legislation or policy of the country of origin should be mirrored to 
some extend in the decision concerning the return from the UK this might be stretching 
the principle of sovereignty.  
Criterion L finally asks museums to consider claims, irrespective of the fact that they 
will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, in the greater line of past cases the museum 
might have received in the past and might yet receive in the future. While the pending 
case should not deviate from the outcome of claims of a similar kind; the museum 
should also consider the impact of the decision to be taken on any decision on future 
claims.  
With the adoption of the non-binding ‘Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in 
Museums’ the developments in the United Kingdom with regard to the repatriation of 
curated human remains has come to a hold. The non-binding guidance essentially boils 
down to a framework guiding institutions in their decision-making process. While the 
guidance also lists a number of principles that may guide the institutions’ decision 
making process, its value lies more in guiding and structuring institutions from a 
procedural point of view in defining the relevant questions and aspects that must be 
addressed. As for the material principles, the most important ones being the avoidance 
of harm and solidarity, are less suited to guide the institutions’ behaviour in that they are 
difficult to translate into concrete measures.  
Next to the adoption of the non-binding guidance, the process, which was initiated 
by the Government in 2000 resulted in the adoption of legislation allowing national 
museums previsouly prevented from doing so to de-accession human remains from 
their collections. The power to de-accession as granted in s 47 of the Human Tissue Act 
2004 is not absolute in that it applies to human remains that are less than 1000 years old 
at the moment the decision to de-accession them is taken. Also, the power to de-
accession does not affect any ‘trust or condiction’ under which the trustees or governors 
may hold the remains concerned. While the legislation was always inteded to be 
permissive rather than compelling the return of human remains our analysis of the 
process indicates that the current regime is less radical in its effect on holding 
collections than the regime as proposed by the WGHR (the majority opinion). In 
particular, the requirement of consent as proposed by the WGHR is an aspect that was 
not taken over in the Human Tissue Act 2004 or the guidance. Another aspect that was 
not adopted by the Government was the proposal to establish a national Human 
Remains Advisory Panel to mediate claims for the repatriation of human remains. In 
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contrast to the general praise of the Panel dealing with Nazi spoliated art, the 
establishment of a comparable body for mediation in cases dealing with human remains 
was not supported.2010 Instead, individual institutions were left free to establish local 
advisory panels allowing them to keep more controle about the decision making process 
and the content of their collections.  
4.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  T H E  UN IT E D  K I N G DO M 
 The process in the United Kingdom to introspect their public collections and to 
reflect upon the treatment of human remains was iniatied by the Government in 2000. 
The process started with the establishment of a Working Group on Human Remains 
(WGHR) to allow for a comprehensive analysis of the matter and subsequently taken 
further in a consulation exercise. While the debate on the return of human remains and 
the opinion to radically change the rules applicable to human remains in public 
collections gained momentum at the beginning of the work of the WGHR, much of it 
was lost during the final report and the subsequent consultation exercise. Two concrete 
results can be mentioned, next to a general increase of awareness of the sensitivity of 
curated remains: first, the adoption of legislation enabling national museums previously 
prevented from doing so to de-accession human remains from their collections. 
Secondly, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) adopted a non-binding 
‘Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in Museums’. As a result the present 
situation in the UK is not much different from the situation in the Netherlands: as for s. 
47 of the Human Tissue Act 2004, it enables the de-accessioning of human remains but 
does not compell it. While the guidance might enjoy more authority having been 
adopted by DCMS, it is non-binding. Furthermore, while it lists a number of principles 
that may guide the institutions’ decision making process, its value lies more in guiding 
and structuring institutions from a procedural point of view in defining the relevant 
questions and aspects that must be addressed.  
I I I .  FR A N C E 
 In France, no official policy on the return of human remains from public 
collections has been endorsed by the French Government. Consequently, and similar to 
the analysis of the Dutch situation we need to rely on case studies to see whether we can 
extrapolate principles applicable to the return of human remains. So far, two cases have 
emerged in France: the case of the remains of Sarah Baartman and the case of a Toi 
Moko presently in the collection of the Natural History Museum in Rouen.  
                                                     
2010 Steel, P., 2004, p. 25 on the other hand reports of a straw poll taken at a MA event attended by 
researchers, archaeologists and museum professionals that showed overwhelming support for an advisory 
panel for human remains.  
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Sarah Baartman’s life2011:  
Sarah Baartman was born in the Gamtoos Valley in 1789. Under the present political 
system, the Gamtoos Valley belongs to the territory of South Africa. During Baartman’s 
lifetime, South Africa did not exist as a political unit. In the mid-17th century, European 
settlement in the region started with the Dutch. In 1814, the region passed to Great 
Britain but was contested in the Boer War (1899-1902). Britain emerged as victorious 
party and took possession of the entire territory. The Union of South Africa was created 
in 1910. It was only in 1961 that South Africa declared its independence. 
Different accounts exist as to the group membership of Baartman: some associate 
her with the San people (or Bushmen)2012, others with the Koehkhoe or Khoi-khoi 
people.2013 Others again come to the conclusion that her group membership cannot be 
recalled.2014 What is known about Baartman’s early life is that her family had been 
massacred. Baartman was taken captive as a child, and worked as a slave for a Dutch 
farmer (Boers) close to the Cap.2015 In 1810, a British ship doctor, William Dunlop took 
Baartman to England. Fascinated by her physiognomy, in particular her buttocks and 
genitals Dunlop wanted to exhibit her to the “curiosity of the Europeans”.2016  
Once in England, Baartman was presented to the public as the “Vénus Hottentote”. 
Her display was, however, not uncontested: an African Association petitioned for her 
"release" and brought the case to court.2017 It is reported that when interrogated in 
court, Baartman stated that she came to England by free will, was under no restraint and 
had been guaranteed half the profits.2018  
Little is known about her later years in England from her baptism in 1811 until she 
was sold to France in 1814. It is suggested that she was married and had two 
children.2019 Once in Paris, she was exhibited for several months, first by a man named 
Henry Taylor and then by an animal trainer under the name Reaux. The Musée National 
                                                     
2011 The exposé at hand is limited to the cornerstone dates of her life. For a more detailed description see, 
e.g.: Gordon, R., 2000; Tobias, P.V., 2002; Qureshi, S., 2004.  
2012 Langaney, A., 2002, p. 377. The San people or Bushmen lived chiefly in Botswana, Namibia, and 
southeastern Angola. Bushmen is an Anglicization of boesman, the Dutch and Afrikaner name for them; 
saan (plural) or saa (singular) is the Nama word for "bush dweller(s)," and the Nama name is now generally 
favoured by anthropologists. Contrary to earlier descriptions, the San are not readily identifiable by physical 
features, language, or culture. In modern times, they are for the most part indistinguishable from the 
Khoekhoe or their Bantu-speaking neighbours. Nevertheless, a San culture did once exist and, among some 
groups, still exists. Source: San. (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 14, 2005, from 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9065258.  
2013 Tobias, P.V., 2002, p. 107; Ferrus, D., 2004, p. 27 The Khoekhoe are not physically distinguishable from 
the San.  
2014 Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 293. 
2015 Richert, P., 2002, p. 3.  
2016 The condition is called steatopygia. See: Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 297. 
2017 Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 293. We were not able to find further information on the case, such as the case 
number.  
2018 The case has been mentioned in: Ibid., pp. 293-294; Gordon, R., 2000, p. 606. 
2019 Tobias, P.V., 2002, p. 107. However, no official reference number has been quoted. 
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d’Histoire Naturelle expressed interest in observing her physiognomy. In a letter addressed 
to the mayor of Paris Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire expressed the wish of the museum 
to “profit from the possibility of the presence of a Bochimane Woman in Paris to 
further study the distinct features of this curious race”.2020 In the spring of 1815, 
Baartman was presented in the Jardin des Plantes to be observed by scientists and 
painters.2021  
Sarah Baartman died on 29 December 1815.2022 As to the cause of her death, 
different explanations circulate: an inflammatory and eruptive sickness2023, an excess of 
alcohol2024, pneumonia, or tuberculosis.2025 Upon her death, Etienne Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire asked the prefect of the police for permission to bring her corpse to the 
anatomical laboratory of the museum (…) to gain new insights on this singuliere race of 
humankind. A decree was granted to Saint-Hilaire allowing for the transport of the 
corpse to the faculty of Medicine and in the Hôpital de la Pitié. Upon her death 
Baartman’s corpse was immediately moved, not by Saint-Hilaire but by a colleague of 
his, the scientist George Cuvier and to a different location, i.e. the laboratory of 
anatomy in the Musée National d’Histoire Naturelle.2026 Cuvier first made a plaster cast of 
her body, and then dissected it, removing the brain, and the genitals, which he preserved 
in glass jars. In 1817, Cuvier presented his observations to the l’Academie de mëdicine.2027 
The remains in the museum 
The skeleton and the cast of her body were exhibited in several Parisian museums 
for more than 150 years: first in the “Salle d’anatomie comparé” in the Musée National 
d’Histoire Naturelle, then in the Museum of Ethnography in the Palais du Trocadero, and 
finally in the Musée de l’Homme. The cast was exhibited until 1974; the skeleton until 
1976.2028 The body cast was shown again to the public in 1994, in an exhibition entitled: 
“De la Vénus hottentote à la Tehura de Gauguin – Les dossiers du Musée d’Orsay”.2029 
Different accounts existed with regard to the whereabouts of the bottled brain and 
genitals. According to the anthropologist Steve J. Gould the bottled remains must have 
                                                     
2020 Le Garrec, J., 2002, p. 7. See further on the person of Étienne-François Geoffroy: Geoffroy, Étienne-
François (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved October 18, 2005, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9036458. 
2021 Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 294. 
2022 Cuvier, G., 1817, p. 265. In the travaux préparatoires, the date of death is 1 January 1916. See: Assemblée 
Nationale, 2002, p. 31.  
2023 Cuvier, G., 1817, p. 262 ; Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 294.  
2024 Cuvier, G., 1817, p. 263.  
2025 Gordon, R., 2000, p. 607.  
2026 See further on the person of Cuvier: Cuvier, Georges, Baron (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Retrieved October 18, 2005, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-
9028345. 
2027 Cuvier, G., 1817.  
2028 It is unclear whether the skeleton was exhibited until 1974 or 1976: See e.g. Richert, P., 2002, pp. 3 & 
11.  
2029 Ibid., p. 12. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   439 12-10-2009   12:09:32
440  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
been in the depot of the Musée de l’Homme at least until his encounter with them 
sometime between 1979 and 1985.2030 The director of the Musée de l’Homme, Andre 
Langenay, denied that the bottled brains and genitals were contained in the 
collection.2031 Again others held that the bottled brain and genitals were accidentally 
destroyed when the shelves on which the bottles were kept collapsed in 1983 or 
1984.2032 The bottled brain and genitals were rediscovered when the French legislative 
procedure to provide for the return of Baartman’s remains had already reached the stage 
of the Senate.2033 
Requesting party? 
What is interesting about the case of the remains of Baartman is the fact that it is not 
entirely clear who actually requested their return. According to one view, the remains 
were officially requested by the South African Government.2034 This view is supported 
by the fact that then French Minister de la Coopération M. Jacques Godfrain and then 
South African Minister of Arts, Culture, Science, and Technology, Dr. Ngubane agreed 
in January 1996 to entrust a French and South African scientist with the task to find 
solution.2035 However, while the negotiations resulted in a set of recommendations2036, 
                                                     
2030 Gould, S.J., 1987, p. 292.  
2031 Gordon, R., 2000; Davie, L., 2002, http://www.southafrica.info/about/history/saartjie.htm 
2032 Richert, P., 2002, p. 3.  
2033 Assemblée Nationale, 2002, p. 32; Sénat, 2002a, p. 4; Sénat, 2002b, p. 3. See further below for more 
details. 
2034 Le Garrec, J., 2002, p. 9; Tobias, P.V., 2002, p. 109. See also: Sénat, Questions, (2001), Journal officiel, 
p. 4659: M. Michel Duffour, State Secretary au Patrimoine et a la décentralisation culturelle stated that "des 
représentant de l'Afrique du Sud ont demande le retour des restes de miss Sarah Baartman conserves au 
Muséum national d'histoire naturelle ". Some sources state that in 1994 president Nelson Mandela stood up 
for the return of the remains. See, e.g.: Davie, L., 2002,  
http://www.southafrica.info/about/history/saartjie.htm; Ferrus, D., 2004, p. 29; Bredekamp, J., 2006, p. 
27. As yet another initiative on governmental level it was reported that the South African Embassy in Paris 
sent a letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 2000. The letter dates 6 October 2000 and 
was probably inspired by the return of El Negro from Spain to Botswana. El Negro's remains were reburied 
in Tsholofelo Park in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana on 5 October, 2000.  
2035 Le Garrec, J., 2002, p. 10. 
2036 The persons entrusted with the negotiations were Henri de Lumley, Director of the Prehistory 
Laboratory of the National Museum of Natural History in Paris, and Philip Tobias, Professor of Anatomy 
and Human Biology at the University of the Witwatersrand Medical School. Their negociations resulted in 
the following recommendations:" 1. The remains should be handed over directly to the South African 
government. 2. The South African government should consult all parties concerned before deciding on the 
disposition of the remains. 3. The remains should not be buried (in the ground) due to the loss to scientific 
and forensic analysis. It was pointed out that it might be important to determine the genetic relationship 
between Baartman's DNA and that of possible living descendants, or to confirm her age at death, or to 
verify that the returned bottled organs indeed belong to the same individual as did the skeleton, or to seek 
evidence bearing on the diagnosis of her final illness. It was proposed that, as an alternative, South Africa 
consider building a dignified tomb for housing the remains, designed as a shrine of remembrance open to 
visitors, with an illustrated account of Baartmans's life and death on the walls. It was further suggested that 
members of the Khoisan communities might be invited to serve as the custodians of the proposed Sarah 
Baarman memorial shrine“. 
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they did not receive governmental support and the case came to a halt.2037 Other sources 
deny government intervention and instead refer to organisations representing the 
descendants of Khoisans and the Griqua National Conference of South Africa, a body 
that represents the interests of the Griquas since 1914, for having sought the return of 
Baartman’s remains.2038 Another non-governmental organization that appearantly 
requested the French government for the repatriation of the female genitalia of Sarah 
Baartman in 1999 was the World Archaeology Congress.2039  
At the time the return of Sarah Baartman was discussed in the French Senate, the 
official position of the French Government was that no official request had been 
received from the South African Government. It was observed that it was rather 
paradoxical that restitution would be based on a French initiative unsupported by South 
Africa.2040  
The process of drafting legislation on the return of Baartman’s remains: from 
integral object of the domaine public to human material incapable of being appropriated.  
The case of Sarah Baartman was introduced into the French Senate by Senator 
Nicolas About on 12 October 2001.2041 About addressed the Minister of Culture and 
Communication and pleaded for the return of the remains of Baartman to South Africa. 
According to the joint reaction by the State Secretary for Cultural Heritage and Cultural 
Decentralisation and the Minister of Education dated 7 November 2001, it was stated 
that the remains had been conserved in a "correct and respectful manner, as all human 
remains in the collection of the Natural History Museum". As part of the national 
collection, the remains were inalienable under French law, which could only be 
overcome by means of a statute enacted by parliament. Furthermore, the reaction 
stressed the scientific value of the remains for the international community.2042  
                                                     
2037 Le Garrec, J., 2002, p. 10. It is not specified whether these recommendations were ever discussed, and 
what the criticism was. 
2038 Richert, P., 2002, p. 5 ; Concern over 'Hottentot Venus' of 1810: Griquas want to bury the remains of 
Khoi woman displayed in France as a freak, 13 December 1995. The Griqua are a 19th-century people, of 
mixed Khoekhoe and European ancestry, who occupied the region of central South Africa just north of the 
Orange River. In 1848 they were guaranteed some degree of autonomy by a treaty with the British governor 
of South Africa. Source: Griqua (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 14, 2005, from 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9038148.  
2039 Gordon, R., 2000, p. 606.  
2040 "Aucune démarche officielle du gouvernement sud-africain n'a récemment attesté de la mobilisation de 
ces autorités sur ce dossier", et observe qu'il pourrait "sembler paradoxal que la restitution s'effectue sur la 
base d'une démarche française non relayée actuellement par l'Afrique du Sud".Richert, P., 2002, p. 6.  
2041 Proposition de loi autorisant la restitution par la France de la dépouille mortelle de Saartjie Baartman, 
dite "Vénus hottentote" à l'Afrique du Sud, présentée par M. Nicolas About, Sénateur. It has been said that 
in 2001 he was busy preparing a proposition to change the law from 1850 holding that all objects in French 
museum are property of the French state when he got knowledge of the remains of Saartije Baartmans 
(through the poem by Diane Ferrus) Ferrus, D., 2004, pp. 29-30. He was contacted by Audrey van Zyl, 
parlementaire sud-africaine. 
2042 n° 1149 (JO Débats du 12 octobre 2001) (p. 4026) - Ministère: Culture - Restitution à l'Afrique du Sud 
des restes de Sara Baartman - Réponse le 7 novembre 2001 (p. 4659). 
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Senator About expressed his discontent with the answer and doubted the scientific 
relevance of the remains. However, following the reasoning of the State Secretary and 
the Minister of Education, he introduced the following proposal for a statute to provide 
for the return of the remains to South Africa on 4 December 2001:  
 
“Par dérogation à l’article L.52 du code du domaine de l’État2043, il est procédé à la restitution par la France 
de la dépouille mortelle de Sarah Baartman, dite “Vénus hottentote”, à l’Afrique du Sud”.2044 
 
As next step, a report was prepared on behalf of the Commission on Cultural 
Affairs.2045 The report addressed questions as to how the remains had become part of 
the national collection and why they had remained in the collection until the present 
day. Also, the report criticised the poor administration of the museums’ inventories. The 
most important aspect however was the status of the remains within the national 
collection and the (im-)possibility of their de-accession. The report challenged the view 
that de-accession of the remains from the national collections is prevented by law. 
According to the report, Art. L. 52 on the inalienability and imprescribtability of objects 
from the domaine public must not be understand as fully preventing the possibility to 
declassify objects, in this case human remains, from the national collections. The report 
suggests that declassification could be legitimized by the remains’ missing scientific 
importance, the necessity to end the “bad publicity”, as well as the need to be able to 
answer to a request for return made by the country of origin. More in concrete, the 
report referred to Art. L. 69-1 of the Code of State-owned property (Code du domaine de 
l’Etat) as possible venue for de-accession.2046 The article provides for a number of 
options in which objects whose value does not exceed a certain amount fixed by the 
Government may be donated to foreign states and organisations working for the good 
                                                     
2043 Art. L. 52 of the Code of State-owned property (Code du domaine de l’Etat) reads as follows: “Les biens du 
domaine public sont inaliénables et imprescriptibles".  
2044 Proposition de loi de M. Nicolas About, autorisant la restitution par la France de la dépouille mortelle 
de Sarah Baartman, dite “Vénus hottentote”, à l'Afrique du Sud, N° 114 (2001-2002). 
2045 Richert, P., 2002. 
2046 Les ventes mentionnées à l'article L. 68 ne peuvent être réalisées à un prix inférieur à la valeur vénale des 
biens cédés. Toutefois, les biens autres que les véhicules automobiles et dont la valeur n'excède pas un 
plafond fixé par arrêté du ministre chargé du domaine peuvent être cédés gratuitement à des Etats étrangers 
dans le cadre d'une action de coopération. De même, les biens meubles, autres que les véhicules 
automobiles, et dont la valeur unitaire n'excède pas un plafond fixé par arrêté du ministre chargé du 
domaine, peuvent être cédés gratuitement à des associations relevant de la loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au 
contrat d'association visées au b du 1 de l'article 238 bis du code général des impôts et dont les ressources 
sont affectées à des oeuvres d'assistance, notamment à la redistribution gratuite de biens meubles aux 
personnes les plus défavorisées. Lesdites associations ne pourront procéder à la rétrocession, à titre 
onéreux, des biens ainsi alloués à peine d'être exclues du bénéfice des présentes mesures. De même, les 
services de l'Etat, les collectivités territoriales et leurs établissements sont autorisés à céder gratuitement les 
matériels informatiques dont ils n'ont plus l'emploi et dont la valeur unitaire n'excède pas 152 euros aux 
associations de parents d'élèves et aux associations de soutien scolaire. Ces associations s'engagent par écrit 
à n'utiliser les matériels qui leur sont cédés que pour l'objet prévu par leurs statuts, à l'exclusion de tout 
autre. Elles ne peuvent procéder à la rétrocession, à titre onéreux, des biens ainsi alloués, à peine d'être 
exclues du bénéfice de la présente loi. 
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cause. Consequently, according to the Commission of Cultural Affairs there was no 
need to adopt a bill to allow for the return of the remains to South Africa.  
The report also discussed the new stand that had been adopted by the Government 
with regard to the status of the Baartman’s remains in the mean time. Different from its 
initial statement that the remains formed part of the national collections the 
Government referred to Art. 16-1 Civil Code and held that the remains could not be the 
object of a proprietary right in the first place.2047 Consequently, in this specific case the 
human remains could not constitute property of the museum, nor of the state and the 
decision to dispose of them was unrelated to the domaine public. Instead, the decision to 
dispose of the remains and to return them to South Africa rested with the administrative 
authorities.2048 The assumption by the Government that Art. 16-1 Civil Code applies to 
human remains in scientific collections is characterised by the report as “a little bit 
amazing, surprising”. The report stresses that the “raison d’être” of the Bioethics Bill, 
which introduced Art. 16-1 Code Civil, was to outlaw insults or violations of human 
dignity, such as the selling of organs or parts of the human body of persons still alive or 
corpses. According to the drafters of the report the bill does not seek to define the legal 
status of human remains in scientific collections. Consequently, should the Government 
wish to adhere to the applicability of the 1994 Bioethics Bill to the present case, the 
consequences of such an extensive interpretation must be clarified.2049 In its final 
conclusion, the report stresses the urgency to stop the delay of the return of the human 
remains to South Africa. It concluded that no legislation was required to allow for the 
de-accession and transfer of Baartman’s remains to South Africa as reliance on both 
Artt. L. 69.1 of the Code of State-owned property (Code du domaine de l’Etat) and 16-1 
Civil Code could allow for their return without interaction of the legislator.  
In spite of holding the proposed bill superfluous, the Commission of Cultural Affairs 
nevertheless did not advice to abandon the drafting process. Instead, only the wording 
of the article should reflect the new insights about the legal status of the remains:  
 
“A compter de la date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, les restes de la dépouille mortelle de la 
personne connue sous le nom de Sarah Baartman cessent de faire partie des collections de l’établissement 
public du Muséum national d’histoire naturelle.  
 
L’autorité administrative dispose, à compter de la même date, d’un délai de deux mois pour les remettre à la 
République d’Afrique du Sud”.2050  
                                                     
2047 Art. 16-1 was introduced by Loi no 94-653 du 29 juillet 1994 relative au respect du corps humain. It 
reads: "Chacun a droit au respect de son corps. Le corps humain est inviolable. Le corps humain, ses 
éléments et ses produits ne peuvent faire l'objet d'un droit patrimonial". In English: Everyone has the right 
to respect for his body. The human body is inviolable. The human body, its elements and its products may 
not form the subject of a patrimonial right. 
2048 Richert, P., 2002, p. 8.  
2049 Ibid. 
2050 In English: Act relating to the restitution by France of the remains of Sarah Baartman to South Africa. 
This Act will enter into force on 7 March 2002. As from the date of entry into force of this Act, the 
surviving remains of the person known as Sarah Baartman will cease to form part of the public collections 
 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   443 12-10-2009   12:09:33
444  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
 
The draft article as proposed by the commission no longer refers to Art. L. 52 of the 
Code of State-owned property (Code du domaine de l’Etat) and the domaine public. Also, the 
article no longer speaks of the de-accessioning or transfer of property or the restitution 
of the remains but instead simply states that the remains of Baartman leave the 
collection of the Musée National d’Histoire Naturelle and should be returned to South 
Africa within two month after the bill entered into force.2051  
After having been discussed and unanimously adopted by the Commission on 
Cultural Affairs on 23 January, 2002, the report and draft bill were discussed in the 
French Senate on 29 January 2002. At that point, the bottled brains and genitals of 
Baartman that had been deemed missing or lost had been rediscovered.2052 The 
Research Minister (ministre de la recherche) defended the view that the remains of 
Baartman cannot be considered as part of the national patrimony for Art. 16-1 Civil 
Code would prevent any appropriation of the human body or corpse. He stressed that 
this understanding did not render the inclusion of human remains in museum 
collections illegal as it can be explained by scientific reasons. The minister did, however, 
recognise a need for the Government to reflect upon the status of (scientific) collections 
of human remains. He did not discuss the option that the remains might have become 
part of the domaine public and could be declassified by relying upon Art. 69 of the Code 
of State-owned property (Code du domaine de l’Etat).2053  
With regard to the text of the proposed article, the Government suggested a number 
of amendments both to the title and the wording of the article itself but in the end the 
Senate adopted the article as proposed in the report of the Commission of Cultural 
Affairs with unanimity.2054  
On 30 January 2002, the proposition was registered at the Assemblée Nationale. On 14 
February 2002, the draft article was discussed within a sub-committee of the National 
Assembly. Despite emphasising the impact the draft article might have in creating a 
                                                                                                                                          
of the National Museum of Natural History. The administrative authority has a time limit of two months, 
starting from the date of entry into force, within which to deliver the remains to the Republic of South 
Africa. 
2051 Richert, P., 2002, p. 14. 
2052 Sénat, 2002a, p. 4; Sénat, 2002b, p. 3; Assemblée Nationale, 2002, p. 32.  
2053 Sénat, 2002a, p. 5. 
2054 Sénat, 2002b. The first amendment suggested to change the title of the bill from “(…) relative à la 
restitution par la France de la dépouille mortelle de Sarah Baartman à l’Afrique du Sud” to “(…) relative au 
retour en Afrique du Sud de la dépouille mortelle de Sarah Baartman”. The second amendment proposed to 
amend the wording of the article as follows: "Les restes de le dépouille mortelle de la personne connue sous 
le nom de Sarah Baartman cessent d’etre placés sous la garde du Muséum national d’histoire naturelle et 
feront retour en Afrique du Sud. L’autorité administrative dispose d’un délai de six mois, a compter de la 
date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, pour mettre en œuvre les dispositions du précédent alinéa". 
Hence, instead of the wording “ceasing to form part of the public collections of the National Museum of 
Natural History” the amendment suggests that the remains of Sarah Baartman” are no longer placed under 
the guardianship of the National Museum of Natural History”. The amendment furthermore suggests to 
replace the verb “remettre” by the expression “feront retour” and to extend the period within which to act by 
four months.  
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precedent for the restitution of “des monuments d’origine étrangère inscrits à notre 
patrimoine”, the committee passed the bill with unanimous support to the full National 
Assembly.2055 
The National Assembly discussed the proposal on 21 February 2002. In the 
discussion preceding the vote, the symbolic relevance of the statute was emphasized. It 
was explicitly held that from a legal point of view the adoption of the statute was 
superfluous given Art. 16-1 of the Code Civil: with human remains being excluded from 
appropriation they do not fall under the notion of the national patrimony, nor do the 
regulations concerning the domaine public apply. The only exception to this principle is 
where the remains are of scientific importance. In the absence of such scientific value, a 
statute providing for the de-classification of the remains and their return is redundant 
and the authority responsible for the collections could have decided about parting from 
the remains. Regardless of the fact that the draft article was presented as merely 
symbolic in character it was passed unanimously as the last statute adopted during the 
XI th legislative period.2056 In view of the question of creating a precedent, it was held 
that the specific character of the bill, drafted for a specific case should prevent its 
working as a precedent.2057  
After the approval of the legislation on 21 February 2002, arrangements were made 
for the return of the remains to South Africa.  
The return to South Africa  
At the end of April 2002, a small delegation from South Africa arrived in Paris to 
accept the remains of Sarah Baartman on behalf of the South African Government.2058 
On 3 May 2002, the remains arrived at Cape Town International Airport, packed in a 
crate draped in a South African flag and were taken to the Military State Mortuary.2059 
On 9 August 2002 Sarah Baartman received a state burial near the city of Hankey on the 
                                                     
2055 La commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales, Travaux de Commission, débat au cours de 
sa séance du mercredi 30 janvier 2002, pp. 19-21.  
2056 Assemblée Nationale, 2002, p. 31 ff. Loi n° 2002-323 du 6 mars 2002 relative à la restitution par la 
France de la dépouille mortelle de Sarah Baartman à l’Afrique du Sud. (JO n°56 du 7 mars 2002 page 4265 
texte n°2). En vigueur depuis le 07 mars 2002. A compter de la date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, 
les restes de la dépouille mortelle de la personne connue sous le nom de Sarah Baartman cessent de faire 
partie des collections de l’établissement public du Muséum national d’histoire naturelle. L’autorité 
administrative dispose, à compter de la même date, d’un délai de deux mois pour les remettre à la 
République d’Afrique du Sud. In English: Act relating to the restitution by France of the remains of Sarah 
Baartman to South Africa. This Act will enter into force on 7 March 2002.As from the date of entry into 
force of this Act, the surviving remains of the person known as Sarah Baartman will cease to form part of 
the public collections of the National Museum of Natural History. The administrative authority has a time 
limit of two months, starting from the date of entry into force, within which to deliver the remains to the 
Republic of South Africa. One member of the Assemblée Nationale, Mme Boisseau, initiatlly refused to 
vote on a statute that is redundant, not to attack the memories of Sarah Baartman, but to live up to her 
responsibilities as legislator. 
2057 Assemblée Nationale, 2002, p. 31.  
2058 Cf.: Bredekamp, J., 2006, p. 28. 
2059 Cf.: Ibid. 
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bank of the Gamtoos river Valley in the Eastern Cape of South Africa.2060 In the mean 
time, the South African Government engaged in a campaign raising national awareness 
of the return of the remains. The campaign stressed that the return was the result of a 
request by the Khoisan people to former President Nelson Mandela, that Baartman had 
become a symbol of subjugation and humiliation of Khoisan women and an icon of 
restitution for people affected colonialism and that her burial at last confirmed the 
South African Government’s negotiations skills in the international arena.2061  
Intermediary summary of the Sarah Baartman case 
The case of the return of the remains of Sarah Baartman addressed a number of 
interesting aspects: first, it is one of the few cases where not only the name and identity 
of the remains are known but historians are able to piece together a relatively coherent 
account of her life.2062 Secondly, it clearly highlights how perceptions of what constitutes 
valid scientific research can change in time.2063 Whereas Cuvier was a celebrated scientist 
during his lifetime and his lifework is still considered as marking a transition between 
the 18th-century view of nature and the view that emerged in the last half of the 19th 
century as a result of the doctrine of evolution, his ideas according to which humans are 
a single species but consisted of three physically distinguishable races, Caucasians, 
Ethiopians and Mongolian are now considered to be profoundly racist.2064 
More concrete central aspects that emerged from the case study are the unclarities as 
to whether or at which point the South African Government actually claimed the 
remains and the uncertainty concerning the legal status of the remains. Little attention 
was paid to the question whether the remains of Baarman had been actively requested 
by the South African Government or another stakeholder. The return of the remains 
was discussed in the French Senate, despite the fact that (at least according to the 
official position of the French Government) no official request had been received from 
the South African Government. In this respect it is also interesting that no further 
research was conducted on possible genealogical descendants of Baartman. After all, 
some sources state that Baartman had married at a certain point and had two 
children.2065  
During the process that the return of the remains were discussed in the French 
Parliament the status of the remains changed from inalienable object belonging to the 
national collections that could only be returned on the basis of specific legislation to 
                                                     
2060 Ferrus, D., 2004, p. 32; Bredekamp, J., 2006, p. 29. 
2061 Bredekamp, J., 2006, p. 29. 
2062 Cf.: Qureshi, S., 2004, p. 249. This fact explains also the great number of articles published in various 
academic disciplines on Sarah Baartman. See, e.g.: Strother, Z.S., 1999; Gordon, R., 2000; Bennett, B., 2002; 
Ferrus, D., 2004. The life and death of Sarah Baartmans has also inspired a novel, theatre play and 
documentary: Parks, S.-L., 1997; Maseko, Z., 1998; Chase-Riboud, B., 2003. 
2063 See also: Bristow, M., 2008, p. 216. 
2064 Cf.: Qureshi, S., 2004, p. 243.  
2065 Tobias, P.V., 2002, p. 107. However, no official reference number has been quoted. 
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human tissue that could not be the subject to proprietary rights in the first place, and 
which could be disposed of and returned without intervention of the legislator. Despite 
this finding that the return did not require the intervention of the legislator, the National 
Assembly had decided not to discard the legislative proposal and to adopt it as being of 
mere symbolic character. The extensive interpretation of Art. 16-1 Civil Code to include 
also human remains in national collections was challenged in the second case dealing 
with the return of human remains from a French public collection, which will be 
discussed in the following. 
2.  TH E  TO I  MOK O  F R O M  TH E  MU S E U M  O F  NA T U RA L  HI S T OR Y  I N  RO U E N 
 The second case in which human remains were claimed from a French public 
collection deal with a tattooed and preserved head of Maori or Moriori origin (Toi 
Moko) in the collection of the Museum of Natural History, Ethnography, and the 
Prehistory in the City of Rouen. The Toi Moko had been given to the city of Rouen by 
an individual in 1875, appearantly as a gift, and has since been part of the municipal 
collection deposited in the Natural History Museum.2066 The Natural History Museum 
has been designated as “Musée de France” in 2003.2067 As explained above in Chapter 3 
(§2.III) objects in public collections qualifying as “Musée de France” are both inalienable 
and imprescriptable.2068  
On 19 October 2007, in reaction to a request by the Museum of New Zealand Te 
Papa Tongarewa (“the Te Papa”) the Municipal Council of Rouen unanimously decided 
that the Toi Moko should be returned to New Zealand.2069 Following the argumentation 
in the case of Sarah Baartman, according to which human tissue, including human 
remains in public collections could not be subject of property rights, the municipal 
council held that no declassifcation proceedings were required despite the museum’s 
designation as “Musée de France”. The resolution adopted by the council stated that 
                                                     
2066 Bel, M., et al., 2008, p. 225. 
2067 Minister of Youth and Minister of Culture, A. September 17, 2003: Official Journal October 1, 2003. 
Cf.: Amiel, O., Ibid., p. 372 & fn. 376; Bel, M., et al., 2008, p. 225. See further on the designation procedure 
according to Art. L. 422-1 Cultural Heritage Code above in chp. 3.§2.III. 
2068 See in particular Art. L. 451-5 and Art. L. 451-3 of the Cultural Heritage Code (Code du Patrimoine) 
(hereinafter: “CHC”. According to Art. L. 451-3 CHC, the collections of the Musées de France are 
imprescriptable: “Les collections des musées de France sont imprescriptibles”. According to the first 
sentence of L. 451-5 CHC “objects constituting collections of the museums of France, and belonging to a 
legal personality under public law, are in the domaine public and are hence inalienable (…)”. (In French: “Les 
biens constituant les collections des musées de France appartenant à une personne publique font partie de 
leur domaine public et sont, à ce titre, inaliénables”). 
2069 Amiel, O., 2008, p. 371. When exactly the museum had received a request by the Te Papa Museum does 
not appear from the documenation. From the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of Rouen discussed 
below it appears that a request had been received: “Considérant que, répondant à la démarche de la 
Nouvelle-Zélande tendant au retour dans leur pays d’origine de restes humains Maori aux fins 
d’accomplissement des rites funéraires traditionnels, le conseil minicipal de la ville Rouen a autorisé (...). See 
for an English translation of the case: Bel, M., et al., 2008 (the quoted passage is on p. 224).  
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products cannot be the object of proprietary rights”.2074 In order to establish whether 
human remains in museum collections, as the Toi Moko in the present case, must be 
considered as “human body, its elements and its products” in the sense of the provision 
the tribunal turned to the legislative history of the 1994 Bioethics Bill that had 
introduced Art. 16-1 into the Civil Code.2075 The tribunal held that the travaux 
préparatoires of the bill indicate that its provisions “constitute only one aspect of the 
superior principle of the protection of human dignity, and have as their object the 
prohibition of the appropriation of utilization of the human body and its elements and 
products, for the purposes of monetary gain”.2076 The tribunal applied this finding to the 
case of the Toi Moko in the municipal collection of Rouen and held that their 
conservation in the collection is not contrary to Art. 16-1 Civil Code. The mere fact that 
the Toi Moko is of human origin does not suffice to subsume it under the scope of 
application of Art. 16-1 Civil Code and thereby to exclude it from the legal regime, in 
particular the provision on inalienability, applicable to objects in collections designated 
as “Musée de France”.2077 Consequently, the city council of Rouen could not have decided 
to return the Toi Moko without the assent of the National Scientific Commission of 
Museum Collections of France as outlined in Art. L. 451-5 CHC on declassification.  
As a result of the ruling the Toi Moko is still in the municipal collection of Rouen. 
However, both the city of Rouen and the Te Papa Museum of New Zealand have 
expressed their hope that the head will eventually return to New Zealand.2078  
3.  IN T E R M E D I A R Y  C O N CL U S I O N S  F O R  FR A N C E 
 In the present section two case studies have been presented on human remains in 
French public collections designated as Musées de France: the case of the remains of Sarah 
Baartman from the collection of the Natural History Museum and the case of a Toi 
Moko from the municipal collection of Rouen. Different from the UK but similar to the 
Dutch situation no official policy has so far been adopted in France with regard to the 
repatriation of human remains. Consequently, case studies are presently the only vehicle 
that may allow us to extrapolate common patterns and principles or at least help 
identifying the general problems, the actors involved, the interests at stake, and the 
solutions found.  
Recalling the results of both case studies we can see that both cases struggled or 
touched upon the same general problem with regard to the legal status of human 
remains in museum collections designated as Musées de France, more in particular whether 
Art. 16-1 Civil Code was applicable to this category of human material. The applicability 
                                                     
2074 Art. 16-1 Code Civil: “Le corps humain, ses éléments et ses produits ne peuvent faire l’objet d’un droit 
patrimonial”. 
2075 Law No. 94-653. 
2076 Bel, M., et al., 2008, p. 225.  
2077 Ibid. 
2078 Ibid., p. 226.  
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of this provision that had been introduced to the Civil Code by the 1994 Bioethics Bill 
was crucial in that it could undermine the general principle of inalienability that applies 
to all objects in collections designated as Musées de France. In the case of Sarah Baartman 
we have seen a shift from the intial understanding that the remains were part of the 
national collections and as such inalienable2079 to the perception that the remains fell 
under the scope of application of Art. 16-1 Civil Code with the result that the remains 
were excluded from appropriation and did not fall under the notion of the national 
patrimony and the regulations applicable.2080 It was explicitly stated in the Assemblée 
Nationale that the statute to be adopted on the return of the remains to South Africa was 
of symbolic relevance rather than a legal necessity.2081 
If one squares this line of argumentation and the extensive interpretation of Art. 16-
1 Civil Code as applied in the case of Sarah Baartman with the case fo the Toi Moko of 
the municipal collection in Rouen it becomes evident that the city council of Rouen in 
its decision to return the Toi Moko to New Zealand stricly followed the path as outlined 
in the legislative process in the French Sénat and Assemblée Nationale: according to the 
resolution adopted by the municipal council “Art. 16-1 Civil Code, enacted pursuant to 
the Bioethics Bill of July 29, 1994, as modified, stipulates regarding human remains that 
they cannot be objects of properietary rights; consequently the principle of inalienability 
according to Art. L. 451-5 CHC does not apply”.2082 This extensive interpretation of 
Art. 16-1 Civil Code was, however, not supported by the Administrative Tribunal in 
Rouen. The tribunal held that the travaux préparatoires of the 1994 Bioethics Bill, which 
introduced Art. 16-1 to the Civil Code, stand in the way of interpreting the provision as 
applying to human remains in museum collections. According to the tribunal, the 
provisions of the bill “constitute only one aspect of the superior principle of the 
protection of human dignity, and have as their object the prohibition of the 
appropriaton of utilization of the human body and its elements and products, for the 
purposes of monetary gain”.2083  
The decision of the Administrative Tribunal not only brought a halt to the return of 
the Toi Moko from the Natural History Museum in Rouen for the time being, it also 
undermines with hindsight the argumentation of the French legislator in the case of 
Sarah Baartman. While the finding does not invalidate the legislation on the return of 
Sarah Baartman, the bill may no longer be characterised as symbolic in character. In any 
event, the question emerges why the declassification procedure of Art. L. 451-5 CHC 
was not mentioned at all as an option in the case of Sarah Baartman. While no definitive 
answer can be given, the answer might lie in the chronology of events:  
                                                     
2079 n° 1149 (JO Débats du 12 octobre 2001) (p. 4026) - Ministère: Culture - Restitution à l'Afrique du Sud 
des restes de Sara Baartman - Réponse le 7 novembre 2001 (p. 4659) - Musées 
2080 Richert, P., 2002, p. 8; Sénat, 2002a, p. 5; Le Garrec, J., 2002, p. 11; Assemblée Nationale, 2002. 
2081 Assemblée Nationale, 2002.  
2082 Municipal Council of Rouen, resolution nos. 2-8, October 19, 2007. Cf.: Amiel, O., 2008, p. 372 & fn. 
372. 
2083 Bel, M., et al., Ibid., p. 225.  
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Senator About had introduced his proposal for a statute to provide for the return of 
the remains of Baartman to South Africa on 4 December 2001.2084 At that moment, the 
explicit declassification procedure now contained in Art. L. 451-5 CHC did not yet exist 
in law.2085 It was introduced only a month after the proposal for a statute had been 
launched by the Law relating to French Museums of January 4, 2002.2086 Consequently, 
the explanation as to why Art. 11(II) of the Law relating to French Museums (now: Art. 
L. 451-5 CHC2087) did not figure in the case of Sarah Baartman might lie in the fact that 
the declassification procedure was introduced only after the legislative procedure had 
already been started. Given the parliament’s view that the remains fell under the scope 
of application of the 1994 Bioethics Bill there was no further incentive for the actors 
involved to study the new legislation introduced with regard to French Museums. The 
fact that there was not incentive or pragmatic reason to be aware of the changes in the 
law does not, however, take away that the legislator should have been aware of it. Had 
the legislator been aware of the relevance of the Law relating to French Museums for 
the declassification of objects from collections of the Musées de France, it could have cut 
down legislative costs, “activate” declassification procedure now contained in Art. L. 
451-5 CHC and could have prevented the somewhat ironic situation of the decision of 
the municipal council of Rouen being characterised as marred by a procedural error 
where it followed the example set throughout the legislative procedure by the Research 
Minister, the Senate and the Assemblée Nationale in respect of the return of the remains of 
Baartman. 
The future will have to show whether an eventual return of the Toi Moko of Rouen 
or other human remains will be based on the declassification procedure by the National 
Scientific Commission of Museum Collections in accordance with Art. L. 451-5 CHC or 
whether it will be based on a legal bill or on a combination of both. Before the National 
Scientific Commission will be able to decide upon the declassification of the Toi Moko 
from the municipal collection of Rouen, the criteria of the National Scientific 
Commission’s assessment must be determined. As explained in Chapter 3 (§2.III), the 
executive order from 2002 that establishes the National Scientific Commission does not 
                                                     
2084 Proposition de loi de M. Nicolas About, autorisant la restitution par la France de la dépouille mortelle 
de Sarah Baartman, dite “Vénus hottentote”, à l'Afrique du Sud, n° 114 (2001-2002). 
2085 Prior to the adoption of this law, which is now incorporated in Book IV CHC, no specific rules with 
regard to cultural objects (not being ecclesiastical objects) existed. Rather, the general procedure of 
declassification by means of an explicit legal act had to be followed and has to observe the rule of parallism 
of forms. See further on the rule of analogy of forms: Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., 2006, p. 275. Cf.: 
Dufau, J., 1993, p. 265; Weidner, A., 2001, p. 48; Weber, M., 2002, pp. 87 & 92. See Conseil d’ État 9.5.1958 
(Delort), AJDA 1958, II, 331; Conseil d’État 17.2.1932 (Commune de Barran), D. 1933, III, 49 for relevant 
case law.  
2086 See Art. 11(II) of the Law relating to French Museums of January 4, 2002. 
2087 When the Cultural Heritage Code was adopted in 2004, the Law relating to French Museums as 
separate law has been repealed and its provision were integrated in the CHC. The CHC was established by 
Order 2004-178 and entered into force on 20 February 2004. See in particular Art. 7 of the order. 
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provide for the criteria of assessment and until present the commission has not 
convened to define the criteria.2088  
In the absence of any criteria to guide the declassification procedure by the National 
Scientific Commission, it might be interesting to once again recall the case of Sarah 
Baartman as to the criteria or principles applied in this case. However, given the early 
choice to return the remains on the grounds that they could not be the museum’s 
property for falling under the scope of application of Art. 16-1 Civil Code it is difficult 
to extrapolate criteria from the case of Sarah Baartman: throughout the case, her 
biography was stressed, i.e. the fact that her name and identity were known, as well as 
her exploitation as living display as the “Venus Hottentot”. While these facts 
undoubtedly contributed to the need felt to return the remains it is not possbile to 
determine in how far the possiblity of identifying the remains, or the knowledge about 
her biography (should) qualify as criteria for future cases.  
In order to stimulate debate on and the establisment of the criteria that will guide the 
assessment of the National Scientific Commission, senator Morin-Desailly, on 20 
February 2008, introduced a proposal for a statute according to which all Maori heads 
were to be declassified from the collections designated as Musées de France:  
 
“A compter de la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, les têtes maories conservées par des Musées de 
France cessent de faire partie de leurs collections".2089 
 
Only two days later, the first public debate on the situation of human remains in 
museums was held in France: from 22-23 February 2008 the Musée du Quay Branley 
hosted a symposium on the subject ‘From anatomic Collections to Objects of Worship: 
Conservation and Exhibition of Human Remains in Museums”.2090 At present, the 
debate has not yet resulted in tangible results. The criteria of declassification to be 
applied by the National Scientific Commission are still not defined nor has the law 
applicable to Maori remains or human remains in collections of Musées de France been 
changed. At this point it is important to stress both options – declassification by the 
National Scientific Commission and the proposed law in its present wording will not be 
able to provide for the declassification of all human remains (irrespective of the fact that 
the proposal by senator Morin-Desailly is limited to “têtes maories”). From our analysis 
of the general legal framework applicable to French collections as outlined in Chapter 3 
(§2.III) it appeared that objects that have been acquired by donation or legacy, or - 
where it concerns public collections not in State property - objects that have been 
acquired with financial public support cannot be declassified cannot be disposed of (Art. 
                                                     
2088 Décret 2002-628 du 25 Avril 2002 modifié pris pour l’application de la loi 2002-5 du 4 Janvier 2002 
relative aux musées de France; Décret n° 2002-852 du 2 mai 2002 pris en application de la loi n° 2002-5 du 
4 janvier 2002 relative aux musées de France. 
2089 Proposition de loi visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des têtes maories présentée Par Mme 
Catherine Morin-Desailly, sénateur.  
2090 See for conference reports: Bristow, M., 2008; Frigo, M., 2008.  
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L. 451-7 CHC).2091 The inability to declassify these objects from the domaine public is 
motivated by the wish not to disencourage future donations and legacies.2092 This 
inability constitutes a full ban on the object’s disposal from the collection. One of the 
objects that cannot be disposed of under the current legal system is the Toi Moko in the 
collection of the municipal collection in Rouen: after all, it had been given to the city of 
Rouen by an individual in 1875, appearantly as a gift. Consequently, even after the 
declassification procedure as provided for in Art. L. 451-5 CHC has been awoken from 
its idle existence, the return of the toi moko from Rouen cannot be realised unless 
further legal changes have been undertaken.  
§3. CONCLUS IONS  FOR  CHAPTER 4   
 Having analysed the developments in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
France with regard to the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains we can now 
draw conclusions on the nature and content of the policies implemented and the 
question in how far these policies might qualify as settled state practice testifying of the 
development of a rule in customary law. In fact, the first question concerning the 
content and the nature of the policies developed in the three countries has already been 
answered in detail in the respective country section. For this reason we will not repeat 
the findings but will limit ourselves to pointing out similarities and differences and to 
reflecting on how the solutions relate to the solutions proposed in the soft law 
instruments as elaborated in Chapter 2. 
I .  NA T U R E  A N D  CO N T EN T  O F  T H E  P O L I C I E S  W I T H  R E G A R D  T O  T H E  R E T U R N  O F  
NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T  A N D  HU M A N  R E M A IN S  
Nazi spoliated art 
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France all introduced non-adversarial 
claims resolution bodies in the form of the Dutch Restitutions Committee, the UK 
Panel and the French ‘Commission pour l’indemnisation des victimes de spoliations 
intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur pendant l’Occupation’ (CIVS). 
While the bodies have in common that they all give non-binding advice to their 
respective Government, their ‘juridisctions’, decision making frameworks, as well as the 
remedies they may recommend vary. Whereas the Dutch solution focusses in the first 
place on the stocks of objects that had been restored after the end of the war but also 
apply to other national collections, the French solution in the form of the CIVS also 
deals with claims of missing artworks. The UK Panel may issue recommendations in 
                                                     
2091 Art. L. 451-7 CHC reads: “Les biens incorporés dans les collections publiques par dons et legs ou, pour 
les collections ne relevant pas de l'Etat, ceux qui ont été acquis avec l'aide de l'État ne peuvent être 
déclassés”. 
2092 Cornu, M., 2008. 
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claims against a UK national collection or another UK museum or gallery established 
for the public benefit.2093  
In as far as the decision-making framework of the reommendation bodies is 
concerned, the analysis revealed that all frameworks allow for a flexible approach 
exceeding purely legal aspects. In the Netherlands and France, the framework is to a 
certain extent defined by the Governments on the basis of the recommendations issued 
by the Ekkart Committee and the Mattéoli Mission. In contrast, the UK Government 
did not adopt an explicit policy concerning the return of artworks. Instead, and in line 
with the general characteristics of common law, i.e. lesser emphasis on codifications and 
a higher degree of judicial independence, the UK Government left it to the discretion of 
the Panel to define the meaning and relevance of ‘non-legal aspects’. Our analysis of the 
recommendations issued by the Panel revealed that the Panel accords moral strength to 
a case in all situations where a cultural object was lost during the years 1933-1945 where 
the loss was precipitated by the Nazi reign, regardless of the actual form of transaction. 
In the end, however, our analysis revealed that there exists little difference between the 
policy-based approaches in the Netherlands and France and the UK case-based 
approach granting discretion to the Panel to translate the notions of non-legal 
obligations into a decision-making framework. 
The three national solutions furthermore share that they take a lenient approach 
towards the proof required, taking account of the inherent difficulties given the war 
times circumstances and the passage in time to proof former ownership and the 
involuntary nature of a loss.2094 
In as far as the range of available remedies is concerned, the Dutch Restitution 
Committee has the most limited range of remedies to its availabiltity. It can only decide 
between returning an object and denying its return. It cannot recommend the payment 
of financial compensation instead. It can, however, state conditions for the return of an 
artwork allowing for greater nuances in the remedies accorded. The Panel has been 
provided with a broad range of remedies ranging from recommending the return of an 
objects, to compensation payments and ex gratia payments, possiblity complemented 
with a commemorative notice reminding the public in future exhibitions of the history 
of the object and its former owners. As for France, CIVS has an additional remedy to its 
availability in the form of compensation payments for missing art works, corresponding 
                                                     
2093 In this respect the statement by Schnabel and Tatzkow in their book ‘Nazi spoliated art’, p. 175 that the 
UK is bottom of the league for providing for the return of Nazi spoliated art is misleading. While the 
statement is correct in as far as the UK still has not amended the legislation preventing the return of works 
from the national collection, it does not pay due regard to the fact that the situation in the UK is different 
from the continental European countries in that it was never occupied. Consequently, different from the 
countries that had to provide for the restoration of rights after the war and where recent introspection of 
how the countries had fulfilled these tasks had led to a reconsideration, such incentive is absent in the case 
of the UK.  
2094 According to Palmer, this leniency with regard to the burden of proof of the claimants is important in 
facilitating the return of objects to their former owers as laborious inquiries often keep victims and heirs 
from choosing for private litigation Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 53. 
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to its greater jurisdiction dealing also with objects whose present location or existence 
are unknown.  
If we compare the solutions implemented at the national level with the solutions 
proposed in the instruments disucssed in Chapter 2 it becomes evident that all three 
countries opted for the finding of solutions within the context of the existing law rather 
than introducing legal reforms as proposed by the Council of Europe in its Resolution 
1205: the jurisdictions analysed did not introduce modern legislation compelling the 
return of spoliated art works.2095 Also, they did not change the law pertaining to good 
faith acquisition, extinctive or acquisitive prescription.2096 Instead, the national solutions 
essentially consist in the establishment of special committees that can hear and decide 
cases without being limited to the positive law applicable.  
In analysing the national solutions adopted with regard to Nazi spoliated art, special 
attention was paid to the role and relevance accorded to potential financial 
compensation received in the past. The national solutions adopted in the Netherlands 
and the UK resemble the soft law instruments adopted at the international level in that 
they accord little relevance to the question of the relevance of financial compensation 
that might have been received in the context of the post war restoration of rights. The 
analysis of the cases heard by the Dutch Restitutions Committee and the UK Panel until 
the end of 2008 revealed that financial compensations received by the claimants were 
not taken into account in assessing the validity of a (moral) claim or in determing an 
appropriate remedy.2097 
France, on the other hand, explicitly looks at potential compensation payments 
received by the claimants. In accordance with recommendation no. 9 of the Mattéoli 
Mission, CIVS does not recommend compensation payments where the rightholders 
have already been compensated in the past.2098 Where only partial compensation has 
been received, CIVS may order to supplement the amount. Where a claimant seeks the 
return of an object from the MNR Collection rather than compensation, the return 
would depend on the repayment of the amount received. In order to assess whether 
                                                     
2095 In fact, very few countries introduced modern legislation compelling the return of spoliated objects to 
victims of the Holocaust. Cf.: Palmer, N., 2001, p. 512. Exceptions are the Czech Republic with its Law no. 
212/2000 of 23 June; see especially s. 3 para. 1 and Lithuania with its Law no. 212/2000 of 23 June; see 
especially s 3 para. 1. Cf.: Palmer, N., 2000b, p. 345. Austria adopted the ‘Federal Law on return of Art 
Objects from the Austrian Federal Museums and Collections’ (Bundesgesetz: Rückgabe von 
Kunstgegenständen aus den Österreichischen Bundesmuseen und Sammlungen) (NR: GP XX RV 1390 AB 
1464 S. 146. BR: AB 5802 S. 646). Of these legal acts, only the Czech Act provides for a legally enforceable 
claims right. The Austrian and Lithuanian Acts enable return of Nazi spoliated art rather than prescribing it. 
Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 259. 
2096 Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 246. 
2097 In 2009, the Spoliation Advisory Panel seems to have adopted a new attitude when it issued its 9th 
report:: http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/429961_HC757_PROOF.pdf (last visited 30 June 
2009).  
2098 Mission-Mattéoli, 2000, Recommandation n° 9, p. 170. 
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claimants have been compensated in the past, CIVS operates an office in Berlin to 
consult files where compensation was previously awarded under the BRüG Law.2099 
The finding that the solutions adopted in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
pay little regard to the question whether claimants might have received financial 
compensation in the past is interesting in two respects: first, a just and fair solution must 
consider compensation payments which already had been made according to post-war 
restitution laws.2100 While it could be argued that a just and fair solution demands the 
physical return of an object regardless of any compensation payments received, this 
cannot be presumed but must be discussed in public taking all relevant aspects, 
including past compensation payments, into account.  
Human remains2101  
With regard to the return of human remains from public collections, the analysis of 
the solutions adhered to in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France revealed 
that none of the countries introduced legislation comparable to the United States federal 
act NAGPRA. This might not be surprising if one considers the different political 
positions of the countries involved. Different from the United States and other 
countries discussed in Chapter 2.§2.II.2, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
France do not have a native population comparable to Native American Indians that is 
seeking the return of human remains.2102 Also, it should be emphazised that NAGPRA 
applies only to Native American remains, not to human remains in museum collections 
in general. The absence of the introduction of new legally enforceable rights for the 
return of human remains does not mean that the national solutions did not affect the 
law pertaining to human remains in public collections. This is, however, only the case 
for the United Kingdom, which adopted the 2004 Human Tissue Act.  
The fact that the UK Government did introduce legislation positively discriminating 
human remains in comparison to other objects in their public collection in allowing for 
their de-accessioning, gives evidence of a certain commitment to the cause of returning 
human remains. With the introduction of s 47 of the 2004 Human Tissue Act the 
situation in the UK came closer to the legal situation in the Netherlands in that the 
trustees of national collections in the UK, which were previously prevented from 
                                                     
2099 Cf.: Presentation by JP Bady 'The Policy of Compensation for Plundered Works of Art in France', 
London 18 October 2006, Conference on Dispute resolution and holocaust related art claims organised by 
the Institute of Art and Law. In an interview in 2006, Prefet Kalfon, then director of the CIVS stated that 
until then no other country had expressed the wish to cooperate in this work (Kalfon, L., 2006, p. 436). 
2100 Cf.: König, H., 
http://www.badv.bund.de/002_menue_oben/007_english/004_provenance/index.html.  
2101 As stated above the reader may referred to the interim conclusions at the end of each section for a 
summary of the content and the nature of the policies developed in the three countries with regard to the 
return of human remains. In this section we will limit ourselves to pointing out similarities and differences.  
2102 It should be mentioned that in the UK, the Council of British Druid Orders (CoBDO) has in a number 
of instances claimed the return of human remains. See, e.g.: Museen: Kontroverse um Kinderknochen, 2 
February 2009. 
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disposing of objects from their collections except in a limited number of exceptions, are 
now able to de-accession human remains if they wish to do so. By adopting legislation 
enabling de-accession of human remains the UK Government distanced itself from the 
opinion that human remains in public collections cannot be subject to property rights. 
Both, in the United Kingdom and in France, it was tried at a certain point to circumvent 
the ban on de-accession by relying on the no-property argument. The reference to the 
commons or anti-commons is a general strategy to change already owned things into an 
acquireable state.2103 In the end, however, the strategy of relying on the no-property rule 
was discarded in both countries: whereas the United Kingdom introduced legislation 
positively discriminating human remains in comparison to other objects in their public 
museum collections, France has returned to its initial starting point that human remains 
in collections designated as Musées de France cannot be de-accessioned unless by assent of 
the National Scientific Commission of Museum Collections of France as outlined in Art. 
L. 451-5 CHC. As for the Netherlands, the argument of the no-property role did not 
figure in any of the case studies. Dutch legal doctine generally affirms that ownership of 
human remains as present in museum collections is possible.2104 In fact, the existence of 
human remains in museum collections and the trade in human remains is referred to as 
supportive evidence by the authors who argue that a corpse or in any event a human 
body after death can, at some point, become the object of property rights.2105 An 
explanation for the absence of the discussion in the Netherlands might be the fact that 
there exists no general ban on the de-accession of objects from Dutch national 
collections in the first place.  
Except for the UK Human Tissue Act 2004, none of the national solutions adopted 
qualify as legal solutions in the sense of changing the law applicable to human remains 
in public collections. Instead, in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands non-
binding guidelines were adopted. In the Netherlands, the policies were developed in a 
dialogue between the institutions affected by a claim for the return of remains, 
respectively adopting a pro-active attitude to meet future claims, and professional ethics 
bodies, respectively expert groups. The Dutch Government was not involved in the 
development of the policies. It did, however, in one case, indirectly confirm the policy 
relied upon by agreeing on the return of human remains that belonged to the national 
                                                     
2103 Cf.: Flessas, T., 2007, p. 19.  
2104 Herten, J.H.S.v., 1984, p. 156 & 160; Putten, W.G.H.M.v.d., 1993, p. 24; Steur, J.C.v.d., 2003, pp. 213-
214; Leenen, H.J.J., et al., 2007, p. 60; Vliet, L.P.W.v., 2007, p. 3. 
2105 See, e.g.: Herten, J.H.S.v., 1984, p. 156; Putten, W.G.H.M.v.d., 1993, p. 24. There exists general 
agreement that throughout a person’s lifetime, his or her body cannot be subject to property rights See in 
this respect: Petit, C., 1950, p. 431; Beekhuis, C.H., 1955, p. 854; Herten, J.H.S.v., 1984, p. 157; Steur, 
J.C.v.d., 2003, pp. 211-212; Boer, J.d., 2006, p. 51, nr. 58; Leenen, H.J.J., et al., 2007, pp. 47-59; Snijders, 
H.J. / Rank-Berenschot, E.B., 2007, p. 21, nr. 27. For a different opinion see advocate general Van Asch 
van Wijck in his conclusion in the Supreme Court case HR 25 June 1946, NJ 1946, 503 where he argued in 
favour of classifying the living body as the object in property owned by the living person as the right holder. 
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collection.2106 As for the extrapolation of common principles, the analysis identified 
three principles. Essentially, these principles boil down to the need to treat human 
remains with respect and sensitivity; to be prepared for transparency and dialogue with 
the requesting party; and finally, less a principle but rather an aspect to be taken into 
account in the decision-making process, to verify the legimitate interest of the 
requesting party.  
In the United Kingdom, the process of critically assessing the treatment of human 
remains in public collections and of developing guidelines was initiated by the 
Government. The final ‘Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in Museums’ is more 
extensive than the common policy we were able to extract for the Netherlands. It does 
not, however, differ in essence from the Dutch principles: while the guidance might 
enjoy more authority for having been adopted by the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS), it is non-binding. Furthermore, its main contribution lies in guiding 
and structuring the decision-making process of institutions with regard to the return of 
human remains by listing the relevant questions and aspects that must be taken into 
account. In as far as substantive principles are concerned the relevance of the guidance 
is limited.  
As for France, no conclusions can yet be drawn with regard to the nature and 
content of any principles. While the case studies identified two possible mechanisms for 
the de-accessioning of human remains from French collections – by means of a legal 
statute or by following the declassification procedure involving the National Scientific 
Commission of Museum Collections – the present state of the cases does not provide 
insight on the nature and content of the principles that will govern the drafting of 
statutes or the de-classification procedure.  
Different from the national solutions adopted with regard to Nazi spoliated art no 
recommendation committees were established to deal specifically with claims for the 
return of human remains as a form of alternative dispute resolution. If we compare the 
solutions adhered to at the national level with the soft law instruments discussed in 
Chapter 2 it becomes evident that the national solutions do not follow the soft law 
instruments in according greater priority to the return of human remains than to other 
cultural objects in public collections. While the developments in the three countries 
analysed, but especially in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, give evidence of 
sympathy for the claimants and of willingness to return human remains, as embodied 
most prominently in s 47 of the Human Tissue Act 2004, they are not reflected in 
substantive principles compelling or at least effectively proposing the return. Instead, as 
summarised above, the principles are limited to procedural aspects of how to meet a 
request for return.  
                                                     
2106 See above in chp. 4.§2.I.2 for the analysis of the return of the Toi Moko from the collection of the 
National Museum of Ethnology to New Zealand.  
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I I .  TO W A R D S  R U L E S  O F  C U S T O MA R Y  L A W  O N  TH E  R E T U R N  O F  NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T  
W O R K S  A N D  H U M A N  R E M A I N S?  
 One of the aims of the present chapter is to evaluate in how far the developments 
at the national level may be considered as expressions of (an emerging) rule of 
customary law. In Chapter 2, which focused on the principles, declarations and 
resolutions adopted at the international level, we came to the conclusion that the 
instruments presently constitute soft law principles de lege ferenda. Such principles may, 
however, develop into rules of international law. This “hardening” of soft law into hard 
law may happen via the creation of customary law.2107 
Customary law, as an important source of international law next to treaty law, has 
been introduced in detail in Chapter 1. Consequently, we will not repeat the 
explanations concerning the two cumulative elements of customary law, opinio iuris and 
state practice, but will turn to the analysis whether the practices identified and discussed 
in the present chapter qualify as sufficiently extensive and convincing state practice. The 
following sources can give evidence of ‘state practice’: administrative acts, legislation, as 
well as decisions of courts. Furthermore, state practice may also be derived from 
activities on the international stage, such as treaty-making, resolutions in the United 
Nations General Assembly, comments made by governments on drafts produced by the 
International Law Commission, decisions of the international judicial institutions, 
decisions of national courts, treaties, and the general practice of international 
organisations.2108 In as far as the evidence that may be derived from the international 
stage is concerned, it has been scrutinised above in Chapter 2. Consequently, and in line 
with the content of the present chapter we can focus on the national dimension.  
In Chapter 4.§1 we have discussed the policies adopted in the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and France in reaction to claims seeking the return of Nazi spoliated 
art. The analysis revealed that none of the countries introduced legislation providing for 
the return of Nazi spoliated art. Instead, the Governments opted for the introduction of 
non-adversarial claims committees that may decide upon the return of art works, in 
particular from national and to a lesser extent from public collections not owned by the 
state. As for the Netherlands and France, the respective committees base their 
recommendations on Governmental policies. The UK Panel, on the other hand, has 
been granted carte blanche to interprete the meaning and relevance of ‘non-legal aspects’. 
While the policies implemented by the three countries express sympathy for the course 
of returning Nazi spoliated art works and may not be undervalued for their effect in 
facilitating returns, they cannot satisfy the standards of uniformity and consistency that 
                                                     
2107 Cf.: Szasz, P., 1992, p. 68; Cassese, A., 2005, p. 491; Andorno, R., 2007. 
2108 Shaw, M., N., 2008, p. 82. Cf.: Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., 2005, p. 108; Dixon, M., 2007, p. 31. 
Bossuyt remarks that it is not entirely clear whether, in the eyes of the ICJ, the resolutions in the United 
Nations General Assembly provide evidence of state practice or of an opinio iuris (or both). 
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are required to speak of state practice relevant for the emergence of a rule of customary 
law.  
Even if our analysis had indicated uniform and consistent practice for the three 
countries scrutinised, the finding would not allow us to draw conclusions for the 
existence of a rule of custormary law. Such a conclusion would require the analysis of 
more jurisdictions. A review of secondary literature supports the conclusion that one 
cannot speak of a rule of customary law on the return of Nazi spoliated art.2109 
The analysis of the national practices developed with regard to the return of human 
remains in Chapter 4.§2 revealed even less consistency between the national solutions. 
Whereas the UK Government actively intervened and triggered the process of reflecting 
upon current practices and the need of returning human remains, no official policy was 
adopted. The Government did, however, relax the statutes applicable to the national 
collections in order to allow for the return of human remains where institutions wish to 
do so. In the Netherlands, no official Government intervention was identified, except 
for the granting of permission to return human remains from a national collection. 
While a connection between the state and public collections certainly exists, especially in 
as far state museums are concerned but including also public collections that are 
incorporated as foundations, trusts, or companies, which are indirectly held by the state 
and subsidized by public money2110, it would not be persuasive to argue that the 
decisions taken by the different public collections in the Netherlands can be accorded to 
the Dutch State as State actions. As for France, no coherent state practice could be 
detected either, with the two existing cases pointing in different differections. 
Consequently, our analysis denies the existence of a rule of customary rule for the 
return of Nazi spoliated art respectively human remains. It does, however, reveal a 
general trend to facilitate returns both with regard to Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains.2111 Different aspects facilitating the return have been identified in the present 
chapter: first, the removal of legal barriers to de-accession objects from public 
collections. This aspect emerged in particular in the context of returns from the United 
Kingdom as one of the jurisdictions characterised by limitations to the de-accessioning 
of objects from public collections. Whereas legislation enabling the return of human 
remains has already entered into force, the adoption of legislation allowing also for the 
return of Nazi spolitated art is currently pending. France, as the other country 
significantly limiting the de-accessioning of objects from public collections, especially 
from the Musées de France, is lagging behind with regard to the de-accessioning of human 
remains. While the de-accessioning of human remains from French public collections is 
not ruled out from the outset as was the case in the UK prior to the adoption of s 47 of 
the 2004 Human Tissue Act, France has not yet clarified the rules and conditions 
                                                     
2109 See, e.g.: Torsen, M.A., 2005, pp. 16-17, http://www.ejcl.org/94/art94-1.html (who analysed the 
national solutions adopted in the United States, Austria, France, and Russia); Garrett, R.L., 2000, p. 385.  
2110 Siehr, K.G., 2005, p. 1086. Cf.: Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, p. 197. 
2111 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, p. 285. 
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applicable to the declassification procedure by the National Scientific Commission of 
Museum Collections in accordance with Art. L. 451-5 CHC. However, the findings of 
the case study of the return of the remains of Saartje Baartmans nevertheless confirm 
the general tendency sympathetic to and faciliting the return of human remains.  
Next to the relaxation of legal statutes preventing the return of human remains and 
Nazi spoliated art works the introduction of non-adversial claims committeees must be 
mentioned as another aspect facilitating the return. Not only do these committees 
constitute low-threshold procedures to claimants from a financial point of view and in 
view of the evidence required; they also allow for the assessment of claims not limited to 
strictly legal aspects.2112  
The identification of a general return-friendly-tendency must neither be over- nor 
undervalued: the tendency is as of today not reflected in legal rules explicitly providing 
for the return of Nazi spoliated art respectively human remains. Put differently, returns 
depend on the good-will and the interests of the holding institution and state concerned. 
However, it would be myopic to consider only the interest of conserving an object for a 
collection. One must not disregard the inherent positive effect a return may have. This 
is particularly true for human remains: returns affected in the past have contributed to a 
better understanding of public collections, of colonial and post-colonial relationships 
and collecting practices.2113 Furthermore, they have resulted in new forms of agreements 
and cooperation between the former holding institutions and institutions in the country 
to which the remains have been returned: the repatriation of human remains has 
facilitated new discoveries about the collections, the provenance and original use of 
collection items, greater understanding of the cultures exhibited and has resulted in 
collaborative projects, such as joined exhibitions and research projects.2114 Next to 
internal reasons to return cultural objects, one must also not forget the influence of 
international media (pressure) and diplomatic channels. 
 
                                                     
2112 Cf.: Ibid., p. 265 & 285. 
2113 Vrdoljak, A.P., 2006, p. 15. 
2114 Ibid. See for concrete examples of cases where the process of repatriation has had benefits both for the 
formerly holding institution: Simpson, M.G., 1996, pp. 233-234; Simpson, M.G., 2001, pp. 245-246. 
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C H A P T E R  5  
Conclusions 
 The overall aim of this book is to take stock and analyse the present law and 
practice with regard to the return of cultural property from public (museum) collections 
through the lens of the cases of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. Time has come 
to draw some conclusions based on the research represented in the previous chapters. 
First, we will summarise the main research findings pertaining to the return of cultural 
objects (§1). Subsequently, we will present the recommendations that can be made on 
the basis of the present research (§2), before briefly discussing the relevance of the 
developments in the cases of Nazi spoliated art and human remains for the return of 
cultural objects from museums more in general (§3). A final reflection in the form of an 
epilogue will be dedicated to developments too recent to have been integrated in this 
study, but which might be of great relevance for the future course of the restitution 
debate. 
§1. SUMMARY  AND  MAIN  F IND IN GS  FROM THE  PREV IOUS  CHAPTERS 
CH A P T E R  1 :  F R O M  T H E  I U S  P R A E DA E  T O  TH E  H E R I TA G E  O F  M A N K I N D :  T H E  
I N C R EA S I N G  P R O T E C T I O N  O F  C U L T U R A L  O BJ E C T S  A S  C U L TU R A L  P RO P E R TY ,  
I N CL U D I N G  R E S T O R A T I V E  B UT  N O  R E T R O A C T I V E  P R O T E C T I O N 
 In analysing public international law with regard to the protection and return of 
cultural objects, the following development became evident: starting from Ancient 
Times, where the looting of cultural objects was a well-established and recognised 
practice, there has been a gradual increase in recognising the obligation to restitute 
cultural objects.  
The obligation to restitute cultural objects is most advanced in the law dealing with 
armed conflicts. The entry into force of the 1899 Hague Convention in 1900 marks a 
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watershed in establishing a ban on the looting of cultural objects.2115 Hand in hand with 
the introduction of the ban on the looting of cultural objects emerged an obligation to 
restitute any objects looted in breach of the ban. This obligation is the result of a 
combination of the general principle of international law that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation and the primacy of physical 
restitution over other forms of reparation where possible. The primacy of physical 
restitution, especially where it concerns an object of cultural relevance, was confirmed 
during the process of the restoration of rights after WWII. By the outbreak of the war in 
1939 the ban on looting and the obligation to restitute looted cultural objects did not 
only apply to State Parties to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions but qualified also 
as rules of customary law. Where cultural objects could not be physically restituted for 
having been destroyed or for being lost, compensation payments were granted. The 
emphasis on physical restitution and the payment of financial compensation where 
physical restitution was not an available option did not remain limited to external 
restitutions. The Allied Forces chose not to observe the principle of State sovereignty, 
according to which the internal restoration of rights would have been a matter of the 
German State only. Instead, they chose to extend the scope and principles of restitution 
to apply also to deprivations that had occurred within the German State since the Nazi’s 
rise to power in 1933. By doing so they created new legal bases for the restitution of 
cultural objects. The new legally enforceable claim rights were construed in a way to 
allow victims to effectively reclaim their property: the internal restitution regime was 
based on a presumption that all transactions made in the period 1933-1945 involving a 
person belonging to a persecuted group qualified as an act of confiscation. Furthermore, 
the right to restitution also existed irrespective of any interest of a potential good faith 
purchaser.  
In 1954, while the post-WWII process of the restoration of rights was still ongoing, 
the protection of cultural objects in times of armed conflicts made a leap forward with 
the adoption of the 1954 Hague Convention and its (First) Protocol. In particular the 
Protocol proved to be relevant for the restitution of cultural property: in the first place, 
the obligation to restitute cultural objects applies to all State Parties rather than only the 
aggressor state. Secondly, the obligation is not subject to any limitation periods. Finally, 
the obligation exists irrespective of any rights possibly acquired in the mean time by a 
bona fide purchaser. In this respect the obligation of the Protocol to restitute cultural 
property reflects the characteristics of the post WWII restitution regime. While the 1954 
Hague Convention is less radical with regard to obliging State Parties to restitute cultural 
property, its relevance for the protection of cultural property must not be undervalued: 
                                                     
2115 The finding that it is the 1899 Hague Convention rather than the 1907 Hague Convention that 
constitutes the watershed in introducing a ban on looting and the corresponding obligation to restitute 
objects is not relevant from a practical point of view: during the ten years that lay between the entry into 
force of the two contentions in 1900 and 1910, no wars were waged between State Parties to the 1899 
Hague Convention. See for a time chart of wars from 3000 BC to the present: Chandler, D.G., 2003.  
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as the first international treaty to focus solely on the protection of cultural objects as 
cultural property, the 1954 Hague Convention added authority to the protection of 
cultural property more in general.  
The protection of cultural property in times of peace in the form of international 
treaties started in the 1970s with the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. In 
1995, the UNIDROIT Convention followed. While the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
requires State Parties to return cultural property stolen from a museum or a similar 
institution, it is not self-executing. Consequently, it cannot by itself create new legal 
rights to restitution. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, on the other hand, is self-
executing and created new legally enforceable rights both with regard to the restitution 
of stolen cultural objects and illegally exported cultural objects. The provisions with 
regard to the return of illegally exported cultural objects are, however, significantly more 
limited in scope than the rights granted for the restitution of stolen cultural objects. 
Countries remain hesitant to grant special rights providing for the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects. However, this hesitation does not mean that states are lacking 
interest in the protection of another country’s cultural property. While states refrain 
from enforcing another State’s criminal or public laws, the analysis revealed a general 
support for the cause of returning cultural objects to the country from where they have 
been illegally exported. In particular, a tendency can be denoted to approach such cases 
as cases of stolen cultural property.2116 
While the return of objects removed during the colonial era belongs strictly speaking 
to the category of objects removed in times of peace, specific attention was given to 
scrutinising the possible existence of specific rights providing for the return of these 
objects. The reason for doing so is two-fold: first, a number of authors have argued that 
a specific rule providing for the return of cultural objects removed from formerly 
colonised countries could have come into existence despite the general aversion of 
states to introduce retroactive obligations.2117 The second reason consists in the fact that 
there exists a coincidence of the era in which the fundaments of current public 
collections of human remains have been laid with the zenith of European dominion 
over the rest of the world.2118 
The analysis addressed whether and in how far a legal basis for the return emerges 
from the resolutions adopted within the frameworks of UNESCO and from the rules 
on state succession. Also, it was verified whether the circumstances of acquisition during 
the colonial era allowed for the qualification as an international illegal act. None of the 
three approaches resulted in the identification of a legal basis providing for the return of 
cultural objects removed during the colonial era.  
A final constellation analysed was the return of cultural objects to a people. The 
analysis did reveal a number of occasions in which cultural objects were returned to a 
                                                     
2116 Cf.: Schönenberger, B., 2009, pp. 215 & 239. 
2117 See further above in chp. 1.§3.  
2118 See further above in chp. 2.§2.I.  
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people. However, these returns were rather indirect in nature and cannot be seen 
isolated from the greater restoration of rights after WWII. There is not sufficient ground 
to speak of a general obligation to return cultural objects to a people.  
In conclusion, explicit rights for the restitution of cultural objects are still mainly 
limited to situations qualifying as armed conflicts where they follow from the principle 
of reparations. Outside of armed conflicts, countries are wary to create or recognise 
legally enforceable rights for the return of cultural objects. This does not mean, 
however, that they are hostile to returning cultural objects.  
CH A P T E R  2 :  TH E  G EN E S I S  O F  C U R R E N T  CL A I M S  A N D  T H EIR  L E G A L  S T A T US   
 The findings of Chapter 1 concerning the wariness of States to create new legally 
enforceable rights for the return of cultural objects while sharing sympathy for the cause 
of returning cultural objects are also true for the two cases, Nazi spoliated art and 
human remains, that were addressed in detail.  
Nazi spoliated art 
With regard to Nazi spoliated art the analysis revealed that present claims can no 
longer rely on the post-war restitution rights. While objects may still be claimed back 
where the dispute is a matter between states, private individuals can no longer rely on 
the rights as they existed / were created after the end of WWII for the lapse of 
application periods. As for the principles, resolutions, and declarations adopted since the 
end of the 1990s with the 1998 Washington Principles as primus inter pares, the analysis 
revealed that the instruments, being of soft law character, did not create new legally 
enforceable rights. Consequently, the relevance of the instruments lies in the rising of 
awareness of the problem and in preparing the grounds for solutions to be adopted at 
the national level. The solutions proposed by the instruments may be grouped into two 
categories: the first category consists of solutions that seek to revive already existing 
legal norms. The solutions within this category seek to address the obstacles that 
prevent claimants from relying on already existing legal bases. In particular, they address 
legal institutions such as good faith acquisition, prescriptive acquisition and extinctive 
prescription. The instruments did not suggest the introduction of new legal bases for the 
return of Nazi spoliated art. Also belonging to this category of legal solutions that as 
such do not create legally enforceable rights are solutions that seek to abolish any rules 
preventing the disposal of objects from public collections or the objects’ export. The 
second category of solutions proposed does not seek to improve the situation of 
claimants by means of legal reform but seeks to arrive at restitution by alternative 
means. In particular, they seek to improve the claimants’ position in providing evidence 
supporting their claims and advocate the creation of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. With regard to the latter, the instruments stress the creation of special 
committees that may hear claims and that may arrive at “just and fair” solutions that are 
not based solely on legal aspects. The question as to what must be understood by “just 
and fair” solutions is not further elaborated on. Against the findings of Chapter 1 it is 
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noticeable that no reference is made to the possibility that financial compensation might 
have been received by (the heirs of) the former owner during the post WWII period.  
Human remains 
With regard to human remains the analysis indicated that human remains satisfy the 
characteristics of the notion of cultural property and thus fall under the protection 
granted by international treaties dealing with the protection of cultural property 
(Chapter 2.§2.III.2). As a consequence, human remains, especially from public 
collections, are granted protection against theft and illegal export, including restorative 
protection in the sense that they must be returned to the country from where they had 
been illicitly removed. The existing legal framework of public international law does not, 
on the other hand, provide for any rights to reclaim human remains that have been 
acquired in the past. The same finding is also true for the instruments adopted by 
various fora dealing (in-) directly with the return of human remains. In fact, only the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage could have 
provided for such a right. The Vermillion Accord on Human Remains, the Mataatua 
Declaration and the ICOM Code do not qualify as normative rules for not having been 
adopted by a forum with treaty-making authority, whereas the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a declaration is missing the required will to be bound. 
Consequently, the relevance of the instruments lies essentially in proposing what the law 
may or should be in the future. Two paths have been suggested by the instruments for 
the solutions to be adopted at the national level: a strictly legal solution, consisting of 
the creation of legally enforceable rights similar to the US federal law NAGPRA and 
alternative solutions in the form of fair and transparent decision making mechanisms 
and in providing better inventories of the collection holdings. It can be noticed that the 
instruments attach greater importance to the necessity to return human remains than to 
return cultural property in general.  
Nazi spoliated art and human remains compared: similarities and differences 
If one compares the solutions proposed at the international level by the various fora 
with regard to recent claims for the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains the 
following similarities and differences become evident. All instruments share that they do 
not create a new legal basis for the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains 
respectively. As soft law instruments they can only denote “values, guidelines, ideas and 
proposals that may develop into rules of international law”.2119 As far as the guidelines 
and proposals made with regard to the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains, 
the instruments differ: whereas the instruments dealing with human remains stress in 
particular the necessity of creating new legal bases for the return of human remains, 
instrument dealing with Nazi spoliated art emphasize first and foremost alternative 
dispute mechanisms, and to a lesser extent legal reforms. Different from instruments 
                                                     
2119 Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, p. 50. 
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dealing with human remains, however, the legal reforms do not seek to create new legal 
claim rights. Instead, they seek to reactivate past claim rights by addressing legal 
institutions that, through the passage of time, have invalidated past claim rights. 
Consequently, both alternative solutions and legal reforms pertaining to Nazi spoliated 
art seek for ways to circumvent the legal effects of the passage of time. Against the 
background of the legal framework as existing in public international law, the solutions 
proposed by the instruments for the two cases make sense: given the far-reaching 
efforts, including the introduction of new legal norms, to restitute spoliated art works 
during the period of the restoration of rights after the end of WWII, present attempts 
can take these past claim rights as anchor or starting point. With regard to human 
remains, such anchorage ground is missing, leaving the call for the creation of new legal 
bases for the return of human remains as the only available option. 
CH A P T E R  3 :  TH E  C O N F I N E S  O F  T H E  L A W   
 The analysis in Chapter 3 of the rules applicable to public collection revealed that 
a return may be prevented by rules regulating the disposal of objects from a public 
collection. This is especially the case for UK and French public collections. Both the 
UK and the French regime are characterised by a general ban on the disposal of objects. 
However, whereas the ban on the disposal of objects from UK public collections 
originates from restraints on the owners’ rights to disposition, the ban on the disposal of 
objects from French public collections results from res extra commercium legislation. Put 
differently, as for objects in UK public collections the ban is the result of an external 
factor whereas the inability to be transferred of objects in French public collections is an 
inherent characteristic of the objects themselves. However, this inherent characteristic is 
not absolute. It may be altered by following the de-classification procedure now 
provided for in Art. L. 451-5 CHC. Consequently, from a theoretical point of view the 
ban on the disposal of objects from French public collections is less absolute than the 
UK regulation in that it provides for a back door to revoke the ban on disposal. From a 
practical point of view, in the absence of any measures implementing the de-
classification procedure of Art. L. 451-5 CHC, the ban on the disposal of objects from 
French public collections is presently as impervious as the ban applicable to objects in 
UK collections. As for the Dutch situation, the analysis revealed that no formal 
restrictions exist to the disposal of an object from a public collection. However, in a 
limited number of cases disposal may be ruled out on the ground of application of the 
criteria of the CHP Act by analogy. 
Further to the general rules on disposal, additional limitations may apply to objects 
that were acquired by donation or legacy. Again, it is the French system that is most 
radical in limiting the possibilities of disposing of an object. According to Art. L. 451-7 
CHC, objects that have been acquired by donation or legacy cannot be declassified. The 
inability to declassify these objects is motivated by the wish not to discourage future 
donations and legacies. While the Netherlands and the United Kingdom also know 
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limitations on disposal of objects acquired by donations or legacies, additional 
limitations to the possibility of disposal will arise only where explicitly or implicitly 
stipulated by the terms of the donation or testamentary disposition. However, even 
when the terms of the agreement exclude or limit disposal they are not necessarily fatal 
for an intended return. As for the UK, the governing statutes of the national collection 
concerned may explicitly provide for the possibility to override trust and other non-
statutory conditions. As for the situation in the Netherlands, the so-called ‘imprévision-
rule’ of Art. 6:258 DCC may provide for the possibility to dispose of objects acquired by 
donations. With regard to testamentary dispositions, the 2003 reform of the inheritance 
legislation broadened the possibility to alter applicable conditions and obligations, 
including limitations on disposal. 
With regard to export regulation the analysis did not detect any fatal obstacles for an 
intended return of an object to a claimant or country abroad. Export regulations may, 
however, subject a return to certain administrative requirements such as the presentation 
of an export licence.  
CH A P T E R  4 :  N A T I O N A L  SO L UT I O N S  P E R T A I N IN G  TO  T H E  R E T U R N  O F  NA ZI  S P O L I A T E D  
A R T  A N D  H U M A N  R E M A I N S  –  D I F F E R EN T  P ER C E P T I O N S  A BO U T  T H E  N E E D T O  R E T U R N  
 In Chapter 4 we summarised the nature and content of the national policies with 
regard to the return of Nazi spoliated art and human remains. In both cases, the 
solutions adhered to do not constitute legal reforms but provide for alternative solutions 
within the existing law. The only exception currently consists in the UK 2004 Human 
Tissue Act, in particular s 47. S 47 enables the disposal of human remains from the 
national collections, which was previously prevented by the trust and statutory rules 
applicable.   
While the solutions adhered to in both cases mainly consist of alternative solutions 
respecting the present state of the law, they nevertheless differ in approach. The 
solutions introduced with regard to the return of Nazi spoliated art rely extensively on 
committees that have been specifically established to give advice on the return in 
individual cases. From the analysis it appeared that the committees have to a greater or 
lesser extent shaped the policy on the return of works of art. This is specifically true for 
the UK Panel whose terms of reference do not further explicate what is meant by 
“moral strength or moral obligations”. While the margin of appreciation of the Dutch 
Restitutions Committee is considerably more limited in that it has to apply the 
liberalised policy as defined by the Government, the analysis revealed that the 
Committee nevertheless has considerable influence on putting the policy into practice.  
In contrast to Nazi spoliated art, no advisory committee has been adopted to make 
recommendations on the return of human remains. Instead, the solutions developed 
with regard to human remains rely essentially on non-binding guidelines that serve 
institutions in their decision-making process. While the guidelines stress that human 
remains should be treated with respect and sensitivity the guidelines do not advocate 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   469 12-10-2009   12:09:35
470  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
that human remains must be necessarily returned. Instead, they offer stepping stones to 
ensure a well-informed and well-balanced decision making process.  
Comparing the reliance on recommendation committees that have significant 
influence on the developments with regard to Nazi spoliated art on the one hand with 
the absence of such committees with regard to human remains and the introduction of 
merely non-binding procedural guidelines on the other hand, suggests the following 
underlying perception of the cases: with regard to Nazi spoliated art the return is 
recognised as a valid ethical imperative in abstracto. This imperative seems to go as far to 
include even cases in which the claimant has already received compensation payments in 
the past. In contrast to Nazi spoliated art, no such imperative to return human remains 
in abstracto has been recognised. The mere fact that the objects requested are the remains 
of once sentient human beings or the circumstances of their appropriation are not 
considered as imperative reasons to return. Instead, the solutions adhered to seek to 
allow for an optimal decision making process in concrete cases without tipping the 
scales necessarily towards return. Consequently, despite the “closer similarity, in terms 
of the need for sensitivity and recognition and respect between these two areas than 
between any two others”2120, the present developments with regard to the objects’ return 
nevertheless rest on different underlying perceptions as to the imperative to return Nazi 
spoliated art and human remains respectively. 
§2. RECOMM END AT IONS   
 Based on the research findings of this study the following recommendations can 
be formulated. The recommendations are presented in the order following from more 
specific to more general recommendations.  
I .  (RE-)  OP EN IN G  O F  TH E  D E BA T E  O N  J U S T  &  F A I R  SO L U T I O N S  W I T H  R EG A R D  T O  
NA Z I  S PO L I A TE D  A R T  
 Since the (re-) emergence of the debate in the mid 1990s the case of Nazi 
spoliated art has come a long way: after awareness of the Nazi art looting was virtually 
inexistent during the 1970s and 1980s, there is now general awareness about the Nazi 
looting and the fact that works of art had been traded for decades without paying any 
attention to the objects’ fate and potential title problems. However, the present analysis 
of the return of Nazi spoliated art in the past and present2121 indicates that there is not 
yet enough historical profundity: while the history of art works and the fate of their 
former owners prior and during WWII is well researched, little attention is granted to 
the developments during the post-war era. As a consequence, there still exists an 
imbalance of the relevance accorded to financial compensations payments. While the 
                                                     
2120 Palmer, N., 2000a, p. 169; Woodhead, C., C., 2002, pp. 324 & 346. 
2121 See above chp. 1.§1.V / §4; 2.§1.III; 4.§1.   
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rules introduced after WWII on the restitution of spoliated art works provided for 
financial compensation payments in cases that physical restitution was impossible, this 
fact is not yet sufficiently acknowledged in the present debate on the return of Nazi 
spoliated art. Neither the instruments introduced by international fora such as the 1998 
Washington Principles2122, nor the national solutions, with the exception of France, pay 
any regard to financial compensation payments that might have been received by the 
(heirs of the) former owners during the post-war period. Instead, the solutions proposed 
at the international level and as implemented in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom present a one-dimensional picture in that they address only the circumstances 
of loss during the years 1933-1945 but do not systematically take into account 
developments since the end of WWII. While it could be argued that a just and fair 
solution demands the physical return of an object regardless of any compensation 
payments received, this cannot be presumed but must be discussed in public taking all 
relevant aspects, including past compensation payments, into account. 
One explanation for the little relevance accorded to the post-war restoration of rights 
can be found in the way that so-called provenance research is conducted nowadays. 
Provenance research of works of art is concerned with the history of ownership.2123 In 
the past, provenance research had served in the first place the research on the 
authenticity of a work: in the ideal case, a researcher succeeded to establish an unbroken 
chain between a current owner and the artist as the ultimate proof that the work was by 
the hands of the artist. While provenance research still contributes to research 
concerning a painting’s authenticity, its focus has shifted to establish the fate of a work 
of art during the reign of the Nazis in 1933-1945.  
While provenance research is conducted by well-trained art historians who go to 
great length in researching a painting’s provenance, there are two problematic aspects 
about provenance research. As pointed out by one of the leading provenance 
researchers Sophie Lillie, provenance lacks a clear methodology and it is often 
conducted in a particular interest.2124 As a consequence, provenance research does not 
pay sufficient attention to reconcile the history of the painting during WWII with the 
restitution processes in the post-war era. While provenance researchers are well aware of 
files documenting the post-war restoration of rights and are keen to integrate them into 
their research as compelling proof that a work of art had indeed been looted2125, the 
research stops with the finding that an object has been looted.  
                                                     
2122 See for the relevant instruments above in chp. 2.§1.III.  
2123 Yeide, N.H., et al., 2001, p. 1.  
2124 Presentation Sophie Lillie, Restitution Symposium organised by Sotheby’s Amsterdam on 30 January 
2008. See for a conference report: Lubina, K.R.M., 2008. Sophie Lillie is author of the book “Was einmal 
war”, 2003.   
2125 The German restitution files have been characterised as restitution records available to all provenance 
researchers as they could serve as “nearly perfect proof that an individual owned an object before the war 
and lost it due to persecution as the post-war German authorities were rigorous (…) in confirming a claim 
before compensating a Nazi victim for a loss”. Henry, M., 8 September 2007.  
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   471 12-10-2009   12:09:35
472  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Consequently, the first recommendation is to reopen the debate of what constitutes 
just and fair solutions and which relevance must be accorded to financial compensation 
payments received. Such reflection on the relevance of compensation payments received 
from the German Government after the war for current disputes involving works of art 
that had been looted during the war is of course not solely the tasks of provenance 
researchers. To the contrary, while provenance research might still be missing a clear 
methodology and is often exercised for specific interests, its aim is first and foremost to 
establish the (unbroken) chain of a painting’s owners. Rather, such a reflection is the 
task of academics, as well as the media and the public.  
Such a debate is not only important to prevent a later backlash undermining the 
legitimacy of the return policies, it would also constitute a chance to allow for a 
broadening the palette of remedies. A solution often praised as just and fair solution but 
less often implemented consists of paying the claimant financial compensation while 
leaving the object in the public collection where it reminds the public, by means of 
commemorative note, of its history and the fate of its former owners.2126 
Commemorative plaques are a powerful reminder and instructor to the general public of 
the story of those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis.2127 Furthermore, they will 
continue to send out their reminder of the horrors of the Nazi reign and their warning 
about the inhumanity within the human species in the near and later future. At present, 
shortly after the end of the first decade of renewed interest into the return of Nazi 
spoliated art works, the level of public awareness is still high. However, one cannot 
foresee how this development will be remembered in the future. At a certain point no 
more art works will be claimed. With fewer claims and returns, there will be less media 
coverage and consequently awareness. In light of keeping up remembrance in the future, 
the feasibility of solutions allowing an object to remain available to the public and 
serving as an ambassador of history should be reassessed.2128 
                                                     
2126 Messer, K., 1008, p. 19; Elmer, T., G., 2000; Hartung, H., 2005, p. 96. The case generally referred to 
and praised for having resulted in a settlement agreement including a commemorative plaque is the dispute 
between the heirs of Fritz and Louise Gutmann and the collector Daniel C. Searle concerning the 
ownership of the painting “Landscape with Smokestacks” by Degas. See for a short description of the case 
and the settlement above in chp. 2.§1.I. The analysis above of the recommendations of the UK Spoliation 
Adivsory Panel showed that in two of the cases the Panel also recommended to leave the objects, her a 
painting and a piece of porcelain in the national or public collection where their future exhibition should be 
accompanied by a display commemorating the object’s history and provenance during and since the Nazi 
era. Cf.: Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2001; Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2008.  
2127 Messer, K., 1008, p. 19. 
2128 At the point that we concluded this research the Terezin Declaration was adopted (30 June 2009). The 
Declaration devotes substantial attention to Holocaust education, remembrance and research, and to 
memorial sites, which will be the only physical witnesses to the Holocaust when the last survivors have died. 
See for the text of the Declaration: http://www.holocausteraassets.eu-files/200000215-
35d8ef1a36/Terezin_Declaration_Final.pdf. The Terezin Declaration will be shortly introduced and 
discussed in the epilogue. 
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1.  RE D R A F T I N G  O F  T H E  1998  WA S H IN G T ON  PRI N C IP L E S   
 In the light of the foregoing and in order to stimulate public debate on what 
constitute just and fair solutions in cases of Nazi spoliated art we suggest a redrafting of the 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art.2129 The reasons for opting 
for the 1998 Washington Principles rather than any other of the soft law instruments 
discussed in Chapter 2 are twofold: not only were the 1998 Washington Principles the 
first soft law instrument adopted with regard to Nazi spoliated art and marked the 
transition from the period in which awareness had been raised and information on the 
looting and the international and national restitution regimes had been gathered to a 
period in which the composition of public collections were actively challenged.2130 The 
1998 Washington Principles also became the most prominent soft law instrument and 
have been recited almost as a mantra.  
The redrafting of the 1998 Washington Principles a little bit more than a decade after 
their adoption should include at least the following changes: first, changing the title 
from ‘Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art’ to ‘General 
Principles on Nazi-Spoliated Art’ therewith “codifying” present practice, which is not 
limited to cases dealing with art works confiscated by the Nazis but comprises also 
involuntary losses that must be considered as being precipitated by the Nazi Regime.2131 
Secondly, the principles dealing with records and archives that may yield information on 
Nazi spoliated art works and also the resources and personnel that should be made 
available for researching the sources should refer to records and archives holding 
information on the post-war process of the restoration of rights.2132 Finally, the 
principles asking to arrive at just and fair solutions should call for an open-minded 
assessment of what constitutes a just and fair solution in a specific case, taking account 
                                                     
2129 The 1998 Washington Principles are discused in detail above in chp. 2.§1.III.  
2130 Of course, not only public collections were affected but also private collections. See, e.g. the case in 
which the heirs of Margarete Mauthner sought the return of a painting by Van Gogh from the collection of 
Elizabeht Taylor; the case Gerda Dorothea de Weerth vs Edith Marks Baldinger or the case of the heirs of 
Carlotta Landsberg vs Marilynn Alsdorf. See for a short summary of the cases and a list of further cases: 
Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., 2007, part 2. 
2131 Cf.: The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press: "spoliate, v."  
2132 The relevant principles of the 1998 Washington Principles dealing with archival records and human 
resources to research the records are principles 2 and 3. They could be amended by the formulations in 
italics to include the reference to potential financial compensation payments received: 
“2. Relevant records and archives, including those holding information on the restoration of rights in the post-war years, 
should be open and accessible to researchers, in accordance with the guidelines of the International Council 
on Archives.  
3. Resources and personnel should be made available to facilitate the identification of all art that had been 
confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted. Resources and personnel should also be made available to 
determine whether the loss of an object has been remedied by other means than physical restitution, including finacial 
compensation payments”.  
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of all facts and circumstances of a specific case, including past compensation payments 
received.2133  
I I .  HU M A N  R E MA IN S :  O P E N  DI A L O G U E  A N D  C O M M O N  S EN S E  
 In contrast to the case of Nazi spoliated art works, no concrete recommendations 
can be given for the case of human remains on the basis of the current research. The 
practices and principles pursued in the various juridisdictions do not coincide and are 
vague in character themselves. The only conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of 
the present research is that open dialogue and common sense are the best advisors for 
public collections to deal with claims for the return of human remains. In dealing with 
claims, it is important to take claimants seriously and to be aware of the relevance of the 
whole process rather than only the final decision on whether or not human remains are 
returned. Ideally, claimants would be involved in defining the criteria on the basis of 
which the decision will be taken. This way the process would become a true dialogue 
and learning experience for both parties. The (re-) action of public collections should 
not be motivated by the fear of loosing a collection item but by the wish to learn more 
about the culture of the requesting party. While it is exaggerated to state that a claim for 
the return contributes to the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage, as is pursued by 
the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage2134, 
an open dialogue with claimants will certainly contribute to better knowledge of burial 
ceremonies and funeral rituals.2135 The learning process does not have to be limited to 
the specific culture’s attitude towards the dead but can go further in the form of future 
collaboration in research and exhibitions.  
I I I .  "WA L K  T H E  TA L K" :  L I V I N G  UP  T O  R A I S E D  EX P E C TA T I O N S  I N  E N A BL I N G  R E T U R N S   
 Squaring the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 dealing with the protection of cultural 
objects in public collections and the national solutions introduced in view of returning 
Nazi spoliated art and human remains, it becomes evident that there remains a gap 
                                                     
2133 The relevant principles of the 1998 Washington Principles dealing with just and fair solutions are 
principles 8 and 9. They could be amended by the formulations in italics to include the reference to 
potential financial compensation payments received: 
“8. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently 
restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair 
solution. In assessing what constitutes a just and fair solution in a specific case, an open-minded approach should be adopted, 
taking into account all facts and circumstances of a specific case, including past compensation payments received”.  
9. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis, or their heirs, can not 
be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution. In assessing what constitutes 
a just and fair solution in a specific case, an open-minded approach should be adopted, taking into account all facts and 
circumstances of a specific case, including past compensation payments received”.  
2134 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, 17 November 2003, 
UNESCO Doc.MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14. 
2135 See: http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=55 (last visited 15.12.2008).  
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between the solutions introduced and the legal possibilities to realise the solutions. This 
finding is particularly true for the United Kingdom and France whose public collections 
are protected by a general ban on the disposal of objects. While the United Kingdom 
has provided for an exception enabling the return of human remains from the national 
collections by introducing s 47 of the 2004 Human Tissue Act, comparable legislation 
with regard to Nazi spoliated art is missing until today. As a consequence, 
recommendations of the Panel suggesting the return of cultural objects, cannot be 
implemented. All hopes are currently set on a Private Member’s bill, which is due to 
have its 3rd Reading when the present research was concluded. Should the ‘Holocaust 
(Stolen Art) Restitution Bill’ not be adopted, the UK Government is advised to take 
swift action to finally adopt legislation enabling the return of Nazi spoliated art in order 
to guarantee its integrity and that of the Panel. 
As for France, the main point of recommendation concerns the de-classification 
procedure as introduced under the Law relating to French Museums from 2002. In the 
present context the procedure is especially relevant for the return of human remains 
from public collections designated as Musée de France. It is less relevant for Nazi spoliated 
art in that the works listed in the MNR inventory did not become the property of the 
holding museums. While the introduction of the de-classification procedure must be 
lauded in enabling returns of objects from the Musées de France, the analysis revealed that 
the procedure has not yet been put into practice. Consequently, France must work on 
the implementation of the de-classification procedure by defining the relevant criteria to 
effectively allow for the return of cultural objects. Furthermore, the French legislative 
should consider facilitating disposal in cases where objects have been acquired by 
donations or testamentary dispositions. While it is one thing not to discourage future 
donations a full ban on the disposal of such objects is disproportionate. A final 
recommendation with regard to the French situation concerns Nazi spoliated art works 
in French public collections that do not belong to the MNR-Collection. Current efforts 
focus either on the objects that have been officially recovered by France after the war 
and that now belong to the MNR-Collection or on those objects that were not 
recovered and are still missing. However, further to these two categories, it is 
conceivable that spoliated objects have unofficially entered the French public collections 
at some point after 1933.2136 After all, public awareness of the problem of Nazi spoliated 
art was raised only in the mid 1990s. This brings us back to the recommendation already 
made in view of the disposal of human remains, i.e. the need to make the de-
classification procedure under the CHC Act operative.   
                                                     
2136 Cf.: the situation of UK public collections. Cf.: also the scope of application of the Dutch liberalised 
return policy that applies not only to objects in the NK Collection but to objects in state-owned collections 
in general. 
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IV .  TA K E  P R O T E C TI O N  O F  O B J E C TS  I N  P U BL I C  CO L L E C T I O N S  SE R I O U SL Y  
 For the Netherlands, different recommendations apply. As a country 
characterised by a liberal regulation of its public collections, few problems exist with 
regard to the disposal of objects from public collections. To the contrary, while the UK 
and France must work on legislation enabling disposal, the Netherlands should consider 
strengthening the protection of its public collections. As has been analysed in Chapter 3 
(§2.I.1), the scope of application of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act is limited to 
privately-owned cultural objects. As for objects in public collections, the CHP Act 
applies only in analogy. In the light of the Mondriaan case and increasing pressure on 
museums to act as cultural entrepreneurs, the Dutch legislator should consider 
extending the application of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act to objects in public 
collections.2137 Inspiration could be drawn from the recent changes to the German Law 
for the Prevention of Export of Cultural Property.2138 Until the amendment brought 
about by the act implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention in Germany2139, the law 
applied only to privately-owned objects. Since May 2007, the law has been extended to 
allow also for the listing of publicly-owned cultural objects.2140 
Further to amending the CHP Act, a recommendation can be made concerning the 
work of advisory committees. This is a recommendation addressed to the museum 
sector rather than the legislature given the self-regulation of the Dutch museum sector. 
The analysis in Chapter 4.§2.I revealed that at present a number of advisory or ethics 
committees are active in the Dutch museum sector. The analysis furthermore revealed 
that the recommendations by these committees differ considerably and sometimes even 
oppose one another. Given the fact that the value of a recommendation of an advisory 
or ethics committee depends on its moral authority, conflicting recommendations by 
different committees are not desirable. Furthermore, the existence of more than one 
ethics committees diminishes the learning effect in that each committee will deal with 
lesser cases, thus having less opportunity to test and refine its recommendations. 
Consequently, the Dutch museum sector should consider merging the NMV Ethical 
                                                     
2137 Cf.: Vlies, I.C.v.d., et al., 2009, p. 86. 
2138 Gesetz zum Schutz deutschen Kulturgutes gegen Abwanderung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung 
vom 8 Juli 1999 (BGBl. I S. 1754). Another source of inspiration is the Flemish Topstukkendecreet 
(Decreet van 24 januari 2003 “houdende bescherming van het roerend cultureel erfgoed van uitzonderlijk 
belang“ (B.S. 14 maart 2003). According to Art. 5 § 1 the decreet applies also to objects and collections 
owned by public authorities. Cf.: Draye, A.M., 2007, p. 390. 
2139 Gesetz zur Ausführung des UNESCO-Übereinkommens vom 14. November 1970 über Maßnahmen 
zum Verbot und zur Verhütung der rechtswidrigen Einfuhr, Ausfuhr und Übereignung von Kulturgut 
(Ausführungsgesetz zum Kulturgutübereinkommen – KGÜAG) (BGBl. I S 757). 
2140 § 18 (2) of the Gesetz zum Schutz deutschen Kulturgutes gegen Abwanderung now reads: “Im 
öffentlichen Eigentum befindliches national wertvolles Kulturgut und Archivgut, auf das das Gesetz nach 
Absatz 1 keine Anwendung findet, kann von Amts wegen, auf Grund einer Anmeldung durch den 
jeweiligen Eigentümer oder auf Antrag der oder des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Kultur und 
Medien in das Verzeichnis national wertvollen Kulturgutes oder das Verzeichnis national wertvoller Archive 
eingetragen werden. Über die Eintragung entscheidet die oberste Landesbehörde nach diesem Gesetz”. 
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Code Committee and the SVCN Ethnological Ethics Committee into one ethics 
committee.   
§3. RELEVANCE FOR  THE  PROTECT ION  AN D RETURN  OF  CULTURAL  OBJECT S  MORE  
IN  GENERAL 
 Having summarised the main findings of the research with regard to the return of 
Nazi spoliated art and human remains, we can now reflect on the relevance of the 
witnessed developments for cultural property in public collections more in general. 
Given the significant divide in protection, including restorative protection, between 
cultural objects removed during armed conflict and cultural objects removed during 
times of peace, we will concentrate on the latter as the lesser developed category. In 
particular, we will focus on the situation of objects that have been removed prior to the 
entry into force of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention. This category includes also objects removed during the colonial era.  
First of all, it can be concluded that the cases of Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains have not opened the “floodgates” leading to the return of all objects from 
public collections. It would be wrong to conclude that the return of a certain numbers 
of Nazi spoliated art works and human remains could result in the obligation to return 
all objects as is sometimes argued by museum directors or curators. However, the 
developments with regard to Nazi looted art and human remains do indicate a certain 
re-orientation with regard to the standards applied in deciding upon restitution by not 
focusing solely on the question in how far an acquisition might have been illegal, but by 
according relevance also to the question in how far the continued presence of an object 
in a museum is (still) appropriate.   
Secondly, the findings of the present research indicate that the chances for the 
adoption of an internationally binding treaty providing for the return of cultural 
property acquired prior to the emergence of legally binding rules on the protection 
against the illicit trade are very small if not absent. In fact, the hesitation to create new 
legally enforceable rights could already be deducted from the difficult process of 
adopting and ratifying the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention. However, the developments with regard to Nazi spoliated art and human 
remains poignantly confirm this point: neither the instruments adopted by the various 
international fora nor any of the solutions adopted at the national level introduced new 
legally binding rights for the return of Nazi spoliated art or human remains. Taking into 
account that both Nazi spoliated art and human remains are rather well delimited 
categories given their legal-historical circumstances (as for Nazi spoliated art) 
respectively their substance matter (as for human remains) the refusal to go down the 
legal path even in these cases suggests that the adoption of a legally binding treaty 
providing for the return of cultural property more in general is inconceivable. The 
subject matter is too complex and sensitive for the formulation of positive legal rules at 
the national or international level. The former colonial powers avoid sending out signals 
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suggesting the illegality of their colonial past for fear of being exposed to blame by the 
international ocmmunity and eventually having to pay huge sums of compensation 
payments.  
On the one hand, the implausibility of the introduction of clear-cut legal rules is 
deplorable in that positive legal rules provide for legal certainty. On the other hand, the 
role and function of positive legal rules must also not be overrated: the prognosis that 
no legally binding treaty will be adopted providing for the return of cultural objects 
removed prior to the entry into force of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 1995 
UNIDROIT Convent does not mean that no objects will be returned. After all, the 
analysis revealed that the fact that states are wary to create new legally enforceable rights 
does not mean that they necessarily oppose the return of cultural objects. With regard to 
Nazi spoliated art and human remains the analysis revealed that the two cases rely 
significantly on alternative solutions, such as the introduction of advisory committees, 
assistance in the production of evidence, as well as concessions with regard to the 
evidence required. Individually, the solutions might be insignificant. Taken together, 
these solutions, which have been introduced by soft law instruments, have contributed 
to a more return-friendly-climate. Consequently, a greater emphasis on the adoption of 
soft law instruments must not be dismissed as ineffective with regard to the return of 
cultural property from public collections more in general.  
Finally, the impact of the cases of Nazi spoliated art and human remains with regard 
to new acquisitions and the ethics of collecting must be mentioned. While this aspect is 
less relevant for already existing collections, it is of crucial importance for the future 
protection of cultural property. The returns of Nazi spoliated art and human remains are 
clear signifiers that morality changes over time. While curators, private collectors and art 
dealers might presently accord little relevance to the question whether an object has 
been illegally excavated or exported, provenance is becoming of ever greater relevance. 
Provenance research is an important tool to prevent illicitly traded objects from entering 
public collection and may, over the long run, contribute to curtailing the illicit trade by 
limiting the demand of unprovenanced objects.  
Current claims for the return of objects acquired in the past are powerful 
ambassadors of history and past injustices. If we follow the philosopher Walter 
Benjamin, the past is important in shaping the present and the future. According to 
Benjamin, it is memories of enslaved ancestors, not dreams of liberated grandchildren 
that drive men and women to revolt.2141 However, according to Benjamin, we should 
strive for an operative history, rather than a nostalgic one and direct our focus to the 
‘liberated grandchildren’.2142 If we apply Benjamin’s philosophy to current claims for the 
                                                     
2141 Benjamin, W., 1980, XII (p. 700). Benjamin completed his text in spring 1940, shortly before his 
attempt to escape from Vichy France, where Jewish and Marxist German refugees were handed over by the 
government to the Gestapo. Benjamin’s ‘theses on the philosophy of history’ were published by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in a mimeographed bookled entitled ‘Walter Benjamin zum 
Gedächtnis’.   
2142 Polsky, S., 2005, p. 80.  
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return of cultural objects, we can perceive them as chances and challenges to recognise 
the past and shape the future. In standing up to this task we need to adopt an open 
mind and attitude of thinking not only along the lines of return in the strict sense but 
also in terms of loans and other forms of cooperation such as travelling exhibitions. 
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Epilogue 
The month of June 2009 was marked by two events that are important for the future 
course of the restitution debate: the recommendation issued by the UK Spoliation 
Advisory Panel in the Glaser case2143 and so-called Terezin Declaration on Holocaust 
Era Assets and Related Issues. While the recommendation and the declaration were 
issued too late to be integrated in the main body of research, we would nevertheless like 
to reflect at this point on their relevance for the future course of the restitution debate. 
While both events belong to the realm of Nazi looted art, they might be relevant for the 
future course of restitution more in general. In the following, we will first introduce the 
recommendation and the declaration before positioning them in the restitution debate. 
§1. THE SP O L I A T ION  ADVISORY  PA N EL’S  R E COM M AN D AT I ON  O N  T HE  GLASER  
C A S E  
 On 24 June 2009, the UK Spoliation Advisory Panel (hereinafter: “the Panel”) 
issued its recommendation on the Glaser case. The case concerned eight drawings from 
the former Glaser Collection, now in the possession of the Samuel Courtauld Trust.2144 
The Glaser collection, including works by Munch, Beckmann and Corinth was set up by 
Professor Dr. Curt Glaser and his first wife Elsa, who deceased in July 1932. Glaser sold 
the bulk of the collection in two auction sales on 9 May and on 18 / 19 May 1933. The 
                                                     
2143 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2009. The recommendation was published on 24 June 2009.  
2144 The drawings comprise the following: an Architectural Sketch, attributed to Domenico Fossati, pen and 
ink, 21.8 x 24 cms; a Kitchen Still-Life, Domenico Piola, pen and ink and chalk, 18 x 28.9 cms; Saint Charles 
Borromeo, Giovanni Battista Crosato, pen and ink, watercolour and graphite, 21 x 17.4 cms; a Group of Figures 
with Bacchus, Giuseppe Bernardino Bison, pen and ink, watercolour and red chalk, 26.4 x 19.8 cms; the Flight 
into Egypt, Giuseppe Bernardino Bison, pen and ink and watercolour, 23.7 x 18.2 cms; Centaurs Embracing 
1911, Lovis Corinth, graphite, 48.3 x 33.4 cms; Laundresses, Pierre Auguste Renoir, graphite and pen and ink, 
31.4 x 22.5 cms; and The Lamentation, Italian School, 17th Century, black chalk, pen and ink and watercolour, 
9 x 12.7 cms.  
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eight drawings that are the subject of the claim were acquired by Count Antoine Seilern. 
In 1978, the drawings were part of Seilern’s bequest to the Home House Society, to 
which the Courtauld is the successor body.  
Before discussing the merits of the claim and the recommendation by the Panel we 
need to give some more details on the circumstances in which Glaser sold part of his 
collection. The auctions were held at the ‘Internationales Kunst – und Auctions-Haus 
G.m.b.H.’ and at Max Perl Auction House. Both sales were advertised in advance and 
were accompanied by detailed catalogues including guide prices for each work. Based on 
Glaser’s expertise, it is assumed that he himself compiled the catalogues. With regard to 
the guide prices mentioned in the catalogues and the prices ultimately fetched in the 
auction there exists evidence that the prices reflected the general market situation and 
were not depressed by circumstances attributable to the Nazi regime.2145 
The auction date in May 1933 postdates the Nazi’s rise to power on 30 January 1933 
and Glaser’s suspension from his position as Director of the State Art Library on 7 
April 1933. The dismissal, which was confirmed in September 1933, was based on the 
Law for the Reestablishment of the Professional Civil Service.2146 The law had drastic 
impacts on the economic situation of the Jewish population in Germany. Glaser, who 
was Jewish by birth, had converted to Protestantism in 1914 but was nevertheless 
affected by the law. He did receive a pension equivalent to 75% of his final salary from 
January 1934 until at least November 1935. On 4 April 1933, three days before his 
dismissal as Director of the State Art Library, his apartment in the Prinz-Albert Strasse 
was seized by the Gestapo together with the other apartments in the building.  
Shortly after the auction, on 30 May 1933, Glaser married his second wife Marie. In 
June or early July 1933 they left Germany for Switzerland, where they rented a house 
near Ascona. Glaser had 14 large crates, containing art objects, silver, porcelain, and 
carpets etc., shipped from Berlin to their new address. In addition, Glaser was able to 
transfer a number of valuable paintings from Germany to Switzerland, which had been 
on loan to the National Galerie. In May 1941, Glaser and his second wife emigrated to 
the United States and settled in New York, where Glaser died in 1943.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, Marie, who remarried Dr. Ernest Ash, submitted claims 
under German compensation laws for the loss of her first husband’s job, and for the 
loss of his art collection. In October 1958, she was awarded 25,839.81 DM in damages 
for the loss in earnings and pension benefits.2147 In a settlement dated 6 December 1963, 
                                                     
2145 The evidence is based on a letter and annotated catalogue by the art historian Ludwig Burchard. 
Burchard, who was a friend both of Glaser and Seilern, who acquired the drawings concerned, wrote in a 
letter to Seilern dated 14 May that the prices at the first auction had been “correctly established”. His 
annotations in the catalogue indicate that there were no significant deviations between the guide prices and 
the prices ultimately fetched in the auction.   
2146 Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums vom 7 April 1933. See further on laws providing 
for the removal of Jews from other profession, e.g.: Edelheit, A.J. / Edelheit, H., 1994.  
2147 In 1959, the exchange rate dollar - deutschmark (DM) was 1 $ = 4,18 DM. See further: Bidwell, R.L., 
1970, pp. 22-24.  
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Marie agreed to a fee of 7,100 DM for the monetary loss realized from the auction 
sales.2148 Both she and her sister-in-law Elly Glaser had testified to the German 
authorities that the results of the 1933 auction had been far below market price.  
Marie died on 9 August 1981. The claimants seeking the return of the drawings from 
the Courtauld are relatives of Marie via her surviving and her deceased sister and 
descendants of her second husband.  
In its recommendation the Panel acts on the assumption that the Courtauld has 
proper legal title to the drawings and focuses on the question whether the moral 
strength of the claimants’ case prompts the return of the drawings. In analyzing this 
question, the Panel takes the following aspects into account: whether the sale in 1933 
must be considered as forced sale, whether the prices realized in the auctions were 
negatively affected by the Nazi oppression, the fact that compensation had been 
awarded to Glaser’s second wife in the 1950s and 1960s and the conduct of the 
Courtauld in acquiring the drawings in the 1970s.  
The Panel concludes that while Glaser’s decision to sell the bulk of his collection and 
to leave Germany was based on mixed motives, including the wish to make a fresh start, 
free from the attachments of his old life, the predominant reason for the sale of the 
drawings was the Nazi persecution. The Panel subsequently balances the finding that the 
sale qualifies as a forced sale with other relevant circumstances. With regard to the 
prices fetched in auction, the Panel reaches the conclusion that the prices were 
reasonable market prices at the time being and were not negatively affected by the Nazi 
oppression. Furthermore, the Panel emphasises the fact that Glaser’s second wife had 
been awarded compensation after the war by the German authorities for the loss of the 
art collection. Squaring the findings of a forced sale on the one hand with the findings 
concerning the prices fetched in auction and the compensation awarded, the Panel 
reached the conclusion that the moral claim is insufficiently strong to warrant the 
transfer of the drawings: “[t]ransfer of the drawings would therefore confer on the 
claimants double recompense”.2149   
As final consideration, the Panel reflected upon the conduct of Seilern, who acquired 
the drawings at the auction in 1933, and the conduct of the Courtauld when accepting 
Seilern’s bequest in 1978. For both parties, the Panel did not see any grounds for 
criticism. Consequently, the conduct of Seilern and the Courtauld does not change the 
Panel’s finding that the moral claim of the claimants is insufficiently strong to warrant 
the transfer of the drawings. This does not take away that the Panel recommended that 
whenever any of the drawings is on show, the Courtauld should display alongside it a 
brief account of its history and provenance during and since the Nazi era, with special 
reference to the claimants’ relationship with and historical interest in the drawings.   
                                                     
2148 In 1963, the exchange rate dollar - deutschmark (DM) was 1 $ = 3.97 DM. See further: Ibid. 
2149 Spoliation Advisory Panel, 2009, para. 43. 
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§2. THE TEREZIN  DECLARAT ION  ON  HOLOCAUS T  ERA  ASS ET S  AN D  RELATED  
I SSUES 
 Within a week after the recommendation by the UK Panel on the Glaser case had 
been published, the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues 
(hereinafter: “the Terezin Declaration”) was adopted. The Terezin Declaration was the 
result of the Holocaust Era Assets Conference, which was convened in Prague on June 
26-30 2009 by the Government of the Czech Republic, in cooperation with a number of 
organisations.2150 The conference was attended by representatives of almost fifty 
countries, as well as representatives from interest groups, cultural institutions and 
practitioners working in the field of restitution. The conference was set up as a follow-
up to the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets.2151 Different from the 
Washington Conference, it did not focus solely on the recovery of looted art and objects 
of cultural, historical and religious value, but addressed the restitution and financial 
compensation schemes for Jewish and other victims of the Nazi reign more in general. 
In further introducing the Terezin Declaration, we will focus on the declaration in as far 
as it is relevant for the return of cultural objects.  
The Terezin Declaration recognises the tangible achievements of the 1998 
Washington Conference, in particular the progress that has been made in research, 
identification, and restitution of cultural property by governmental and non-
governmental institutions in some states since the 1998 Washington Conference and 
affirms the need to strengthen and sustain the efforts in order to ensure just and fair 
solutions regarding cultural property, including Judaica that was looted or displaced 
during or as a result of the Holocaust (Shoah).2152 The Terezin Declaration reaffirms the 
signatory states’ support for the 1998 Washington Principles and encourages states, 
public and private institutions and individuals to apply them. More in particular, the 
Terezin Declaration stresses the importance of continued and intensified systematic 
provenance research, the need to establish mechanisms to assist claimants and to 
facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi spoliated art in the form of 
alternative dispute resolution.2153 It does not stipulate any concrete measures.  
If one compares the Terezin Declaration with the achievements of the 1998 
Washington Principles and the other principles, declarations and resolutions adopted in 
the last decade it becomes evident that the declaration does not have any (additional) 
normative value: similar to the instruments discussed above in Chapter 2.§1.III, the 
                                                     
2150 The Documentation Centre of Property Transfers of Cultural Assets of WW II Victims, the Federation 
of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic, the Jewish Museum in Prague, the Terezín Memorial, the 
Institute of Jewish Studies at the Hussite Theological Faculty of the Charles University in Prague and the 
Forum 2000 Foundation.  
2151 The Washington Conference and the Washington Principles that resulted from the conference are 
discussed in detail in chp. 2.§1.III.1. 
2152 Terezin Declaration, para. 3.  
2153 Terezin Declaration, section ‘Nazi-Confiscated and Looted Art’.  
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Terezin Declaration does not create any legally enforceable rights. To the contrary, in its 
preamble, the Terezin Declaration explicitly recognises its legally non-binding nature 
and the supremacy of international law and obligations. As a typical soft law instrument, 
the Terezin Declaration may - at the utmost - denote “values, guidelines, ideas and 
proposals that may develop into rules of international law but have not yet done so”2154 
and may add further urgency and legitimacy for government action.2155  
In as far as the (alternative) solutions proposed by the Terezin Declaration are 
concerned; the most relevant question in the light of the present research is whether the 
declaration touches upon the issue of financial compensation payments that might have 
been received by the original owners or their heirs during the direct post-war era. 
Having analysed the instruments adopted by different fora since the mid-1990s on the 
return of Nazi spoliated art, as well as national policies, the present research indicates 
that the issue of financial compensation payments possibly received by (the heirs of) the 
former owner during the post WWII period is not yet integrated in the restitution 
debate. Consequently, one of the recommendations of this research is to re-open the 
debate on just and fair solutions for cases dealing with cultural objects spoliated during 
the Third Reich. More in particular, it is suggested to add greater weight to the reflection 
upon the relevance of past compensation payments. While it could be argued that “just 
and fair solutions” demand the physical return of an object regardless of any 
compensation payments received, this cannot be presumed but must be discussed. One 
possibility to trigger such a public debate is the re-drafting of the 1998 Washington 
Principles as the most prominent soft-law instrument adopted in reaction to Nazi 
spoliated art. While the Terezin Declaration is construed as a follow up to the 
Washington Conference, its relevance is limited to reinforcing the 1998 Washington 
Principles. It does not reflect upon the relevance of past financial compensation 
payments received nor does it deepen the debate on the return of spoliated cultural 
objects in any other regard. The Terezin Declaration is limited to reiterating the need to 
facilitate the production of evidence and to arrive at just and fair solutions in the form 
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.2156 In as far as the return of Nazi spoliated 
art is concerned, the Terezin Declaration’s relevance and expected impact is thus 
limited. One could state that the declaration “codifies” the present state and awareness 
of the restitution discourse but does not further it in any respect.  
§3. DIRECTION S  FOR  THE  FUTURE 
 While I hope of course that the present research will contribute to deepening and 
furthering the debate, in particular in view of the past compensation payments received, 
it might be more realistic to count on the aftermath of the Glaser case. As introduced 
                                                     
2154 Cf.: Dixon, M., 2007, p. 50. 
2155 Cf. above in chp. 2.§3 on the status and relevance of soft law. See also: Renold, M.-A., 2009, p. 62. 
2156 Cf.: chp. 2.§1.III.3.II.2. 
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above, in deciding upon the claim for the return of works of art from the Glaser 
collection, the UK Spoliation Advisory Panel balanced the finding that the loss of the 
paintings was (predominantly) a forced sale with the facts that the prices fetched in 
auction were not unreasonably low and that Glaser’s second wife had been awarded 
compensation after the war by the German authorities for the loss of the art collection. 
The Glaser case consequently constitutes the first case in which compensation payments 
were accorded a significant role in the decision making process of the Spoliation 
Advisory Panel. While the case is not the first case ever to accord such relevance to 
compensation payments2157 it is prominent enough to trigger the debate.2158 This is even 
more the case given the reaction of the Glaser claimants to the Panel’s recommendation:  
The Glaser claimants criticised the recommendation and asked the Panel to 
reconsider it.2159 When the Panel informed the heirs that it saw no reason to review its 
recommendation2160 the claimants wrote to UK culture secretary Barbara Follett, to ask 
her to reject the recommendation of the Panel.2161 The Glaser case is thus not only the 
first case in which the Panel accorded a significant role to compensation payments 
received but also marks the first time that a recommendation of the Panel has not been 
accepted by one of the parties. 
It will be interesting to see how the media, the general public and academic debate 
will react to the Glaser case and the aspect of financial compensation payments. The 
debate on the return and restitution of cultural objects is standing at the crossroads. In 
Chapter 2. §1. IV we concluded that the absence of any discussion on this point must be 
noted as lamentable and not contributing to the transparency and legitimacy of the 
current practices. While the outcome of such discussion might still be physical 
restitution is the only just and fair solution given the atrocities of the Nazi-era, in spite 
of any financial compensations received, it is nevertheless crucial to have this discussion 
for a fuller comprehension of the subject matter and the legitimacy of solutions pursued. 
Finally, the explicit recognition of physical restitution as the only just and fair solution 
                                                     
2157 See in this respect also the decision-making framework of the Commission pour l’indemnisation des 
victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur pendant l’Occupation’ 
(CIVS) discussed in chp. 4.§1.III.3. CIVS checks whether the claims submitted have not already been the 
subject of compensation by France under the 1946 Act on War Damage or under the German Federal 
Restitution Law (BRüG).  
2158 See, e.g. the speech by Olaf S. Ossmann at the recent Terezin Conference titled 'One Collection, One 
Persecution, One Deseizin - but Different ideas of “Just and Fair Solutions”: Hurdles in Different National 
Processes for Heirs of Art Collections' where he refers to the decision of the Panel in the Glaser case as 
“tragic and  (…) wrong and misleaing decision”.  
2159 Letter dated 8 July 2009. Available online at: http://www.commartrecovery.org/docs/ltr-07-08-09-
SAP.pdf .  
2160 Letter dated 23 July 2009. Available online at:  
http://www.commartrecovery.org/docs/DCMSDE1.PDF .  
2161 Bailey, M., 26 August 2009 2009.   
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Glaser%20heirs%20reject%20UK%20spoliation%20ruling/186
93 
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regardless of any compensation payments received will have an impact on the discourse 
on the return of cultural property more in general.    
 
 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   487 12-10-2009   12:09:37
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   488 12-10-2009   12:09:37
 
 
  
Bibliography 
Aalders, G., Roof. De ontvreemding van Joods bezit tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog, (Den Haag) (1999). 
Aalders, G., Berooid: De beroofde joden en het Nederlandse restitutiebeleid sinds 1945, (Amsterdam, 
Boom) (2001). 
Aarts, B., Een lijk in de kast? Teruggave van menselijke resten in de collecties van volkenkundige musea 
(Afstudeerscriptie Reinwardt Academie), (Amsterdam) (2000). 
Abramson, R. / Huttler, S., The legal response to the illicit movement of cultural property, (1973), Law and 
policy in international business, 932-970. 
Abtahi, H., The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (2001), The Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, 1-32. 
Afrasiabi, P.R., Property Rights in Ancient Human Skeletal Remains, (1997), Southern California law review, 
805-840. 
Akinsha, K. / Grigorii, K., The Soviet War Treasures: A Growing Controversy, (1991a), ARTnews, 112-119. 
Akinsha, K. / Grigorii, K., Spoils of War: The Soviet Union's Hidden Art Treasures, (1991b), ARTnews, 
130-141. 
Albers, J., Poems and Drawings, (London, Tate Publishing) (2006). 
Alda, K., Reversing Course on Restitution - Regional museums in the Czech Republic are resisting court 
orders to return looted paintings, (2006), ART News, 74. 
Amiel, O., A Maori Head: Public Domain?, (2008), International Journal of Cultural Property, 371-375. 
Andorno, R., The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the Development of Universal Norms in Bioethics, 
presentation at a Workshop jointly organized by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
German UNESCO Commission, Berlin, 15 February 2007, (2007). 
Angenendt, A., Heilige und Reliquien: die Geschichte ihres Kultes vom frühen Christentum bis zur 
Gegenwart, (München, C.H. Beck) (1994). 
Anglade, L., Art, Law and the Holocaust: the French Situation, (1999), Art, Antiquity and Law, 301-311. 
Anglade, L., A special Jurisdiction: France and the Mattéoli Mission, in: Palmer, N. (Ed.) Museums and the 
Holocaust: Law, Principles and Practice, (Leicester, Institute of Art and Law) (2000), 150-157. 
Anzilotti, D., Cours de droit international, (Paris, Sirey) (1929). 
Arnold, D., Indian artifacts: where do they rightfully belong?, The Boston Globe, 2 April 1990, 27-28. 
Ashcroft, B., et al. (Eds.), Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, (London, Routledge) (2003). 
Asser, C. / Perrick, S., Mr. C. Asser's handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht = 
Asser serie, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2002). 
Aubry, C.M.B.A., et al., Droit civil français: Biens, actions possessoires, propriété, (Paris, Librairies 
Techniques) (1961). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   489 12-10-2009   12:09:37
490  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Aufderheide, A.C. / Rodriguez-Martin, C. (Eds.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Paleopathology, 
(Cambridge, University Press) (1998). 
Aust, A., Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge, University Press) (2005). 
Awekotuku, N.T., He Maimai Aroha: A Disgusting Traffic for Collectors: the colonial trade in preserved 
human heads in Aotearoa, New Zealand, in: Kiendl, A. (Ed.) Obsession, Compulsion, Collection: 
on objects, display culture and interpretation, (Banff, Banff International Curatorial Institute) 
(2004), 77-91. 
Baan, E. / Valk, W.L., Artikel 258 (6.5.3.11), in: Hondius, E.H. (Ed.) Verbintenissenrecht (Groene 
Losbladige Serie), (Deventer, Kluwer) (2008). 
Baer, M., Eine Kopfjagd: Deutsche in Ostafrika, Spuren kolonialer Herrschaft, (Berlin, Ch. Links Verlag) 
(2001). 
Baikie, G., What Do Labrador Inuit want?, (1993), Inuit Art Quarterly, 8-13. 
Bailey, M., Giving back the loot: Nazi-era claims against UK Museums, (2005), Apollo: a journal of the arts, 56-
63. 
Bailey, M., Glaser heirs reject UK spoliation ruling - Claimed drawings will remain at the Courtauld in 
London, The Art Newspaper, 26 August 2009 
Barkan, E., The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, (Baltimore and London, 
The John Hopkins University Press) (2000). 
Barker, I., The Protection of Cultural Heritage Items in New Zealand, in: Hoffmann, B.T. (Ed.) Art and 
Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, University Press) (2006), 145-147. 
Barron, S., "Degenerate Art": The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany, (Los Angeles, Los Angeles 
County Museum of Art) (1991). 
Barr-Smith, A., United Kingdom: National Report on Topic 1. Freedom of museums to sell, trade or 
otherwise dispose of objects of art in their collections, in: Briat, M. / Freedberg, J., A. (Eds.), 
International Sales of Works of Art: International Art Trade and Law, (Deventer, Boston, 
Kluwer) (1991), 147-152. 
Bator, P.M., The International Trade in Art, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press) (1993). 
Bazyler, M., Crimes against Humanity, in: Charny, I.W. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of genocide, (ABC-CLIO) 
(1999), 153-154. 
Bazyler, M., Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, (2001), University of 
Richmond Law Review, 1-284. 
Becher, K., On the obligation of subjects of international law to return cultural property to its permanent 
place, (1974), Annuaire de l'Association des Anciens Auditeurs de l'Acadëmie de La Haye, 96-99. 
Becker, A., Das Museum: Sein Raum in der Zeit und die Zeit seines Raumes, in: Wunderkammer des 
Abendlandes. Museum und Sammlung im Spiegel der Zeit, (Bonn, Kunst- und Austellungshalle 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland GmbH) (1994), 16-21. 
Beekhuis, C.H., De eerbiediging van de wens dat het stoffelijk overschot wordt verbrand (slot), (1955), 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 853-864. 
Bekvalac, J., et al., Scientific Research on Archaeological Human Remains in the United Kingdom: Current 
Trends and Future Possibilities, in: Lohman, J. / Goodnow, K. (Eds.), Human Remains and 
Museum Practice, (UNESCO) (2006), 111-116. 
Bel, M., et al., Case Note: Administrative Tribunal of Rouen, Decision NO. 702737, December 27, 2007 
(Maori Head case), (2008), International Journal of Cultural Property, 223-226. 
Bell, C., Aboriginal Claims to Cultural Property in Canada: A Comparative Examination of the Repatriation 
Debate, (1992/1993), American Indian Law Review, 457-521. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   490 12-10-2009   12:09:37
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  |  491   
 
  
Benjamin, W., Über den Begriff der Geschichte, in Gesammelte Schriften I-2. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann & 
Hermann Schweppenhäuser, (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp) (1980), 691-704. 
Bennett, B., Dead bodies on display: El Negro in cross-cultural perspective, (2002), Pula: Botswana Journal 
of African Studies (Special Issue: 'El Negro and the Hottentot Venus: Issues of Repatriation'), 8-
13. 
Benoît-Rohmer, F. / Klebes, H., Council of Europe law - Towards a pan-European legal area, (Strasbourg) 
(2005). 
Bentwich, N., International Aspects of Restitution and Compensation for Victims of Nazis, (1955-56), 
British Yearbook of International Law, 204-217. 
Berber, F., Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (I), (München, C.H. Beck) (1975). 
Berenbaum, M. / Kramer, A., The world must know: the history of the Holocaust as told in the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, (Baltimore, Md /London, Johns Hopkins University Press) 
(2006). 
Berezowski, C., Ochrona prawnomiedzynarodowa zabytkow i dziel sztuki w czasie wojny (International 
Legal Protection of Historic Monuments and Works of Art during War), (Warsaw) (1948). 
Berg, J.W., et al., Informed consent: legal theory and clinical practice, (Oxford, University Press) (2001). 
Berndt, J., Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz, (Köln, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG) (1998). 
Bettenhaussen, P., Eerlijk omgaan met restitutieverzoeken, (2000), Museumvisie, II-VI. 
Bevers, A.M. / Halbertsma, M.E., Behouden is kiezen: over het verzamelen, selecteren en wijzigen van 
museale collecties: verslag van een onderzoek naar de opvattingen en ervaringen van 
museumdeskundigen, (1991). 
Bibas, S., The Case against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, (1996), International Journal of Cultural 
Property, 73-110. 
Bidwell, R.L., Currency Conversion Tables: A Hundred Years of Change, (London, Rex Collings) (1970). 
Bila, J., Nationaler Kulturgüterschutz in der Europäischen Union, (Bonn, University Bonn) (1997). 
Birov, V.A., Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of Works of Art and the International Law of War, (1998), New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 201-249. 
Bleckmann, A., Decolonization, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public international law: Part: 
10: States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal law, (Amsterdam, North-
Holland) (1987), 75-79. 
Blom, J., Laying Claim to Long-Lost Art: The Hoge Raad of the Netherlands and the Question of 
Limitation Periods, (2000), International Journal of Cultural Property, 138-150. 
Blume Huttenlauch, A., Street Scenes and other Scenes from Berlin - Legal Issues in the Restitution of Art 
after the Third Reich, (2006), German Law Journal. 
Bluntschli, J., Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten, (Nördlingen) (1878). 
Boekel, J.v. / Groot, G.d., '... en daarom moet je lichaam vervallen, als de ziel het verlaat': Tentoonstelling: 
Botje bij Botje, (1998/1999), Arctica: Bulletin van Arctic Peoples Alert, 1, 7-9. 
Boekel, J.v. / Groot, G.d., Ik heet geen IJsbrand: '... en daarom moet je lichaam vervallen, als de ziel het 
verlaat', (1999), Arctica: Bulletin van Arctic Peoples Alert, 21-25. 
Boele-Woelki, K., et al., Dutch Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Pluralism of 
Methods, in: Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative Law, 
(Bristol / Antwerpen / Groningen) (2004), 203-227. 
Boer, J.d., Mr. C. Asser's Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. Personen- en 
Familierecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2006). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   491 12-10-2009   12:09:37
492  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Boguslavsky, M., M, Der Begriff des Kulturguts und seine rechtliche Relevanz, in: Dolzer, R., et al. (Eds.), 
Rechtsfragen des internationalen Kulturgüterschutzes, (Heidelberg, C.F. Müller) (1994), 3-12. 
Boll, J., M., 'Compositie met twee lijnen' ofwel 'het eigen-aardige karakter van het eigendomsrecht van 
overheidslichamen op kunstvoorwerpen' en de 'Wet Cultuurbezit', (1989), R.M. Themis, 125-134. 
Bollen, C.J.M. / de Groot, G.R., Verknoeit het Europese recht ons Burgerlijk Wetboek?, (1995), Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht, 1-9. 
Borg, L.t. / Rottenberg, H., Mr. B. J. Asscher: ‘Ik kon Donner niet overtuigen’, (2006), Vrij Nederland. 
Borries, R.v. / Zacker, C. (Eds.), Europarecht von A-Z. Das Recht der Europäischen Union nach dem 
Vertrag von Nizza, (München, dtv) (2002). 
Bos, D., et al. (Eds.), Harmonie in Holland: het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu, (Amsterdam, Bert Bakker) 
(2007). 
Bossuyt, M.J.M. / Wouters, J., Grondlijnen van internationaal recht, (Antwerpen, Intersentia) (2005). 
Boström, H.-O., Philipp Hainhofer and Gustavus Adolphus' Kunstschrank in Uppsala, in: Impey, O. / 
MacGregor, A. (Eds.), The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Europe, (London, House of Stratus) (2001), 121-136. 
Bostyn, S., J.R., The legal protection of biological material / La protection juridique du matériel biologique, 
in: Hondius, E.H. (Ed.) Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, (Antwerpen / Groningen, Intersentia Rechtswetenschappen) (1998). 
Bothe, M., Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful. Distinction in International Relations?, (1980), 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 65-95. 
Bottom, W.P., Essence of Conflict: Cognitive Illusions, War Guilt, and the Origins of Appeasement. IACM 
17th Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=602007. 
Boulet-Sautel, M., De Choppin à Proudhon: Naissance de la notion moderne de domaine public, (1995), 
Droit, 91-102. 
Bourlet, M., Le statut juridique des MNR, in: Fohr, R. / de La Broise, G. (Eds.), Pillages et restitutions: le 
destin des Oeuvres d'art sorties de France pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale: actes du 
colloque organisé par la Direction des musées de France le 17 novembre 1996 à l'amphithéatre 
Rohan de l'école du Louvre sous la présidence de Françoise Cachin, directeur des musées de 
France, (Paris, Direction des musées de France / Adam Biro) (1997), 107-115. 
Boylan, P.J., Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict: the Hague Convention of 1954, (1993), available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001001/100159eo.pdf. 
Braillard, P., Switzerland and the Crisis of the Dormant Assets and Nazi Gold, (London and New York, 
Kegan Paul International) (2000). 
Bredekamp, J., The Politics of Human Remains: The Case of Sarah Bartmann, in: Lohman, J. / Goodnow, 
K. (Eds.), Human Remains and Museum Practice, (UNESCO) (2006), 25-32. 
A Brief History of the Creation by UNESCO of an Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the 
Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit 
Appropriation, (1979), Museum (special issue on the "Return and Restitution of Cultural Property"). 
Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, Interim Report: Removal and Retention of Human Material (May 2000), 
available at: http://www.bristolinquiry.org.uk/interim_report/report.htm. 
Bristow, M., Human Remains in Museums Today: A Symposium, (2008), Art Antiquity & Law, 207-223. 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), How art made the world, (2006). 
Brouwer, D., Verslag over den toestand van het West-Friesch Museum te Hoorn, (Hoorn) (1890). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   492 12-10-2009   12:09:37
|  493   
 
  
Brouwer, D., Catalogus van het West-Friesch Museum, (Hoorn) (1891). 
Brown, M.F., Who owns native culture?, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press) (2003). 
Brown, M.F. / Bruchac, M.M., NAGPRA from the Middle Distance. Legal Puzzles and Unintended 
Consequences, in: Merryman, J.H. (Ed.) Imperialism, art and restitution, (2006), 193-217. 
Brownlie, I., System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I, (Oxford) (1983). 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford, University Press) (2003). 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford, University Press) (2008). 
Brunner, C.J.H., Dief wordt eigenaar, in: Quod Licet, Bundel aangeboden aan Prof. mr. W.M. Kleijn ter 
gelegenheid van zijn afscheid als hooglerraar burgerlijk recht e notarieel recht aan de 
Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, (Deventer) (1992), 45-53. 
Bulmer, S., Archaeology and indigenous rights: The World Archaeological Congress' code of ethics form an 
archaeologist's point of view, (1991), Archaeology in New Zealand, 55-58. 
Buomberger, T., Raubkunst / Kunstraub. Die Schweiz und der Handel mit gestohlenen Kulturgütern zur 
Zeit des Zweiten Weltkriegs, (Zürich, Orell Füssli) (1998). 
Burchardi, K., Der deutsch-russische Streit um die kriegsbedingt verlagerten Kulturgüter, (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos) (2000). 
Burton, J.W., Representing Africa: Colonial Anthropology Revisited, (1992), Journal of Asian and African 
Studies, 181-201. 
Calhoun, A., De-accessioning: Why not?, (1985), Agmanz, 14-15. 
Campen, J.v., De Haagse jurist Jean Theodore Royer (1737-1807) en zijn verzameling Chinese voorwerpen, 
(Hilversum, Verloren) (2000). 
Campfens, E., et al., Recht auf Umwegen: die niederländische Restitutionskommission, in: Osteuropa - 56. 
Jahrgangsheft, (2006), 415-432. 
Carducci, G., La restitution internationale des biens culturels et des objets d'art. Droit commun, Directive 
CEE, Convention de l'UNESCO et d'UNIDROIT, (Paris, LGDJ) (1997). 
Carrier, D., Museum skepticism, (Durham, Duke University Press) (2006). 
Cassese, A., International Law, (Oxford, University Press) (2005). 
CB, Aan MT (Management Team). Betreft voorstel antwoord aan Te Papa en als aanhangsel de 
verschillende overwegingen die hieraan ten grondslag liggen. 
Chamberlain, K., Repatriation of Human Remains and the Human Rights Act, in: United Kingdom 
Working Group on Human Remains (Ed.) Report of the Working Group on Human Remains, 
(2003), 205-235. 
Chamberlin, R., Loot! The Heritage of Plunder, (London, Thames and Hudson Ltd.) (1983). 
Chandler, D.G., The timechart of military history, (Edison, N.J, Chartwell Books) (2003). 
Chase-Riboud, B., Hottentot Venus: A novel, (Doubleday) (2003). 
Chatelain, F., France: Rapport national sur le sujet 1. Liberté des musées de procéder à des transactions 
d'objets d'art, in: Briat, M. / Freedberg, J., A. (Eds.), International Sales of Works of Art: 
International Art Trade and Law, (Deventer, Boston, Kluwer) (1991), 109-112. 
Chatelain, F., et al., Oeuvres d'art et objets de collection en droit français, (Nancy, Berger-Levrault) (1997). 
Chatelain, J. / Chatelain, F., Oeuvres d'art et objets de collection en droit français, (Paris, Berger-Levrault) 
(1990). 
Chernela, J., M., Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in: Leonard, T.M. (Ed.) 
Encyclopedia of the Developing World, (Routledge) (2006), 487-488. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   493 12-10-2009   12:09:37
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
494  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Chesnoff, R.Z., Pack of Thieves: How Hitler and Europe Plundered the Jews and Committed the Greatest 
Theft in History, (UK, Weidenfeld and Nicholson) (2000). 
Chief Medical Officer, Report of a Census of Organs and Tissues Retained by Pathology Services in 
England, January 2001, available online at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_40
06720. 
Chirac, J., Allocution prononcée lors des cérémonies commémorant la grande rafle des 16 et 17 juillet 1942 
(17 Juillet), (1995). 
Choi, S., The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 
(2005), Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 167-199. 
Clay, L.D., Entscheidung in Deutschland, (Frankfurt am Main, Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte) (1950). 
Coalitie blijft bij besluit over teruggeven mummie, (2000), Dagblad van West-Friesland. 
Codd, E.F., A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared Data Banks, (1970), Communications of the ACM, 
377–387. 
Cohan, A., An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural 
Property (Part Two), (2004), Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal, 4-115. 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, Report on a legal framework for free movement 
within the internal market of goods whose ownership is likely to be contested (2002/2114(INI)) 
Rapporteur: Willy C.E.H. De Clercq, (2003), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/omk/sipade3?SAME_LEVEL=1&LEVEL=3&NAV=X&DET
AIL=&PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2003-0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
Concern over 'Hottentot Venus' of 1810: Griquas want to bury the remains of Khoi woman displayed in 
France as a freak, The Star, 13 December 1995, 11. 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford University Press) (2004). 
Cook, B., The Elgin Marbles, (London, British Museum Paperbacks) (1984). 
Copping, J., National galleries to hand back Nazi art - Artworks looted by the Nazis during the Second 
World War and now held in Britain's national museums and galleries are to be handed back to 
their owners, Telegraph, 18 October 2008. 
Cornu, M., Le droit culturel des biens - L'intérêt culturel juridiquement protégé, (Brussels, Bruylant) (1996). 
Cornu, M., The Impact of Uniform Laws on the Protection of Cultural Heritage and the Preservation of 
Cultural Heritage in the 21st Century - Country Report on France prepared for the Session on 15 
November, 2008 on the Protection of Cultural Objects at the Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law Mexico City 13.-15.11.2008) (publication by Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers pending), (2008). 
Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., Droit, oeuvres d'art et musées: protection et valorisation des collections, 
(Paris) (2001). 
Cornu, M. / Mallet-Poujol, N., Droit, oeuvres d'art et musées: Protection et valorisation des collections, 
(Paris, CNRS) (2006). 
Country Reports of the conference "Spoils of War and Restitutions. The Destiny of French Works of Art 
During the Second World War", Paris, 17 November 1996, available at: http://www.dhh-
3.de/biblio/bremen/sow3/crfrance.htm. 
Craig, P. / De Búrca, G., EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) (2008). 
Craufurd Smith, R., Community Intervention in the Cultural Field: Continuity or Change?, in: Craufurd 
Smith, R. (Ed.) Culture and European Union law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) (2004), 19-
78. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   494 12-10-2009   12:09:37
|  495   
 
  
Crawford, J., The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, (Cambridge) (2002). 
Cuvier, G., Extrait d'observations faites sur le cadavre d'une femme connue à Paris et à Londres sous le 
nom de Vénus Hottentotte, in: Mémoires du Musée d'histoire naturelle, (1817), 259-274. 
Cuvier, Georges, Baron (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved October 18, 2005, from 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9028345. 
Daniel, G., Editorial, (1982), Antiquity, 1-7. 
David, R., The International Unification of Private Law, (1971), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 
Davie, L., Living History: Sarah Baartman, at rest at last, (2002), available at: 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/history/saartjie.htm. 
Davies, P., The Return of Treasures to Indigenous Peoples, (2004), Art Antiquity & Law, 78-98. 
De Bastier, M., Re: questions en concernant le service de CIVS à propos de la restitution / l'indemnification 
des objets d'arts. Email dated 23 June 2009 on file with the author. 
"de-accession, v." The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989, OED Online, Oxford University Press, 29 
June 2009. 
Deacon, H.J. / Deacon, J., Human Beginnings in South Africa: Uncovering the Secrets of the Stone Age, 
(Altamira Press) (1999). 
Debbasch, C., et al., Droit administratif des biens, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France) (1994). 
Delingpole, J., What are museums for?, Times Online, March 17 2006. 
Depta, S., L., Twice saved or Twice Stolen?: The Trophy Art Tug-of-War between Russia and Germany, 
(1996), Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 371-194. 
Desch, T., The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the event of armed conflict, (1999). 
Destruction of cultural property report (Annex XI) to the Final report of the United Nations Commission 
of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) S/1994/674/Add.2 
(Vol. V), (1994), available at: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/XI.htm. 
Detling, K.J., Eternal Silence: the Destruction of Cultural Property in Yugoslavia, (1993), The Maryland 
Journal of International Law & Trade, 41-75. 
Deutscher Bundestag (Ausschuss für Kultur und Medien), Wortprotokoll der Öffentliche Anhörung von 
Sachverständigen bezügl. der Anwendung der Grundsätze der Washingtoner Erklärung in 
Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich. Anhörung zu Erfahrungen im Bereich der 
Restitution von NS-verfolgungsbedingt entzogenen Kulturgütern und der Provenienzforschung 
(Protokoll Nr. 16/31), (2007), available at: 
http://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/a22/anhoerungen/raubkunst/a22_Prot31.pdf. 
Dixon, M., Textbook on international law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) (2007). 
Doehring, K., War die Universität Heidelberg verpflichtet die Bibliotheca Palatina dem Vatikan 
zurückzugeben?, (1987), Ruperto Carola, 138-142. 
Dölle, H. / Zweigert, K., Gesetz Nr. 52: über Sperre und Beaufsichtigung von Vermögen: Kommentar, 
(Stuttgart) (1947). 
Donders, Y.M., Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, (Antwerpen, Intersentia) (2002). 
Doumas, C., Archaeological Ethics and the Treatment of the Dead, (1990), World Archaeological Bulletin, 21–
22. 
Dousset, L., Introduction to Australian Indigenous Social Organisation: transforming concepts, (2002), 
available at: http://www.ausanthrop.net/research/kinship/kinship2.php. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   495 12-10-2009   12:09:37
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
496  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Draye, A.M., De Bescherming van het Roerend en Onroerend Erfgoed. Wet-, Decreet- en Regelgeving van 
kracht binnen het Vlaamse Gewest / de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, (Brussel, De Boeck & Larcier) 
(2007). 
Dufau, J., Le domaine public, (Paris, Le moniteur) (1993). 
Dunné, J.M.v., Narrative coherence and its function in judicial decision making and legislation, (1996), 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 463-486. 
Dutch return Ghana chief's severed head, (2009), available at: 
http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2309332.ece/Dutch_return_Ghana_chiefs_seve
red_head. 
Duuren, D.v., et al., Physical anthropology reconsidered. Human remains at the Tropenmuseum, 
(Amsterdam, KIT Publishers) (2007). 
Edelheit, A.J. / Edelheit, H., Legislation, Anti-Jewish, in: History of the Holocaust: A Handbook and 
Dictionary, (Boulder, Westview Press) (1994), 299-331. 
Edelson, S., Concerted international effort in the trade of cultural property, (1984), Law and policy in 
international business, 1249-1273. 
Effert, R.A.H.D., Volkenkundig Verzamelen. Het Koninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden en het Rijks 
Ethnographisch Museum 1816-1883, (2003). 
Effert, R.A.H.D., Onderzoek mbt Toi Moko ter bepaling van de tijd waarin dit voorwerp bij het Koninklijk 
Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden terecht is gekomen (unpublished document dated 21 October 2005. 
On file at the archive of the RMV.), (2005). 
Effert, R.A.H.D., Royal Cabinets and Auxiliary Branches. Origins of the National Museum of Ethnology 
1816-1883, (Leiden, CNWS Publications) (2008). 
Eirinberg, K.W., The United States Reconsiders the 1954 Hague Convention, (1994), International Journal of 
Cultural Property, 27-35. 
Eizenstat, S.E., Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor and the Unfinished Business of World War 
II, (New York, PublicAffairs) (2003). 
El-Bitar, J., Der deutsche und der französische Kulturgüterschutz nach der Umsetzung der 
Kulturgüterrückgaberichtlinie. Eine materiellrechtliche und kollisionsrechtliche Untersuchung, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang) (2006). 
El-Bitar, J., Der Schutz von Kulturgut als res extra commercium in Frankreich: Ein Vorbild für 
Deutschland?, in: Koordinierungstelle für Kulturgutverluste (Ed.) Im Labyrinth des Rechts? 
Wege zum Kulturgüterschutz, (Magdeburg, Koordinierungstelle für Kulturgutverluste) (2007), 
175-207. 
Elmer, T., G., A Question of Dignity: An Equitable Solution to the Trophy Art Debate, (2000), New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 117-135. 
Engelsman, S., Letter by Steven Engelsman to State Secretary of Culture Van Leeuwen re: "Maori-hoofd 
360-555763", 7 May 2003. 
Engelsman, S., Letter to State Secretary of Culture Van Leeuwen, 23 October. 
Engelsman, S., Email to Catherine Nesus requesting information about the Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation 
Programme and availability of the Toi Moko for serious research, (Leiden) (2004a). 
Engelsman, S., Letter to Mrs. Catherine Nesus - Repatriation Project Leader of the Te Papa, (Leiden) 
(2004b). 
Engelsman, S., Letter to Mrs. Catherine Nesus - Repatriation Project Leader of the Te Papa. 
Engelsman, S., Letter to the Dutch State Secretary of Culture Van der Laan 11 August 2005, (2005). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   496 12-10-2009   12:09:37
|  497   
 
  
Engstler, L., Die territoriale Bindung von Kulturgütern im Rahmen des Völkerrechts, (Cologne, Heymann) 
(1964). 
Ermacora, F., Colonies and Colonial Regime, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public 
international law: Part: 10: States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal law, 
(Amsterdam, North-Holland) (1987), 40-45. 
European Commission, I.M.D., Guide to the concept and practical application of articles 28-30 EC, (2001), 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/art2830/guideart2830_en.pdf. 
Falconer, K.A., When Honor will not suffice: The need for a legally binding international agreement 
regarding ownership of nazi-looted art, (2000), University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law, 383-426. 
Falke, O.v., Die Majolikasammlung Alfred Pringsheim, augmented reprint with articles by Tjark Hausman, 
Carmen Ravanelli-Guidotti and Timothy Wilson, (Ferrara) (1994). 
Farmer, W.I., The Safekeepers: A Memoir of the Arts at the End of World War II, (Berlin and New York, 
Walter de Gruyter) (2000). 
Fawkes, H., Netherlands hails return of stolen art, BBCnews, 20 April 2004, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/3640951.stm. 
Fechner, F.G., The fundamental aims of cultural property law, (1998), International Journal of Cultural Property, 
376-394. 
Feliciano, H., Le musée disparu: enquête sur le pillage des oeuvres d'art en France par les nazis, (Paris) 
(1995). 
Feliciano, H., The Lost Museum: the Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works of Art, (New 
York, Basic Books) (1997). 
Ferencz, B.B., Less than slaves: Jewish forced labor and the quest for compensation, (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Museum) (2002). 
Ferguson, G., Signs and Symbols in Christian Art, (New York, Oxford University Press) (1954). 
Ferid, M. / Sonnenberger, H.J., Das französische Zivilrecht, Bd. 2 Schuldrecht, Sachenrecht, (Heidelberg) 
(1986). 
Ferris, N. / Leclair, L., The Authority of the Missing One Tenth: Issues of Archaeological Artifact 
Ownership, (Brantford, OAS Annual Meetings) (1998). 
Ferrus, D., De thuiskomst van Sara Baartman, (2004), Armada: tijdschrift voor wereldliteratuur, 27-32. 
Fiedler, W., State Succession, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public international law: Part: 10: 
States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal law, (Amsterdam, North-Holland) 
(1987), 446-456. 
Fiedler, W., Zur Entwicklung des Völkergewohnheitsrechts im Bereich des internationalen 
Kulturgüterschutzes, in: Hailbronner, K., et al. (Eds.), Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung: Festschrift 
für Karl Doehring, (Berlin, Springer) (1989), 199-218. 
Fiedler, W., Kulturgüter als Kriegsbeute? Rechtliche Probleme der Rückführung deutscher Kulturgüter aus 
Rußland, (Heidelberg, C.F. Müller Verlag) (1995). 
Fiedler, W., Zwischen Kriegsbeute und internationaler Verantwortung - Kulturgüter im Internationalen 
Recht der Gegenwart. Plädoyer für eine zeitgemäße Praxis des Internationalen Rechts, in: 
Reichelt, G. (Ed.) Neues Recht zum Schutz von Kulturgut. Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz: 
EG- Richtlinie, UNIDROIT-Konvention und Folgerecht, (Wien, Manzsche Verlags- und 
Universitätsbuchhandlung) (1997), 147-160. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   497 12-10-2009   12:09:37
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
498  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Fisher, D., Tribes get a victory in Kennewick Man battle but U.S. ruling may clear way for anthropologists' 
lawsuit seeking to study the skeleton, (2000), Seattle Post-Intelligencer. 
Fitzmaurice, G., The future of public international law and the international legal system in the 
circumstances of today, in: Livre du Centenaire de l'Institut de Droit International 1873-1973, 
(Institut de Droit International) (1973), 196-238. 
Flessas, T., The Repatriation Debate and the Discourse of the Commons, (2007), LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 10/2007. 
Flood, M., A., "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One"? - A matter of interpretation, (2002), Montana Law 
Review, 39-90. 
Forder, C., The Bredius Museum Case: Public Interest and Private International Law, (1993), International 
Journal of Cultural Property, 117-125. 
Forder, C., Legislation: The Museums and Galleries Act 1992, (1994), International Journal of Cultural Property, 
131-158. 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Ed.), Nazi Gold - The London Conference, 2-4 December 1997, 
(London, The Stationary Office) (1998). 
Francioni, F., Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium: Beyond 
State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a shared Interest of Humanity, (2004), 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 1209-1228. 
Francioni, F., Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: an Introduction, in: Francioni, F. / Scheinin, M. (Eds.), 
Cultural Human Rights, (Leiden / Boston, Martinus Nijhoff) (2008), 1-15. 
Francioni, F. / Scheinin, M., Cultural Human Rights, (Leiden / Boston, Martinus Nijhoff) (2008). 
Fraoua, R., Le trafic illicite des biens culturels et leur restitution: analyse des réglementations nationales et 
internationales: critique et propositions, (Fribourg, Editions Universitaire Fribourg Suisse) (1985). 
Frazer, J.G., The Golden Bough - A Study in Magic and Religion, (London, MacMillan) (1890). 
Freeman, A.V., Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of their Armed Forces, (1955), Recueil des Cours 
vol. 88 Part 2, 263-416. 
Freytag, C., "Cultural Heritage": Rückgabeansprüche von Ursprungsländern auf "ihr" Kulturgut?, in: 
Fechner, F.G., et al. (Eds.), Prinzipien des Kulturgüterschutzes. Ansätze im deutschen, 
europäischen, und internationalen Recht, (Berlin) (1996), 175-200. 
Friedlander, S., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution", (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press) (1992). 
Friedmann, E. / Weissberb, R., The French Holocaust Era Claims Process, in: Bazyler, M. / Alford, R., P. 
(Eds.), Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its Legacy, (New York / 
London, New York University Press) (2006), 133-144. 
Frier, P.-L., Droit du patrimoine culturel, (Paris, PUF) (1997). 
Frigo, M., Looted art and public international law: General principles and international conventions, in: 
Renold, M.-A. / Gabus, P. (Eds.), Claims for the Restitution of Looted Art, (Geneva, Schulthess) 
(2004), 47-70. 
Frigo, M., The International Symposium "From anatomic Collections to Objects of Worship: Conservation 
and Exhibition of Human Remains in Museums", Paris, February 22-23, 2008, (2008), International 
Journal of Cultural Property, 437-439. 
Fuhrmann, M. (Ed.), Die Reden gegen Verres = In C. Verrem: lateinisch-deutsch / Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
(Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) (1995). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   498 12-10-2009   12:09:37
|  499   
 
  
Ganslmayr, H., Wem gehört die Benin-Maske? Die Forderung nach Rückgabe von Kulturgut an die 
Ursprungsländer, (1980), Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre 
Sonderorganisationen, 88-92. 
Garner, B., A. (Ed.), Black's Law Dictionary, (St. Paul, West Group) (1999). 
Garner, B., A. (Ed.), Black's Law Dictionary, (St. Paul, Thomsson West) (2004). 
Garner, J., International Law and the World War I (Vol. 2), (London) (1920). 
Garrett, R.L., Time for a Change? Restoring Nazi-Looted artwork to its rightful Owners, (2000), Pace 
International Law Review, 367-395. 
Gattini, A., Restitution by Russia of Works of Art Removed from German Territory at the End of the 
Second World War, (1996), European Journal of International Law, 1-88. 
Geluwe, H.v., Belgium's contribution to the Zairian cultural heritage, (1979), Museum (special issue on the 
"Return and Restitution of Cultural Property"), 32-37. 
Geoffroy, Étienne-François (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved October 18, 2005, from 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9036458. 
German East Africa (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved May 15, 2008, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9036569. 
German restitution for National Socialist crimes, in: Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Ed.) Nazi Gold - 
The London Conference, 2-4 December 1997, (London, The Stationary Office) (1998), 286-292. 
Germans Can't Return Sultan Makaua's Head; Say African Trophy Was Retaken Years Ago, The New York 
Times, 10 September 1920, available at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A04E0D61E3CEE3ABC4952DFBF66838B6
39EDE. 
Germany. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, available at: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-58214. 
Gerstenblith, P., Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for the 21st Century: The 
Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, (2001), Connecticut Journal of International Law. 
Gerstenblith, P., United States v. Schultz, (2002), Culture Without Context. 
Gerstenblith, P., The McClain/Schultz doctrine: another step against trade in stolen antiquities, (2003), 
Culture Without Context. 
Gevers, J.K.M., Beschikken over cellen en weefsels, (Deventer, Kluwer) (1990). 
Gheyn, C.v.d., Les tribulations de l'agneau mystique, (1945), Revue belge d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'art, 25-46. 
Giblin, J.C., The Riddle of the Rosetta Stone. Key to Ancient Egypt, (New York) (1992). 
Gioia, A., The development of international law relating to the protection of cultural property in the event 
of armed conflict: the second protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, (2003). 
Giovannini, T., The Holocaust and Looted Art, (2002), Art Antiquity & Law, 263-280. 
Gollin, R. / Schoonenboom, M., Lakmoesproef voor Ruimhartigheid - Juridisch steekspel in de zaak 
Goudstikker, de Volkskrant, 9 February 2006, 2-3. 
Gordon, R., The life and times of Sara Baartman: The Hottentot Venus, (2000), The American anthropologist, 
605-607. 
Goschler, C., et al., Raub und Restitution: "Arisierung" und Rückerstattung des jüdischen Eigentums in 
Europa, (Frankfurt am Main, Fischer) (2003). 
Gould, C., Trophy of Conquest, in: Merryman, J.H. (Ed.) Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer) (2007), 4-6. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   499 12-10-2009   12:09:37
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
500  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Gould, S.J., The Flamingo's Smile: Reflections in Natural History, (London) (1987). 
Goy, R., Le retour et la restitution des biens culturels à leur pays d'origine en cas d'appropriation illégale, 
(1979), Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 962-985. 
Graham, G.M., Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of Definition and Justification, 
(1987), The international lawyer, 755-793. 
Greenfield, J., The Return of Cultural Treasures, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) (1989). 
Greenfield, J., The Return of Cultural Treasures, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) (1996). 
Greenfield, J., The Return of Cultural Treasures, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) (2007). 
Griqua (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 14, 2005, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9038148. 
Grotius, H., De jure belli ac pacis (German translation from 1950), (Tübingen) (1625). 
Guinnane, T.W., Financial Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement, (2004), Yale 
University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 880 (Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=493802). 
Guzman, A.T., The Design of International Agreements, (2005), European Journal of International Law, 579-
612. 
Haanappel, P.P.C. / MacKaay, E., Nieuw Nederlands Burgerlijk Wetboek: het vermogensrecht (zakenrecht, 
verbintenissenrecht en bijzondere overeenkomsten) / New Netherlands Civil Code: patrimonial 
law (property, obligations and special contracts), (Deventer, Kluwer) (1990). 
Hagens, G.v., Gruselleichen, Gestaltplastinate und Bestattungszwang, in: Hagens, G.v. (Ed.) Körperwelten. 
Die Faszination des Echten, (Heidelberg) (1999a), 40-84. 
Hagens, G.v., Körperwelten. Die Faszination des Echten, (Heidelberg) (1999b). 
Hall, A.R., The Recovery of Cultural Objects dispersed during World War II, (1951), Department State 
Bulletin, 337-345. 
Hammer, F., Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Denkmalrechts in Deutschland, (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck)) (1995). 
Harclerode, P. / Brendan, P., The Lost Masters: The Looting of Europe's Treasure Houses, (London, 
Victor Gollancz) (1999). 
Hardcastle, R., Law and the human body: property rights, ownership and control, (Oxford, Hart) (2007). 
Harting, P., Het eiland Urk, zijn bodem, voortbrengselen en bewoners, (Utrecht) (1853). 
Hartkamp, A.S., Wijziging en opheffing van bij erfstelling of legaat gemaakte bedingen: van Museumwet tot 
Nieuw BW, in: Gerver, P.H.M. (Ed.) Ars notariatus, 90, (Amsterdam / Deventer, Stichting tot 
Bevordering der Notariele Wetenschap / Kluwer) (1999), 15-27. 
Hartung, H., Kunstraub in Krieg und Verfolgung: die Restitution der Beute- und Raubkunst im Kollisions- 
und Völkerrecht, (Berlin, De Gruyter Recht) (2005). 
Hattenhauer, H. / Bernert, G., Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten von 1794: Textausgabe, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Alfred Metzner) (1970). 
Hedjaz. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/259797/Hejaz. 
Hedrick, L., Xenophon's Cyrus the Great: the arts of leadership and war, (New York, St. Martin's) (2006). 
Henckaerts, J.-M. / Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, Customary international humanitarian law, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) (2005). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   500 12-10-2009   12:09:38
|  501   
 
  
Henry, M., 55 years later, restitution is an art - Germany is in a unique position to provide data which would 
facilitate claims for Nazi-looted artworks, The Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2007. 
Herman, D., "I do not attach great significance to it": Taking note of "The Holocaust" in English Case Law, 
(2008), Social and Legal Studies, 427-452. 
Hershkovitch, C., Offene Rechnungen: die Restitution von Kunstwerken in Frankreich, in: Osteuropa - 56. 
Jahrgangsheft, (2006), 441-446. 
Herten, J.H.S.v., De rechtspositie van lichaam, lijk, stoffelijke resten, organen en niet-menselijke 
implantaten, (1984), Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notaris-ambt en Registratie, 155-164. 
Hervé, B., A quoi sert le domaine public mobilier, L'exemple des biens culturels, (1993), AJDA, 675. 
Hesselink, M.W., De redelijkheid en billijkheid in het Europese privaatrecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (1999). 
Heuer, C.-H., Die Kunstraubzüge der Nationalsozialisten und ihre Rückabwicklung, (1999), Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (NJW), 2558-2264. 
Heyting, L., Schilderij Toorop blijft in Zeeland, NRC Handelsblad, 29 May 2000, 9. 
Hilberg, R., The destruction of the European Jews, (New York, Holmes & Meier) (1985). 
Hillgenberg, H., A Fresh Look at Soft law, (2004), European Journal of International Law, 499-515. 
Hipp, A., Schutz von Kulturgütern in Deutschland, (Berlin, de Gruyter) (2000). 
Hirsch, M. / Majer, D. (Eds.), Recht, Verwaltung und Justiz im Nationalsozialismus: ausgewählte Schriften, 
Gesetze und Gerichtsentscheidungen von 1933 bis 1945 mit ausführlichen Erläuterungen und 
Kommentierungen, (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft) (1997). 
Hladík, J., Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, Netherlands (March 15-26), 
(1999). 
Hladík, J., The control system under the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict 1954 and its Second Protocol, (2004). 
Hoffmann, G., Protectorates, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public international law: Part: 10: 
States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal law, (Amsterdam, North-Holland) 
(1987), 336-339. 
Hollander, B., The international law of art: for lawyers, collectors and artists, (London, Bowes & Bowes) 
(1959). 
Hollander, P.d., De zaak Goudstikker, (Amsterdam, Meulenhoff) (1988). 
Homo heidelbergensis (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9040898. 
Hubert, J., Dry Bones or Living Ancestors? Conflicting Perceptions of Life, Death and the Universe, (1992), 
International Journal of Cultural Property, 105-127. 
Hudson, M.O. (Ed.), International Legislation. A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International 
Instruments of General Interest, (Washington) (1972). 
Huijgen, W.G., Compendium erfrecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2005). 
ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (as approved by the 21st General Assembly of ICOM in Seoul, 
Republic of Korea, 8 October 2004), International Journal of Cultural Property, 393-408. 
'IJsbrand' nu op bordje Groenland, Noordhollands Dagblad, 23 September 2000. 
Impey, O. / MacGregor, A., The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Europe, (London, House of Stratus) (2001). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   501 12-10-2009   12:09:38
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
502  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Information Brochure: Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting from the 
Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force during the Occupation (CIVS). 
Institute of Forensic Medicine, Report on the Examination of Human Remains of an alleged Greenlandic 
Inuk housed at Hoorn Musuem, Hoorn, Holland, (2001). 
Instituut Collectie Nederland, Netherlands guidelines for deaccessioning of museum objects, (2006). 
International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, (2000), International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference. 
International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (2001), Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 20-143. 
Ipsen, K., Völkerrecht, (München, C.H. Beck) (2004). 
Israel, F.L., et al., Major peace treaties of modern history 1648-1967, (New York, Chelsea House Publishers 
etc. & McGraw-Hill) (1967). 
Jansen, J.E., Reactie op "Dief wordt vaak geen eigenaar" van mr. A.C. van Schaik, (2005), WPNR (6639), 
801-803. 
Jayme, E., Die Washingtoner Erklärung über Nazi-Enteignungen von Kunstwerken der Holocaustopfer: 
Narrative Normen im Kunstrecht, in: Häder, U. (Ed.) Museen im Zwielicht: Ankaufpolitik 1933-
1945 (Kolloquium vom 11. und 12. Dezember 2001 in Köln.) Die eigene Geschichte: 
Provenienzforschung an deutschen Kunstmuseen im internationalen Vergleich (Tagung vom 20. 
bis 22. Februar 2002 in Hamburg), (Koordinierungsstelle für Kulturgutverluste Magdeburg) 
(2002), 247-257. 
Jellinek, G., Allgemeine Staatslehre, (Berlin, O. Häring) (1914). 
Jennings, R.Y., The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law, 
(1996), International Comparative Law Quarterly, 1-12. 
Jenschke, C., Der völkerrechtliche Rückgabeanspruch auf in Kriegszeiten widerrechtlich verbrachte 
Kulturgüter, (Berlin, Duncker&Humblot) (2005). 
Jessup, P.C.J., General Report: Topic 1: Freedom of Museums to sell, trade or otherwise dispose of objects 
of art in their collections, in: Briat, M. / Freedberg, J., A. (Eds.), International Sales of Works of 
Art: International Art Trade and Law, (Deventer, Boston, Kluwer) (1991), 67-72. 
Joffe, J., Reviewed work(s): West German Reparations to Israel by Nicholas Balabkins, (1977), The American 
Political Science Review, 1274-1275. 
Johansen, B.E., Kennewick Man: the Facts, the Fantasies, and the Stakes, in: Johansen, B.E. (Ed.) Enduring 
legacies: native American treaties and contemporary controversies, (Westport, Praeger) (2004), 
283-303. 
Jote, K., International Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage, (Stockholm, Juristförlaget) (1994). 
Joyce, R., Cultural Treasures and Slippery Slopes, available at: 
http://www.uk.digiserve.com/mentor/marbles/ethics.htm. 
Kaam, A.v., Hoofd van Maori gaat terug, Leidsch Dagblad, 9 November 2005. 
Kabwe cranium. (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 9, 2008, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9044260. 
Kalfon, L., Entschädigung in Frankreich: Lucien Kalfon über die Tätigkei der französischen 
Entschädigungskommission, in: Osteuropa - 56. Jahrgangsheft, (2006), 433-440. 
Karasik, M., Problems of Compensation and Restitution in Germany and Austria, (1951), Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 448-468. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   502 12-10-2009   12:09:38
|  503   
 
  
Kass, L.R., Thinking about the Body, (1985), The Hastings Center Report, 20-30. 
Kastenberg, J., E., The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, (1997), The 
Air Force Law Review, 277-303. 
Kaye, L., M., Cultural Property Theft during War: Application of the Statute of Limitations, in: Briat, M., & 
Freedberg, Judith, A. (Ed.) Legal Aspects of International Trade in Art, (The Hague, Kluwer) 
(1996a), 217-230. 
Kaye, L., M., The Future of the Past: Recovering Cultural Property, (1996b), Cardozo Journal of International 
Law & Comparative Law, 23-41. 
Kaye, L., M., Laws in Force at the Dawn of World War II: International Conventions and National Laws, 
in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The Spoils of War - World War II and Its Aftermath: the Loss, 
Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 100-
105. 
Keane, D., The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, (2004), DePaul Journal of Art and 
Entertainment Law, 1-38. 
Kelly, M., A Skeleton in the Legal Closet: The Discovery of "Kennewick Man'' Crystallises the Debate Over 
Federal Law Governing Disposal of Ancient Human Remains, (1999), Hawaii Law Review, 41-72. 
Kelsen, Principles of International Law, (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston) (1967). 
Kemenade, J.A.v., Deel I van het rapport “Roof en Restitutie Joods Vermogen”, uitgebracht aan de 
Contactgroep Tegoeden Wereldoorlog II, (1999a), available at: 
http://www.minfin.nl/binaries/minfin/assets/pdf/dossiers/diversen/tegoeden-woii/0_roof-en-
restitutie-joods-vermogen--deel-i.pdf. 
Kemenade, J.A.v., Deel II van het rapport “Roof en Restitutie Joods Vermogen”, uitgebracht aan de 
Contactgroep Tegoeden Wereldoorlog II, (1999b), available at: 
http://www.minfin.nl/binaries/minfin/assets/pdf/dossiers/diversen/tegoeden-woii/roof-en-
restitutie-joods-vermogen--deel-ii-.pdf. 
Kempster, N., Tracking the Nazi Plunder, (1998), L.A. Times, F1. 
Kennon, H., Take a picture, it may last longer if Guggenheim becomes the law of the land: the repatriation 
of fine art, (1996), St. Thomas law review, 373-422. 
Kirby, C.L., Stolen Cultural Property; Available Museum Responses to an international Dilemma, (2000), 
Dickinson Law Review, 729-748. 
Kline, T., R., Legal Issues relating to the recovery of the Quedlinburg Treasures, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The 
Spoils of War. World War II and its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and recovery of 
Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N Abrams) (1997), 156-158. 
Klomp, R.J.Q., Dieven met geduld. Over verkrijgende verjaring te kwader trouw, in: Brand, I., et al. (Eds.), 
Tijd en onzekerkeid. BW-krant jaarboek 16, (Deventer, Gouda Quint) (2000), 59-74. 
Koenigs, C.F., Under Duress: The Sale of the Franz Koenigs Collection, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The Spoils of 
War. World War II and its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and recovery of Cultural 
Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 237-240. 
Kogelfranz, S. / Korte, W., A., Quedlinburg-Texas und zurück. Schwarzhandel mit geraubter Kunst, 
(München, Droemersche Verlagsanstalt Th. Knaur Nachf.) (1996). 
Kohn, M., "Colonialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), (2006), available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/colonialism/. 
Kolkman, W.D. (Ed.), Erfrecht: de tekst van Boek 4 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en aanverwante wetten 
voorzien van commentaar, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2006). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   503 12-10-2009   12:09:38
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
504  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
König, H., The Implementation of the Washington Principles - Some Legal Aspects, available at: 
http://www.badv.bund.de/002_menue_oben/007_english/004_provenance/index.html. 
König, H., Grundlagen der Rückerstattung. Das deutsche Wiedergutmachungsrecht, in: Osteuropa (Ed.) 
Kunst im Konflikt. Kriegsfolgen und Kooperationsfelder in Europa [Art in conflict], (2006), 371-
381. 
Körbs, H., Der internationale Schutz von Kulturgütern: Ein Rückblick, (1996), Humanitäres Völkerrecht, 138-
148. 
Kortmann, C.A.J.M., Boekbeschouwing J.M.E. Derks, De Grondwet en delegatie. Het delegatievraagstuk 
inconstitutioneel perspectief, (1996), RM Themis, 344-345. 
Kortmann, S.C.J.J., et al., Vertegenwoordiging en tussenpersonen, (Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink) (1999). 
Kowalski, W.W., Introduction to the International Law on the Restitution of Works of Art Looted During 
armed Conflicts. Part I, (1996a), Spoils of War, 1-2. 
Kowalski, W.W., Introduction to the International Law on the Restitution of Works of Art Looted during 
Armed Conflicts. Part II, (1996b), Spoils of War, 4-6. 
Kowalski, W.W., Art Treasures and War. A Study on the Restitution of Looted Cultural Property, pursuant 
to Public International Law, (Leicester, Institute of Art and Law) (1998). 
Kowalski, W.W., The Machinery of Nazi Art Looting. The Nazi Law on the Confiscation of Cultural 
Property. Poland: a Case Study, (2000), Art, Antiquity and Law, 217-231. 
Kowalski, W.W., Repatriation of Cultural Property following a Cession of Territory or Dissolution of 
Multinational States, (2001), Art, Antiquity and Law, 139-166. 
Kowalski, W.W., Claims for Works of Art and their Legal Nature, in: The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (Ed.) Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes. Papers 
emanating from the seventh PCA International Law Seminar May 23, 2003, (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International & Schulthess) (2004), 31-51. 
Krause, K.-J., Denkmalschutz im Altertum, (1986), Die alte Stadt. Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Stadtgeschichte, 
Stadtsoziologie und Denkmalpflege, 267–285. 
Kuitenbrouwer, F., Onduidelijke regeling. De commissie-Polak doet de zaken eenvoudiger voor dan ze zijn. 
Nieuwe claims zullen weer problemen opleveren, NRC Handelsblad, 18 April 2002. 
Kuitenbrouwer, F., Gestolen kunst gedijt goed - De bezwaren tegen het Unidroit-verdrag, NRC 
Handelsblad, 16 May 2003, 22. 
Kuitenbrouwer, F., Besluit teruggave 'Goudstikkers' is juridische spagaat, NRC Handelsblad, 7 February 
2006, 8. 
Kunze, H.H., Restitution "Entarteter Kunst". Sachenrecht und Internationales Privatrecht, (Berlin & New 
York, de Gruyter) (2000). 
Kurtz, M., J., The End of the War and the Occupation of Germany, 1944-52. Laws and Conventions 
enacted to counter German Appropriations: The Allied Control Council, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) 
The spoilsof war. World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of 
Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 112-116. 
Kurtz, M.J., Nazi Contraband: American Policy on the Return of European Cultural Treasures, 1945-1955, 
(New York & London, Garland Publishing) (1985). 
Kurtz, M.J., Inheritance of Jewish Property, (1998), Cardozo Law Review, 625-655. 
Kurtz, M.J., America and the return of Nazi contraband: the recovery of Europe's cultural treasures, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) (2006). 
Kuyvenhoven, F. (Ed.), Developments in Dutch Museum Policy, (Amsterdam, Instituut Collectie 
Nederland) (2001). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   504 12-10-2009   12:09:38
|  505   
 
  
LaCapra, D., Representing the Holocaust: history, theory, trauma, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press) (1994). 
Lalive, P., Une Convention internationale qui dérange: la Convention UNIDROIT sur les biens culturels, in: 
Dupuy, R.-J. (Ed.) Mélanges en l'honneur de Nicolas Valticos, (Paris, A. Pedone) (1999), 177-188. 
Langaney, A., Collections humaines et sciences inhumaines: échantillons et reliques, in: Bancel, N., et al. 
(Eds.), Zoos Humains: de la vénus hottentote aux reality shows, (Paris, éditions La Découverte) 
(2002), 374-380. 
Lannan, R., W., Anthropology and restless Spirits: the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act, and the unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains, (1998), Harvard Environmental Law 
Review, 369-439. 
Lanzmann, C., Shoah (Le films Aleph), (1985). 
Larsen, C.S., Bioarchaeology: Interpreting behaviour from the human skeleton, (New York, Cambridge 
University Press) (1997). 
Lauterpacht, Recognition of Insurgents as a de facto Government, (1939-1940), Modern Law Review, 1-20. 
Leenen, H.J.J., et al., Handboek gezondheidsrecht: Deel I - Rechten van mensen in de gezondheidszorg, 
(Houten, Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum) (2007). 
Legassick, M. / Rassool, C., Skeletons in the Cupboard - South African museums and the trade in human 
remains, 1907 - 1917, (South African Museum & McGregor Museum) (2000). 
Legêne, S., et al., Notitie over de omgang met menselijke resten in volkenkundige musea, (2001). 
Leiden geeft hoofd Badu Bonsu II terug, NRC Handelsblad, 21 March 2009. 
Leistra, J., A Short History of Art Loss and Art Recovery in the Netherlands, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The 
Spoils of War. World War II and Its Aftermath: the Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of 
Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 53-57. 
Lepaulle, P., Traité théorique et pratique des trusts en droit interne, en droit fiscal et en droit international, 
(Paris, Rousseau) (1932). 
Lerner, R., E., The Nazi Art Theft Problem And The Role Of The Museum: A Proposed Solution To 
Disputes Over Title, (1998), New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 15-41. 
Lesaffer, R.C. / Broers, E.-J., Private Property in the Dutch-Spanish Peace Treaty of Münster (30 January 
1648), (2007), available at: http://ssrn.com/paper=1002389. 
Less, S., International Administration of Holocaust Compensation: The International Commission on 
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), (2008), German Law Journal, 1651-1692. 
Levy, D. / Sznaider, N., Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust, (Frankfurt am Main) (2001). 
Levy, D., et al., The Holocaust and memory in the global age, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press) 
(2005). 
Lichfield, J., Robbery that followed the Holocaust, The Independent, 28 January 1997. 
Lijkresten gevonden in depot Tropenmuseum, (2007), Netwerk. 
Lillie, S., Was Einmal War: Handbuch der enteigneten Kunstsammlungen Wiens, (Vienna, Czernin Verlag) 
(2003). 
Lillteicher, J., Westdeutschland und die Restitution jüdischen Eigentums in Europa, in: Goschler, C., et al. 
(Eds.), Raub und Restitution: "Arisierung" und Rückerstattung des jüdischen Eigentums in 
Europa, (Frankfurt am Main, Fischer) (2003), 92-107. 
Lipman, R., Jewish Cultural Reconstruction Reconsidered - Should the Jewish Religious Objects Distributed 
Around the World After WWII be Returned to Europe?, (2006), Kunst und Recht - Journal für 
Kunstrecht, Urheberrecht und Kulturpolitik, 89 - 93. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   505 12-10-2009   12:09:38
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
506  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Lohman, J., Introduction, in: Lohman, J. / Goodnow, K. (Eds.), Human Remains and Museum Practice, 
(UNESCO) (2006a), 10-15. 
Lohman, J., Parading the Dead, Policing the Living, in: Lohman, J. / Goodnow, K. (Eds.), Human Remains 
and Museum Practice, (UNESCO) (2006b). 
Lokin, J.H.A. / Zwalve, W.J., Hoofdstukken uit de Europese Codificatiegeschiedenis, (Groningen, Wolters-
Noordhoff/Egbert Forsten) (1992). 
Lowenthal, C., The Role of IFAR and the Art Loss Register in the Repatriation of Cultural Property 
displaced in World War II, (1996), Spoils of War, 8-10. 
Lubina, K.R.M., The Aftermath of the Second World War: Restitution of Looted Art (unpublished 
dissertation), (2002). 
Lubina, K.R.M., Human remains in the KIT Tropenmuseum collection - Summary of meeting of experts on 
23-24 February 2006, in: van Duuren, D. (Ed.) Physical anthropology reconsidered: Human 
remains at the Tropenmuseum, (Amsterdam, KIT Publishers) (2007), 83-95. 
Lubina, K.R.M., Sotheby's Restitution Symposium: Sotheby's Amsterdam, The Netherlands (January 30, 
2008): Conference Reports, (2008), International Journal of Cultural Property, 429-431. 
Lufkin, M., The Subpoena heard round the World. The Schiele Case and other Legal Immunities for Art 
Loaned into the US, (1999), Art Antiquity & Law, 364-372. 
Lufkin, M., Criminal Liability for Receiving State-Claimed Antiquities in the United States: The 'Schultz' 
Case, (2003), Art Antiquity & Law. 
Luijten, E.A.A., Rechterlijk ingrijpen in testatmentaire beschikkingen (I), (1994a), Stichting & Vereniging, 105-
107. 
Luijten, E.A.A., Rechterlijk ingrijpen in testatmentaire beschikkingen (II), (1994b), Stichting & Vereniging, 
135-138. 
Luijten, E.A.A. / Meijer, W.R., Huwelijksgoederen- en erfrecht (Deel 2: Erfrecht), (Deventer, Kluwer) 
(2003). 
Lust, J., International Symposium in Kiev, (1996), Spoils of War. 
Lustig, A.J., Cabinets and collections, in: Heilbron, J.L. (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to the History of 
Modern Science, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) (2003), 117-119. 
Lyotard, J.-F., Heidegger et les juifs, (Paris, Éditions Galilée) (1988). 
M.B., List Reveals Names of Nazi-Era Looters, Washington Post, November 7 1998, C3. 
Mackenzie, S., Going, Going, Gone: Regulating the Market in Illicit Antiquities, (Leicester, Institute of Art 
and Law.) (2005). 
Mak, G.L., Rembrandt en Jan Six: contouren van een vriendschap, (Amsterdam, pAn Amsterdam) (2005). 
Malanczuk, P. / Akehurst, M.B., Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, (London, Routledge) 
(1997). 
Maori (2009), In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retreived April 17, 2009, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 
Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, (1974), Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 689-
724. 
Mark, L.F., The recovery of cultural artifacts: the legacy of our archeological heritage, (1990), Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, 165-182. 
Maseko, Z., On l'appelait la Venus Hottentote (documentary), (1998). 
Mastalir, R.W., A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property" Aspects of Cultural Property under 
International Law, (1993), Fordham international law journal, 1033-1093. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   506 12-10-2009   12:09:38
|  507   
 
  
Mastroberardino, M.M., The Last Prisoners of World War II, (1997), Pace International Law Review, 315-356. 
Matthews, M., Repatriation of Koiwi Tangata Maori (Maori Ancestral Human Remains) (personal 
communication to Seddon Bennington), (2004). 
Maurer, C.H.M., Die Ausfuhr von Kulturgütern in der Europäischen Union, (Frankfurt am Main, Haag + 
Herchen) (1997). 
Maurice, C. / Turnor, R., The Export Licensing Rules in the United Kingdom and the Waverley Criteria, 
(1992), International Journal of Cultural Property, 273-295. 
Mauriès, P., Cabinets of Curiosities, (London, Thames & Hudson Ltd) (2002). 
McAleese, K., The Reinterment of the Thule Inuit Burials and Associated Artifacts – IdCr-14 Rose Island, 
Saglek Bay, Labrador, (1998), Études Inuit/Inuit Studies, 41-52. 
McAndrew, C. / O'Hagan, J., Export Restrictions, Tax Incentives and the National Artistic Patrimony, 
(2000), Trinity Economics Papers. 
McClellan, A., Inventing the Louvres. Art, Politics and the Origins of the Modern Museum in eighteenth-
century Paris, (Cambridge) (1994). 
McGuire, T., African Antiquities removed during colonialism: restoring a stolen cultural legacy, (1990), 
Detroit College of Law Review, 31-69. 
Meijer, K., E 100 en de naoorlogse rechtspraak met betrekking tot onroerend goed, (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal 
Publishers) (2008). 
Meng, W., War, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public international law: Part: 4: Use of Force, 
War and Neutrality, Peace Treaties, (Amsterdam, North-Holland) (1982), 282-290. 
Mercillon, H., L'évolution du commerce mondial de l'art - Problématique de la France, in: Briat, M. (Ed.) 
International sales of works of art, (Paris, ICC Publishing) (1990), 49-56. 
Merryman, J.H., Two ways of thinking about cultural property, (1986), The American Journal of International 
Law, 831-853. 
Merryman, J.H., Cultural Property, International Trade and Human Rights, (2000a), Occasional Papers in 
Intellectual Property, New York, NY, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, n° 9. 
Merryman, J.H., Thinking about the Elgin marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law, (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International) (2000b). 
Merryman, J.H., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, (London, Kluwer Law International) (2002). 
Merryman, J.H., Cultural Property Internationalism, (2005), International Journal of Cultural Property, 11-39. 
Merryman, J.H., Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, (London, Kluwer Law International) (2007). 
Messer, K., Two sides of the same coin: the memory of the holocaust at war with a survivor, (1008), 
Northern Kentucky Law Review. 
Meyer, K.E., The plundered past; the traffic in art treasures, (Harmondsworth, Penguin) (1977). 
Meyer, T., Soft Law as Delegation (July 26). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1214422, (2008). 
Meyer-Landrut, J., Die Behandlung von staatlichen Archiven und Registraturen nach Völkerrecht, (1953), 
Archivalische Zeitschrift, 45-120. 
Michiels, F.C.M.A., Boekbespreking H.E. Bröring, Richtlijnen, (1994), M en R, 226-229. 
Michielsen, J., The 'Nazification' and 'Denazification' of the Courts in Belgium, Luxembourg and The 
Netherlands - The Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands courts and their reactions to 
occupation measures and measures from their governments returning form exile, (Maastricht, 
Universitaire Pers Maastricht) (2004). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   507 12-10-2009   12:09:38
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
508  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Miller, D.L.C.M., David W. &Cowe, Anne L., Restitution of Art and Cultural Objects: a Re-Assessment of 
the Role of Limitation, (2001), Art, Antiquity and Law, 1-17. 
Minister wint zaak Koenigs-collectie, de Volkskrant, 1 February 2007. 
Ministerie van Welzijn Volksgezondheid en Cultuur, Kiezen voor kwaliteit: beleidsnota over de 
toegankelijkheid en het behoud van het museale erfgoed, (1990). 
Moffett, J.P., Handbook of Tanganyika, (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer) (1958). 
Moriori (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved April 17, 2009 from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online. 
Mulheron, R., The class action in common law legal systems: a comparative perspective, (Oxford, Hart) 
(2004). 
Muller, E. / Schretlen, H., Betwist Bezit. De Stichting Nederlands Kunstbezit en de teruggave van 
roofkunst na 1945, (Zwolle, Waanders Uitgevers) (2002). 
Müller-Graff, Artikel 34, in: Groeben, H.v.d., et al. (Eds.), Kommentar zum EU-EG-Vertrag, Band 1, 
(Baden-Baden) (1997a). 
Müller-Graff, Artikel 36, in: Groeben, H.v.d., et al. (Eds.), Kommentar zum EU-EG-Vertrag, Band 1, 
(Baden-Baden) (1997b). 
Müller-Katzenburg, A., Internationale Standards im Kulturgüterverkehr und ihre Bedeutung für das Sach- 
und Kollisionsrecht, (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot) (1996). 
Müller-Katzenburg, A., Possession and Ownership of stolen or otherwise lost Works of Art, (2000), Art, 
Antiquity and Law, 105-123. 
Müller-Marsall, M. / Coenen, M., Deutschland 1949 bis 1999 - Band 1: April 1948 - 1953, (Sankt Augustin, 
Siegler Verlag) (2000). 
Mulongo, A.H., Return and restitution of cultural property, The Broken Hill skull: a Zambian case, (1992), 
Museum International, 103-104. 
Mulvaney, D.J., Reflections on the Murray Black Collection, (1989), Australian Natural History, 66-73. 
Mulvaney, D.J., Bones of Contention, (1990), The Bulletin, 104-107. 
Müntz, Les annexions de collections d’art ou de bibliothèques et leur role dans les relations internationales, 
principalement pendant la Révolution Française (Suite), (1895), Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 375–
393. 
Museen: Kontroverse um Kinderknochen, Der Spiegel, 2 February 2009, 125. 
Muséum de Rouen, Communiqué de presse: La Ville de Rouen restitue une tête maorie au gouvernement 
néo-zélandais (Available online at: http://rouen.blogs.com/tetemaori/files/dp_maori_07.pdf 
Last visited: 22 January 2008), (2007). 
Museumonderzoek Museale Verwervingen 1933-1940 en 1948-heden, (2009), Museumberichten. 
Museums Australia Inc, Continuous Cultures, Ongoing Responsibilities - Principles and guidelines for 
Australian museums working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural heritage, (2005). 
Museums Libraries and Archives Council Notice, UK Export Licensing for Cultural Goods - Procedures 
and guidance for exporters of works of art and other cultural goods, (2008). 
Nachenius, A.d.B., Letter to the Director of the Museum van Volkenkunde - subject: Maori head and Te 
Papa, 18 February. 
Nafziger, J.A.R., An Anthro-Apology for Managing the International Flow of Cultural Property, (1982), 
Houston Journal of International Law, 189-201. 
Nafziger, J.A.R., The New International Legal Framework for the Return, Restitution or Forfeiture of 
Cultural Property, (1983), NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 789. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   508 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  509   
 
  
Nahlik, S.E., Grabiez dziel sztuki, Rodowód zbrodni miedzynarodowej (The plunder of works of art. 
History of an international crime), (Wroclaw-Krakow, Ossolineum) (1958). 
Nahlik, S.E., La Protection Internationale des Biens Culturels en Cas de Conflit Armé, in: Recueil des cours 
= Collected courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, (1967), 61-163. 
Nahlik, S.E., International Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, (1976), The 
Hastings Law Review, 1069-1087. 
National Museum Directors' Conference, Too much stuff? Disposal from museums, (2003). 
National Museum Directors' Conference (NMDC), Spoliation of works of art during the Holocaust and 
World War II period: Statement of principles and proposed actions, (1998). 
Nelson, L.D.M., The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and Law-Making Conventions, (1972), The modern 
law review, 52-56. 
Nicholas, L., H., The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second 
World War, (London, Macmillan) (1995). 
Nicholas, L., H., World War II and the Displacement of Art and Cultural Property, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) 
The Spoils of War. World War II and Its Aftermath: the Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of 
Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 39-45. 
Nieskens-Isphording, Boekbeschouwing T. Hartlief, Ontbinding, (1996), RM Themis, 148-150. 
Niewyk, D.L., The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust, (New York, Columbia University Press) (2000). 
Nollkaemper, A., Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice 
of the ICTY, in: Boas, G. / Schabas, W. (Eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the 
Case Law of the ICTY, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,) (2003), 277-296. 
Nooter, G., Old kayaks in the Netherlands, (Leiden, Brill) (1971). 
Novick, P., The Holocaust in American life, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin) (1999). 
O’Donoghue, G., Precatory Executive Statements and Permissible Judicial Responses in the Context of 
Holocaust-Claims Litigation, (2006), Columbia Law Review, 1119-1164. 
Odendahl, K., Kulturgüterschutz. Entwicklung, Struktur und Dogmatik eines ebenenübergreifenden 
Normensystems, (Tübingen, Mohr) (2005). 
O'Keefe, P., Maoris claim head, (1992), International Journal of Cultural Property, 393. 
O'Keefe, P., The Draft Resolution on looted Jewish Cultural Property produced by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, (1999a), Art, Antiquity, and Law, 313-322. 
O'Keefe, P., The Meaning of 'Cultural Property' under the 1954 Hague Convention, (1999b), Netherlands 
International Law Review, 26-56. 
O'Keefe, P., Vilnius International Forum on Holocaust-Era Looted Cultural Assets, Vilnius, Lithuania 
(October 3-5, 2000), (conference report), (2001), International Journal of Cultural Property, 127-133. 
O'Keefe, P., European Developments in the Return of Nazi Looted Cultural Heritage, in: Häder, U. (Ed.) 
Museen im Zwielicht: Ankaufpolitik 1933-1945 (Kolloquium vom 11. und 12. Dezember 2001 in 
Köln.) Die eigene Geschichte: Provenienzforschung an deutschen Kunstmuseen im 
internationalen Vergleich (Tagung vom 20. bis 22. Februar 2002 in Hamburg), 
(Koordinierungsstelle für Kulturgutverluste Magdeburg) (2002), 263-275. 
Olmi, G., Science - Honour - Metapor: Italian Cabinets of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in: 
Impey, O. / MacGregor, A. (Eds.), The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, (London, House of Stratus) (2001), 1-18. 
O'Neill, M., Enlightenment museums: universal or merely global?, (2004), Museum and Society, 190-202. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   509 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
510  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Örücü, A.E., Methodology of comparative law, in: Smits, J.M. (Ed.) Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law, 
(Edward Elgar Publishing) (2006), 442-454. 
The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press: "spoliate, v." 
Oyer III, H.E., The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict - Is It Working? A Case Study: The Persian Gulf War Experience, (1999), Columbia - 
VLA Journal of Law & the Arts, 49-65. 
Paas, S. / Mertens, S. (Eds.), Beutekunst unter Napoleon: die "französische Schenkung" an Mainz 1803 
(Ausstellungskatalog im Landesmuseum Mainz, 25. Okt. 2003-14. März 2004), (Mainz, von 
Zabern) (2003). 
Paczensky, G.v. / Ganslmayr, H., Nofretete will nach Hause: Europe - Schatzhaus der "Dritten Welt", 
(München, C. Bertelsmann) (1984). 
Palmer, N., The Body as Property, (1996), Art, Antiquity and Law, 414-416. 
Palmer, N., Artists, Corpses, Property and Theft, (1998a), Art, Antiquity and Law, 299-305. 
Palmer, N., Conversion, trespass and title to art works, in: Palmer, N. (Ed.) The Recovery of Stolen Art: a 
collection of essays, (London, Kluwer Law International) (1998b). 
Palmer, N., Museums and the Holocaust: Law, Principles and Practice, (Leicester, Institute of Art and Law) 
(2000a). 
Palmer, N., Sending them Home: Some Observations on the Relocation Cultural Objects from UK 
Museums Collections, (2000b), Art, Antiquity & Law, 343-354. 
Palmer, N., Repatriation and Deaccessioning of Cultural Property: Reflections on the Resolution of Art 
Disputes, (2001), Current Legal Problems, 475-532. 
Palmer, N., Spoliation and Holocaust-related cultural objects - Legal and ethical models for the resolution 
of claims, (Moscow, (2005). 
Pancaldi, G., Museum, in: Heilbron, J.L. (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press) (2003), 550-551. 
Park, G.S., De-accessioning, (1985), Agmanz, 12-14. 
Parks, S.-L., Venus, (New York, Theatre Communication Group) (1997). 
Parsons, N., El Negro/ El Negre of Banyoles: Bushman from Bechuanaland, or Bechuana from 
Bushmanland?, (2000). 
Parsons, N. / Sebobye, A., Kelo, Missing persons and stolen bodies: the repatriation of 'El Negro' to 
Botswana, in: Fforde, C., et al. (Eds.), The dead and their possessions: repatriation in principle, 
policy and practice, (London, Routledge) (2002), 245-255. 
Partsch, K.J., Individuals in International Law, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of public 
international law: Part: 10: States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal law, 
(Amsterdam, North-Holland) (1987), 316-321. 
Pearce, S.M., On Collecting. An investigation into collecting in the European tradition, (London / New 
York, Routledge) (1995). 
Peers, L. / Brown, A.K., Museums and Source Communities. A Routledge Reader, (London, Routledge) 
(2003). 
Peresztegi, Á. Reparations for Holocaust-Era Human Rights Violations, (2005), Jewish Studies Yearbook, 135-
146. 
Petit, C., Lichaam en lijk als voorwerp van rechtsbetrekking, (1950), Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn, 428-435. 
Petropoulos, J., Art as Politics in the Third Reich, (University of North Carolina Press) (1996). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   510 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  511   
 
  
Petropoulos, J., German Laws and Directives bearing on the Appropriation of Cultural Property in the 
Third Reich, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The Spoils of War. World War II and Its Aftermath: the Loss, 
Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 106-
111. 
Petropoulos, J., Art Looting during the Third Reich: Overview with Recommendations for Further 
Research, (1999), Proceedings of the Washington Conference On Holocaust-Era Assets (Released by the Office 
of the Coordinator for the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, Washington, DC, April 1999) 
Available online at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heac4.pdf (last visited: 
August 30, 2006). 
Petropoulos, J., Evidence submitted to the Parliamentary Inquiry on Cultural Property, 'Return and Illicit 
Trade', (2000). 
Peya, A., Die Ausfuhr von Kulturgütern im nationalen und Gemeinschaftsrecht, (Frankfurt a.M., Lang) 
(2002). 
Phuong, C., The Protection of Iraqi Cultural Property, (2004), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
985-998. 
Pickering, M., Policy and Research Issues Affecting Human Remains in Australian Museum Collections, in: 
Lohman, J. / Goodnow, K. (Eds.), Human Remains and Museum Practice, (UNESCO) (2006), 
42-47. 
Piper, E. / Swamy, U. (Eds.), Gibt es wirklich eine Holocaust-Industrie? Zur Auseinandersetzung um 
Norman Finkelstein, (Zürich, Pendo) (2001). 
Pitlo, A., et al., Erfrecht, (Deventer, Gouda Quint) (1997). 
Plehwe, T.v., Verjährung des dinglichen Herausgabeanspruchs und Ersitzung in Fällen abhanden 
gekommener Kulturgüter - Zur Notwendigkeit einer Reform, (2001), Kunstrecht und Urheberrecht, 
49-61. 
Polak, J.M., Boekbespreking M.J.C. Leijten, Tuchtrecht getoetst, (1992), N.J.B., 1176-1178. 
Poli, J.-F., La protection des biens culturels meubles, (Paris, LGDJ) (1996). 
Polonsky, M. / Canat, J.-F., The British and French System of Control of the Export of Works of Art, 
(1996), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 5557-5591. 
Polsky, S., Down the K. Hole: Walter Benjamin's Destructive Land-surveying of History, in: Benjamin, A. 
(Ed.) Walter Benjamin and History, (London, Continuum) (2005), 69-87. 
Pomian, K., Collectors and Curiosities: Paris and Venice, 1500-1800, (Cambridge, Polity Press) (1990). 
Pomian, K., Der Ursprung des Museums. Vom Sammeln, (Berlin, Klaus Wagenbach) (1998). 
Pott, P.H. / Sutaarga, M.A., Arrangements concluded or in progress for the return of objects: the 
Netherlands-Indonesia, (1979), Museum (special issue on the "Return and Restitution of Cultural 
Property"), 38-42. 
Poulos, A., Helleni, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of 
Armed Conflict: An Historic Analysis, (2000), International Journal of Legal Information, 1-44. 
Price, D., The Human Tissue Act 2004, (2005), Modern Law Review, 798-821. 
Price III, H.M., Bones of Contention: Reburial of Human Remains under RS MO. 194.400-410, (1988), Mo. 
Archaeol. Soc. Q. 
Price III, H.M., Disputing the dead: U. S. law on aboriginal remains and grave goods, (Columbia, University 
of Missouri Press) (1991). 
Prince, M.v., Eine deutsche Frau im Innern Deutsch-Ostafrikas, (Berlin, Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Sohn) 
(1908). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   511 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
512  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Pritchard, S., Der völkerrechtliche Minderheitenschutz: historische und neuere Entwicklungen, (Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot) (2001). 
Prott, L.V., Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage, in: Recueil 
des cours de l´Académie de droit international de La Haye 217, (1989), 219-317. 
Prott, L.V., The History and Development of Processes for the Recovery of Cultural Heritage, (2008), Art 
Antiquity & Law, 175-198. 
Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P., Law and the Cultural Heritage. Volume I, Discovery and Excavation, (Abingdon, 
Professional Books) (1984). 
Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., Law and the cultural heritage (Vol. 3 - Movement), (London, Butterworths) 
(1989). 
Prott, L.V. / O'Keefe, P.J., "Cultural Heritage" or "Cultural Property", (1992), International Journal of Cultural 
Property, 307-320. 
Proudhon, V., Traité du domaine public ou de la distinction des biens considérés principalement par 
rapport au domaine public, (1833). 
Psychogiopoulou, E., The Cultural Mainstreaming Clause of Article 151(4) EC: Protection and Promotion 
of Cultural Diversity or Hidden Cultural Agenda?, (2006), European Law Journal, 575-592. 
Psychogiopoulou, E., The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law and Policies, (Leiden / 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff) (2008). 
Pullar, G.L., The Qikertarmiut and the Scientist: Fifty years of clashing world views, in: Bray, T.L. / Killion, 
T.W. (Eds.), Reckoning with the Dead: The Larsen Bay Repatriation and the Smithsonian 
Institute, (Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press) (1994), 15-25. 
Putten, W.G.H.M.v.d., Handboek Wet op de lijkbezorging, (Lelystad, Koninklijke Vermande) (1993). 
Quaedvlieg, A.A., The Netherlands: Introduction, in: Briat, M. / Freedberg, J., A. (Eds.), International Sales 
of Works of Art: International Art Trade and Law, (Deventer, Boston, Kluwer) (1991a), pp. 45-
52. 
Quaedvlieg, A.A., The Netherlands: National Report on Topic 1. Freedom of museums to sell, trade or 
otherwise dispose of objects of art in their collections, in: Briat, M. / Freedberg, J., A. (Eds.), 
International Sales of Works of Art: International Art Trade and Law, (Deventer, Boston, 
Kluwer) (1991b), 123-125. 
Quatremère de Quincy, Lettres à Mirande sur le déplacement des d'Art de l'Italie. 
Qureshi, S., Displaying Sara Baartman, the 'Hottentot Venus', (2004), History of Science, 233-257. 
Quynn, D.M., The Art Confiscations of the Napoléonic Wars, in: Merryman, J.H. (Ed.) Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer) (2007), 6-9. 
Raby, J., Exotica from Islam, in: Impey, O. / MacGregor, A. (Eds.), The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet 
of Curiosities in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, (London, House of Stratus) (2001), 
345-354. 
Ramjohn, M., Text, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts, (New York, Routledge) (2008). 
Range, D., Deaccessioning and Its Costs in the Holocaust Art Context: The United States and Great 
Britain, (2004), Texas International Law Journal, 665. 
Rapport omtrent prijzenverloop kunstwerken op kunstveilingen etc. opgesteld door drie deskundigen voor 
de Raad voor het Rechtsherstel, Afdeling Rechtspraak Amsterdam, (29 October 1947). 
Rascher, A.F.G., The Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (November 30 - December 3, 
1998), (1999), International Journal of Cultural Property, 338-343. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   512 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  513   
 
  
Ratliff, W., British-Hedjaz Agreement of 1916, in: Oslson, J.S. / Shadle, R. (Eds.), Historical Dictionary of 
the British Empire, (Westport, Greewood Publishing) (1996). 
Réau, L., Iconographie de l'art chrétien: Iconographie des saints (G-O), (Paris, Presses Universitaires de 
France) (1958). 
Redmond-Cooper, R., Handling Stolen Goods: The Civil Law, (British Museum, Transacting in Art: The 
Legal Pitfalls) (1996). 
Redmond-Cooper, R., Time Limits in Actions to Recover Stolen Art, in: Palmer, N. (Ed.) The Recovery of 
Stolen Art: a collection of essays, (London, Kluwer Law International) (1998). 
Redmond-Cooper, R., Time Limits in Art and Antiquity Claims (Part I), (1999), Art Antiquity & Law, 323-
346. 
Redmond-Cooper, R., Time Limits in Art and Antiquity Claims (Part II), (2000), Art Antiquity & Law, 185-
208. 
Reichelt, G., Die Vereinheitlichung des privatrechtlichen Kulturgüterschutzes nach dem UNIDROIT-
Vertragsentwurf, in: Dolzer, R., et al. (Eds.), Rechtsfragen des internationalen 
Kulturgüterschutzes, (Heidelberg, C.F. Müller) (1994), 67-81. 
Renold, M.-A., Editorial: The Adoption of the Terezin Declaration on June 30, 2009, (2009), Kunstrechtspiegel, 
62.  
"Repatriation" The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 17 
May 2007, available at: http://dictionary.oed.com. 
Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its eleventh session (E/CN.4/2006/79 - 22 March 2006), (2006), 
available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/119/46/PDF/G0611946.pdf?OpenEleme
nt. 
Reppas II, M.J., The Deflowering of the Parthenon: A Legal and Moral Analysis on why the Elgin Marbles 
must be Returned to Greece, (1999), The Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal, 911-998. 
Rijghard, R., Twist over aard rechtsherstel erven-Goudstikker, NRC Handelsblad, 7 February 2006, 8. 
Rijk retourneert Goudstikkers', NRC Handelsblad, 4 February 2006, 1 & 7. 
Riley, A.R., Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement under the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, (2002), Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 49-94. 
Rings, W., Raubgold aus Deutschland. Die 'Golddrehscheibe' Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, (Zürich, 
München) (1985). 
Roberts, G.K., What is comparative politics?, (London, Macmillan) (1972). 
Robertson, A.H., The Council of Europe - Its Structure, Functions and Achievements, (London, Stevens & 
Sons Limited) (1961). 
Roede, M.J., A History of Physical Anthropology in the Netherlands, in: Vermeulen, H. / Kommers, J. 
(Eds.), Tales from Academia: history of anthropology in the Netherlands, Part II, (Saarbrücken) 
(2002), 1033-1094. 
Rotter, M., Staat, in: Seidl-Hohenveldern, I. (Ed.) Lexikon des Rechts: Völkerrecht, (Neuwied, Luchterhand 
Verlag) (1982). 
Rousseau, J.-J., Du contrat social, (1762). 
The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report (The Stationery Office 2001) H.C. [Session 2000-1]; 112-II, 
available at: 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   513 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
514  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidan
ce/DH_4005937. 
Rudolf, W., Über den internationalen Schutz von Kulturgütern, in: Hailbronner, K., et al. (Eds.), Staat und 
Völkerrechtsordnung: Festschrift für Karl Doehring, (Berlin, Springer) (1989). 
Rudolph, S., Restitution von Kunstwerken aus jüdischem Besitz. Dingliche Herausgabeansprüche nach 
deutschem Recht, (De Gruyter) (2007). 
Rutherford, L. / Bone, S. (Eds.), Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, (London, Sweet & Maxwell) (1993). 
Ruzié, D., Entschädigung der Opfer von Enteignungen aufgrund antisemitischer Gesetzgebung während 
der Okkupationszeit in Frankreich, (2004), available at: 
www.civs.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Livret_Ruzie_avril_07.pdf (originally published in: Liberté, justice, 
tolérance - Mélanges en l'honneur du Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan (pp.1351-1370). 
Salomons, A.F., Reactie op "Dief wordt vaak geen eigenaar" van mr. A.C. van Schaik, (2005), WPNR 
(6639), 803-806. 
Salomons, A.F., Richtlijn 93/7/EEG betreffende de teruggave van cultuurgoederen die op onrechtmatige 
wijze buiten het grondgebied van een lidstaat zijn gebracht, in: Hartkamp, A.S., et al. (Eds.), De 
invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse privaatrecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2007), pp. 
153-177. 
San. (2005). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved December 14, 2005, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9065258. 
Sandholtz, W., Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder, (2008), European 
Journal of International Relations, 101-131. 
Savoy, B., "An Bildern schleppt ihr hin und her..." Restitutionen und Emotionen in historischer 
Perspektive, in: Koldehoff, S., et al. (Eds.), Kunst-Transfers - Thesen und Visionen zur 
Restitution von Kunstwerken, (München / Berlin, Deutscher Kunstverlag) (2009), 85-102. 
Schaik, A.C.v., Dief wordt vaak geen eigenaar, (2005), WPNR (6617), 289 - 290. 
Schaik, A.C.v., Naschrift. Verbergende dieven usucapiëren niet, (2005), WPNR (6639), 806-808. 
Scheicher, E., The Collection of Archduke Ferdinand II at Schloss Ambras: Its Purpose, Composition and 
Evolution, in: Impey, O. / MacGregor, A. (Eds.), The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of 
Curiosities in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, (London, House of Stratus) (2001), 37-
50. 
Schindler, D. / Toman, J., The laws of armed conflicts: a collection of conventions, resolutions, and other 
documents, (Leiden, Nijhoff) (2004). 
Schiphof, T., Schenkingen, erfstellingen en legaten, in: Beunen, A. (Ed.) Museumrechtwijzer: Juridisch 
handboek voor musea, (Amsterdam, Boekmanstichting) (2000), 204-217. 
Schivelbusch, W., Die Bibliothek von Löwen: eine Episode aus der Zeit der Weltkriege, (München, Hanser) 
(1988). 
Schleunes, K.A., The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939, (Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press) (1970). 
Schmahl, S., Die Kulturkompetenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, (Baden-Baden, Nomos) (1996). 
Schmidt, W., The Loss of German Artistic Property as a Result of World War II, in: Simpson, E. (Ed.) The 
Spoils of War. World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of 
Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997), 95-98. 
Schmitt, J.-M., La colonne Vendôme interdite de sortie du territoire, (2004), Le Journal des Arts. 
Schmoller, G.v., et al., Handbuch des Besatzungsrechts, (Tübingen) (1957). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   514 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  515   
 
  
Schnabel, G. / Tatzkow, M., Nazi Looted Art. Handbuch Kunstrestitution weltweit, (Berlin, Proprietas-
Verlag) (2007). 
Schönenberger, B., Restitution von Kulturgut. Anspruchsgrundlagen - Restitutionshindernisse - 
Entwicklung, (Bern, Stämpfli Verlag) (2009). 
Schoordijk, H., C.F., De Goudstikker-Zaak: Regels van privaatrecht zijn door het beheersinstituut nooit 
toegepast, zo eenvoudig is het, (2006), Nederlands Juristenblad, 743-748. 
Schorlemer, S.v., Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz: Ansätze zur Prävention im Frieden sowie im 
bewaffneten Konflikt, (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot) (1992). 
Schorlemer, S.v., Der internationale Schutz von Kulturgütern gegen Umwelteinflüsse - Vom kurativen zum 
präventiven Kulturgüterschutz, in: Fechner, F.G., et al. (Eds.), Prinzipien des 
Kulturgüterschutzes. Ansätze im deutschen, europäischen, und internationalen Recht, (Berlin) 
(1996), 225-256. 
Schorlemer, S.v., Stolen art, in: German Yearbook of International Law, (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot) 
(1998), 317-343. 
Schrage, E.J.H., De Regelen der Kunst III, (Amsterdam / Den Haag, Russell Advocaten) (2007). 
Schulze, D., Die Restitution von Kunstwerken zur Völkerrechtlichen Dimension der 
Restitutionsresolutionen der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, (Bremen, Herbert 
Ganslmayr) (1983). 
Schwarz, W., Rückerstattung nach den Gesetzen der Alliierten Mächte. Die Wiedergutmachung 
nationalsozialistischen Unrechts durch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bd. I. ), (München) 
(1974). 
Schwarze, J., Der Schutz nationalen Kulturguts im europäischen Binnenmarkt, (1994), JZ, 111-117. 
Seferiades, S., La question du repatriement des Marbres d'Elgin considérée plus spécialement au point de 
vue du Droit des Gens, (1932), Revue de droit international, 51-78. 
Segobye, A., Missing persons, stolen bodies and issues of patrimony: the El Negro story, (2002), Pula: 
Botswana Journal of African Studies (Special Issue: 'El Negro and the Hottentot Venus: Issues of Repatriation'), 
14-18. 
Seidemann, R.M., Time for a Change? The Kennewick Man Case and its implications for the future of the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, (2003), West Virginia Law Review, 149-
176. 
Seidemann, R.M., Bones of Contention: A comparative examination of law governing human remains from 
archaeological contexts in formerly colonial countries, (2004), Louisiana Law Review, 545-587. 
Seligman, T.K., The Murals of Teotihuacán: a Case Study of Negotiated Restitution, (Albuquerque, NM, 
University of New Mexico Press) (1999). 
Selle, C.v. / Szchunke, U., Ein Weg, wo kein Wille ist?, in: Osteuropa - 56. Jahrgangsheft, (2006), 383-392. 
Shaw, M., N., International Law, (Cambridge, University Press) (2003). 
Shaw, M., N., International Law, (Cambridge, University Press) (2008). 
Shek, T., Can Dust Remain Dust? English Law and Indigenous Human Remains, (2000), Art, Antiquity and 
Law, 265-293. 
Shelbourn, C., Bringing the Skeletons out of the Closet? The Law and Human Remains in Art, Archaeology 
and Museum Collections, (2006), Art Antiquity and Law, 179-198. 
Shyllon, F., The Right to a Cultural Past: African Viewpoints, in: Institute of Art and Law (Ed.) Cultural 
Rights and Wrongs. A collection of essays in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Paris/ London, IAL & UNESCO Publishing) (1998), 
103-119. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   515 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
516  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Shyllon, F., The Nigerian and African Experience on Looting and Trafficking in Cultural Objects, in: 
Hoffmann, B.T. (Ed.) Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 
University Press) (2006), 137-144. 
Siehr, K., Manuscript of the Quedlinburg Cathedral back in Germany, (1992a), International Journal of Cultural 
Property, 215-217. 
Siehr, K., Preliminary Draft Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
(approved by the UNIDROIT Study Group on the International Protection of Cultural Property 
at its Third Session on 26 January 1990), (1992b), International Journal of Cultural Property, 252-256. 
Siehr, K., The UNIDROIT Draft Convention on International Protection of Cultural Property, (1992c), 
International Journal of Cultural Property, 321-330. 
Siehr, K., International Art Trade and the Law, (Academie de droit international) (1993). 
Siehr, K., Chronicles, (1998), International Journal of Cultural Property, 272-282. 
Siehr, K., Herausgabe gestohlener Kunst, in: Schmid, N. / Ackermann, J.-B. (Eds.), Wiedererlangung 
widerrechtlich entzogener Vermögenswerte mit Instrumenten des Straf-, Zivil-, Vollstreckungs- 
und internationalen Rechts, (Zürich, Schulthess Juristische Medien) (1999), 1-17. 
Siehr, K., Verjährt ein Anspruch auf Herausgabe des Eigentums? - Deutsches Verjährungsrecht vor 
englischem Gericht, in: Carl, M., H. & Güttler, Herbert, & Siehr, Kurt (Ed.) Kunstdiebstahl vor 
Gericht: City of Gotha v. Sotheby's Cobert finance S.A., (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) (2001), 53-
75. 
Siehr, K.G., Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends Toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural 
Objects, (2005), Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1067-1096. 
Siehr, K.G., The Beautiful one has come - to return. The Return of the Bust of Nefertiti from Berlin to 
Cairo, in: Merryman, J.H. (Ed.) Imperialism, art and restitution, (2006), 114-134. 
Simpson, E., The Spoils of War - World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance and Recovery 
of Cultural Property, (New York, Harry N. Abrams) (1997). 
Simpson, J.A. / Weiner, E.S.C. (Eds.), The Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford, Clarendon Press) (1989). 
Simpson, M., Museums and Repatriation: An Account of Contested Items in Museum Collections in the 
UK, with Comparative Material from Other Countries, (London) (1997). 
Simpson, M.G., Making Representations: Museums in the Post-colonial Era, (London, Routledge) (1996). 
Sjouke, P.S., Het behoud van cultuurgoederen: twee werelden, twee visies (The Preservation of Cultural 
Property, Two Worlds, Two Views), (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri) (1999). 
Sjouke, P.S., Wet tot behoud van cultuurbezit / P.S. Sjouke, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2007). 
Smyth, C., Hugh, Repatriation of Art from the Collecting Point in Munich after World War II, (Maarssen / 
The Hague, Gary Schwartz / SDU Publisher) (1988). 
Snijders, H.J. / Rank-Berenschot, E.B., Goederenrecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2007). 
Snijders, M.Y. / Meier, G.J., Nederlands Burgerlijk Procesrecht, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2002). 
Sorbara, J.-G., Le domaine public mobilier au regard du code général de la propriété des personnes 
publiques, (2007), AJDA, 619. 
Specht, J., The Australian Museum and the return of artefacts to Pacific Island countries, (1979), Museum 
(special issue on the "Return and Restitution of Cultural Property"), 28-30. 
Specht, J., Book review: Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural 
Objects, (2008), International Journal of Cultural Property, 447-451. 
Stake, R.E., The Art of Case Study Research, (Thousand Oaks, Sage) (1995). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   516 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  517   
 
  
Stapp, D.C. / Longenecker, J.G., Reclaiming the Ancient One: addressing the conflicts between American 
Indians and archaeologists over protection of cultural places, in: Smith, C. / Wobst, M.H. (Eds.), 
Indigenous archaeologies: decolonising theory and practice., (London, Routledge) (2005), 171-
186. 
Steckel, R., et al., The Scientific Value of Human Remains in studying the Global History of Health, in: 
Lohman, J. / Goodnow, K. (Eds.), Human Remains and Museum Practice, (UNESCO) (2006), 
60-70. 
Steel, P., Close to the bone, (2004), Museums Journal, 22-25. 
Stengel Freiherr von, K., Die Rechtsverhältnisse der deutschen Schutzgebiete, (1901). 
Steur, J.C.v.d., Grenzen van rechtsobjecten - Een onderzoek naar de grenzen van objecten van 
eigendomsrechten en intellectuele eigendomsrechten, (Kluwer) (2003). 
Stone, L., Introduction: Theoretical Implications of New Directions in Anthropological Kinship, in: Stone, 
L. (Ed.) New directions in anthropological kinship, (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield) (2001), 2-20. 
Strebel, H., Die Haager Konvention zum Schutze der Kulturgüter im Falle eines bewaffneten Konfliktes 
vom 14. Mai 1954, (1955/56), Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 35-75. 
Strother, Z.S., Display of the Body Hottentot, in: Lindfors, B. (Ed.) Africans on stage: studies in 
ethnological show business, (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press) (1999), 1-61. 
Stuers, V.E.L.d., Holland op zijn smalst, (1873), De Gids. 
Stuurgroep Evaluatie Dualisering Gemeentebestuur, Aangelegd om in vrijheid samen te werken - 
dualisering: bijsturing geboden (Rapport van de Stuurgroep Evaluatie Dualisering 
Gemeentebestuur, (2004). 
Sumner, I. / Warendorf, H.C.S., Inheritance law legislation of the Netherlands: a translation of Book 4 of 
the Dutch Civil Code, procedural provisions and private international law legislation, (Antwerp, 
Intersentia) (2005). 
Szasz, P., International Norm-Making, in: Weiss, E.B. (Ed.) Environmental Change and International Law: 
New Challenges and Dimensions, (UN University Press) (1992), 41-70. 
Tanzania (2008). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved May 16, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, available at: http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-37594. 
Taylor, R.E., Amino Acid Composition and Stable Carbon Isotope Values on Kennewick Skeleton Bone. 
Attachment B, in: Report on the DNA Testing Results of the Kennewick Human Remains from 
Columbia Park, Kennewick, Washington, (Washington, D.C., National Park Service) (2001). 
Te Herekiekie, H., The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa) and the Repatriation of 
Köiwi Tangata (Maori and Moriori skeletal remains) and Toi Moko (Mummified Maori Tattooed 
Heads), (2008), International Journal of Cultural Property, 405-406. 
Te Puni, J. / Nesus, C., Letter to the Director of the Museum van Volkenkunde - subject: Maori ancestral 
remains, 30 June. 
Thalheimer, S., Der Genter Altar, (München, Beck) (1967). 
The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Repatriation of Human Remains and Te Papa - 
Background Paper for Overseas Institutions. 
The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Working Group on Human Remains - Submission by 
The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, (2001). 
The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Letter to Steven Engelsman with the subject 
"Repatriation - Human Remains", 16 September. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   517 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
518  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
The National Monuments Council, New Legislation for National Heritage Resources - Celebrating our 
achievements and redressing past inequities, available at: 
http://www.nationalmonuments.co.za/e.htm. 
Thomas, D.H., The skull wars: Kennewick man, archaeology, and the Battle for Native American identity, 
(New York, Basic Books) (2000). 
Thomason, D., Rolling Back History: The UN and the Right to Cultural Property, (1990), Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, 47-96. 
Thonke, C., Hitlers langer Schatten. Der mühevolle Weg zur Entschädigung der NS-Opfer, (Wien) (2004). 
Thorn, B., Internationaler Kulturgüterschutz nach der UNIDROIT-Konvention, (Berlin, Walter de 
Gruyter) (2005). 
Thornberry, P., Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, (Manchester University Press) (2002). 
Thornton, R., Repatriation as healing the wounds of the trauma of history: cases of Native Americans in the 
United States of America, in: Fforde, C., et al. (Eds.), The dead and their possessions: repatriation 
in principle, policy and practice, (London, Routledge) (2002), 17-24. 
Thürer, Self-Determination (Addendum), in: Bernhardt, R. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(EPIL), (Amsterdam, North-Holland) (2000), 364-374. 
Timmer, P.M.Y. / Gubbels, G.J., Niets gaat verloren: twintig jaar selectie en afstoting uit Nederlandse 
museale collecties, (Amsterdam, Instituut Collectie Nederland, Boekmanstudies) (2007). 
Tobias, P.V., Saartje Baartman: her life, her remains, and the negotiations for their repatriation from France 
to South Africa, (2002), South African Journal of Science, 107-110. 
Toman, J., The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, (Dartmouth, UNESCO 
Publishing) (1996). 
Toorop terug naar Zeeuws Museum, de Volkskrant, 28 November 2008. 
Torsen, M.A., National Reactions to Cultural Property Looting in Nazi Germany: A Window on Individual 
Effort and International Disarray, (2005), available at: http://www.ejcl.org/94/art94-1.html. 
Trienens, H.J., Landscape with Smokestacks: The Case of the Allegedly Plundered Degas, (Northwestern 
University) (2000). 
Trope, J., F. / Echo-Hawk, W., R., The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: 
Background and Legislative History, in: Mihesuah, D., A. (Ed.) Repatriation Reader: Who owns 
American Indian Remains?, (Lincoln/ London, University of Nebraska Press) (2000), 123-168. 
Tsosie, R., Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural Values, 
(1999), Arizona State Law Journal, 583-677. 
Tupara, N., “Sacred Places” to the Maori, (2000), Heritage New Zealand Magazine. 
Turnbull, P., Ramsay's Regime: The Australian Museum and the procurement of Aboriginal Bodies, (1991), 
Aboriginal history, 108-121. 
Turner, C.G.I., What is Lost with Skeletal Reburial? I. Adaptation, (1986), Quarterly Review of Archaeology, 1-2. 
Turner, M.I., The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During World War II, (1999), Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 1511 - 1548. 
Turner, S., Das Restitutionsrecht des Staates nach illegaler Ausfuhr von Kulturgütern: Eigentumsordnung 
und völkerrechtliche Zuordnung, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) (2002). 
Twining, E., A Chief's Skull returned to His People, (1954), Times British Colonial Review. 
Uhl, A.-K., Der Handel mit Kunstwerken im europäischen Binnenmarkt: freier Warenverkehr versus 
nationaler Kulturgutschutz, (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot) (1993). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   518 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  519   
 
  
UNESCO, Information Kit on the Restitution of Cultural Property, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001394/139407eb.pdf. 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: Explanatory Report prepared by 
the UNIDROIT Secretariat, (2001), available at: 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-
explanatoryreport-e.pdf. 
Van der Ploeg volgt advies commissie. Oorlogskunst uit rijksbezit naar erven, NRC Handelsblad, 18 April 
2002. 
Vane, C. (Ed.), Memoirs And Correspondence Of Viscount Castlereagh (X), (London) (1852). 
Vattel, The law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of 
Nations and of Sovereigns (Available online at: http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/vatt-
309.htm Last visited 14 May 2008), (1758). 
Veen, G.A.v.d., Openbare zaken: betekenis van het aloude publiek domein na vestiging van het primaat van 
het publiekrecht, (Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink) (1997). 
Velten, A.A.v., Juridische verwikkelingen rond de voormalige collectie Goudstikker (I), (2006a), Weekblad 
voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 233-243. 
Velten, A.A.v., Juridische verwikkelingen rond de voormalige collectie Goudstikker (II), (2006b), Weekblad 
voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 257-265. 
Veraart, W., Ontrechting en rechtsherstel in Nederland en Frankrijk in de jaren van bezetting en 
wederopbouw, (Kluwer) (2005). 
Verdross, Entstehungsweisen und Geltungsgrund des universellen völkerrechtlichen Gewohnheitsrechts, 
(1969), Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 635-653. 
The Vermillion Accord on Human Remains, adopted by the South Dakota WAC Inter-Congress in 1989. 
Vernon, C., Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, (1994), Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 435-479. 
Verslag Ethische Commissie van de SVCN d.d. 3 april 2003 (on file with the author). 
Versteden, C.J.N., et al., De gemeentewet en haar toepassing, (Deventer, Kluwer) (2008). 
Villiger, M.E., Customary international law and treaties: a study of their interactions and interrelations with 
special consideration of the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties, (Dordrecht & Boston, 
M. Nijhoff) (1985). 
Visscher, C.d., La protection internationale des objets d'art et des monuments historiques, (1935), Revue des 
droits international et de législation comparée, 32-74. 
Vitrano, V.J., Comments: Protecting cultural objects in an internal border-free EC: The EC Directive and 
Regulation for the Protection and Return of Cultural Objects., (1994), Fordham international law 
journal, 1164-1200. 
Vlies, I.C.v.d., et al., Kunst, recht en beleid, (Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers) (2009). 
Vliet, L.P.W.v., The Boundaries of Property Rights: Netherlands National Report 2006, vol. 11.1, (2007), 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (available online at: http://www.ejcl.org/111/art111-20.doc Last 
visited: 14 November 2007. 
Vloten, F.v., Von Ihrem Freund Jan Toorop - Toorop, Domburg en de zaak Flersheim, (2001), Zeeuws 
Tijdschrift, 41-58. 
Vogt, H., Die Kunstbeschlagnahmen im Zeitalter Napoleons, (Göttingen) (1956). 
Vrdoljak, A.P., International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press) (2006). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   519 12-10-2009   12:09:39
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
520  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Vrdoljak, A.P., Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in: Francioni, F. / Scheinin, M. (Eds.), Cultural 
Human Rights, (Leiden / Boston, Martinus Nijhoff) (2008), 41-78. 
Vries, W.d., The "Sonderstab Musik" of the "Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg" 1940-1945, (1995), Spoils 
of War, 4-7. 
Waidacher, F., Vom Wert der Museen., (2000), Museologie Online, 1-20. 
Walker, P.L., Bioarchaeological Ethics: A Historical Perspective on the Value of Human Remains, in: 
Katzenberg, M.A. / Saunders, S.R. (Eds.), Biological Anthropology of the Human Skeleton, 
(New York, Wiley-Liss) (2000), 3-39. 
Walter, B., Rückführung von Kulturgut im internationalen Recht, (Bremen, Herbert Ganslmayr) (1988). 
Watkins, J., et al., Accountability: Responsibilities of archeologists to other interest groups, in: Lynott, M. / 
Wylie, A. (Eds.), Ethics in American archaeology: Challenges for the 1990s., (Washington D.C., 
Society of American Archaeology) (1995), 33-37. 
Watson, N., The Repatriation of Indigenous Remains in the United States of America and Australia: a 
comparative analysis, (2003), Australian Indigenous Law Reporter, 33-44. 
Watt, R., J., Museums as Sacred Repositories for Human Remains: The New Zealand Experience, (1989), 
Bulletin of the Conference of Museum Anthropologists, 97-111. 
Watt, R., J., Museums can never own the remains of other people but they can care for them, (1995), 
University of British Columbia Law Review, 77-89. 
Weber, M., Unveräußerliches Kulturgut im nationalen und internationalen Rechtsverkehr, (Berlin, de 
Gruyter) (2002). 
Webster, C., The foreign policy of Castlereagh. Part: I: 1812-1815: Britain and the reconstruction of 
Europe, (London, Bell) (1947-1950). 
Weeks, J. / Bott, V., Scoping Survey of Historic Human Remains in English Museums undertaken on 
behalf of the Ministerial Working Group on Human Remains, (London) (2003). 
Weidner, A., Schriften zum Kulturgüterschutz - Kulturgüter als res extra commercium im internationalen 
Sachenrecht, (Berlin, de Gruyter) (2001). 
Weil, S., The American legal response to the problem of Holocaust art, (1999), Art, Antiquity and Law, 285-
300. 
Weil, S., A deaccession reader, (Washington D.C., American Association of Museums) (2000). 
Weiss, L.J., The Role of Museums in sustaining the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, (2007), Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal, 837-875. 
Wescher, P., Kunstraub unter Napoleon, (Berlin, Mann) (1976). 
Westermarck, E., The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, (London, Macmillan and Co.) (1926). 
Wetz, F.J. / Tag, B. (Eds.), Schöne neue Körperwelten, (Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta) (2001). 
Wilske, S., International Law and the Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of Spoils?, (1998), UCLA 
Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, 223-282. 
Wilson, D.M., The British Museum: purpose and politics, (London, British Museum Publications Ltd) 
(1989). 
Wilson, G.G., Changing Field of International Law, (1939), The American Journal of International Law, 337-338. 
Winans, E.V., The Head of the King: Museums and the Path to Resistance, (1994), Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 221-241. 
Wolfrum, R., Reparation for internationally wrongful acts, in: Bindschedler, R.L. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of 
public international law: Part: 10: States, responsibility of states, international law and municipal 
law, (Amsterdam, North-Holland) (1987), 352-353. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   520 12-10-2009   12:09:39
|  521   
 
  
Wood, J.N., The Authorities of the American Art museum, in: Cuno, J.B., et al. (Eds.), Whose muse?: art 
museums and the public trust, (Princeton University Pres) (2003), 103-128. 
Woodhead, C., C., A Debate which crosses all Borders: the Repatriation of Human Remains: more than just 
a legal Question, (2002), Art, Antiquity and Law, 317-347. 
Woodhead, C., C., Summary of the report of the working group on human remains in museum collections, 
(2004), Art Antiquity & Law, 178-201. 
Wyss, M.P., Kultur als eine Dimension der Völkerrechtsordnung: vom Kulturgüterschutz zur 
internationalen kulturellen Kooperation, (Zürich, Schulthess) (1992). 
Wyss, M.P., Kulturgüter: Ziel und Opfer der Gewalt - Kriegsrechtliche Schutzbestimmungen und neue 
Initiativen der UNESCO, (1994), Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre 
Sonderorganisationen, 92-97. 
Yeide, N.H., et al., The AAM Guide to Provenance Research, (Washington, DC, American Association of 
Museums) (2001). 
Zamoyski, A., Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, (Harper Collins) (2007). 
Zelig, J.M., Recovering Iraq's Cultural Property: what can be done to prevent Illicit Trafficking, (2005), 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 289-323. 
Ziff, B.H. / Pratima, V.R., Borrowed Power, (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press) 
(1997). 
Zimmerman, L., Anthropology and Responses to the Reburial Issue, in: Zimmerman, L. / Biolsi, T. (Eds.), 
Indians and Anthropologists: Vine Deloria Jr. and the Critique of Anthropology, (Tuscon, 
University of Arizona Press) (1997), 92-112. 
Zimmerman, L.J. / Clinton, R.N., Case Notes: Kennewick Man and Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act Woes, (1999), International Journal of Cultural Property, 212-228. 
Zingeris, E.R., Looted Jewish cultural property (Doc. 8563 6 ) - Report Committee on Culture and 
Education, (1999). 
Zschiedrich, K. / Hoffmann, E., Völkerrechtlicher Schutz der Kulturgüter vor Wegnahme und illegaler 
Verbringung ins Ausland, (1984), Neue Justiz, 86-91. 
 
International treaties and soft law instruments 
 
Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, No. 4961, signed at Luxembourg, on 10 
September 1952, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/10/12/00018584.pdf. 
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Government of Spain and the Government of the 
Republic of Venezuela. No. 14947, signed at Madrid on 28 June 1973, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/28/36/00055772.pdf (last visited: 13 July 2009). 
Agreement on German External Debts, February 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 445, 449. 
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899. 
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 
14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 215), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html_eng/fulltext.htm. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   521 12-10-2009   12:09:40
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
522  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, 17 November 2003, UNESCO 
Doc.MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14. 
Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (Vertrag über die 
Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Mächten), signed at Bonn, 
26 May 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1955 II. 29.03.1954, No 3), p. 61-67. 
Die Westfälischen Friedensverträge vom 24. Oktober 1648. Texte und Übersetzungen. Anonymous English 
Translation from 1710 (available online at: http://www.pax-
westphalica.de/ipmipo/pdf/m_1710en-treatys.pdf Last visited 14 May 2008), (2004). 
European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, signed at Delphi, 23 June 1985 (ETS No. 
119). 
Final Act and Annex of the Paris Conference on Reparations, 14 January 1946, Annex: Resolution on the 
Subject of Restitution, 40. 
Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation 
or Control, 8 Dep't St. Bull. 21 (1943). 
Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
signed at The Hague, 14 May 1954 (249 UNTS 358), available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html_eng/fulltext.htm. 
Resolution 4. 413, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twelfth session. 
Roerich Pact: Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Montevideo, April, 
15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, TS No. 899, 167 LNTS 279, available at: 
http://www.roerich.org/Roerich_Pact.html. 
Russian Memoir from 1815, which included a memoir of Lord Castlereagh), Public Record Office (United 
Kingdom), CAB 154/1&2, p. 263 (PRO pagination). 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 26 March 1999. 
Security Council Resolution 1483, P 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
Treaty of Cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Providing for 
the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/22/37/00043809.pdf (last visited: 23 July 2008). 
Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia, and Ukraine signed at Riga, 18 March 1921. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declaration and Special 
Declaration signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919, available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles, June 28th, 
1919, available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/menu.htm. 
Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary; Protocol and Declaration signed 
at Trianon, 4 June 1920. 
Treaty on the Protection of Movable Property of Historic Value, April 15, 1935, OASTS 28. 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970 (823 U.N.T.S. 231). 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects signed at Rome, 24 June 1995. 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, (A/RES/61/295). 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts. Done at 
Vienna on 8 April 1983. 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   522 12-10-2009   12:09:40
|  523   
 
  
Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated 
Art, (1998). 
 
EC Legislation  
 
Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from 
the territory of a Member State, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 974/2001 of 14 May 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 on the 
export of cultural goods. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods, OJ No L 395, 
31.12.1992, p. 1, as amended by information of 27 March 1993, OJ No L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 80. 
 
National legislation and policy instruments 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Besluit herindeling ministeriële taak recuperatie weggevoerde kunstvoorwerpen, Stb. 233, (1988) available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004319/geldigheidsdatum_20-05-2009. 
Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen tot instelling van een tijdelijk 
adviescollege, 20 September 1999, WJZ/1999/31477 (8091). 
Besluit van de Staatssecretaris van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, dr. F. van der Ploeg, houdende 
Instelling van een commissie die adviseert over verzoeken om teruggave van cultuurgoederen 
waarover de oorspronkelijke eigenaar door omstandigheden die direct verband hielden met het 
nazi-regime onvrijwillig het bezit heeft verloren en die zich thans in bezit van de Staat der 
Nederlanden bevinden (Besluit adviescommissie restitutieverzoeken cultuurgoederen en Tweede 
Wereldoorlog) WJZ/2001/45374(8123) 16 November 2001. 
Brief en regeringsnotitie inzake restitutie en recuperatie van cultuurgoederen (letter and government 
memorandum in respect of restitution and recuperation of items of cultural value) d.d. 14 juli 
2000, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 25 839, nr. 16. 
Commissie Ekkart, Herkomst Gezoch / Origins Unknown: Eindrapportage Commissie Ekkart / Final 
Report Ekkart Committee, (Zwolle, Waanders in cooperation with Bureau Herkomst Gezocht) 
(2006). 
De staatssecretaris van Onderwijs Cultuur en Wetenschap, Brief aan de voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal. Onderwerp: Informatie over het verzoek tot teruggave Goudstikker 
collectie. (Bijlage(n): Kopie advies en onderzoeksrapport Restitutiecommissie inzake 
Goudstikker) Kenmerk: DCE/06/5640, (2006). 
Decree issued by the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science, F. van der Ploeg, establishing a 
committee to advise the government on the restitution of items of cultural value of which the 
original owners involuntarily lost possession due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi 
regime and which are currently in the possession of the State of the Netherlands, 16 November 
2001 (Reference WJZ/2001/45374(8123), (2001). 
Deviezenorder 1945, Stb. F 222. 
Ekkart Committee, Aanbevelingen restitutie kunstwerken van kunsthandelaren, (2003). 
Ekkart Committee, Begeleidingscommissie Herkomst Gezocht - Slotaanbevelingen, (2004). 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   523 12-10-2009   12:09:40
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
524  |  C O N T E S T E D  C U L T U R A L  P R O P E R T Y  
 
 
Ekkart Committee (Supervisory committee Origins Unknown/Herkomst Gezocht), Origins Unknown: 
Recommendations for the restitution of works of art, (2001). 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, Rapport van het proefonderzoek naar de herkomst van de onder 
beheer van het Rijk gebleven uit Duitsland gerecupereerde kunstwerken / Report on the pilot 
study into the provenance of works of art recovered from Germany and currently under the 
custodianship of the State of the Netherlands, (1998). 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, Deelrapportage 1 (oktober 1999) / Interim report I (October 
1999), (1999). 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, Deelrapportage 2 (oktober 2000) / Interim report II (October 
2000), (2000). 
Herkomst Gezocht / Origins Unknown, Deelrapportage 3 (februari 2002) / Interim report III (February 
2002), (2002). 
KB 17 juni 1987 nr 7, Stb. 344 houdende schorsing van het besluit van de gemeenteraad van Hilversum tot 
verkoop van een schilderij. 
Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 5 December 2003 in respect of the second series of recommendations 
made by the Ekkart Commitee, parliamentary year 2003-2004, 25 839, nr. 34. 
Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 8 March 2005 in respect of the final recommendations made by the Ekkart 
Commitee, parliamentary year 2004-2005, 25 839, nr. 36. 
Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 16 November 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart 
Commitee, parliamentary year 2001-2002, 25 839, nr. 27. 
Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 20 May 1998, parliamentary year 1997-1998, 25013, nr. 23. 
Letter [in Dutch] from the State Secretary for Education, Culture and Science to the House of 
Representatives dated 29 June 2001 in respect of recommendations made by the Ekkart 
Commitee, parliamentary year 2000-2001, 25 839, nr. 26. 
Raad voor Cultuur, Advies Actualisering WBC-lijst (kenmerk wbc-2000.1785/2), 13 december, (2001), 
available at: http://www.minocw.nl/documenten/brief2k-2002-doc-8733b.pdf (last visited 8 
April 2009). 
Wet van 1 februari 1984 houdende vaststelling van de Wet tot behoud van cultuurbezit, Stb. 1984, 49. 
Wet van 1 mei 1925 tot herziening in het algemeen belang van bij erfstelling of legaat gemaakte bedingen, 
Stb. 174. 
Wet van 13 juli 2002 tot vaststelling van de Wet inzake het beheer van de financiën van het Rijk, Stb. 2002, 
414. 
Wet van 18 April 2002 tot vaststelling van de Invoeringswet Boek 4 en Titel 3 van Boek 7 van het nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek, vierde gedeelte (aanpassing van de wetgeving aan het nieuwe erfrecht en 
schenkingsrecht), Stb. 230. 
Wet van 21 december 2006 tot wijziging van de Monumentenwet 1988 en enkele andere wetten ten 
behoeve van de archeologische monumentenzorg mede in verband met de implementatie van het 
Verdrag van Valletta (Wet op de archeologische monumentenzorg), Stb. 2007, 42. 
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British Military Government Law No. 59 on the "Restitution of Identifiable Property to Victims of Nazi 
Oppression', Control Commission for Germany. B.E. Law No. 59: "Restitution of Identifiable 
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Imperial War Museum Act 1920 (c.16), London: The Stationery Office. 
Merseyside Museums and Galleries Order 1986, (as amended by the Museums and Galleries Act 1992), 
London: The Stationery Office. 
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Stat. 43 Eliz. 1, c4 (1601). 
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Samenvatting 
 Dit proefschrift biedt een overzicht van, en reflectie op, de huidige wetten en 
rechtspraktijk op het gebied van de teruggave van cultuurbezit uit publieke 
(museum)collecties. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van twee casussen: de teruggave van nazi 
roofkunst en de omgang met menselijke resten.  
Er is hernieuwde belangstelling voor kunst die door de nazi’s werd geroofd, of die 
door vervolgden onder druk moest worden afgestaan. Terwijl in de jaren ’60 de 
teruggave van geroofde kunst algemeen als afgerond werd beschouwd, is in de laatste 
twintig jaar een toegenomen gevoeligheid ontstaan voor de complexe gevolgen van de 
massale roof van kunstwerken door de nazi’s. In Nederland heeft met name de zaak 
Goudstikker veel aandacht gekregen.  
De teruggave van menselijke resten kreeg een belangrijk impuls door het aannemen 
van een federale wet in de VS in 1990. De wet geeft inheemse stammen het recht om 
menselijke resten en grafobjecten terug te eisen uit musea die geld van de federale 
overheid ontvangen. De meeste claims richten zich sindsdien op de teruggave van 
menselijke resten uit voormalige koloniën. Het is echter niet de eerste keer dat 
vertegenwoordigers van voormalige koloniën proberen objecten uit Westerse 
verzamelingen terug te halen. Na de dekolonisatie in de jaren ’70 was er een eerste golf 
van pogingen om cultuurgoederen terug te eisen, zonder veel succes. Gezien de 
toename van internationale claims voor de teruggave van menselijke resten was het geen 
verrassing dat ook Nederlandse musea zulke verzoeken ontvingen. In 1998 ontving het 
Westfries Museum een verzoek tot teruggave van menselijke resten. Een verzoek aan 
het Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde resulteerde in 2005 in de overdracht van een Māori 
hoofd aan het Nieuw-Zeelands Te Papa museum. 
Om een integraal beeld van het juridisch kader van de restitutieproblematiek te 
schetsen strekt het onderzoek zich uit over verschillende rechtsgebieden. Ten eerste is 
een analyse gemaakt van het internationaal publieksrecht met betrekking tot 
cultuurgoederen. Na het uiteenzetten van de bestaande rechtsregels met betrekking tot 
de bescherming en teruggave van cultuurgoederen, worden de twee casussen nader 
geïntroduceerd en in de context van reeds bestaande rechtsregels geplaatst. Hierop volgt 
een analyse van relevante ‘soft law’ instrumenten, zoals resoluties, declaraties en 
‘principles’, die in reactie op de toename van restitutieverzoeken zijn aangenomen. Het 
beeld wordt gecompleteerd door aandacht te besteden aan de nationale wetgeving: 
verzoeken tot teruggave komen niet in een rechtsvrije ruimte terecht en juist objecten in 
museale collecties genieten vaak bijzondere bescherming als cultuurgoederen. Daarom 
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worden de nationale systemen van Nederland, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
nader bestudeerd. De keuze voor deze jurisdicties berust op het samenspel van een 
aantal aspecten. Historisch gezien hebben deze landen een rol gespeeld in de opkomst 
van het instituut museum als zodanig. Verder hebben deze landen in het verleden grote 
koloniale rijken overzee bezeten, en waren zij betrokken in de Tweede Wereldoorlog en 
de gevolgen daarvan. De keuze voor deze landen berust echter niet alleen op deze 
overeenkomsten maar houdt ook rekening met de verschillende nationale benaderingen 
van de bescherming van cultuurgoederen. De kern van het onderzoek ligt in de analyse 
van de nationale (rechts-)praktijken: hoe wordt in de drie jurisdicties gereageerd op de 
toename in verzoeken tot restitutie? Welke oplossingen worden gevolgd en wat kan 
hieruit worden afgeleid voor de restitutieproblematiek meer in het algemeen?  
De resultaten van het onderzoek worden hieronder per hoofdstuk samengevat. Ze 
worden gevolgd door gerichte aanbevelingen.  
HO O F D S T UK  1:  VA N  IUS  P RAE DA E  (R E C H T  O P  PL UN D E R IN G)  N A A R  E RF G O E D  V A N  D E  
M E N S H E I D:  TOE N E M E N D E  B ES C H E R M I N G  V A N  C U L T U UR G O E D E R E N  A L S  
C U L T U U R B E Z IT ,  M E T  R E C H T  O P  T E R UG G A V E ,  M A A R  ZO N D ER  T E R U G W E R K E N D E  
K RA C H T 
 De analyse van het internationaal publieksrecht met betrekking tot de 
bescherming en teruggave van cultuurgoederen maakt duidelijk dat sinds de oudheid, 
toen het buitmaken van cultuurgoed gebruikelijk was, zich een geleidelijke ontwikkeling 
heeft voltrokken naar het erkennen van de verplichting tot teruggave van 
cultuurgoederen.  
Deze verplichting is het verst voortgeschreden in de context van gewapende 
conflicten. Het van kracht worden in 1900 van het verbod op het buitmaken van 
cultuurgoederen, zoals vastgesteld in de Haagse Conventie van 1899, vormt een 
waterscheiding op dit terrein. Tegelijk met de invoering van het verbod op het 
buitmaken van cultuurgoederen ontstond de verplichting tot teruggave van objecten die 
in weerwil van het verbod geroofd werden. Deze verplichting vloeit voort uit de 
combinatie van het algemene beginsel van aansprakelijkheid voor schendingen van het 
internationaal recht en de voorrang van fysieke teruggave boven andere vormen van 
rechtsherstel. Dit primaat van fysieke teruggave, in het bijzonder met betrekking tot 
cultuurgoederen, werd bekrachtigd tijdens het proces van rechtsherstel na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. Bij het uitbreken van de oorlog in 1939 waren het verbod op roofbuit en 
de verplichting tot teruggave van cultuurgoederen niet alleen van toepassing op de 
aangesloten staten van de Haagse Conventies van 1899 en 1907, zij golden inmiddels 
evenzeer als regels van het gewoonterecht. Waar fysieke teruggave van cultuurgoederen 
niet mogelijk was als gevolg van vernietiging of vermissing, werden financiële 
vergoedingen toegekend. De nadruk op fysieke teruggave en de betaling van 
schadevergoeding waar fysieke teruggave niet mogelijk was, bleef niet beperkt tot de 
relatie tussen Duitsland en de voormalig bezette landen (externe restitutie). De 
geallieerde machten weken af van het beginsel van nationale soevereiniteit, waarnaar het 
Thesis_Lubina_v2.pdf   534 12-10-2009   12:09:41
S U M M A R Y  I N  D U T C H  |  535   
 
  
binnenlands rechtsherstel uitsluitend een zaak van de Duitse staat zou zijn geweest. In 
plaats daarvan kozen zij ervoor om de reikwijdte en de uitgangspunten van teruggave 
ook toe te passen op de vormen van rechtsontzetting die hadden plaatsgevonden binnen 
Duitsland na de machtsovername door de nazi’s in 1933 (interne restitutie). Het beleid 
voor de interne restitutie werd gebaseerd op de aanname dat alle transacties in de 
periode 1933-1945 waarbij een persoon was betrokken die behoorde tot een vervolgde 
groepering, beschouwd moesten worden als een confiscatie. Bovendien bestond dit 
recht op restitutie onafhankelijk van enig belang van een koper die een goed eventueel te 
goeder trouw verkregen zou kunnen hebben. Door zo te handelen schiepen zij nieuwe 
afdwingbare grondslagen voor de teruggave van cultuurgoederen 
In 1954, toen het rechtsherstel in de nasleep van WO II nog volop gaande was, 
maakte de bescherming van cultuurgoederen tijdens gewapende conflicten een sprong 
voorwaarts als gevolg van de aanvaarding van de Haagse Conventie van 1954 met het 
bijbehorende (Eerste) Protocol. Dit Protocol is bijzonder relevant gebleken voor de 
teruggave van cultureel eigendom: in de eerste plaats omdat de verplichting tot 
teruggave van cultuurgoederen zich uitstrekt tot alle aangesloten staten in plaats van 
alleen tot de agressor-staat. Ten tweede is de verplichting niet beperkt tot een 
gelimiteerd tijdsbestek. Tenslotte geldt de verplichting los van enige rechtstitel die in de 
tussentijd zou kunnen zijn verworven door een bonafide koper. In dit opzicht 
weerspiegelt de verplichting van het Protocol de kenmerken van het restitutiebeleid van 
na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hoewel de Haagse Conventie van 1954 minder vergaand is 
waar het er om gaat aangesloten staten te verplichten tot restitutie van cultuurbezit, 
moet het belang ervan voor de bescherming van cultuurgoederen niet onderschat 
worden: als eerste internationaal verdrag dat uitdrukkelijk en uitsluitend gericht is op 
bescherming van cultuurgoederen droeg de Haagse Conventie van 1954 in algemene zin 
bij aan het gewicht dat werd gehecht aan de bescherming van cultuurbezit.  
De bescherming van cultuurgoederen in vredestijd middels internationale verdragen 
begon in 1970 met de vaststelling van het UNESCO verdrag. In 1995 volgde het 
UNIDROIT verdrag. Het UNESCO verdrag 1970 verplicht aangesloten staten tot het 
teruggeven van cultuurgoederen die zijn gestolen uit een museum of een 
overeenkomstige instelling. Het verdrag is echter niet ‘self-executive’: het kan niet uit 
zichzelf nieuwe afdwingbare rechten op restitutie creëren maar is afhankelijke van de 
nationale implementaties. Het UNIDROIT verdrag 1995 is daarentegen wel ‘self-
executive’ en schiep nieuwe afdwingbare rechten, die zowel betrekking hebben op 
teruggave van gestolen cultuurgoederen als op illegaal uitgevoerde cultuurgoederen. De 
voorzieningen die betrekking hebben op de terugkeer van illegaal geëxporteerde 
cultuurgoederen zijn echter aanzienlijk beperkter van reikwijdte dan de toegekende 
rechten op teruggave van gestolen cultuurgoederen. Landen blijven terughoudend waar 
het gaat om het erkennen van verplichtingen om illegaal uitgevoerde cultuurgoederen 
terug te geven. Deze terughoudendheid impliceert echter niet dat staten weinig belang 
stellen in de bescherming van het cultuurbezit van een ander land. Hoewel staten zich 
ervan onthouden vreemd publiekrecht toe te passen, blijkt uit mijn analyse algemene 
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steun voor het teruggeven van cultuurgoederen aan landen van waaruit zij illegaal 
geëxporteerd zijn. Meer specifiek is een tendens te ontwaren om dergelijke zaken, voor 
zover het vreemde nationale rechtsstelsel het toelaat, te benaderen als zaken van 
gestolen cultuurbezit. 
Hoewel de teruggave van objecten die in het koloniale tijdperk werden weggehaald 
strikt genomen behoort tot de categorie van objecten die in “vredestijd” werden 
weggehaald, heb ik bijzondere aandacht besteed aan de vraag of er mogelijk specifieke 
rechten bestaan die voorzien in teruggave van zulke goederen. De reden daarvoor is 
tweeledig: ten eerste heeft een aantal auteurs betoogd dat er een regel van 
gewoonterecht is ontstaan die voorziet in de teruggave van cultuurgoederen die zijn 
weggehaald uit voormalige koloniën. De tweede reden is gelegen in het feit dat het 
tijdperk waarin de grondslagen werden gelegd van de huidige collecties van menselijke 
resten samenvalt met het hoogtepunt van de Europese dominantie over de rest van de 
wereld.  
Deze analyse betrof de vraag of en in hoeverre een rechtsbasis voor teruggave 
voortkomt uit de resoluties die zijn aangenomen binnen het kader van de UNESCO en 
uit de regels voor statenopvolging. Ook ben ik nagegaan of de omstandigheden van 
verwerving tijdens het koloniale tijdperk het mogelijk maken deze als een schending van 
internationaal recht te bestempelen. Geen van deze drie benaderingen heeft echter 
geleid tot de identificatie van een rechtsbasis die voorziet in teruggave van 
cultuurgoederen die zijn weggehaald in de koloniale tijd.  
De laatste constellatie die ik onderzocht betreft de teruggave van cultuurgoederen 
aan een volk. Onderzoek leverde een aantal gevallen op waarin cultuurgoederen aan een 
volk werden geretourneerd. Deze gevallen van teruggave waren echter indirect van aard 
en vallen niet los te zien van het meer omvattende rechtsherstel dat volgde op de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog. Er is onvoldoende grond om te spreken van een algemene 
verplichting om cultuurgoederen aan een volk terug te geven.  
Mijn conclusie luidt dat uitdrukkelijke rechten op teruggave van cultuurgoederen nog 
steeds in hoofdzaak beperkt blijven tot situaties die kunnen worden omschreven als 
gewapende conflicten. Waar het niet gaat om gewapende conflicten zijn landen 
terughoudend bij het scheppen of erkennen van rechtsgrondslagen voor teruggave van 
cultuurgoederen. Dit betekent overigens niet dat zij ook gekant zijn tegen het 
teruggeven van cultuurgoederen.  
HO O F D S T UK  2:  HE T  O N T S T A A N  V A N  D E  H UI D I G E  C L A I M S  EN  H UN  P O S I T I E  V A N U I T  
J U R I D I S C H  P E R S P E C T I E F  
 De bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 1 aangaande de terughoudendheid van staten om 
nieuwe rechtsgronden te creëren voor de teruggave van cultuurgoederen, hoewel zij 
sympathie koesteren voor de achterliggende motieven, gaan evenzeer op voor de twee 
detailonderzoeken naar nazi roofkunst en de omgang met menselijke resten in publieke 
collecties.  
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Nazi roofkunst 
Met betrekking tot nazi roofkunst blijkt dat huidige claims niet langer gebaseerd 
kunnen worden op de naoorlogse rechten op terugvordering. Hoewel goederen nog 
steeds teruggevorderd kunnen worden waar het een geschil tussen staten betreft, kunnen 
natuurlijke (of rechts)personen zich niet langer beroepen op de rechten zoals die 
bestonden, dan wel gecreëerd werden na afloop van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, vanwege 
het verstrijken van de aanvraagtermijnen. Wat betreft de beginselen, resoluties, en 
verklaringen die zijn aangenomen vanaf het einde van de jaren ‘90, met de Washington 
Principles van 1998 als voornaamste, bleek dat deze instrumenten, vanwege hun 
karakter van ‘soft law’, geen nieuwe afdwingbare rechten hebben voortgebracht. De 
relevantie van deze instrumenten ligt dan ook voornamelijk in het toegenomen 
bewustzijn van dit probleem en in het voorbereiden van oplossingen op nationaal 
niveau. De voorgestelde oplossingen zijn te verdelen in twee categorieën. De eerste 
categorie bestaat uit oplossingen die gericht zijn op het doen herleven van al bestaande 
wettelijke normen. Oplossingen in deze categorie zijn erop gericht de obstakels aan te 
pakken die maken dat eisers zich niet kunnen baseren op eerder in het leven geroepen 
wettelijke grondslagen. Zij richten zich in het bijzonder op juridische instituten als 
verkrijgende en vernietigende verjaring, en verwerving te goeder trouw. De ‘soft-law’ 
instrumenten deden geen suggesties voor invoering van nieuwe rechtsgrondslagen voor 
de teruggave van nazi roofkunst. Ook oplossingen die gericht zijn op het wegnemen van 
obstakels als het verbod op het verwijderen of exporteren van objecten uit publieke 
collecties horen in deze categorie thuis. De tweede categorie van oplossingen richt zich 
niet op de verbetering van de positie van eisers door juridische hervormingen, maar 
draagt andere middelen aan om teruggave te bewerkstelligen. Deze zijn in hoofdzaak 
gericht op het beschikbaar maken van bewijsmateriaal ten faveure van indieners van 
claims, en bepleiten het instellen van alternatieve manieren om geschillen te beslechten. 
Wat dit laatste betreft, bepleiten de instrumenten de instelling van bijzondere 
commissies die claims kunnen onderzoeken en zich richten op “redelijke en billijke” 
oplossingen in plaats van een puur positiefrechtelijke aanpak. De vraag wat onder 
“redelijk en billijk” verstaan moet worden, wordt echter niet verder uitgewerkt. In 
vergelijking met de bevindingen in het eerste hoofdstuk valt op dat niet wordt 
gerefereerd aan de mogelijkheid dat (de erfgenamen van) de voormalige eigenaar in de 
periode na WO II financiële compensatie zouden kunnen hebben ontvangen.  
Menselijke resten 
Wat betreft de omgang met menselijke resten blijkt uit het onderzoek dat deze 
voldoen aan de kenmerken van het begrip van cultuurgoederen en dus vallen onder de 
reikwijdte van internationale verdragen inzake de bescherming van cultuurbezit. Als 
gevolg daarvan zijn menselijke resten, met name in publieke collecties, beschermd tegen 
diefstal en illegale uitvoer, wat inhoudt dat zij na een mogelijke verwijdering 
teruggebracht dienen te worden naar het land van herkomst. Het bestaande kader van 
het internationaal publiekrecht voorziet daarentegen niet in rechten op het terugeisen 
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van menselijke resten die in het verleden verworven zijn. Deze bevinding gaat ook op 
voor de ‘soft law’ instrumenten die zijn aangenomen door de verschillende fora die zich 
hebben uitgesproken over de teruggave van menselijke resten. Dit ondanks het feit dat 
de instrumenten meer belang toekennen aan teruggave van menselijke resten dan aan de 
teruggave van cultuurgoederen in het algemeen. Het Vermillion Accord on Human 
Remains, de Mataatua Declaratie en de ICOM Code komen niet in aanmerking als 
normstellende instrumenten omdat zij niet zijn aangenomen op basis van bevoegdheden 
tot verdragssluiting, terwijl aan de VN-verklaring over de rechten van inheemse volken 
als verklaring de van staten vereiste wil om gebonden te worden ontbreekt. Alleen de 
UNESCO-conventie voor de bescherming van immaterieel cultureel erfgoed zou in een 
dergelijk recht kunnen hebben voorzien. De relevantie van deze instrumenten is dan 
ook met name gelegen in het doen van suggesties voor toekomstige regelgeving. De 
instrumenten suggereren twee wegen waarlangs op nationaal niveau oplossingen kunnen 
worden gezocht: een zuiver wettelijke, die bestaat uit het scheppen van afdwingbare 
rechten zoals in de Amerikaanse federale wet ter bescherming en teruggave van graven 
van ‘native Americans’ (NAGPRA), en alternatieve oplossingen in de vorm van billijke 
en transparante besluitvormingsprocedures en het beschikbaar maken van (betere) 
inventarissen van collecties.  
Overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen nazi roofkunst en menselijke resten 
Een vergelijking van door internationale fora aangedragen oplossingen voor recente 
claims op teruggave van nazi roofkunst en van menselijke resten leert het volgende. Alle 
instrumenten hebben gemeen dat zij geen nieuwe grondslag voor teruggave scheppen. 
Als ‘soft law’ instrumenten reiken zij alleen waarden, ideeën en voorstellen aan die zich 
tot (inter)nationale rechtsregels zouden kunnen ontwikkelen. Voorstellen met betrekking 
tot menselijke resten benadrukken vooral het belang van het scheppen van nieuwe 
rechtsgrondslagen voor teruggave, terwijl bij nazi roofkunst de nadruk ligt op 
alternatieve manieren om geschillen te beslechten. Waar instrumenten met betrekking to 
nazi roofkunst wetswijzigingen voorstellen gaat het niet om de creatie van nieuwe 
rechtsgronden. Dit betekent dat zowel alternatieve oplossingen als wetswijzigingen op 
het gebied van nazi roofkunst zoeken naar wegen om de juridische gevolgen van het 
verstrijken van de tijd ongedaan te maken. Deze bevinding is begrijpelijk tegen de 
achtergrond van het internationaal publieksrecht: gezien de verreikende inspanningen 
om geroofde kunstwerken terug te geven tijdens de periode van rechtsherstel na WO II, 
inclusief de invoering van nieuwe wettelijke normen, vinden huidige pogingen een goed 
uitgangspunt in deze rechten op teruggave uit het verleden. Met betrekking tot 
menselijke resten ontbreekt een vergelijkbare grondslag, zodat de roep om het creëren 
van nieuwe juridische grondslagen voor teruggave de enige optie is.  
HO O F D S T UK  3:  HE T  J U R I D I S C H  K A D E R 
 Uit onderzoek van de nationale regels die op publieke collecties van toepassing 
zijn, blijkt dat teruggave onmogelijk gemaakt kan worden door regelgeving die voorziet 
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in de bescherming van voorwerpen in publieke collecties. Zowel het Britse als het 
Franse bestel worden gekenmerkt door een algemeen verbod op de vervreemding van 
goederen uit publieke collecties. Waar echter het verbod op vervreemding van objecten 
uit Engelse nationale collecties voortkomt uit beperkingen van de rechten van de 
eigenaar, geldt voor de Franse situatie dat het verbod voortkomt uit res extra commercium 
wetgeving (wetgeving waarna bepaalde goederen aan het handelsverkeer worden 
onttrokken). Anders gesteld, terwijl het verbod voor Engelse nationale collecties 
voortkomt uit externe factoren, komt de onmogelijkheid om goederen over te dragen uit 
Franse publieke collecties voort uit een inherente karakteristiek van die goederen zelf. 
Dit inherente kenmerk is echter niet absoluut. Het kan worden gewijzigd middels de 
procedure tot declassificatie die nu is geregeld in Artikel L. 451-5 CHC (de Franse wet 
op het cultureel erfgoed). Dit betekent dat vanuit theoretisch oogpunt het verbod op 
vervreemding van goederen uit Franse publieke collecties minder absoluut is dan zijn 
Britse tegenhanger, omdat het voorziet in een achterdeur om dit verbod ongedaan te 
maken. Uit praktisch oogpunt is het Franse verbod even ongenaakbaar als het Britse, 
omdat alle maatregelen ontbreken voor de invoering van Artikel L. 451-5 CHC. Wat 
betreft de Nederlandse situatie blijkt uit analyse dat er geen formele beperkingen bestaan 
voor het vervreemden van objecten uit publieke collecties. In een beperkt aantal 
gevallen moet vervreemding echter als uitgesloten beschouwd worden op grond van 
toepassing van de criteria van de Wet tot behoud cultuurbezit in analogie.  
Behalve de algemene verbodsbepalingen met betrekking tot vervreemding kunnen er 
nog verdergaande beperkingen van kracht zijn voor goederen die door schenking of  
legaat verworven zijn. De onmogelijkheid om deze objecten te declassificeren komt 
voort uit de wens om toekomstige schenkingen en legaten niet te ontmoedigen. 
Opnieuw is het Franse stelsel het meest drastisch in het beperken van de mogelijkheden 
om een object te vervreemden. Volgens Artikel L. 451-7 CHC kunnen objecten die zijn 
verworven via schenking of legaat niet gedeclassificeerd worden. Terwijl Nederland en 
Engeland ook beperkingen kennen voor het vervreemden van objecten die door 
schenking of bij legaat zijn verworven, komen bijkomstige beperkingen van de 
mogelijkheden van vervreemding alleen dan voor wanneer deze expliciet of impliciet 
zijn gestipuleerd in de termen van de schenking of de testamentaire beschikking. Maar 
zelfs wanneer de bepalingen van de overeenkomst vervreemding uitsluiten of beperken, 
maken zij een voorgenomen teruggave niet volstrekt onmogelijk. Wat betreft Engeland 
is het mogelijk dat de statuten van de desbetreffende nationale collectie uitdrukkelijk 
voorzien in de mogelijkheid om afspraken baserend op ‘trusts’ en andere niet-statutaire 
verplichtingen terzijde te schuiven. In Nederland voorziet de zogenaamde imprévision-
regeling van Artikel 6:258 Burgerlijk Wetboek in de mogelijkheid om gedoneerde 
objecten te vervreemden. Wat betreft testamentaire bepalingen heeft de hervorming van 
het erfrecht in 2003 de mogelijkheden verruimd om toepasselijke bepalingen te wijzigen, 
met inbegrip van beperkingen op het vervreemden.  
Op het gebied van uitvoerbepalingen heeft het onderzoek geen onoverkomelijke 
obstakels aan het licht gebracht voor teruggave van een object aan een buitenlandse 
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eiser. Uitvoerbepalingen kunnen teruggave wel binden aan administratieve vereisten 
zoals een exportvergunning.  
HO O F D S T UK  4:  NA T I O N A L E  O P L O S S I N G EN  I N Z A K E  T E R UG G A V E  V A N  N A Z I  R O O F K UN S T  
E N  M E N S EL I JK E  R E S T E N ;  V E R S C H I L L E N D E  E T H I S C H E  P R E MI S S E N  
 Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de verschillende nationale benaderingen, 
die geen wetswijziging blijken in te houden maar uiteenlopende oplossingen aandragen 
binnen het bestaande juridische kader. De enige uitzondering hierop is de Britse 
“Human Tissue Act” van 2004, met name sectie 47, waardoor het vervreemden van 
menselijke resten uit nationale collecties mogelijk wordt gemaakt, iets wat voorheen was 
uitgesloten door de regelgeving.  
Waar het gaat om teruggave van nazi roofkunst ligt het zwaartepunt bij de instelling 
van commissies die over individuele gevallen adviseren. Deze commissies blijken in 
meerdere of mindere mate het beleid inzake teruggave van kunstwerken vorm te geven. 
In het Verenigd Koninkrijk werkt het Spoliation Advisory Panel op basis van zeer 
algemene richtlijnen; de Nederlandse Restitutie Commissie werkt op basis van 
aanzienlijk nauwer omschreven beleidslijnen, maar blijkt toch aanzienlijke invloed te 
hebben op de uitvoering van het beleid.  
Er zijn geen adviescommissies ingesteld om aanbevelingen te doen over de teruggave 
van menselijke resten. Oplossingen op dit terrein gaan uit van niet-bindende richtlijnen 
voor de besluitvorming binnen museale instellingen. Hoewel deze richtlijnen 
benadrukken dat menselijke resten met respect en gevoel behandeld moeten worden, 
pleiten zij niet noodzakelijkerwijs voor teruggave. In plaats daarvan bieden zij 
handreikingen voor een goedgeïnformeerde en afgewogen besluitvorming.  
De instelling van adviescommissies voor nazi roofkunst enerzijds, en niet-bindende 
richtlijnen voor teruggave van menselijke resten anderzijds, lijkt te zijn voortgekomen 
uit een verschillende onderliggende visie op beide zaken. De teruggave van nazi 
roofkunst wordt beschouwd als een ethische imperatief die in abstracto geldig is. Deze 
imperatief strekt zich zelfs uit tot gevallen waarin de eiser in het verleden al 
herstelbetaling heeft ontvangen. Een overeenkomstige in abstracto geldige imperatief tot 
teruggave van menselijke resten wordt niet als zodanig gepercipieerd. Het loutere feit dat 
deze overblijfselen restanten zijn van ooit levende mensen wordt net zo min als de 
omstandigheden waarin deze resten zijn verworven beschouwd als een dwingende reden 
om ze terug te geven. In plaats daarvan wordt gekozen voor oplossingen die een 
optimaal besluitvormingsproces in specifieke gevallen mogelijk maken, zonder de balans 
bij voorbaat te laten doorslaan naar teruggave. Hoewel op deze twee gebieden sprake is 
van grote overeenkomsten voor wat betreft de noodzaak van sensibiliteit, herkenning en 
respect, gaan de huidige ontwikkelingen op het gebied van teruggave uit van 
verschillende ethische vooronderstellingen.  
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AA N B E V EL IN G EN 
1 .  HE R O P E N I N G  V A N  H E T  D E BA T  O V E R  D E  R ED E L I JK E  EN  B I L L I JK E  O M G A N G  M E T  
N A ZI  R OO FK UN S T  
 Nadat in de jaren ’70 en ’80 er nauwelijks aandacht bestond voor de kunstroof 
door de nazi’s, is men zich nu algemeen bewust van het feit dat er lang gehandeld is in 
kunst die door nazi’s was geroofd of onder druk verkocht zonder dat er aandacht werd 
besteed aan deze herkomst. Er is grondig onderzoek verricht naar de geschiedenis van 
kunstwerken en naar het lot van de eigenaren voor en tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 
maar de naoorlogse ontwikkelingen hebben verhoudingsgewijs weinig aandacht 
gekregen. In het huidige debat wordt te weinig aandacht besteed aan het gegeven dat na 
WO II regels zijn opgesteld voor financiële compensatie in gevallen waar fysieke 
teruggave onmogelijk was. Dit leidt tot een eenzijdige benadering. Hoewel men zou 
kunnen argumenteren dat het redelijk en billijk is dat kunstwerken altijd worden 
teruggegeven, ongeacht al ontvangen herstelbetalingen, mag dit niet zonder meer 
worden aangenomen maar dient dit onderwerp te zijn van een publiek debat waarin alle 
relevante aspecten, inclusief naoorlogse schadeloosstelling, worden meegewogen.  
Een deel van de verklaring voor deze eenzijdigheid kan worden gevonden in de wijze 
waarop tegenwoordig onderzoek naar de herkomst (‘provenance’) van kunstwerken 
wordt verricht. In het verleden werd de geschiedenis van een kunstwerk in de eerste 
plaats onderzocht om de authenticiteit van een werk te helpen vaststellen: in het ideale 
geval slaagde de onderzoeker er in een ononderbroken keten vast te stellen van de 
huidige eigenaar tot de kunstenaar zelf, als ultiem bewijs dat het werk door de 
kunstenaar eigenhandig was gemaakt. Tegenwoordig ligt de nadruk in 
herkomstonderzoek op het vaststellen van de lotgevallen van een kunstwerk in de jaren 
1933-1945. Ongeachte de grote deskundigheid van de onderzoekers kent het 
provenance onderzoek twee problematische aspecten: er is geen heldere methodologie, 
en onderzoek wordt meestal uitgevoerd op grond van een particulier belang. Als gevolg 
hiervan wordt in dit onderzoek niet genoeg aandacht besteed aan de naoorlogse 
geschiedenis: de bevinding dat een werk afkomstig is uit roof besluit het onderzoek. 
Mijn eerste aanbeveling luidt daarom het debat te heropenen over de vraag wat 
redelijk en billijk is en welke relevantie er moet worden toegekend aan al door de 
naoorlogse Duitse overheid betaalde financiële compensatie. Dit is natuurlijk niet alleen 
een taak voor onderzoekers van de herkomst van kunstwerken, maar vooral voor 
academici, de media en het openbaar debat. Het belang van zo’n debat ligt niet alleen in 
het voorkomen van een latere terugslag die de legitimiteit van beleid inzake teruggave 
zou aantasten, maar ook in het verbreden van het palet van mogelijke remedies. Een 
veelgeprezen maar zelden toegepaste oplossing bestaat eruit dat de eiser financieel 
schadeloos wordt gesteld terwijl het werk in de publieke collectie blijft, waar een 
bijschrift het publiek herinnert aan de geschiedenis van het werk en het lot van de 
voormalige eigenaren. Zulke bijschriften vormen een indringende herinnering aan de 
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gruwelen van het nazi-regime die ook zichtbaar zal blijven wanneer het debat over 
roofkunst is geluwd.  
a) Herziening van de 1998 ‘Washington Principles’ 
Om dit publieke debat te stimuleren, stel ik een herziening voor van de richtlijnen 
inzake door nazi’s geconfisqueerde kunst zoals neergelegd in de ‘Washington Principles’ 
van 1998. Deze ‘principles’ zijn het meest invloedrijke ‘soft law’ instrument op dit 
gebied; zij waren van doorslaggevende invloed op het beginnen van rechtszaken om 
kunstwerken uit publieke museumcollecties te laten teruggeven aan voormalige 
eigenaren of hun erfgenamen.  
De revisie van de ‘Washington Principles’ zou de volgende wijzigingen moeten 
omvatten. Ten eerste zou de titel moeten veranderen van ‘Washington Conference 
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art’ in ‘General Principles on Nazi-Spoliated Art’, om zo 
de huidige praktijk te codificeren, die zich niet beperkt tot kunstwerken die door de 
nazi’s zijn geconfisqueerd maar ook onvrijwillige verliezen omvat die beschouwd 
moeten worden als door het nazi regime bespoedigd. Ten tweede moeten de ‘principles’ 
betreffende documenten en archieven die informatie kunnen bevatten over nazi 
roofkunst ook van toepassing zijn op de naoorlogse processen van rechtsherstel; dit 
heeft ook betrekking op de middelen en het personeel die ter beschikking worden 
gesteld om de geschiedenis te ontsluiten. Ten derde zouden de ‘principles’ die vragen 
om een redelijke en billijke oplossing moeten oproepen tot een onvooringenomen 
afweging van de feiten en omstandigheden van individuele gevallen, daaronder begrepen 
ook de ontvangen herstelbetalingen uit het verleden.  
2.  ME N S EL I JK E  R E S T E N :  O P EN  D I AL OO G  EN  CO M M O N  S EN S E 
 Het onderzoek leidt op dit terrein niet tot specifieke aanbevelingen, aangezien de 
richtlijnen die in verschillende rechtsgebieden worden gehanteerd te uiteenlopend en te 
vaag zijn. De conclusie luidt daarom dat open dialoog en common sense de beste 
raadgevers zijn voor publieke collecties die worden geconfronteerd met claims tot 
teruggave van menselijke resten. Bij de behandeling van zulke claims is het belangrijk de 
eisers serieus te nemen en zich bewust te zijn van de relevantie van het hele proces, in 
plaats van de enkele beslissing of de menselijke resten al dan niet teruggegeven worden. 
Het ideaal is hierbij dat de eisers betrokken worden bij het opstellen van de criteria op 
basis waarvan besloten wordt. Zo wordt het proces een werkelijke dialoog en een 
leerproces voor beide partijen. Het handelen van publieke collecties zou niet mogen 
worden gemotiveerd door de angst om een stuk uit de collectie te verliezen, maar door 
de wens om meer te leren van de cultuur van de verzoekende partij. Hoewel het 
overdreven is te stellen dat een claim op teruggave bijdraagt aan de bescherming zoals 
bedoeld in het UNESCO verdrag ter bescherming van immaterieel cultureel erfgoed van 
2003, zal een dialoog met indieners van een claim ongetwijfeld bijdragen aan een grotere 
kennis van begrafenisceremonieën en uitvaartrituelen. Dit leerproces hoeft niet beperkt 
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te blijven tot de opvatting van de specifieke cultuur inzake de doden maar kan verder de 
vorm aannemen van toekomstige samenwerking in onderzoek en tentoonstellingen.  
3.  GE W E K T E  V ER W A CH T I N G EN  W A A R MA K EN  DO O R  T E R UG G A V E  M O G EL I JK  TE  M A K EN  
 Uit het onderzoek blijkt duidelijk dat er een kloof blijft bestaan tussen de 
oplossingen zoals voorgesteld in de ‘soft law’ instrumenten en de wettelijke 
mogelijkheden om deze oplossingen door te voeren. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk en Frankrijk, waar publieke collecties worden beschermd door een 
algemeen verbod om objecten te vervreemden. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft sectie 
47 van de Human Tissue Act van 2004 als uitzondering de teruggave van menselijke 
resten mogelijk gemaakt, maar vergelijkbare wetgeving die betrekking heeft op nazi 
roofkunst ontbreekt tot op de dag van vandaag. Als gevolg daarvan kunnen in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk aanbevelingen van het Spoliation Advisory Panel om 
cultuurgoederen terug te geven niet worden uitgevoerd. Alle hoop is op dit moment 
gevestigd op een initiatiefwet (Private Member’s bill), de Holocaust (Stolen Art) 
Restitution Bill, die bij afsluiting van deze studie nog niet definitief aangenomen was. 
Mocht deze wet niet worden aangenomen, dan wordt de Britse regering aanbevolen snel 
te handelen om ten langen leste wetgeving in te voeren die teruggave van nazi roofkunst 
mogelijk maakt.  
Wat Frankrijk betreft, heeft de voornaamste aanbeveling betrekking op de regeling 
voor declassificatie zoals ingevoerd onder de Wet op de Franse Musea van 2002. In 
onze context is de regeling in het bijzonder relevant voor de teruggave van menselijke 
resten uit collecties die zijn aangemerkt als Musée de France. Hij is minder toepasselijk 
voor nazi roofkunst omdat de werken die als zodanig zijn aangemerkt in de 
inventarisatie van de Musées Nationaux Récupération (MNR-collectie) geen eigendom zijn 
geworden van de musea waarin zij bewaard worden. Hoewel de invoering van een 
regeling voor declassificatie als zodanig geprezen verdient te worden, bleek uit het 
onderzoek dat deze procedure nog niet in praktijk is gebracht. Frankrijk dient dus te 
zorgen voor de implementatie van deze regeling door criteria op te stellen die teruggave 
van cultuurgoederen effectief mogelijk maken. Bovendien zou de Franse wetgever 
moeten overwegen het vervreemden van objecten die zijn verworven bij schenking of 
legaat te vergemakkelijken. Het categorische verbod hierop is buiten proportie. Een 
laatste aanbeveling betreft nazi roofkunst in Franse publieke collecties die geen deel 
uitmaken van de MNR-collectie. De huidige inspanningen zijn exclusief  gericht op de 
goederen die na de oorlog officieel zijn teruggevorderd door Frankrijk en nu deel 
uitmaken van de MNR-collectie en op objecten die nog steeds niet teruggevonden zijn. 
Het is echter voorstelbaar dat ook geroofde objecten in de Franse publieke collecties 
terechtgekomen zijn die niet tot een van deze categorieën behoren. Dit betekent, 
nogmaals, dat een effectieve regeling voor declassificatie onder de Franse wet op het 
cultureel erfgoed van kracht dient te worden.  
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4.  NE E M  D E  B E S C H E R M I N G  V A N  O B J E C T E N  I N  P U B L I EK E  C O L L E C T I E S  S E R I EU S  
 Voor Nederland gelden andere aanbevelingen. Omdat in dit land het beheer van 
publieke collecties liberaal is, bestaan er weinig problemen die betrekking hebben op het 
vervreemden van goederen uit publieke collecties. In tegenstelling tot het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk en Frankrijk zou Nederland juist moeten overwegen de bescherming van 
publieke collecties te versterken. De reikwijdte van de Wet tot Behoud Cultuurbezit is 
beperkt tot cultuurgoederen in privébezit. Voor publiek cultuurgoed geldt de wet slechts 
in analogie. In het licht van de Mondriaan-zaak en de toenemende druk op musea om 
zich als culturele ondernemers op te stellen, zou de Nederlandse wetgever moeten 
overwegen het toepassingsgebied van de Wet tot Behoud Cultuurbezit uit te breiden tot 
publiek cultuurbezit. Inspiratie zou kunnen worden gevonden in de recente 
veranderingen in de Duitse Wet tot voorkoming van de uitvoer van cultuurgoed, die 
sinds 2007 ook cultuurgoederen in publiek bezit omvat, en in het Vlaams 
Topstukkendecreet van 2003.  
Een tweede aanbeveling heeft betrekking op de adviescommissies in de 
museumsector, die bij ontstentenis van wetgeving een regulerende taak vervullen. Er is 
momenteel een aantal adviserende of ethische commissies actief, en uit het onderzoek is 
gebleken dat hun aanbevelingen ver uiteenlopen en elkaar soms zelfs tegenspreken. 
Aangezien de waarde van de adviezen van zulke commissies berust op hun moreel gezag 
zijn conflicterende adviezen onwenselijk. Ook betekent het bestaan van een veelheid aan 
commissies dat iedere commissie minder gevallen ter behandeling krijgt, en dus minder 
gelegenheid heeft om zijn oordelen te toetsen en te verfijnen. Het verdient daarom 
aanbeveling de ethische commissie en adviescommissies die actief zijn op het gebied van 
publieke museumcollecties in Nederland samen te voegen. 
Relevantie voor bescherming en teruggave van cultuurgoederen in het algemeen 
Het onderzoek naar deze twee specifieke casussen roept de vraag op of zij een meer 
algemene relevantie hebben, vooral voor objecten die zijn weggehaald in vredestijd, en 
dan met name voor het van kracht worden van het UNESCO verdrag 1970 en het 
UNIDROIT verdrag 1995. Dit omvat ook de cultuurgoederen die in het koloniale 
tijdperk zijn weggehaald.  
Als eerste kan worden vastgesteld dat de toegenomen aandacht voor nazi roofkunst 
en voor menselijke resten niet “de sluizen heeft opengezet” voor het teruggeven van alle 
betreffende goederen uit publieke collecties. Het is onjuist te concluderen dat teruggave 
van een bepaald aantal werken uit deze groepen zou kunnen leiden tot de verplichting 
om alles terug te geven, zoals door museumdirecties en conservatoren soms is beweerd. 
Maar de ontwikkelingen op de terreinen van nazi roofkunst en menselijke resten wijzen 
wel op een heroriëntatie die niet beperkt is tot een heroverweging van de wettigheid van 
een verwerving, maar die ook leidt tot een nieuwe afweging van de vraag in hoeverre de 
voortgezette aanwezigheid van objecten in een collectie nog gepast is.  
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Ten tweede: er is weinig tot geen kans op invoering van een internationaal bindend 
verdrag tot teruggave van cultuurgoederen die zijn verworven voorafgaand aan de 
regulering van de kunst- en antiekhandel in 1970. De aarzeling om nieuwe wettelijk 
afdwingbare rechten te scheppen viel al af te leiden uit de moeizame totstandkoming en 
ratificatie van het UNESCO verdrag 1970 en het UNIDROIT verdrag 1995. Zelfs in de 
verhoudingsgewijs goed afgebakende gevallen van nazi roofkunst en van menselijke 
resten is gebleken dat noch in de internationale fora, noch in nationale wetgeving er 
nieuwe afdwingbare rechten op teruggave zijn gecreëerd. Een afdwingbare regeling voor 
teruggave van cultuurgoederen meer in het algemeen is onvoorstelbaar: het onderwerp is 
te complex en te gevoelig om op nationaal of internationaal niveau in positieve 
rechtsregels te worden geformuleerd. De voormalige koloniale machten vermijden het 
geven van signalen die zouden kunnen suggereren dat hun koloniaal verleden onwettig 
is geweest, uit angst om zich bloot te stellen aan beschuldigingen door de internationale 
gemeenschap en om eventueel enorme bedragen aan herstelbetalingen te moeten 
spenderen.  
Enerzijds is dit te betreuren, omdat heldere juridische regelingen wettelijke zekerheid 
bieden. Anderzijds moet de functie van zulke regelingen niet worden overschat: de 
prognose dat er geen wettelijk bindend verdrag zal komen voor de teruggave van 
cultuurgoederen die zijn weggehaald voordat de UNESCO en UNIDROIT verdragen 
van kracht werden, betekent niet dat er geen cultuurgoederen teruggegeven zullen 
worden. Uit de bestudeerde casussen bleek het grote belang van alternatieve oplossingen 
als het instellen van adviescommissies, hulp bij het vergaren van bewijs, en concessies 
inzake de te hanteren bewijsstandaard. Zulke oplossingen, het resultaat van ‘soft law’, 
hebben bijgedragen aan een klimaat dat positiever staat tegenover teruggave. Het 
invoeren van ‘soft law’ moet niet als ineffectief van de hand worden gewezen als het 
gaat om teruggave van cultuurgoederen uit publieke collecties in het algemeen. 
Tenslotte laten de omgang met nazi roofkunst en met menselijke resten zien dat er 
veranderingen plaatsvinden in de ethiek van het verzamelen. Zelfs indien  
conservatoren, particuliere verzamelaars en kunsthandelaren weinig belang toekennen 
aan de vraag of goederen illegaal zijn opgegraven of uitgevoerd, wordt de relevantie van 
provenance steeds groter. Onderzoek naar provenance van cultuurgoederen is een 
belangrijk instrument om het opnemen van illegaal verhandelde objecten in publieke 
collecties te voorkomen en kan op de lange duur bijdragen aan het terugdringen van de 
illegale handel.  
Het verleden vormt het heden en de toekomst, en als wij de thesen over de filosofie 
van de geschiedenis van Walter Benjamin volgen, is het het beeld van geknechte 
voorouders, niet het ideaal van vrijgemaakte kleinkinderen, dat een onderworpen klasse 
in verzet brengt. Benjamins filosofie daagt ons uit de geschiedenis zo onder ogen te zien 
dat onrecht uit het verleden niet verwatert, maar dient om het heden en daarmee de 
toekomst anders vorm te geven. Om tegen deze taak opgewassen te zijn dienen we ons 
niet slechts open te stellen voor teruggave in de strikte zin, maar ook voor 
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samenwerking bij het uitlenen van cultuurgoederen en bij het samenstellen van reizende 
tentoonstellingen. 
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